at stake; but I entreat you to order some of your suite to take out of the way of danger my favourite mare, which is at that Wilson's, three miles beyond Princeton. "I am, dear General, yours,

"CHARLES LEE."

"Here we perceive, that, so far from complying with the pressing orders of General Washington, he suggests doubts whether he shall be able to join the main army at all, since it has removed from Brunswic, and there was an uncertainty where it could be found. The whole tenor of the letter indicates a purpose to act separately, not only with his own troops, but with those coming from the northward, of which he was about to take the command, as the oldest major-general, although Washington had given him no such instructions, but on the contrary expected those troops to march forward and join him as soon as possible."

Major Hoops has just delivered to me your Excellency's letter. I am extremely shocked to hear that your force is so inadequate to the necessity of your situation, as I had been taught to think you had been considerably reinforced. Your last letters proposing a plan of surprises and forced marches convinced me, that there was no danger of your being obliged to pass the Delaware; in consequence of which proposals, I have put myself in a position the most convenient to co-operate with you, by attacking their rear. I cannot persuade myself, that Philadelphia is their object at present, as it is almost certain that their whole troops lately embarked have directed their course to the eastern provinces; for Spencer writes me word, that half of them have passed the Sound, and the other half turned the southwestern end of Long Island and steered eastward. I detached Colonel Varnum and Monsieur Malmedy to take the direction of the Rhode Island troops, who are without even the figure of a general. It will be difficult I am afraid to join you, but cannot I do you more service by attacking their rear? I shall look about me to-morrow, and inform you further.

"I am, dear General, yours,

"CHARLES LEE."

"The following note was addressed to General Washington, and is in the handwriting of General Lee, although he speaks of himself in the third person.” "Morristown, 11 December, 1776.

"We have three thousand men here at present, but they are so ill shod, that we have been obliged to halt these two days for want of shoes. Seven regiments of Gates's corps are on their march, but where they actually are is not certain. General Lee has sent two officers this day, one to inform him where the Delaware can be crossed above Trenton, the other to examine the road towards Burlington. As General Lee thinks he can, without great risk, cross the great Brunswic postroad, and by a forced night's march make his way to the ferry below Burlington, boats should be sent up from Philadelphia to receive him; but this scheme he only proposes, if the head of the enemy's column actually pass the river. The militia in this part of the province seem sanguine. If they could be sure of an army remaining amongst them, I believe they would raise a very considerable number."

"This was the last communication received by General Washington from General Lee. It would seem as if his idea of a junction was more distant than ever, for he talks of a project of moving towards Burlington, directly across the cordon of the enemy from Brunswic to Trenton; a project entirely at variance with all the views of the Commander-in-chief. General Lee was captured on the morning of the 13th, two days after the above note was written. What would have been his future movements must now be left to conjecture. He passed the night of the 12th, with a small guard, at a house called White's Tavern, near Baskenridge, and about three miles from the main body of his troops. A Tory had watched his motions, and given intelligence to Colonel Harcourt, who commanded a patrolling party of the enemy then in that neighbourhood, and who came suddenly upon General Lee, seized him, and carried him off a prisoner to Brunswic. Wilkinson was present and witnessed this adventure, and has described it in his Memoirs, Vol. I. pp. 102– 106."

In a letter to his brother, dated December 18th, Washington thus describes the situation of affairs.

"I have no doubt but General Howe will still make an attempt upon Philadelphia this winter. I foresee nothing to oppose him a fortnight hence, as the time of all the troops, except those of Virginia, now reduced almost to nothing, and Smallwood's regiment of Marylanders, equally as low, will expire before the end of that time, In a word, my dear sir, if every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up, owing, in a great mea sure, to the insidious arts of the enemy, and disaffection of the colonies before mentioned, but principally to the ruinous policy of short enlistments, and placing too great a dependence on the militia, the evil consequences of which were foretold fifteen months ago, with a spirit almost prophetic. Before you receive this letter, you will undoubtedly have heard of the captivity of General Lee. This is an additional misfortune, and the more vexatious, as it was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he was taken. As he went to lodge three miles out of his own camp, and within twenty of the enemy, a rascally Tory rode in the night to give notice of it to the enemy, who sent a party of lighthorse that seized him, and carried him off, with every mark of triumph and indignity.

"You can form no idea of the perplexity of my situation. No man, I believe, ever had a greater choice of difficulties, and less means to extricate himself from them. However, under a full persuasion of the justice of our cause, I cannot entertain an idea that it will finally sink, though it may remain for some time under a cloud."

The motives of General Lee, it is not hard to divine. No suspicion can rest upon him of any traitorous designs. It is known, that he was, prior to his entry into the American service, an officer in the British army. There was no wish, therefore, upon his part, to fall into the enemy's hands; in fact, it was the worst possible chance that could befall him, as there was a serious intention upon their part of hanging or shooting him as a deserter from their service. The threats of most severe retaliation made by Washington and the congress, coupled with the conviction, that, having resigned his half pay before joining us, Lee was no longer connected with the British army, alone saved his life. His conduct is, therefore, attributable to different motives. The fact is, that Lee was a self-willed, obstinate, and ambitious man; of very considerable military genius and acquirements; who was anxious to be at the head of affairs, and uneasy in a subordinate situation. He was desirous to strike some blow, in a separate command, which should give him, by its éclat, special repute, particularly at a time when our affairs appeared in so critical a state. He was disappointed; and though Washington interested himself very much, both to procure his release and to make his condition as a prisoner comfortable, Lee had not magnanimity enough to forget his mortification, but allowed his temper to manifest itself subsequently at the battle of Monmouth, in a way unfortunate for himself and injurious to our cause. He was mistaken in the man with whom he had to deal; he miscalculated the decision and the energy of his commander.

It was during the trying season we have mentioned, that Wash

ington determined to strike a blow, which might defeat the plans of the invaders, and infuse some spirit into his disheartened fellow citizens. That he had formed a plan some time before the attack at Trenton, and only waited a favourable opportunity to put it into execution, is apparent from his correspondence. In a letter to Governor Trumbull, of the 14th of December, he says:

Your situation at the eastward is alarming; and I wish it were in my power to afford you that assistance which is requisite. You must be sensible that it is impossible for me to detach any part of my small army, when I have an enemy far supe rior in numbers to oppose. But I have immediately countermanded the march of General Heath's division, which was coming down from Peekskill. It is ordered to return again to that place, and hold itself ready to move as occasion may require. General Lee's division is so necessary to support this part of the army, that without its assistance we must inevitably be overpowered, and Philadelphia lost. I have ordered General Arnold, who was on his way down from Ticonderoga, immediately to repair to New London, or wherever his presence will be most necessary. The troops, who came down with him and General Gates, are already, from the advices I have received, so far advanced towards this army, that to countermand them now would be losing the small remainder of their services entirely, as the time of their enlistment would expire before they could possibly reach you; whereas, by coming on they may, in conjunction with my present force, and that under General Lee, enable us to attempt a stroke upon the forces of the enemy, who lie a good deal scattered, and to all appearance in a state of security. A lucky blow in this quarter would be fatal to them, and would most certainly rouse the spirits of the people, which are quite sunk by our late misfortunes.

"In the interval between the dissolution of the old and the enlistment of the new army, we must put our dependence on the public spirit and virtue of the people, who, I am sorry to say, have manifested but too small a regard to their rights and liberties in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the citizens of Philadelphia excepted. But I hope such a spirit still exists among your people, as will convince the bold invaders, that, although they may by a superior naval force take possession of your seaport towns, yet, that they cannot penetrate and overrun your country with impunity."

On the 23d of December, '76, he wrote from the camp above Trenton Falls to two of his officers:

"DEAR SIR,

"The bearer is sent down to know whether your plan was attempted last night, and, if not, to inform you, that Christmas-day at night, one hour before day, is the time fixed upon for our attempt on Trenton. For Heaven's sake, keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us; our numbers, sorry am I to say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity, dire necessity, will, nay must, justify an attack. Prepare, and, in concert with Griffin, attack as many of their posts as you possibly can with a prospect of success; the more we can attack at the same instant, the more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result from it. If I had not been fully convinced before of the enemy's designs, I have now ample testimony of their intentions to attack Philadelphia, so soon as the ice will afford the means of conveyance.

"As the colonels of the Continental regiments might kick up some dust about command, unless Cadwalader is considered by them in the light of a brigadier, which I wish him to be, I desired General Gates, who is unwell, and applied for leave to go to Philadelphia, to endeavour, if his health would permit him, to call and stay two or three days at Bristol in his way. I shall not be particular; we could not ripen matters for an attack, before the time mentioned in the first part of this letter; so much out of sorts, and so much in want of every thing, are the troops under Sullivan. The letter herewith sent, forward on to Philadelphia; I could wish

it to be in time for the southern post's departure, which will be, I believe, by eleven o'clock to-morrow.

"I am, dear sir, &c.

"P.S. I have ordered our men to be provided with three days' provisions, ready cooked, with which and their blankets they are to march; for if we are successful, which Heaven grant, and the circumstances favour, we may push on. I shall direct every ferry and ford to be well guarded, and not a soul suffered to pass without an officer's going down with the permit. Do the same with you."

During the night of the 25th, and the morning of the 26th of December, his enterprise was accomplished. Its beneficial effects can hardly be realized at the present day. It infused animation into the almost expiring energies of many of our countrymen, and produced dismay in the breasts of the invaders. Washington's own modest account of the affair we shall transcribe. It is contained in a letter to the President of Congress, under date of December 27, 1776.

"SIR,

"I have the pleasure of congratulating you upon the success of an enterprise, which I had formed against a detachment of the enemy, lying in Trenton, and which was executed yesterday morning. The evening of the 25th I ordered the troops intended for this service to parade back of McKonkey's Ferry, that they might begin to pass as soon as it grew dark, imagining we should be able to throw them all over, with the necessary artillery, by twelve o'clock, and that we might easily arrive at Trenton by five in the morning, the distance being about nine miles. But the quantity of ice, made that night, impeded the passage of the boats so much, that it was three o'clock before the artillery could all be got over; and near four, before the troops took up their line of march. This made me despair of surprising the town, as I well knew we could not reach it before the day was fairly broke. But as I was certain there was no making a retreat without being discovered and harassed on repassing the river, I determined to push on at all events. I formed my detachment into two divisions, one to march by the lower or river road, the other by the upper or Pennington road. As the divisions had nearly the same distance to march, I ordered each of them, immediately upon forcing the out-guards, to push directly into the town, that they might charge the enemy before they had time to form.

"The upper division arrived at the enemy's advanced post exactly at eight o'clock; and in three minutes after, I found, from the fire on the lower road, that that division had also got up. The out-guards made but small opposition, though, for their numbers, they behaved very well, keeping up a constant retreating fire from behind houses. We presently saw their main body formed; but, from their motions, they seemed undetermined how to act. Being hard pressed by our troops, who had already got possession of their artillery, they attempted to file off by a road on their right, leading to Princeton. But, perceiving their intention, I threw a body of troops in their way, which immediately checked them. Finding from our disposition that they were surrounded, and that they must inevitably be cut to pieces if they made any further resistance, they agreed to lay down their arms. The number that submitted in this manner was twenty-three officers and eight hundred and eighty-six men. Colonel Rahl, the commanding officer, and seven others, were found wounded in the town. I do not exactly know how many were killed; but I fancy not above twenty or thirty, as they never made any regular stand. Our loss is very trifling indeed, only two officers and one or two privates wounded.

"I find that the detachment of the enemy consisted of the three Hessian regiments of Anspach, Kniphausen, and Rahl, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, and a troop of British light-horse; but, immediately upon the beginning of the attack, all those, who were not killed or taken, pushed directly down the road towards Bordentown. These would likewise have fallen into our hands, could my plan have been completely carried into execution. General Ewing was to have crossed before day at Trenton Ferry, and taken possession of the bridge leading out of town; but

the quantity of ice was so great, that, though he did every thing in his power to effect it, he could not get over. This difficulty also hindered General Cadwalader from crossing with the Pennsylvania militia from Bristol. He got part of his foot over; but, finding it impossible to embark his artillery, he was obliged to desist. I am fully confident, that, could the troops under Generals Ewing and Cadwalader have passed the river, I should have been able with their assistance to drive the enemy from all their posts below Trenton. But the numbers I had with me being inferior to theirs below me, and a strong battalion of light infantry being at Princeton above me, I thought it most prudent to return the same evening with the pri soners and the artillery we had taken. We found no stores of any consequence in the town.

"In justice to the officers and men, I must add, that their behaviour upon this occasion reflects the highest honor upon them. The difficulty of passing the river in a very severe night, and their march through a violent storm of snow and hail, did not in the least abate their ardor; but, when they came to the charge, each seemed to vie with the other in pressing forward; and were I to give a preference to any particular corps, I should do great injustice to the others. Colonel Baylor, my first aid-de-camp, will have the honor of delivering this to you; and from him you may be made acquainted with many other particulars. His spirited behaviour upon every occasion requires me to recommend him to your particular notice. I have the honor to be, &c."

Mr. Sparks corrects an error into which the author of the Life of Robert Morris has fallen; and as his exposition of the incident is interesting, we give it to our readers.

·

"The writer of the Life of Robert Morris, contained in the fifth volume of the Biography of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence,' has committed a remarkable mistake in regard to the agency of that distinguished patriot in the battle of Trenton. After describing the manner in which Mr. Morris obtained a sum of money in specie, which General Washington had pressed him to supply for the purpose of procuring intelligence of the situation and designs of the enemy, the writer adds, that it enabled General Washington to gain the signal victory over the hireling Hessians at Trenton, which not only diminished the numerical force of the enemy, but had the necessary and important results of animating the spirit of patriotism, and checking the hopes and predictions of our enemies. Such was the instrumentality of Robert Morris in the victory of Trenton; and it may be truly remarked, that, although his own brows were unadorned with the laurels of the warrior, it was his hand, which crowned the heroes who triumphed on that day.' This statement is more rhetorical than accurate. The money was not sent, nor applied for, till four days after the battle of Trenton, as will appear by the date of the following letter."

56 SIR,

"I have just received your favor of this day, and sent to General Putnam to detain the express, until I collected the hard money you want, which you may depend shall be sent in one specie or other with this letter, and a list thereof shall be enclosed herein.

"I had long since parted with very considerable sums of hard money to Congress; and therefore must collect from others, and, as matters now stand, it is no easy thing. I mean to borrow silver, and promise payment in gold, and will then collect the gold in the best manner I can. Whilst on this subject, let me inform you that there is upwards of twenty thousand dollars in silver at Ticonderoga. They have no particular use for it, and I think you might as well send a party to bring it away, and lodge it in a safe place convenient for any purposes for which it may hereafter be wanted. Whatever I can do, shall be done for the good of the

service.

"By the list enclosed, the money sent was specified to be four hundred and ten