children become, by the subsequent marriage of the parents, legitimate, and may inherit as heirs; but such persons cannot inherit landed property in England. Yet a person illegitimate by the law of his domicil of birth, will be held illegitimate in England. By the law of England, marriage is an indissoluble contract except by act of parliament, and it is held that a marriage between British subjects in an English domicil, cannot be dissolved by a divorce obtained under the laws of a foreign country, to which the parties may temporarily remove. Thus an English marriage cannot be dissolved under such circumstances by a Scotch divorce, regularly obtained according to the law of England, by persons going thither for that purpose, who have their domicil in England.

In the American courts, the doctrine as to capacity or incapacity to marry, has been held to depend generally on the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, and not on the place of domicil of the parties. An exception would doubtless be applied to cases of incest and polygamy. But in affirmance of the general principle it has been held, that if a person divorced from his first wife, is rendered by the law of the place of the divorce incapable of contracting a second marriage, still if he contracts marriage in another state, where the disability does not exist, the marriage will be held valid; and a marriage celebrated in a foreign state, to evade the law of the place of domicil, is on the same account held valid.

At this day in France, the age of majority of males is twentyfive, and of females twenty-one; and France has ventured upon the bold doctrine that the marriages of Frenchmen in foreign countries shall not be deemed valid, if the parties are not by its own law competent to contract, from their being under the parental power. There can be little doubt that foreign countries, where such marriages are celebrated, will follow their own law, and disregard that of France.

The rules which seem best established in the jurisprudence of England and America, are 1. The capacity, state, and condition of persons, according to the law of their domicil, will generally be regarded as to acts done, rights acquired, and contracts made in the place of their domicil. 2. As to acts done, and rights acquired, and contracts made in other countries, the law of the country where they are done, acquired, or made, will generally govern in respect to the capacity, state, and condition of persons. 3. In regard to questions of minority or majority, competency to marry, incapacities incident to coverture, guardianship, emancipation, and other personal qualities and disabilities, the law of domicil is not generally to govern, but the law of the place where the contract is made, or the act done. 4. Personal disqualifications, not arising from the law of nature, but from the principles of the customary or positive law of a foreign country, and especially such as are of

a personal nature, are not generally regarded in other countries where the like disqualifications do not exist. 5. In questions of legitimacy, the lex loci of the marriage will generally govern as to the issue subsequently born. 6. No nation will suffer its own subjects to evade the operation of its own fundamental policy or laws, or to commit frauds in violation of them by acts or contracts made in a foreign country; and it will judge for itself how far it will adopt or reject such acts or contracts.

Let us next examine into the effects of marriage upon the property of the husband and wife, and their rights over it. Where there has been an express contract on the marriage, that will generally be admitted to govern all the property of the parties, not only in the matrimonial domicil, but in every other place, under the same limitations and restrictions as apply to other cases of contract. Where there is no express contract, and no change of domicil, perhaps the most simple and satisfactory exposition of the subject, or at least that which best harmonizes with the analogies of the common law, is, that the law of the place of celebration should govern the rights of the parties in respect to all personal estate, moveable, wherever acquired and wherever it may be situate; but real estate (immoveable) should be left to be adjudged by the lex loci sita, as not within the reach of any extra-territorial law. Where there has been a change of domicil, 1. As to property acquired before the removal. 2. In relation to property acquired afterwards in the new domicil-various opinions prevail among foreign jurists.

The following propositions may be laid down as those which, though not universally established or recognised in America, have much of domestic authority for their support, and none in opposition to them.

1. Where there is a marriage between parties in a foreign country, and an express contract respecting their rights and property, present and future, that, as a matter of contract, will be held equally valid every where, unless under the circumstances it stands prohibited by the laws of the country where it is sought to be enforced. It will act directly on moveable property every where; but as to immoveable property, in a foreign territory, it will at most confer only a right of action, to be enforced according to the jurisprudence rei sita. 2. Where such an express contract applies in terms or intent only to present property, and there is a change of domicil, the law of the actual domicil will govern the rights of the parties as to all future acquisitions. 3. Where there is no express contract, the law of the matrimonial domicil will govern, as to all the rights of the parties to their present property in that place, and as to all personal property every where, upon the principle that moveables have no situs, or rather that they accompany the person every where. As to immoveable property, the law rei

site will prevail. 4. Where there is no change of domicil, the same rule will apply to future as to present acquisitions. 5. But where there is a change of domicil, the law of the actual domicil, and not of the matrimonial domicil, will govern as to all future acquisitions of moveable property; and as to all immoveable property, the law rei sita. 6. And here also, as in cases of express contract, the exception is to be understood, that the law of the place where the rights are sought to be enforced, do not prohibit such arrangements; for if they do, as every nation has a right to prescribe rules for the government of all persons and property within its own territorial limits, in a case of conflict, its own law is to prevail. 7. Although, in a general sense, the law of the matrimonial domicil is to govern in relation to the incidents and effects of marriage, yet this doctrine must be received with many qualifications and exceptions. No other nation will recognise such incidents or effects, when they are incompatible with its own policy, or injurious to its own interest. A marriage in France or Prussia may be dissolved for incompatibility of temper; but no divorce would be granted from such a marriage, for such a cause, in England, Scotland, or America.

The principle maintained by foreign jurists is, that with reference to personal rights and rights of property, the actual or intended domicil is to be deemed the matrimonial domicil; or the law of the place where, at the time of marriage, the parties intend to fix their domicil, is to govern all the rights resulting from the marriage. The place of the marriage contract is not so much to be deemed the place where the nuptial contract is made, as that in which the parties contracting matrimony intend to live.

Divorce. It is deemed by all modern nations to be within the competency of legislation to authorize, directly or indirectly, a dissolution of the matrimonial state, and in some form and for some causes, to release the parties from all future obligation. And there is no doubt, that a divorce regularly obtained, according to the jurisprudence of the country where the marriage was celebrated, and where the parties are domiciled, will be held a complete dissolution of the matrimonial contract in every other country. The real difficulty is, to lay down appropriate principles to govern cases where the marriage is celebrated in one place, and the parties are domiciled in another; where there is a change of domicil by one party without a similar change by the other; where, by the law of the place of celebration, the marriage is indissoluble or dissolved only under peculiar circumstances, and by the law of another it is dissoluble for various causes, and even at the pleasure of the parties.

In Scotland it is decided, 1. That a marriage between English subjects in England, and indissoluble there, may be lawfully dissolved by the proper Scottish court, for a cause of divorce good

by the law of Scotland, when the parties are within the process. and jurisdiction of the court. 2. That a Scotch marriage by persons domiciled at the time in England, is dissoluble in like manner by the proper Scottish court. 3. That in case of a marriage in England, it will make no difference that the parties are Scottish persons, domiciled in Scotland, or are afterwards bona fide, and permanently domiciled there. The mere fact of the marriage having been celebrated in England, whether between English or Scottish parties, is not, per se, a defence against an action of divorce, for adultery committed there.

Upon the continent of Europe there has long existed a known distinction between the Catholics and Protestants, on the subject of divorce. The former, according to the doctrine of the Romish church, considers marriage as a sacrament, and in its effects to be governed by the Divine law, and according to their interpretation of that law, it is indissoluble. The Protestants, on the contrary, have not always considered it as a sacrament, but many, if not most of them, have considered it mainly as a civil institution, subject to the legislative authority, as matter of public police and regulation.

Foreign Contracts. Generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where it is made. If valid there, it is, by the general law of nations, gine gentium, held valid every where, by tacit or implied consent. 2. The same rule applies vice versa to the invalidity of contracts; if void or illegal by the law of the place of the contract, they are generally held void and illegal every where. 3. An exception to the rule as to the universal validity of contracts, respects those which are in evasion or fraud of the laws of a country, or the rights or duties of its subjects; contracts against good morals, or religion, or public rights; and contracts opposed to the national policy or institutions. It is to be regreted, that in the jurisprudence of the common law it is an established principle that no regard will be paid to the revenue laws of another country, and that the contracts of its own subjects, to evade or defraud the just rights of other nations, will be enforced in its own tribunals.

In the interpretation of contracts, the law and custom of the place of the contract is to govern.

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When the contract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed any other place than that where the contract is made, there the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the contract as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the place of performance. In general, it may be said, that if no place of performance is stated, or the contract may indifferently be performed any where, it ought to be referred to the lex loci contractus. If the transactions between two merchants residing in different countries

are all on one side, as in case of sales and advances by a commission merchant in his own country for his principal abroad, then the contracts may well be referred to the country of the commission merchant, and the balance be deemed due according to its laws. The debt is due where the advances are made, and payment may be insisted on there. Upon principle, it may perhaps be found most easy to decide, that each transaction is to be governed by the law of the place where it originated; advances by the law of the place where advanced, and sales of goods by the law of the place where received. The importance of the true rule is peculiarly felt in all cases of interest to be paid on balances.

A merchant in America orders goods to be purchased for him in England. In such a case, the law of England ought to govern, for there the final assent is given by the person who receives and executes the order of his correspondent.

If a like contract of purchase is made by an agent without orders, and the correspondent ratifies it, it is to be deemed a contract in the country of the purchase, because the ratification has reference back to the time and place of the purchase. A like rule applies, if a merchant in one country agrees to accept a bill drawn on him by a person in another country. It is deemed a contract in the place where the acceptance is to be made.

A merchant in one country sends a letter to a merchant in another, requesting him to purchase goods, and to draw on him for the amount of the purchase money by bills. When such advances are made, the undertaking is to replace the money at the same place, and therefore the party advancing will be entitled to interest on the advances, according to the law of the place of the advances. So, if advances are made for a foreign merchant, at his request or security given for a debt in like manner, the party paying or advancing is entitled to repayment in the place of the advances or security given, unless some other place is stipulated. So, when a loan is made in one state, and security is to be given therefor in another state, by way of mortgage, the law of the place where the loan is made is to govern. But if the mortgage is actually to be executed in a foreign country, and the money to be paid there, the loan will be deemed to be there completely made, although the money may have been actually advanced elsewhere.

Official bonds with sureties to the government of the United States, are to be treated as delivered, and to be performed at the seat of government, upon the ground that the principal is bound to account there, and the parties look to that as the place of performance by the law of which they are to be governed.

As to interest, the general rule is, that interest is to be paid on contracts, according to the law of the place where they are to be performed, in all cases where interest is expressly or impliedly to be paid. Loans made in a place bear the interest of that place,