tions the Diet found occasion to interfere in favor of despotic power. Prussia, by the constitution of 1850 and as a consequence of the Revolution of 1848, established a House of Deputies, to be filled by universal suffrage with double election. Austria in 1860 established a Diet of one hundred members, chosen by the provincial diets. In the German Empire, by the imperial constitution of 1871, it was first provided that the Reichstag or Imperial Parliament should be elected by direct universal suffrage, at the average rate of one deputy to one hundred thousand of population. Every German having reached twentyfive years of age, in good standing and belonging for at least a year to one of the confederated states, is entitled to a vote. It is an important exception, however, both in the case of Germany and France, that soldiers in the active army are not allowed to vote either in the local elections or for the Chamber of Deputies.

In the Spain which was ruled by Philip II. and the Catholic Inquisition there could be little room for popular power. The first approach to it was in the constitution of 1812, extorted from Ferdinand VII. and afterwards so grossly violated. By it all the inhabitants of the parishes were to assemble and choose delegates to what we should call a "convention" of the department. This convention chose delegates to a convention of the province and the convention of the province chose deputies to the single chamber of the Cortes. This latter was, therefore, three removes from the people. The constitution of 1869 first established direct universal suffrage for the popular chamber of the Cortes, with the ratio of one deputy to each fifty thousand inhabitants. The franchise was, however, still more restricted than in France or Great Britain. The voter must be twenty-five years of age, and, besides being in the enjoyment of civil and political rights, must have paid a tax upon realty of $5

for one year, or a personal property tax of $10 for two years, though an exception was made in this respect in favor of certain literary and official classes.

"The geographical expression" known as Italy was even more backward than Spain. The first constitution established was that granted in 1848 by Charles Albert to the kingdom of Sardinia and which was subsequently extended to the whole peninsula. When the Austrians offered to replace his son, Victor Emmanuel, on his throne by the force of bayonets if he would consent to abolish the constitution, that hero replied: "No! We have sworn to observe it and we will keep faith, even if we have to emigrate to America." He lived to reap his reward. In Italy, as in Spain, with one deputy to each fifty thousand inhabitants, there is a considerable pecuniary qualification attached to the vote, the requirements being,

1. That the voter shall be in the enjoyment of civil and political rights, irrespective of religion.

2. That he shall be able to read and write.

3. That he shall be twenty-five years of age.

4. That he shall have paid an annual tax equivalent to $8.

Here, also, as in Spain, exception is made in this last respect in favor of certain literary and official classes.

The famous Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century was a confederation of provinces more or less aristocratically governed, as was that of Venice. The constitution of modern Holland dates from 1815, with modifications in 1840 and 1848. Voters under it must be twenty-three years of age, enjoying full civil and political rights and pay taxes varying in the different provinces from $8 to $68, the smallest of which sums reduces the voters to a

1 I am indebted for much of this information to the work entitled "Constitutions Européenes," par G. Demombynes, Avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Paris. Paris, 1881.

small proportion even of the adult male population. In the popular chamber there is one deputy to about fortyfive thousand inhabitants.

Belgium, having been a part of the kingdom of the Netherlands, first received a separate constitution in 1831. Under it voters must be either born or duly naturalized citizens, twenty-one years of age, and pay at least $8.50 in direct taxes. A voter cannot be registered unless he proves that he possesses that sum for the current year, and has actually paid it for three years previous. The effect of this was to limit the suffrage to one in thirteen of adult males or one in fifty of the total population. It was not till 1893 that a constitutional change increased the voters by tenfold.1

In Denmark, by the constitution of June 5, 1849, which was somewhat modified in 1866, the popular chamber is chosen by direct suffrage of all inhabitants thirty years of age, in good standing, and domiciled for one year, with the exclusion of those receiving public charity or domestic wages, unless having a separate house.

In Norway, by the constitution of 1814, the people choose deputies at the rate of one to fifty voters in towns and one to one hundred in the country, and these deputies elect from themselves and other voters the representatives in the Storthing. Electors must be twenty-five years of age, resident for five years, and, except in the case of officials, possessing in the country a farm either in freehold or under lease for more than five years. In cities they must be burgesses or possess house or land of a value of $350.

The Swedish constitution, though it dates from 1809, was only placed on a popular basis in 1866. Every elector for the popular chamber must be twenty-five years of age, domiciled in a commune, and must possess either

1 See post, Chap. XXVII.

1. Property or usufruct of real estate valued for assessment at $280, or

2. Have a lease for life, or at least five years, of farm property valued at $1680, or

3. Pay to the State a tax calculated on an annual revenue of $225.

In the kingdom of Greece, by the constitution of 1864 and the electoral law of 1877, every male member of a commune aged twenty-one years is entitled to a vote for the popular chamber.

Crossing the Atlantic, we find that under the Federal Constitution the qualifications of voters for the House of Representatives are those fixed by the states for the corresponding body. In Massachusetts the constitution of 1780 required the possession of a freehold estate in a town of £3 annual income, or of any estate valued at £60, and it was not till 1822 that this was changed to the payment of any tax. Connecticut till 1845 required the possession of a freehold of the annual value of $7. Rhode Island till 1842 required real estate of the value of $134, or which was rented for $7. In New York the constitution of 1777, which continued in force till 1826, required a freehold of £20 value, or the rental of a tenement of the yearly value of 40 shillings. New Jersey till 1844, Virginia till 1850, North Carolina till 1865, and Pennsylvania and Delaware till 1873, enforced pecuniary qualifications which were much more important than they seem at present. The majority of our present state constitutions did not exist till within this century. In the whole of Central and South America there was nothing like popular government until after the revolt from Spain in the third decade of this century. The great commonwealths which are growing up in the Pacific Ocean-Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand

did not come into being till the century was well advanced.

From what has been said, therefore, it may fairly be concluded that no criticisms upon democracy, so far as that term applies to governments representative of universal suffrage, have any weight of precedent or experience prior to this century, for the reason that the thing did not exist in its present form. It cannot be shown that the circumstances were applicable to the present question. As far as history is in point we are debarred from going back of the nineteenth century. Unless thus modern in date any evidence can only be based upon the principles of human nature, as to which we need to be very careful that the analysis is accurate and the inferences legitimate. A quotation may be given in illustration of this.

There have been three ways in which great political bodies have arisen. The earliest and lowest method was that of conquest without incorporation. A single powerful tribe conquered and annexed its neighbors without admitting them to a share in the government. It appropriated their military strength, robbed them of most of the fruits of their labor, and thus virtually enslaved them. Such states degenerate rapidly in military strength. Their slavish populations, accustomed to be starved and beaten or massacred by the tax-gatherer, become unable to fight, so that great armies of them will flee before a handful of freemen, as in the case of the ancient Persians and the modern Egyptians. To strike down the executive head of such an assemblage of enslaved tribes is to effect the conquest or the dissolution of the whole mass, and hence the history of Eastern peoples has been characterized by sudden and gigantic revolutions.

The second method of forming great political bodies was that of conquest with incorporation. The conquering tribe, while annexing its neighbors, gradually admitted them to a share in the government. In this way arose the Roman Empire, the largest, the most stable, and in its best days the most pacific political aggregate the world had as yet seen. Throughout the best part of Europe its conquests succeeded in transforming the ancient predatory type of society into the modern industrial type. It effectually broke up the primeval clan system, with its narrow ethical idea, and arrived at the broad conception of rights and duties coextensive with humanity. But in the method upon which Rome proceeded there was an essential element of weak