In its final development the committee system has completely destroyed the control of the houses over the national finances. Down to the year 1865 something of the nature of a budget existed, from the fact that all revenue and all appropriation bills were referred to the Ways and Means Committee. All the great revenue measures and all the vast appropriations required by the Civil War were reported by that committee. But in 1865 the committee on Appropriations was created and that branch of legislative business was transferred to it from the Ways and Means Committee. In 1880 the Agricultural Appropriation Bill was taken over by a committee of that name, and in 1883 the practice of having the River and Harbor Bill reported by a distinct committee was begun. In 1885 the wholesale distribution of the powers of the Appropriations Committee amongst other committees took place. The Army Appropriation Bill and the Military Academy Bill were turned over to the committee on Military Affairs, the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill to the committee on Foreign Affairs, the Post-office Appropriation Bill to the committee on Post-offices and Post Roads, the Naval Appropriation Bill to the committee on Naval Affairs, and the Indian Appropriation Bill to the committee on Indian Affairs. But six of the fourteen great annual appropriation bills remained in charge of the committee of Appropriations, the remaining appropriation bills, eight in number, being turned over to seven other committees. Mr. Randall, who was chairman of the Appropriations Committee when its powers were thus mutilated, told the House at the time: "You will enter upon a path of extravagance you cannot foresee the length of or the depth of until we find the treasury of the country bankrupt." In ten years his prediction was fulfilled. The distribution of the appropriations made just so many additional points upon which local interests could mass their demands. The total appropriations (exclusive of pensions) for the decade 1887-96, as compared with the decade 1877-86, show an increase of $688,489,376. The appropriations had increased 46.43 per cent while the population had increased 24.85 per cent. All sense of proportion between income and expenditure has been lost. The Fifty-third Congress, although well aware that the revenues of the government were inadequate to meet such an expenditure, voted appropriations amounting to $989,239,205. At the same time it refused to enable the government to borrow money to meet the obligations which Congress had so profusely created, and the government had to use the authority conferred upon it by an old statute not made for such an emergency and not suited to the occasion. Bonds of longer term and higher interest rate than were at all necessary had to be sold to enable the treasury to meet its engagements. The Fifty-fourth Congress, without having done anything to increase the revenue, increased the appropriations to over one billion of dollars. Never were

the exactions of local interests so monstrous as during this period. The largest River and Harbor Appropriation Bill ever reported in the history of the country was passed by the House without debate, and it was eventually passed by Congress over the veto of the President by a confederation of interests embracing members of all parties. To preserve the treasury from the bankruptcy prepared by Congress, government bonds to the amount of $262,000,000 were sold. The blame of this shameful situation was bandied from one party to another, but there was a common agreement that it was a matter beyond the power of Congress to control. The House is not oblivious to the shame of its situation, but such is its subserviency to local interests that it is unable to practise any self-control. The best it can do is to put it out of its power to act at all by surrendering its liberty of action in cases where party interests make it necessary to impose restraint. From this condition of affairs has emerged the strangest system of control ever generated in political procedure — an absolute discretionary negative upon action vested in the Speaker. This authority has grown up from force of party necessity and is extremely simple and absolute in mode of exercise. The Speaker simply refuses to recognize a member who has a proposition to make that is not acceptable to the Chair. This authority, which was to a large extent exercised by many preceding Speakers, reached its full development under Speaker Carlisle, and he made it an effectual interdict upon legislation calculated to obtain the support of local interests in a way antagonistic to his party policy. Subsequent Speakers have exercised the same power quite as absolutely. It has become the practice for members to petition a Speaker to permit the House to consider its own business, and the Speaker does not hesitate to disregard such petitions even when signed by enough members to remove him from the chair and elect another in his place. Such an anomaly can be explained only by the fact that members value the protection thus afforded against a pressure of local interests injurious to the general welfare or to the national party organization.1

Note the downward steps. At first one committee, even though composed of a few local representatives, and wholly irresponsible for administration, was bound to adjust expenditure to income. Next, by means of two committees, expenditure is cut loose from income. Then there are eight separate committees, existing solely to see that their departments get enough money, without

1 H. J. Ford, "Rise and Growth of American Politics," Chap. XX.

knowing or caring where it comes from. If the character and fate of governments are dependent on the conduct of their finances, what is to be expected from such a system as that?

Could there be a more powerful picture of the anarchy resulting from government by a legislature? Unless remedied by the establishment of strong and responsible executive power, it must lead just as certainly as the Long Parliament in England or the National Assembly in France to military despotism.1

1 In Chapter V. we have pointed out how in the British Parliament all financial proposals, whether of revenue or expenditure, must emanate from the ministry, no private member having any such power. Section 54 of the British North America Act of 1867, providing for the government of Canada, says:

"It shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt or pass any Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any part of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost, to any Purpose that has not been recommended to that House by Message of the Governor-General, in the Session in which such Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill is proposed."

It is evident what a vast difference such a restriction must make, not only in the finances, but in the whole government of a country. Observe, further, that it was imposed, not for any advantage to the mother country, of which there is obviously none, but because the British ministry and Parliament thought that it was necessary for the good government of Canada.

CHAPTER XVIII

GOVERNMENT BY LEGISLATURE (Continued)

THE HE effects of the organization and methods of operation of the government which have been described may be considered from two points of view: First, their action upon the character and the quality not merely of the men who seek and obtain situations in public life, but also upon the character and the conduct of the voters who are supposed to have the regulation of that public life; and second, their action upon the work of government, both as regards legislation and administration.

As far as two branches of the federal government are concerned, the executive and the judicial, the people of the United States pronounce directly only as to two individuals, the President and the Vice-President, of whom the latter may for the present be left out of the account. All the other offices, from the highest to the lowest, are filled directly or indirectly by appointment of the President, subject to control, to greater or less extent, directly by the Senate and indirectly by the House. The actual and the possible advantages of the presidential election have been pointed out, and also that these advantages have been almost counterbalanced by other influences tending in the opposite direction. In the legislative branch the people also elect one individual directly, a member of Congress from each district; and two indirectly, senators through the legislature. What are the conditions prerequisite to the election as members of Congress of men of the best ability and highest integrity of character?

Nine persons out of ten would answer at once, Intelligence, purity of purpose, and a sense of duty on the part of the voters. But those are only a part of what is required and a secondary part at that. Before them comes the question whether the offices are of such a nature that men of integrity and ability are willing to seek and accept them or are repelled by them to an almost prohibitory degree; or whether, on the other hand, those offices present attraction and large opportunities to men of bad character and inferior ability. It does not follow because a man is called senator or representative that he is therefore entitled to or receives honor. "The rank is but the guinea's stamp." It is the manner not merely in which he fulfils but in which the circumstances allow him to fulfil the duties of that office, which form the real test of his manhood. Another question is whether the conditions of public life are such as to give to the voters the means of readily testing the character and ability of the men to whom they have given their votes.

It must be remembered that the majority and the best part of the voters are exceedingly busy in providing for themselves and their families; that they have very little time and still less inclination to study the details of politics; that apart from very broad and strong abstractions such as patriotism or party it is only personality presented in a strong light which can move them, and, moreover, unless their passions or interests are directly involved, presented from the moral side of right or wrong.

To test these conditions let us follow the career of a member of Congress. In some district of exceptionally good population the nominating convention selects a man of high personal character and antecedents and he is duly elected. He goes to Washington full of good intentions and accompanied by the best wishes and expectations of his constituents.