ON

THE METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND

REASONING IN POLITICS.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN a subject is extensive and multifarious; when it

has been cultivated with assiduity, but with an alternation of good and bad success; when the facts with which it deals are in a state of continual change, and, therefore, continually require new observation and new reasoning; when there prevails a great diversity of opinions as to its theoretical principles, its preceptive maxims, its application in practice, and even as to the import of its terms; when it concerns the most important interests of human life, and attracts the unceasing attention of all civilized nations; there will surely be a general agreement as to the desirableness of finding some instrument or method, by which the uncertainty of the results may be diminished, and greater stability be given to its treatment.

Now this description applies to Politics. Writers of the most dissimilar schools of philosophy, historians, and practical men, as well as the general public, seem to concur in thinking that the principles of political science are ill-ascertained, and that the maxims of political art are insufficiently established; while we see, from the daily experience of civilized nations, that there is no generally-recognised standard of opinion with respect to the practical application of political theories and rules of conduct. So unfavourable, indeed, is the popular judgment with respect to political philosophy, that it is often inclined to pro

VOL. I.

B

scribe the whole for the defects. of a part; to distrust much that is sound on account of the rest that is unsound; and to involve the good with the bad, in one sweeping and indiscriminate condemnation.

No great department of human knowledge can remain long in an unsettled state-its foundations ill-established, its system imperfectly developed, its principles irregularly recognised and `perpetually disputed-without serious detriment to mankind. The human race has derived essential benefits from the establishment of many of the physical sciences (as astronomy, mechanics, optics, and chemistry) on a secure basis. Can we, then, doubt that it would obtain as great, if not greater, advantages from the increased certainty of a system of truths and doctrines, which, like politics, lies at the bottom of all civilization, and directly affects the daily conduct and welfare of every member of a political community?

The most effectual mode of removing this uncertainty, and of reducing the discordant chaos of political theories and doctrines to a uniform and harmonious system, would be to produce a complete body of political philosophy, which should, by the accuracy and completeness of its facts, the fitness of its arrangement, and the force of its reasoning, command the general approbation of competent judges, and, through their assent, gradually work its way to popular reception. Such a task, however, is more easily described than executed; and there may, in the present state of political investigation, be obstacles to the attempt, which, when we consider the failure which has attended the efforts of many eminent speculators, might fairly be deemed insurmountable.

Whether, however, an attempt at a definitive treatment of the whole compass of political philosophy be, or be not, premature at the present moment, it will at least be conceded, that the success of such an attempt at some future period may be facilitated by preliminary labours, intended to clear the way for other and more capable investigators. One of the most important of these

labours consists in the determination of the subject-matter of politics, and of the methods by which it is to be investigated.' When we have settled what political theory and practice are, and how we ought to reason respecting them, we may hope to have made some progress towards the attainment of that end, which all men, whatever their opinions may be, must concur in thinking desirable, provided it be attainable.

In the present treatise, therefore, an attempt will be made. to survey this foreground of political philosophy, with the view of furnishing a guide to the political student who seeks to reason for himself, and to form an independent judgment upon any department of politics. On the one hand, it does not aim at establishing any political theory, or inculcating any system of political doctrine; on the other hand, it does not pretend to be a logical treatise, but it avails itself of logical rules, established by professed writers on logic, and is merely concerned with their application to politics. It makes no claim to novelty or invention; but it seeks only to extend to politics those methods of observation and reasoning which experience has proved to be" most effectual, and which are employed with success in other departments of knowledge. Without proposing to determine truth, it proposes to be instrumental in promoting the determination of truth by others.

§ 2 But, limited and subordinate as the proposed inquiry may be, compared with a comprehensive and definitive scheme of political science, it is nevertheless both wide in its extent, and important in its applications. In order to ascertain the methods proper to each subject of investigation, it will be necessary to pass in succession through the different departments of politics; and if those methods should be laid down with tolerable correctness and accuracy, their use, both for scientific and practical purposes, will hardly be doubted. If an organon, or instrumental art of reasoning, could be constructed for the use of the political inquirer, by a proper adaptation of the logical processes recognised as sound in other departments of knowledge, it might,

though destitute of the novelty and originality which distinguished the great productions of Aristotle and Bacon, (') nevertheless give him important assistance in his researches, and often furnish a thread in the intricate labyrinth of politics.

$ 3 Our main object, then, being to distinguish between sound and unsound methods of reasoning in politics, and to obtain the proper instruments of inquiry for each department of the subject, we must first consider what value belongs to a method of reasoning, (2) and how much assistance a logical instrument affords in the conduct of intellectual processes, such as those which are required in political discussion.

A good logical method directs all our efforts to the right end, and furnishes a compendious and well-contrived mechanism for the attainment of that end. Hence it abridges mental labour, and renders an equal amount of exertion more productive. (3) Thus, arithmetic is the scientific method of counting. Common sense, if left to itself, could only count unit by unit; a process so tedious, that for large numbers it is, in general, impracticable. Arithmetic abridges the labour, by providing compendious methods, which dispense with the necessity of indi

(1) The series of the logical writings of Aristotle was not known to his early commentators by the name of organon or instrument. This collective appellation seems, indeed, to have been first given to them after the invention of printing. (See Barthelemy St. Hilaire, De la Logique d'Aristote, tom. i. p. 19.) It came, however, into general use as the distinctive name of Aristotle's logic; and hence, Bacon called his new logic by the name of Novum Organum. Lambert published a logical work, entitled Das Neue Organon, in 1763.

(2) Cicero translates peodos by via, and couples it with ars. (Brut. c. 12.) Compare De Fin. ii. 1:-Omnis autem in quærendo, que viâ quadam et ratione habetur, oratio, præscribere primum debet, ut inter quos disseritur conveniat, quid sit id de quo disseratur;' also, De Orat. i. 19.

(3) Nec manus nuda, nec intellectus sibi permissus multum valet ; instrumentis et auxiliis res perficitur; quibus opus est non minus ad intellectum, quam ad manum. Atque ut instrumenta manus motum aut cient aut regunt; ita et instrumenta mentis intellectui aut suggerunt aut cavent.-Nov. Org. i. 2.

Intellectus sibi permissus in ingenio sobrio et patiente et gravi (præsertim si a doctrinis receptis non impediatur) tentat nonnihil illam alteram viam quæ recta est, sed exiguo profectu; cum intellectus nisi regatur et juvetur res inæqualis sit, et omnino inhabilis ad superandam rerum obscuritatem.'-Ib. 21.