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1704 with a great deal of fury; the French infantry, which were pofted at Blenheim, making at the fame time a terrible fire

they could never think it safe to be remote from that city.

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Marshal de Villeroy might even have compelled the allies to retire, in part, to the Rhine, and leave the elector of Bavaria to act with freedom in the heart of Germany, if that general had forced the lines of Biel, and then marched his army down the Rhine near Philipfburg For this motion alone would have obliged the enemy to separate, in order to protect Philipfburg, and the Lower-Neckar. This march might likewife have been effected without the leaft danger, because, when the lines had once been forced, marfhal de Villeroy might have thrown a bridge over the Rhine, in cafe the allies had approached him with all their forces; and, if they had attempted that motion, they would have abandoned Auftria, and even the city of Vienna, to the elector of Bavaria.

These were the errors committed with refpect to the general state of the war in Germany: the reft related to the particular difpofition and order of battle, and were as follow:

1. The French and Bavarians incamped their two armies, as if they were to engage feparately.

2. They difpofed them on the day of battle, in the order of their incampment, and only in the front of the camp.

3. They did not chuse their field of battle fo near the rivulet as would have prevented the allies from paffing it, and not

from

have left them a fufficient extent of ground to form their troops between the rivulet and the front of the French line.

4. They neglected to advance their right and center upon the allies, when they faw they had paffed the rivulet, and formed themselves on the front of the French.

5. They had not the precau:ion to take a strict view of the rivulet, when they arrived at their camp; and were fo inconfiderate, as not to poft a body of infantry along the bank for the fecurity of their camp, and to gain intelligence of the motions of the allies.

6. They were fo injudicious, as to form their center of battle out of the right and left wings of their two armies, instead of providing a formidable center of infantry.

7. They fhut up the greatest and beft part of marthal de Tallard's infantry in the village of Blenheim, where they were pofted without the leaft order, and rendered incapable of forming any motion; and they had not even the least precaution to fecure a communication from one brigade or regiment to another.

8. They did not furvey the ground, which extended from their right to the rivulet and the Danube, and they posted dragoons

there inftead of infantry. 9. When they arrived at their camp, they neglected to detach a body of cavalry, beyond the left of their armies, to obferve

the

from behind fome hedges on their flank, which were advanced too near that village, fo that the first line was put into fuch disorder, that part of them retired beyond the rivulet.

the fituation of the camp of the allies, which they were unacquainted with to fuch a degree, as not to know that prince Eugene had joined the duke of Marlborough with his army; and they imagined, that the prince of Baden was engaged with a confiderable body of troops at the fiege of Ingoldftadt. 10. After the firft diforder in their grand center of cavalry, and after they had fhrunk from their ground, till they formed a confufed line with the infantry, who were embarraffed in the village of Blenheim, the elector of Bavaria's army did not clofe on their right, to form an attack in flank upon the enemy, who had advanced beyond the interval of ground, that extended between the two villages. Had they difpofed themfelves into this motion, they might either have sustained or drawn off the French infantry from Blenheim, and have given their cavalry, who had been difordered by the fire of the enemy's foot, an opportunity of rallying in order of battle. But, inftead of this obvious motion, that whole army was only attentive on their retreat to Ulm; and they abandoned marshal de Tallard's infantry, while the cavalry of that general's army never attemped to recover their proper order, or make any effort to difengage their infantry, when they faw the elector's army retreat from the field of battle.

11. When marshal de Tallard VOL. XVI.

was taken prifoner, and the center of the French army intirely thrown into diforder, not one of the general officers of the marthai's army made the least endeavour to draw the infantry from Blenheim, while they had an opportunity of affording them that relief, by marching them along the Danube, till they had rejoined their cavalry; but, on the contrary, those who were charged, in particular, with the command of the body of infantry, either intirely abandoned them, even before they were attacked, when they faw the cavalry defeated, and plunging themselves into the Danube, in hopes of fwimming to the other fide; or elfe they continued in the village without daring to leave it, and were even so destitute of thought, as not to attempt any communication between the battalions. In fhort, they seemed to continue there with no other view than to charge themselves with the defpicable province of making a brave fet of battalions lay down their arms with reluctance, and of furrendering to the enemy twenty-feven battali ons and twelve fquadrons of the best troops of France; which was fo infamous an action, that it would fcarce be credited by pofterity, especially when it is informed, that, except one brigadier of foot, who was broke, all the other authors or fpectators of this contemptible timidity were rewarded and advanced to stations of dignity.

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1704. vulet. Upon this, the duke gave orders to lieutenant-general Bulaw, commander in chief of the troops of Lunenburgh, to bring up his own regiment of dragoons, and two of the troops of Zell, which charged the enemy's horfe with fo much vigour, that they broke them, and drove them. beyond the fecond rivulet, called Meul Weyer, and from thence to the very hedges of the village of Blenheim. This gave time to thofe, who had given ground, to repafs the rivulet, and to form a fecond line behind those regiments of dragoons, and fome others, that had joined them, fo that thole dragoons remained in the first line during the rest of

the action.

The cavalry of the confederates left wing, having by this fucccfs gained the advantage of forming themfelves intirely in order of battle, advanced leifurely to the top of the hill, and feveral times charged the enemy's horse, who were always routed, but who, neverthelefs, rallied every time, though at a confiderable distance, and thereby gave the allies an opportunity of gaining ground. As the duke of Marlborough, who was now in perfon among them, was preparing a fresh attack, marfhal de Tallard caufed ten of his battalions to advance, to fill up the intervals of his cavalry, in order to make a laft effort; which, the duke perceiving, caufed three battalions of the troops of Zell to come up and fuftain the Horse. Then the prince of Heffe Caffel, general of the horfe, and the lieutenantgenerals Lumley, Bulaw, Hompesch, and Ingoldsby, returned with their troops to the charge; but the fuperior fire of the enemy's infantry put their first line into fome diforder, fo that it fhrunk back, and renained, for fome time, at about fixty paces diftant from the enemy, neither party advancing against the other. At length, the confederates pushed forwards with fo much bravery and fuccefs, that, having broke and routed the enemy's horfe, the ten battalions, who found themfelves abandoned by them, were cut to pieces, none efcaping, but a very few foldiers, who threw themfelves on the ground, as dead, to fave their lives.

Marfhal de Tallard rallied his broken cavalry behind fome tents, which were ftill ftanding in his camp; and, feeing things in this defperate condition, refolved to draw off his dragoons and infantry out of the village of Blenheim. He thereupon fent one of his aids-de-camp to marthal de Marfin, who, with the elector of Bavaria, commanded on the left, to defire him, " to face the enemy " with

"with fome troops on the right of the village of Oberklau, 1704. "to keep them in play, and favour the retreat of the in"fantry, that was in Blenheim." But marshal de Marfin represented to the meflenger, "That he had too much bu"finefs in the front of the village, where he was posted, "and where he had to deal with the duke of Marlborough, "who was come to the affiftance of prince Eugene, as "well as in the rest of the line, to fpare any troops; fince "he was so far from being victorious, that all he could do "was to maintain his ground."

In the mean time, Ingoldfby made the other generals of the fame attack fenfible, how eafily they might intirely defeat the French cavalry, by charging them on the right flank. This advice being put into execution with a great deal of vigour, the enemy were foon thrown into diforder, and put to flight, part of them endeavouring to gain the bridge, which they had over the Danube, between Blenheim and Hochftet; and the other part, among whom were the Gens d'Armes, were clofely pursued by the Lunenburgh dragoons, and thofe, who escaped the flaughter, threw themselves into the Danube, where most of them were drowned. Thofe, who fled towards Hochftet, rallied once more, making a fhew to fuccour the reft; but the fame regiment of Bothmar faced them, and kept them in awe for fome time, till it was joined by fome other regiments, when the enemy made the best of their way to fave themselves by flight.

The marihal de Tallard was furrounded by the fugitives, and taken near a mill, behind the village of Sonderen, not far from the Danube, by monfieur de Boinenburg, a lieutenant-colonel of the troops of Heffe, aid-de-camp to the prince of Heffe-Caffel. The marquis de Montperoux, general of horse; de Seppevile, de Silly, and de la Valiere, major-generals; monfieur de la Meffiliere, St. Pouange, de Legondais, and several other officers of note, were likewife made prifoners in this defeat.

While these things paffed at the village of Blenheim, and in the center, the duke of Marlborough caufed the village of Oberklau, which was marshal de Marfin's quarters, to be attacked by the brigade of Berenfdorff, confiiting of ten battalions. The prince of Holftein-Beck, who commanded them as major-general, paffed the rivulet at the head of two battalions, with undaunted refolution. But as the imperial cavalry, which was to have fupported him, were wanting in their duty, and kept mufket-fhot from him, he was fearce

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1704. got over, when feven or eight of the enemy's battalions fell upon him with great fury, before he could form his two battalions; fo that one of them, that of Goor, was almost intirely cut to pieces, and the prince himself desperately wounded and taken prifoner. But, notwithstanding this firft fhock, thefe battalions were no fooner fupported by fome Danish and Hanoverian cavalry, than they charged a fecond time, but with no better fuccefs; till, upon the third charge, the duke of Marlborough having himself brought up fome fquadrons, which were fupported by others of the body of referve, made them advance with fome battalions beyond the rivulet; upon which the enemy began to retire.

As foon as the duke had performed this confiderable fervice, he repaired to the center, where, finding the action decided in favour of the confederates, he caufed part of his victorious cavalry to halt, to obferve the motions of that part of the enemy, which, by this time, was drawn up beyond the morals of Hochftet. During this halt, the elector of Bavaria, whom prince Eugene could make no impreffion upon for fome time, but whofe bravery at last put that elector's troops to the rout, was perceived making his retreat from the village of Lutzingen. Upon which, orders were dispatched to the baron de Hompefch (who with several fquadrons was pursuing the fugitives towards Morselingen, and who had already overtaken and forced two of their battalions to lay down their arms) to face about, and march to join thofe who halted, as well to prevent the elector's falling upon Hompefch's rear, as to form a body, in order to charge that prince, who marched in great hafte, but in pretty good order, with his fquadrons on the left, and his battalions on the right. But, before general Hompefch returned from his chace, the right wing of the confederate army was perceived at fome difiance behind the elector; and, appearing to be part of his army marching in fuch a manner, as might eafily have flanked them, had the duke immediately charged him, the duke, with great prudence, fent out a party to view them. During this time, the elector continued marching off with great precipitation, till he reached the morafs of Morfelingen.

The French horfe being entirely defeated, and the confederates matters of all the ground, which was between the enemy's left and the village of Blenheim, the twenty-eight battalions and twelve fquadrons of dragoons, which were in the village, found themfelves cut off from the rest of their army, and, defpairing of being able to make their escape,

after

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