a detachment of the troops and some of the enemy, who attempted a landing on the shore of the East River, above the city, under cover of the fire of their ships. The cowardly behaviour of some of the brigades is said to have excited Washington in a remarkable manner. The note of Mr. Sparks, alluding to the

incident, is as follows:

"The conduct of General Washington on this occasion has been described, as not being marked by his usual self-command. In writing from Haerlem Heights to a friend, General Greene said :-'We made a miserable, disorderly retreat from New York, owing to the disorderly conduct of the militia, who ran at the appearance of the enemy's advanced guard. Fellows's and Parsons's brigades ran away from about fifty men, and left his Excellency on the ground within eighty yards of the enemy, so vexed at the infamous conduct of the troops, that he sought death rather than life.'-MS. Letter, September 17th. Dr. Gordon relates the incident nearly in the same way, though a little enlarged, and, as he was in camp soon afterwards, he probably derived his information from a correct source. 'The General's attempts to stop the troops were fruitless, though he drew his sword and threatened to run them through, cocked and snapped his pistols. On the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not more than sixty or seventy, their disorder was increased, and they ran off without firing a single shot, and left the General in a hazardous situation, so that his attendants, to extricate him out of it, caught the bridle of his horse, and gave him a different direction.'-Gordon's History, Vol. II. P. 327."

Washington himself describes the occurrence, in his letter to the President of Congress of the 16th September, '76.

"As soon as I heard the firing, I rode with all possible despatch towards the place of landing, when, to my great surprise and mortification, I found the troops that had been posted in the lines, retreating with the utmost precipitation, and those ordered to support them (Parsons's and Fellows's brigades) flying in every direction, and in the greatest confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of their generals to form them. I used every means in my power to rally and get them into some order; but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual; and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not more than sixty or seventy, their disorder increased, and they ran away in the greatest confusion, without firing a single shot."

Washington gradually removed his army from Haerlem Heights to White Plains, retreating, though with a bold front, before the far superior force of the enemy. During the whole of this harassing period, he endured great personal labour, being continually on horseback. On the 12th of November, '76, he passed over to Jersey. Here commenced the most trying and critical period of the whole revolutionary war; and at no time were the heroic patience and ardent patriotism of the Commander-in-chief more conspicuous. We shall mention, in a general way, some of the principal causes which rendered the prospects of the contest so very dismal.

All the States were extremely inattentive in levying their quotas of men. Naturally perhaps, each was, also, more careful of her own safety than of her neighbour's, and not over-willing to send troops beyond her own borders. The militia system, which then prevailed, was totally unsuited to the exigency of the crisis. The periods for which the militia was enlisted were very short; and when they expired, no inducement could secure

the longer stay of the men. They would march off, though a battle were hourly expected. Washington made most earnest and frequent endeavours to prevail upon Congress to remedy the evil, by raising troops for the war, and providing for their complete disciplining and training. He, at last, in part succeeded; but it was a long time before the jealousy of a standing army and the fear of military domination were swallowed up in the consciousness of the absolute necessity of a resort to measures which could alone preserve the lives and liberties of the people. The just sense which they entertained of the virtue and patriotism of Washington, above every other officer in the service, no doubt influenced them in the course they adopted, at this critical juncture, of investing him with dictatorial powers. A word upon

this hereafter.

We were yet in the first year of the war; and its terrors and hardships had been confined to particular sections of the country. All parts of our land had not yet been made to feel the necessity of active personal exertion, on the part of every individual, in order to overcome the efforts of a foe as mighty as that we then had to combat. This may account for the supineness of many quarters of the land, at the very moment when, as our leaders, and particularly Washington, clearly saw, exertion was the most essential; and when, had it not been for the admirable energy of the Commander-in-chief in the successful attacks at Trenton and Princeton, probably the war might have ended, not long after its inception, with the overthrow of our liberties.

Our troops had been dispirited by defeat; they were raw and inexperienced; they were retreating before a foe vastly superior in numbers and discipline; our treasury was in an embarrassed condition; and we had many individuals within our limits, who looked upon the struggle with indifferent eyes, and many more who openly favoured the enemy. As the war continued, after the first brunt of the contest had been endured, and the chances of a successful issue appeared more probable; the whole country being compelled to the use of arms, and supplying better soldiers from their greater experience in military affairs, our cause, of course, greatly increased in strength; and long before the war ended, the subjugation of America was confessedly a hopeless task. It was not so, however, at the period to which we now allude, the fall and winter of the year '76.

It is interesting to peruse the letters of the General, containing, as they do, his views at the time; we shall, therefore, here present some passages. He wrote to his brother John, from Hackinsac, (Jersey,) where our little army was then encamped, on the 19th of November, 1776.

"It is a matter of great grief and surprise to me to find the different States so slow and inattentive to that essential business of levying their quotas of men. In

ten days from this date, there will not be above two thousand men, if that number, of the fixed established regiments on this side of Hudson's River to oppose Howe's whole army, and very little more on the other to secure the eastern colonies and the important passes leading through the Highlands to Albany, and the country about the Lakes. In short, it is impossible for me, in the compass of a letter, to give you any idea of our situation, of my difficulties, and of the constant perplexities and mortifications I meet with, derived from the unhappy policy of short enlistments, and delaying them too long. Last fall, or winter, before the army, which was then to be raised, was set about, I represented in clear and explicit terms the evils which would arise from short enlistments, the expense which must attend the raising an army every year; the futility of such an army when raised; and, if I had spoken with a prophetic spirit, I could not have foretold the evils with more accuracy than I did. All the year since, I have been pressing Congress to delay no time in engaging men upon such terms as would insure success, telling them that the longer it was delayed the more difficult it would prove. But the measure was not commenced till it was too late to be effected, and then in such a manner, as to bid adieu to every hope of getting an army, from which any services are to be expected; the different States, without regard to the qualifications of an officer, quarrelling about the appointments, and nominating such as are not fit to be shoeblacks, from the local attachments of this or that member of Assembly.

"I am wearied almost to death with the retrograde motion of things, and I solemnly protest, that a pecuniary reward of twenty thousand pounds a year would not induce me to undergo what I do; and after all, perhaps, to lose my character, as it is impossible, under such a variety of distressing circumstances, to conduct matters agreeably to public expectation, or even to the expectation of those who employ me, as they will not make proper allowances for the difficulties their own errors have occasioned.

"I am glad to find by your last letter, that your family are tolerably well recovered from the indisposition they labored under. God grant you all health and happiness. Nothing in this world would contribute so much to mine, as to be once more fixed among you in the peaceable enjoyment of my own vine and fig-tree. Adieu, my dear sir; remember me affectionately to my sister and the children, and give my compliments to those who inquire after your sincerely affectionate brother."

The plan of General Howe, before the palpable evidences of the weakness of our army, had been merely to gain a footing in Jersey, and in the next campaign, to proceed upon a more extensive course of operations. The retreat of the Americans through New Jersey opened to him earlier prospects of triumph; and he prepared to embrace the happy opportunity. The very unexpected success of our army in the battles referred to, completely frustrated his hopes, for a time at least; and induced him to curtail his proposed sphere of action, and to take measures which evinced his expectation of a much more protracted struggle. The perplexities of Washington were much increased by a circumstance, which was the result of a breach of orders on the part of General Lee. We refer to the capture of that officer by the British. He was in command of a very considerable detachment in the northern part of Jersey; and as the troops were not particularly wanted in that quarter, and especially as it was a matter of urgent necessity that the main army should be strengthened, a junction with him was earnestly desired by Washington. For purposes of his own, he did not keep the commander-in-chief informed of his motions. Mr. Sparks says:

"Congress seemed to be as much in the dark about General Lee's plans and movements as General Washington, and on the 2d of December, they instructed a committee to send an express to General Lee, to know where and in what situation he and the army with him are.'-Secret Journal, Vol. I. p. 50,"

Washington wrote frequently and earnestly to him to procure a union of their forces. On the 10th of December, '76, he says:

"Dear sir-I last night received your favor by Colonel Humpton, and were it not for the weak and feeble state of the force I have, I should highly approve of your hanging on the rear of the enemy, and establishing the post you mention; but when my situation is directly the opposite of what you suppose it to be, and when General Howe is pressing forward with the whole of his army (except the troops that were lately embarked, and a few besides left at New York,) to possess himself of Philadelphia, I cannot but request and entreat you, and this too by the advice of all the general officers with me, to march and join me with your whole force with all possible expedition. The utmost exertions, that can be made, will not be more than sufficient to save Philadelphia. Without the aid of your force, I think there is but little if any prospect of doing it. I refer you to the route, of which Major Hoops would inform you.

"The enemy are now extended along the Delaware at several places. By a pri. soner, who was taken last night, I am told, that at Pennington there are two bat talions of infantry, three of grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, the forty-second of Highlanders, and two others. Their object doubtless is to pass the river above us, or to prevent your joining me. I mention this, that you may avail yourself of the information. Do come on; your arrival may be fortunate, and, if it can be effected without delay, it may be the means of preserving a city, whose loss must prove of the most fatal consequence to the cause of America. Pray exert your influence, and bring with you all the Jersey militia you possibly can, Let them not suppose their State is lost, or in any danger, because the enemy are pushing through it. If you think General St. Clair, or General Maxwell, would be of service to command them, I would send either. I am, &c."

"General Washington wrote again, the next day, to General Lee, pressing him to hasten forward. Nothing less,' he observes, 'than our utmost exertions will be sufficient to prevent General Howe from possessing Philadelphia. The force I have is weak and entirely incompetent to that end, I must therefore entreat you to push on, with every possible succour you can bring."

Lee disobeyed him; and the result was his capture. We shall extract what Mr. Sparks says upon this head in the appendix.

"The conduct of General Lee, in neglecting to obey the orders of the Com mander-in-chief, after they had been earnestly and repeatedly communicated, has drawn upon him the just and unqualified censure of historians. Nor do his letters, written at the time, afford any facts in justification of the course he chose to pur

sue.

On the contrary, they aggravate the offence of disobedience by showing, that he had ulterior designs of his own, which he was disposed to prosecute without the concurrence of the Commander-in-chief. From his letters, in reply to those of Gene, ral Washington, connected with the issue of events, it will be easy to judge of his motives and anticipations.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"Camp, 24 November, 1776,

"I have received your orders and shall endeavour to put them in execution, but question much whether I shall be able to carry with me any considerable number; not so much from a want of zeal in the men, as from their wretched condition with respect to shoes, stockings, and blankets, which the present bad weather renders more intolerable. I sent Heath orders to transport two thousand men across the river, apprize the General, and wait for further orders; but that great man (as I might have expected) intrenched himself within the letter of his instructions, and refused to part with a single file, though I undertook to replace them with a part of my own. I should march this day with Glover's brigade, but have just received VOL. XVII.-NO. 33. 11

intelligence that Rogers's corps, a part of the light-horse, and another brigade, lie in so exposed a situation, as to present us the fairest opportunity of carrying them off. If we succeed, it will have a great effect, and amply compensate for two days' delay.

"I am, dear General, yours most sincerely,

"CHARLES LEE."

"In this first letter General Lee's plan is obvious. He intended to cross the river with as large a force as possible, act in a separate command, and fall upon the rear or flank of the enemy, as opportunities might offer. For this purpose he requested General Heath to send two thousand troops over the river. General Heath not only declined complying with the request, but refused to obey an order, alleging that his instructions were explicit, to employ his whole force in defence of the Highlands. (Heath's Memoirs, pp. 88-98.) Lee was displeased and vexed at this decision, and undertook to order two regiments away himself, but finally desisted on more mature reflection. General Washington approved the conduct of General Heath, as it was not his intention that any part of the troops under his command should be withdrawn. General Lee had lingered on the east side of the river, with the hope of obtaining the detachment he desired, till he received another letter from General Washington, to which he replied as follows.

"I received yours last night, dated the 27th from Newark. You complain of my not being in motion sooner. I do assure you, that I have done all in my power, and shall explain my difficulties when we both have leisure. I did not succeed with Rogers, and merely owing to the timidity or caution of the enemy, who contracted themselves into a compact body very suddenly. I am in hopes I shall be able to render you more service than if I had moved sooner. I think I shall enter the province of Jersey with four thousand firm and willing troops, who will make a very important diversion; had I stirred sooner, I should have only led an inferior number of unwilling.

"The day after to-morrow we shall pass the river, when I should be glad to receive your instructions; but I could wish you would bind me as little as possible; not from any opinion, I do assure you, of my own parts, but from a persuasion that detached generals cannot have too great latitude, unless they are very incompetent indeed. Adieu, my dear Sir,

"Yours, most affectionately,

"CHARLES LEE."

"P.S. I have just been speaking with General Heath, the strictness of whose instructions a good deal distresses me. I could have replaced the force I requested, by men who are able to do stationary duty, but not to make expeditious marches. My numbers will in consequence be fewer than I promised."

Having thus failed in procuring a reinforcement from General Heath, he passed over the river with his own troops on the 2d and 3d of December, and proceeded slowly on his march."

"DEAR GENERAL,

"Haverstraw, 4 December, 1776.

"I have received your pressing letter, since which, intelligence was sent to me, that you had quitted Brunswic, so that it is impossible to know where I can join you. But, although I should not be able to join you at all, the service which I can render you will, I hope, be full as efficacious. The northern army has already advanced nearer to Morristown than I am. I shall put myself at their head to-morrow. We shall, upon the whole, compose an army of five thousand good troops in spirits. I should imagine, dear General, that it may be of service to communicate this to the troops immediately under your command. It may encourage them, and startle the enemy. In fact their confidence must be risen to a prodigious height, if they pursue you, with so formidable a body hanging on their flank and rear.

I shall clothe my people at the expense of the Tories, which has a doubly good effect. It puts them in spirits and comfort, and is a correction of the iniquities of the foes of liberty. It is paltry to think of our personal affairs, when the whole is