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cessive touches-erasing, amending, and adding as he proceeds. Each successive effort of his invention is tentative; it is an experiment of his imagination, upon which his taste is to decide. The poet, the painter, and the sculptor, equally follow this mode in their respective productions; each regards the first crude results of his creative faculty as provisional, until they have received the deliberate approbation of his critical sense.

A close analogy is likewise perceptible between the experiments of practical medicine and those of practical politics. The physician often proceeds tentatively. He prescribes a certain regimen and course of medicine, and watches its effects, uncertain of the result. He feels his way as he proceeds, each successive step in the treatment indicating the next. In obscure cases, medical treatment can be little better than mera palpatio. But by a cautious observance of this method, strong and decisive remedies may be safely administered; and a healing virtue may be extracted even from poisons, by their dexterous exhibition in small and appropriate quantities. The physician is often compelled to proceed by the method of gradual approach: he attacks a disease as an engineer attacks a fortress. (35)

One of the leading sects among the classical physicians-the Empirici-rejected all abstract reasoning upon medicine, even to the study of physiology, and relied exclusively upon the experiments made by former physicians in the treatment of diseases. Those modes of treatment which had been successful were good, and those which had failed were bad. They recognised no other standard of medical practice, and no other source of medical science. (36) The Empirici, therefore, founded their

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(35) Alterum illud ignorari non oportet; quod non omnibus ægris eadem auxilia conveniunt. Ex quo incidit, ut alia atque alia summi auctores, quasi sola, venditaverint, prout cuique cesserant. Oportet itaque, ubi aliquid non respondet, non tanti putare auctorem, quanti ægrum, et experiri aliud atque aliud. Sic tamen, ut in acutis morbis cito mutetur, quod nihil prodest; in longis (quos tempus, ut facit, sic etiam solvit), non statim condemnetur, si quid non statim profuit; minus vero removeatur, si quid paulum saltem juvat, quia profectus tempore expletur.'-Celsus de Medicinâ, iii. 1, cf. i. præf. Est enim hæc ars conjecturalis, neque respondet ei plerumque non solum conjectura, sed etiam experientia.'

(36) See Celsus de Med. præf. Dr. Gregory, in the introduction to

doctrine exclusively upon the experimenta fructifera of their predecessors, converting them into experimenta lucifera, and making them serve as guides. All medical practice must be founded, in part, upon reasoning of this nature; and the error of the method employed by the Empirici consisted, not in watching and recording the effects of certain plans of treatment, but in confining themselves to the results of these observations, and in excluding from their system the assistance to be derived from anatomy and physiology, and even pathology. In this respect, they correspond exactly with those political reasoners who assume the distinctive appellation of 'practical men'-that is to say, they argue from the observations and experiments belonging to a particular department (which method, so far as it goes, is sound and right); but they exclude altogether from their view those general theorems of political philosophy which are founded on a wider induction, and represent facts lying out of the sphere of their experience. The materials of the practical man are generally sound and valuable, but they must be properly employed, in order to make a good structure. In general, it requires a man whose mind has taken a wider range than the limited subject in question, to turn these materials to good account. It is only by combining them with results derived from a more extensive view, that they can be safely applied in practice; whereas the practical man, confident in his own precise but limited knowledge, applies his opinions without the due corrections and allowances, and is blind to considerations which lie out of the circle of his personal experience.

§ 11 It happens not unfrequently that practical experiments conduce to the establishment of a general truth, and in fact perform the function of scientific experiments, though instituted with a different and more limited object. Most of the general principles of legislative science have been worked out by

his Conspectus Medicina Theoretica, states, in several places, that the abuse of theory has led men to reject it altogether in medicine, and to rely exclusively on experience.-See p. xvii. xxv. xxxix. § 72. See below, ch. xxi. § 2.

a series of practical experiments upon society; many unsuccessful attempts, differing from one another in their character, having at last shown the way to a better system, by serving as examples to deter. Some theories, indeed, are so alluring and attractive, especially on a superficial consideration, that nothing short of an actual experimental proof of their evil operation is sufficient to convince the world of their unsoundness. Such is the theory of propagating religious truth by penal inflictions (or what is popularly called religious persecution); such is the theory of commercial protection; and such, too, is the theory of protection of labour, which is now advancing into popular favour, and under which mankind seem destined to suffer before they have discovered its true tendencies.

Practical experiments upon foreign nations-the result of conquest or colonization-may likewise serve to disprove imaginary empirical laws, which have been the result of an inaccurate or narrow observation. Thus, Montesquieu lays it down that all the Oriental nations, with the exception of the Mahometans, believe all religions to be in themselves indifferent. It is only (he adds)

as a change in the government that they fear the establishment of another religion.'() In support of this generalization, he refers to examples drawn from Japan, Siam, the Calmucks, and Calicut. But the position that Oriental nations are indifferent about a change of religion, provided it is not accompanied by a change of government, is refuted by the practical experiment of the British empire in India. We have changed the government of the Hindus, but we cannot change their religion. And experience has shown, that not only the Mahometan, but the Hindu subjects of England in India are highly sensitive on the subject of religion; and that so far from the change of government leading to a change of religion, a systematic attempt on the part of the government to change the religion of the people would be followed by a general resistance to the British rule in India.

VOL. I.

(37) Esprit des Lois, xxv. 15.

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§ 12 The preceding explanation shows that when politics is said not to be an experimental science, we exclude from the signification of experiment, not only all intentional and active observation, but also all practical experiments; and that we confine the word in question to scientific experiments, strictly so called. It is important to bear these distinctions in mind, as they appear to have been sometimes overlooked even by Bacon and some of his followers; and the non-observance of them exercises a material influence upon the application of this term to politics. For if by an experimental science is meant a science founded on observation and experience, politics is an experimental science not less than chemistry, or optics, or astronomy. Or if by an experimental science, is meant a science which institutes practical experiments, politics is again, on this account also, an experimental science. But if by an experimental science is meant a science which admits of scientific experiments, of experimenta lucifera, then politics is not an experimental science. (**)

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(38) By experiment, in the second book of the Novum Organum, and in several passages of the first book (as where he speaks of lucifera experimenta, and of the experiments of Gilbert with the magnet, of the chemists with gold, Aph. 70), Bacon appears to mean experiment in the strict sense; i. e., a manipulation of some physical object, contrived for the purpose of ascertaining its properties, and establishing a scientific truth. At other times, he appears to mean the results of intentional observation, whether there be manipulation or not. Thus, in lib. i. aph. 82, he says: Restat experientia mera: quæ, si occurrat, casus; si quæsita sit, experimentum nominatur.' Here experiment appears to be that experience which is sought by the observer, as opposed to that which presents itself to him unsought. According to this acceptation of the word, the observations of the astronomer upon the heavenly bodies would be an experiment. Thus, in lib. ii. aph. 39, he calls Galileo's discoveries in the heavens, by the aid of the telescope, experiments. After speaking of the satellites of Jupiter, the inequalities in the moon's surface, the spots in the sun, &c., discovered by this instrument, he adds-'Omnia certe inventa nobilia, quatenus fides hujusmodi demonstrationibus tuto adhiberi possit. Quæ nobis ob hoc maxime suspecta sunt quod in istis paucis sistatur experimentum, neque alia complura investigatu æque digna eâdem ratione

inventa sint.'

Elsewhere, he appears to use experimenta in a sense which would include all the results of experience, whether sought or unsought. Thus, in lib. i. aph. 72, he refers to the narrow horizon of experience commanded by the ancients, owing to the short duration of their authentic history, and the small extent of their geographical discoveries. Angusta erat et tenuis notitia per illam ætatem vel temporis vel orbis ; quod longe pessimum est, præsertim iis qui omnia in experientiâ ponunt.' He then contrasts

§ 13 We have now examined the process of observation in politics, scientific and practical; and have shown to what extent the method of experiment is either practicable or useful in reference to it. From what has been stated, it results that the facts with which the political philosopher, the historian, and the practical statesman have to deal, are not, in themselves and taken singly, recondite or abstruse. The phenomena of political science lie upon the surface; and if the process of observation was alone sufficient to form them into a science, there would be no difficulty in giving to politics as much perfection as to other sciences. The obstacles to scientific certainty in politics do not arise at 1 this stage of the process of investigation, but are due to distinct

the advantages of the moderns, in this respect :- Nostris autem temporibus et novi orbis partes complures, et veteris orbis extrema undique innotescunt, et in infinitum experimentorum cumulus excrevit.' Here the results of geographical discovery are called experiments; but many of these were the accidental consequences of expeditions made for purposes of conquest, colonization, or trade.

Bacon speaks of a Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis, which he considers as the necessary basis of a sound philosophy. By historia experimentalis, he understands the history of arts, which he distributes into three compartments-viz., 1, mechanical arts; 2, the operative part of liberal sciences; 3, practices and experiments which have not been formed into a regular art. See Parasceue ad Hist. Nat. et Experim. vol. xi. p. 411, 416; Nov. Org. ii. 10. Here again the word experiment includes manual processes made without any scientific aim.

In more modern writers there is likewise often an indistinctness as to the meaning of experiment; inasmuch as it is sometimes used in the narrow sense of a manipulation of natural objects, and sometimes in the general sense of a result of experience. Thus, Bishop Sprat, in his History of the Royal Society, speaks of Lord Bacon as being the great teacher of the experimental philosophy (p. 35; ed. 1702). Dugald Stewart likewise calls Bacon the father of experimental philosophy (First Diss. Encycl. Brit. vol. i. p. 32, ch. ii. § 1). The phrase, 'experimental philosophy,' appears, in fact, to be often used to signify the philosophy which is founded, not upon experiment, but upon experience. Thus, the same writer calls Descartes the father of experimental the philosophy of the human mind' (Diss. p. 56), upon which Mr. Hallam remarks, that the word experiment must be taken in the sense of observation.—Literature of Europe, vol. iii. 249. p.

D'Alembert (Discours Préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie) says that 'la physique générale et expérimentale' differs from the physico-mathematical sciences, en ce qu'elle n'est proprement qu'un recueil raisonné d'expériences et d'observations.'-Euvres, tom. i. p. 203.

So Playfair, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Mathematical and Physical Science, divides his inquiry into two branches, the latter of which is the branch of logic which teaches the application of experiment and observation to the interpretation of nature' (p. 433). To the inquiry thus

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