applied to the determination of causes, may be called the Method of Continuous Comparison.(59) It consists in arranging a series of adjacent or contiguous cases in a graduated scale; in comparing the points of resemblance and difference, as these successively increase or diminish in the connected system, and in determining the causes of these variations. The great pattern of this method of reasoning is afforded by comparative anatomy and physiology, in which class of subjects the changes of the corresponding organs or functions are traced through a graduated series of animated and organized beings. In politics, this method may be applied to the examination of a series of adjacent cases, each conterminous with the succeeding one, and passing into it by an insensible and evanescent line of demarcation, like the bands of colour in the rainbow. Thus, the characteristics of different forms of political government may be investigated by beginning with a municipal body; then proceeding to a dependency under the strict control of the paramount state; next to a semi-dependent province; afterwards to an independent but tributary state; thence to a state wholly independent. The approximations between the characteristics of the successive cases serve to afford mutual illustration. The progressive nature of political institutions affords frequent opportunities for the application of this method. Thus, an institution (such, for example, as criminal judicature, or political representation) may be taken in its rudest form, and traced through a series of modifications, either in the same country, or in different countries, until it reaches the most perfect form to which successive trials and recent civilization have brought it. Such a process of inquiry may be compared with the method of the naturalist, who traces a certain organ, such as the stomach, (59) This method is placed by M. Comte under the head of observation. See above, p. 108, n. 3. Compare Bacon (Nov. Org. ii. aph. 41), who, in speaking of his Instantia Articulate, says: Eæ sunt, quæ indicant naturæ motus gradatim continuatos. Hoc autem genus instantiarum potius fugit observationem, quam sensum. Mira enim est hominum circa hanc rem indiligentia. Contemplantur siquidem naturam tantummodo desultorie et per periodos, et postquam corpora fuerint absoluta ac completa, et non in operatione suâ.' or the respiratory process, through a series of animals arranged in an ascending or descending scale. § 21 We have already had occasion to remark that, in the application both of the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference, the experimental sciences possess an important advantage in their power of excluding all collateral causes, which is wanting in politics. On the other hand, politics, and the other sciences relating to man, possess an important aid for the investigation of causes not shared by any physical science, to which we have adverted in a former chapter. (6) This consists in the testimony of the agent himself. Causation in politics resolves itself into human agency; and for the true interpretation of human agency, no better means can be found than the declarations of the agent himself, where he is willing to disclose the truth. This is the source of our information with respect to the causes of a large number of historical and political facts; and it affords an important, if not an equivalent, compensation for the loss of the Experimental Method. The voice and the pen of man, endowed with action, thought, observation, and memory, supply the place of the answers obtained by the experimenter from the interrogation of insentient and speechless nature. § 22 We have likewise, in a former part of this chapter, had occasion to point out the connexion which exists between causation in human action, and moral responsibility or blame. This is a subject which belongs properly to ethics and jurisprudence; but it has too important a bearing upon political causation to be passed over in this place without further notice. When the acts of any man are the substantial cause of an effect, when the antecedents necessary to the production of a certain result are all under his control, and have been set in motion by him, either with a view of bringing about that end, or with a knowledge that it would ensue, then we hold him morally, or even legally responsible-we say that he is guilty, that the grounds of imputation attach to him, and we visit him with (60) Above, ch. vi. § 5. blame, censure, or punishment accordingly. In some cases, however, the fault consists, not in the procuring a certain end, but in omitting to do a certain act by which some other end would have been accomplished. In this case, the blame attaches to the non-performance of the act, and to the consequent production of an effect which that act would have averted; as when the absence of a watchman, or of a sentinel from his post, leads to a house being robbed, or an army being surprised. All moral guilt or responsibility involves causation: it implies that the effect was due to the agency or the neglect of the guilty person, and that he was the author of it, either positively or negatively. If the circumstances were not within the control of the agent; if he did not so dispose the conditions necessary for the completion of the act as to bring it about, or if he had it not in his power to use the means fitted to prevent a certain result, the measure of his guilt would not be complete-the grounds of imputation would not be established. Again, the agent may not be able to command all the conditions necessary for success; but some unforeseen obstruction may prevent his design from being completed, and may reduce it to an attempt to commit the act. In this case, the legal punishment may be less, but the moral guilt of the agent, so far as it consists in the desire to set in motion all the means requisite for his purpose, is the same.(61) Hence, in politics, as well as in ethics and in jurisprudence, he who is the cause or author of anything is responsible for it, and is subject to whatever censure, liability, or punishment, is due in respect of it. The nation which originates or causes a war is answerable for that war, and must bear the consequences (61) From the connexion of causation and guilt, or blame, the Greek word airia has both senses. Thus, the words of Priam to Helen, ovтi μoi airín éσoì, deoí vú poi aïtioi elơi (Iliad, iii. 164), might be translated eitherYou are not the cause of the war, the gods are the cause of it;' or, 'I do not blame you for the war, I blame the gods for it.'-Caussor, in Latin, likewise signifies to blame. Speaking of the crossing of the Rubicon by Cæsar, Lucan says: Urgentes addunt stimulos, cunetasque pudoris : Esse ducis motus, et caussas invenit armis.'-i. 263-5. of its responsibility. Thus Polybius, as we have seen, considers the Romans as substantially the authors of the second Punic war, and therefore as blameable for the renewal of hostilities between the two republics. On the other hand, where the effect produced is beneficial, the credit is due to the authors, and hence rewards, honours, panegyrics, and other marks of approbation, are bestowed upon those who originate or cause any national benefit, such as improvements in legislation, military and naval victories, and the like. The determination of praise or blame, of reward or punishment, of the seat of responsibility or merit, in politics, as well as in other departments of human action, therefore involves the determination of causes. To treat a person as the cause of any event is, according to the circumstances of the case, to entitle him to praise or blame. § 23 As all our judgments concerning moral responsibility, and praise or blame, imply a decision of the question of causation, and as the main object of a narrative of human actions, not only in political history and biography, but even in fiction, is to exhibit the merits and demerits of the several agents, it is clear that all narration must imply an explanation of causes. The general characteristics of narration have been collected in a former chapter; (2) and we have ascertained that the narration of political history implies a connected series of successive events relating to the same community. Now the connexion which narration implies is the connexion of cause and effect. Every link which is essential to the chain of a narrative-which constitutes its connexion-and which is not descriptive matter introduced merely for the sake of illustration or ornament,-is either the cause of a succeeding effect, or the effect of a preceding cause, or it is the condition, that is a part of the cause, of a succeeding event. Any narrative, when examined, will be found to be resolvable into these elements. For example, if we say that Xerxes, after having been defeated at the sea-fight of Salamis, retreated, with a large portion of his army, from Attica along the (62) Above, ch. v. § 5. On the causal connexion of history, see Rotteck, Allgemeine Geschichte, introd. § 9. = northern coast of Greece to the Hellespont; that, on his arrival there, he found the bridge of boats broken by a storm; that he and the remnant of his army were carried over in ships, the fleet having in the meantime joined him; and that he then continued his march to Sardis: this, though a short, is manifestly a connected narrative, and its connexion is to be thus explained in detail. The defeat at Salamis is the cause of the retreat of Xerxes from Greece; and he retreats by land because the Greeks are masters of the sea. He and his army cross the Hellespont in ships, because he finds the bridge broken, and his own fleet had joined him; these two events are the joint cause of his mode of transport; lastly, his transport across the Hellespont enables him to reach Sardis in safety. It will be seen, therefore, that the connecting links in this narrative are all causes or conditions of succeeding events; and that this mutual relation of its several parts constitutes the unity of the action. We may take as another example the following narrative from the apostolic history. 'When Paul was at Jerusalem, the people, offended by his doctrine, made a tumult, and were about to kill him. The Roman officer came with troops to quell the tumult, carried away Paul prisoner, and lodged him in the castle, from the staircase of which he addressed the people in justification of his conversion to the Christian faith. The people, however, cried out the more against him, and the Roman officer, in order to ascertain the truth, was about to flog him, when Paul claimed his privilege of Roman citizenship. The officer allowed the claim, and sent him before the Sanhedrim.' Here, again, each step in the narrative is connected, either as cause or condition, with those which follow. The popular anger at Paul's teaching gives rise to the tumult, and the attempt to put him to death. The tumult calls forth the interference of the Roman officer, and his desire to investigate the truth leads to his intention to subject Paul to the torture. This announcement causes Paul to set up his rights of Roman citizenship as a protection against this mode of examination; and the claim being admitted, the Roman officer in consequence remits him to the jurisdiction of the native council. |