rowed by the happy diffusion of these great branches of knowledge, which daily mixes their language with the general vocabulary of educated men. The cultivator of mental and moral philosophy can seldom do more than mend the faults of his words by definition; a necessary, but very inadequate expedient, and one in a great measure defeated in practice by the unavoidably more frequent recurrence of the terms in their vague, than in their definite acceptation.' (3) Notwithstanding the disadvantages indicated in this passage, we may, as far as the science of politics is concerned, safely assent to Dr. Whewell's aphorism, that in framing scientific terms, the appropriation of old words is preferable to the invention of new ones.'(") In fact, in a science so closely connected with practice as that of politics, an attempt to innovate upon the existing vocabulary, and to introduce not only new definitions, but also new words, can rarely be attended with success. Nevertheless, Dr. Whewell makes it a necessary condition for the soundness of this maxim, that the appropriated common word should receive a meaning fixed with rigorous precision, and should therefore be free from all ambiguity. How far this condition can be generally fulfilled with respect to common words made technical in politics, we shall inquire presently. It is, however, certain that each writer may, if he think fit, form a distinct conception of the meaning in which he uses a term, and (3) Dissert.on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy: Works, vol. i. page 5. (4) The following are the principal aphorisms established by Dr. Whewell, respecting the conversion of common into technical terms: Aph. 3. In framing scientific terms, the appropriation of old words is preferable to the invention of new ones. Aph. 4. When common words are appropriated as technical terms, their meaning and relations in common use should be retained as far as can conveniently be done. Aph. 5. When common words are appropriated as technical terms, their meaning may be modified, and must be rigorously fixed. 6 Aph. 6. When common words are appropriated as technical terms, this must be done so that they are not ambiguous in their application. 'Aph. 7. It is better to form new words as technical terms, than to employ old ones in which the three last Aphorisms cannot be complied with.'-pp. lxvii-lxxi. Aphorisms 5 and 6 might perhaps be consolidated with advantage. he may adhere to that meaning consistently. In this manner, he will enable his readers to follow the course of his arguments, and he will save himself from the obscurity and errors in reasoning caused by the ambiguity of technical terms, which sometimes occur even in the best political writers, and in popular discussion are of perpetual occurrence. § 3 Exactitude in the use of technical political terms may often be observed, without violating Dr. Whewell's aphorism, which prescribes that their meaning and relations in common use should be retained as far as can conveniently be done. Thus the word law, as it occurs not only in the mouths of lawyers, but in ordinary discourse, has a tolerably definite sense, to which a strict technical definition can, without much difficulty, be accommodated. Theoretical writers on politics, however, sometimes adopt the vague sense attached to the word in the first chapter of Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, according to whom it denotes the 'rapports des êtres des hommes.' Hence arises a confusion between the law itself, and the idea or conception of the law, the grounds or motives of the law, the intention of the law, and the conditions of the law; a confusion which would have been avoided if, in the technical use of the term, the ordinary juristical notion of it had been adhered to.(5) Again, the popular acceptation of a word may be unfixed and fluctuating; it may sometimes bear one, and sometimes another meaning; in which case, science may fairly call upon usage-the jus et norma loquendi-to make its election between the different meanings, and to adhere to one or the other. Nor ought usage to complain if science prescribes the choice, and selects that meaning which best fulfils the conditions of technical phraseology. One of the most striking exemplifications of the ambiguous (5) See Comte, Traité de Législation, liv. ii. ch. 1-5, for an exemplification of this confusion. Compare below, chap. xviii. § 7. In the conjugates of law, as lawyer, legal, legality, legislation, and legislature, the strict sense of the word is always preserved. That which is in accordance with the laws of nature' is never called legal, nor is it considered as a subject for the decision of a lawyer. VOL. I. G and unsettled use of technical terms in politics, is furnished by the terms monarchy and republic-terms which, together with other cognate phrases, enter into the great political controversies which agitate mankind, and are sometimes the watchwords which unite parties and divide nations. These two words-one of them of Greek, the other of Roman origin, and both now received in all civilized languages-properly signify a government in which one man rules, and a government in which several men rule. (6) It happens, however, that many monarchs (that is to say, despotic or absolute princes) have borne the title of king, or of the appellatives in other languages which are equivalent to king; and hence, as some monarchs were kings, it was assumed that all kings were monarchs. In some countries, likewise, it happened that a line of hereditary kings, which originally had claimed or enjoyed a despotic power, and were therefore monarchs in the proper sense of the word, were in time subjected to restrictions of the regal omnipotence; so that the sovereignty was in fact shared by the king with a body, and divided among several. government thus modified was called a limited monarchy-that is to say, the power of the king, having originally been monarchical, underwent limitation. For the reasons thus described, monarchy, in its general acceptation, has been considered equivalent to royal government; every king is called a monarch, and every kingdom is called a monarchy. Hence those governments of several, which are presided over by a king who is not absolute, and is therefore not properly a monarch, are called monarchies, and not republics. The only exception to this customary rule is made in the case of the Lacedæmonian government; which, inasmuch as it had a double line of hereditary kings, is called a republic, not a monarchy.(7) A (6) Tutti gli stati, tutti i dominii che hanno avuto, ed hanno imperio sopra gli uomini, sono state e sono o repubbliche o principati.'-Machiavelli, Principe, c. i. 'Republic: Commonwealth, state in which the power is lodged in more than one.'-Johnson's Dictionary. Compare Cic. de Rep. iii. 31. (7) Some writers, however, both ancient and modern, have called the two Spartan kings monarchical. See Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 49, note g. The diminution of the royal authority, while the ensigns and outward marks of its dignity are retained, is analogous to the change effected by Augustus, when he introduced a real monarchical power in the state, and left the old republican magistracies with the same titles and honours, though with only the semblance of authority, the reality being taken away.(") The change operated by Augustus is, therefore, the exact converse of the change which takes place when an absolute passes into a limited monarchy; the means by which the change is effected being, however, the same. By the one, a republic is transmuted into a monarchy, preserving the republican forms; by the other, a monarchy is transmuted into a republic, preserving the monarchical forms. In both, the titles of office represent no certain power; and the functions of the office-holders fluctuate according to circumstances. As we shall show presently, the title of an office does not express any constant aggregate of powers. According to Gibbon, the imperial government of Rome may be defined to be an absolute monarchy, disguised by the forms of a commonwealth.(") On the other hand, the modern government of England may be defined to be a commonwealth, disguised by the forms of an absolute monarchy. (8) Speaking of the tribunicia potestas in the time of Tiberius, Tacitus remarks Id summi fastigii vocabulum Augustus reperit, ne regis aut dictatoris nomen adsumeret, ac tamen appellatione aliquâ cetera imperia præmineret.'-Ann. iii. 56, cf. i. 1-3. Hence Lucan, speaking of the time of Augustus, says: 'Namque omnes voces, per quas jam tempore tanto v. 385-6. In like manner, the taking of auguries on the appointment of magistrates became at last a mere form at Rome.-Dion. Hal. ii. 6. (9) Decline and Fall, c. 3, vol. i. p. 89: The names and forms of the ancient administration (says Gibbon) were preserved by Augustus with the most anxious care. The usual number of consuls, prætors, and tribunes were annually invested with their respective ensigns of office, and continued to discharge some of their least important functions. Cæsar had pro voked his fate, as much by the ostentation of his power, as by his power itself. The consul or tribune might have reigned in peace. The title of king had armed the Romans against his life. Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names; nor was he deceived in his expectation, that the senate and people would submit to slavery, provided they were respectfully assured that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom. p. 87, 94. By degrees, as the imperial power became more firmly established, § 4 Now the popular usage of the terms monarchy and republic affords a striking illustration of an aphorism which Dr. Whewell justly considers as 'the fundamental principle and supreme rule of all scientific terminology.' 'Terms (he says) must be constructed and appropriated so as to be fitted to enunciate simply and clearly true general propositions.' (1) Again, he says: 'Amid the countless combinations of properties and divisions of classes which the structure of language implies, scarcely any are arbitrary or capricious. A word which expressed a mere wanton collection of unconnected attributes could hardly be called a word; for of such a collection of properties no truth could be asserted, and the word would disappear for want of some occasion on which it could be used. Though much of the fabric of language appears, not unnaturally, fantastical and purely conventional, it is in fact otherwise. The associations and distinctions of phraseology are not more fanciful than is requisite to make them correspond to the apparent caprices of nature or thought; and though much in language may be called conventional, the conventions exist for the sake of expressing some truth or opinion, and not for their own sake. The principle, that the condition of the use of terms is the possibility of general, intelligible, consistent assertions, is true in the most complete and extensive sense.'(") And he further cites, in support of this canon of terminology, a remark made by Cuvier upon Gmelin, that by placing the lamantin in the genus of morses, and the siren in the genus of the constitutional fictions devised by Augustus, and scrupulously observed by the early emperors, were laid aside. The fine theory of a republic (says Gibbon, speaking of the end of the second century) insensibly vanished, and made way for the more natural and substantial feelings of monarchy.' (Ib. c. 5, p. 163). And see further, the account of the change under Diocletian, ib. c. 13, p. 491-5. Appian (Præf. ad Hist. c. 6) says that the heads of the Roman state call themselves imperators (avтokpáropes), not kings; though they are in fact kings: in which passage he means by king, an absolute or despotic king. (10) Aph. 8, concerning the language of science, p. lxxiii. (11) Phil. of the Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 455. |