vidual numeration. Geometry, in like manner, is the scientific method of measuring. In cases where actual measurement is laborious and difficult, geometry furnishes an indirect method of measuring without the physical application of the rod or the line. Scientific processes abridge intellectual labour to a far greater extent than mechanical processes abridge physical labour. Moreover, though more rapid and less wearisome, they tend to accuracy, and diminish the chances of error: thus, an arithmetical process, where the data are certain, is more likely to be correct than a result obtained by counting: while they sometimes, as in the measurement of the heavenly spaces by geometrical methods, render it possible to arrive at results which, without their assistance, would be unattainable.(")

A good scientific method, therefore, assists the mental faculties; it guides and enlarges their operations. But it is not alone sufficient-it supersedes neither natural ability nor practice. 'No method of reasoning will, of itself, make a good reasoner. A certain amount of natural ability, combined with attentive study, and practical experience and employment of the method, is necessary to enable a person to use it with success. The mere knowledge of a scientific method of reasoning will not lead a person to right conclusions, more than the mere possession of a chest of tools will make him a carpenter; than the possession of a musical instrument will make him a musician; or, than the possession of a library will make him a scholar.(5)

(4) See Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. vol. i. p. 121-4.

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(5) Lord Bacon, in the Distributio Operis, containing the plan of his Instauratio Magna, lays it down, that no method can guarantee the mind against error: Neque enim excellens aliqua demonstrandi via, sive naturam interpretandi forma, ut mentem ab errore et lapsu defendere ac sustinere, ita ei materiam ad sciendum præbere et subministrare possit.'— Vol. ix. p. 171.

In his Nov. Org., however, he exaggerates the efficacy of his own method:

'Nostra vero inveniendi scientias ea est ratio, ut non multum ingeniorum acumini et robori relinquatur, sed quæ ingenia et intellectus fere exæquet.'-i. 61.

Nostra enim via inveniendi scientias exæquat fere ingenia, et non multum excellentiæ eorum relinquit, cum omnia per certissimas regulas et demonstrationes transigat.'-i. 122.

But with equal natural ability, equal study, and equal experience, the man who is provided with a good method will outstrip him who employs a defective or feeble method, or who trusts to mere common sense. If two artisans of equal skill work with tools of unequal goodness; if two manufacturers of equal skill work with machinery of unequal improvement, the result is manifest. So, if military engineers of equal skill are provided with artillery of unequal force, the preponderance cannot be doubtful. No courage or discipline in an army could enable the spear and the arrow to contend with success against the musket and the

cannon.

No power of intellect, or natural talent, can do much with defective methods of investigation. A good method of reasoning, though not all-sufficient, is indispensable for success. (6) A man of ordinary capacity, working with a good logical instrument, will accomplish far more than a man of greater natural powers working according to an unsound method; just as a weak man, taking the right path, will reach the journey's end sooner than a strong walker, taking a wrong path.(7) In like manner, when a language is in an uncultivated and rude state, no amount of natural genius can produce a literary work; whereas a polished language is an instrument which any writer can use.

Inasmuch as a sound method, though indispensable for the attainment of a true result, is no infallible preservative against error, even in the ablest hands, it follows that the failure of any method, in a given case, is no decisive proof of its unsound

(6) Neque huic labori et inquisitioni, ac mundana perambulationi ulla ingenii aut meditationis aut argumentationis substitutio aut compensatio sufficere potest; non si omnia omnium ingenia coierint. Itaque aut hoc prorsus habendum, aut negotium in perpetuum deserendum.'-Bacon, Distributio Operis, vol. ix. p. 171. Compare Nov. Org. i. 30.

(7) See Nov. Org. i. 61. Claudus enim (ut dicitur) in viâ antevertit cursorem extra viam. Etiam illud manifesto liquet, currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.'

a

Une bonne méthode donne à l'esprit une telle puissance qu'elle peut en quelque sorte remplacer le talent; c'est un levier qui donne à l'homme faible qui l'emploie, une force que ne saurait posséder l'homme le plus fort qui serait privé d'un semblable moyen.'-C. Comte, Traité de Législation,

I. i. c. 1.

ness.

The failure may, indeed, be owing to the defectiveness of the method; and if the process has been carefully worked, the erroneous result may raise a presumption that the rule is vicious; but even the soundest rules of investigation may be misapplied. 'We cannot be surprised (says Dr. Whewell) that in attempting to exemplify the method which he recommended, Bacon should have failed, for the method could be exemplified only by some important discovery in physical science; and great discoveries, even with the most perfect methods, do not come at command. Moreover, although the general structure of his scheme was correct, the precise import of some of its details could hardly be understood, till the actual progress of science had made men somewhat familiar with the kind of steps which it included. Accordingly, Bacon's inquisition into the nature of heat, which is given in the second book of the Novum Organon as an example of the mode of interpreting nature, cannot be looked upon otherwise than as a complete failure.'() It would, however, be wholly unwarrantable to draw any general inference from the failure of Bacon's method in an individual case, even as employed by himself; or to conclude, from this single instance, that the substitution of the mode of investigation which he recommended, for that which he found in use, did not give a powerful impulse to the philosophy of nature.

One advantage belonging to a good method, for a particular subject, is, that it defines the degree of precision which the subject admits. Hence it prevents waste of labour, in striving after an exactness which is not attainable, and it guards against the error of supposing that, because the truth cannot be expressed with rigorous accuracy, an approximation as close as possible ought not to be made to it. Aristotle repeatedly inculcates the doctrine, that all subjects do not admit of the same precision and the same species of proof; and he lays it down that it is the mark of an instructed mind, as distinguished from

(8) Phil. of the Inductive Sciences, vol. ii. p. 401.

an incompetent judge, to be satisfied with that amount of exactitude and demonstration which comports with the subject.(")

§ 4 A method of politics, therefore, aims at furnishing a set of rules which may serve to guide the observer and reasoner in the different departments of politics. It does not undertake to define the nature of government and law; it does not solve legislative problems, or inquire what are the best institutions of a state; nor does it, like the Principe and Discorsi of Machiavel, lay down a series of practical precepts for certain situations and contingencies in politics. Hence it will be only incidentally, and in illustrations and examples, that we shall be called on to criticise the opinions of former writers on the matter of politics; it will be no part of our object to establish a dogmatic political system. (1) Much of the contents of the ensuing treatise has, indeed, been the subject of discussion by writers on politics; but questions of method have, in their miscellaneous works, been often mixed with questions of matter. Moreover, the best mode of explaining a method is to exemplify it, and to show its application in detail to the examples selected.

(9) Sce Biese, Philosophie des Aristoteles, vol. ii. p. 12-18.

(10) Antiquis auctoribus suus constat honos, atque adeo omnibus; quia non ingeniorum aut facultatum inducitur comparatio, sed viæ; nosque non judicis, sed indicis, personam sustinemus.-Nov. Org. i. 32.

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BE

CHAPTER II.

ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICS.

EFORE we can enter upon the proper subject of this treatise the methods of observation and reasoning in Politics-it will be necessary to determine, as fully and precisely as our purpose requires, the ideas comprehended by the term Politics, the extent of which must govern the course of our investigation.

A political community(') is distinguished from a collection of persons living in a state of anarchy; or (as it is sometimes called) in a state of nature, by their being in subjection to a common government. For a definition of political government, or sovereignty, involving the idea of national independence, we must refer to the writers on jurisprudence, by whom the requisite explanations have been given.(2)

The entire subject-matter of politics is involved in the idea of a sovereign government, together with the independent community over which it presides. When men are still in a savage state, they have no political rule: (3) they may have temporary

(1) A móλis, civitas, or state-sometimes a commonwealth, in the generic sense. Buffon distinguishes three sorts of society: 1, That of the inferior animals, as the bees; 2, That of the superior animals, as beavers, elephants, monkeys; 3, That of man. This distinction is approved by M. Flourens, De l'Instinct, p. 65. The principle upon which the first of these societies is distinguished from the second is not, however, obvious.

(2) See, particularly, Austin's Province of Jurisprudence, p. 199.

(3) A community in a savage state, before the division of land, has customs rather than laws (Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, xviii. 13.) Volney, in his observations on the North American Indians, says that they had neither government nor subordination; that the greatest war-chief could not strike or punish a warrior even in the field, and that in the village he was not obeyed by a single child except his own; that in these villages they dwelt singly, in mistrust, jealousy, secret ambushes, and implacable vengeances; in a word, that their society was a state of anarchy, of a ferocious nature, where want constitutes right, and strength laws.' (View of the United States of America, p. 397: Eng. tr.) In those vil

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