The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social StructureBrian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract (which won the prestigious Lakatos Award) has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much greater. Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms's characteristic clarity and verve, this intriguing book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, economics, sociology and evolutionary biology. |
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... of indefinitely repeated games. Suppose that the probability thatthe prisoner's dilemma will be repeated another timeis constant. In the repeated game, the Foolehasthe strategy of always defecting. Hobbes argues that if someone defects,
... of indefinitely repeated games. Suppose that the probability thatthe prisoner's dilemma will be repeated another timeis constant. In the repeated game, the Foolehasthe strategy of always defecting. Hobbes argues that if someone defects,
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Brian Skyrms. strategy of always defecting. Hobbes argues that if someone defects, others will never cooperate with the defector. Those who initially cooperate but who retaliate, as Hobbes suggests against defectors, have a Trigger ...
Brian Skyrms. strategy of always defecting. Hobbes argues that if someone defects, others will never cooperate with the defector. Those who initially cooperate but who retaliate, as Hobbes suggests against defectors, have a Trigger ...
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... defectors,andso for all subsequent generations. If the haystack is founded by a defector and a cooperator, the cooperator getsa payoff of 0 and has no progeny. The defector gets a payoff of 3 and the next generation has three defectors ...
... defectors,andso for all subsequent generations. If the haystack is founded by a defector and a cooperator, the cooperator getsa payoff of 0 and has no progeny. The defector gets a payoff of 3 and the next generation has three defectors ...
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adaptive dynamics andthe average payoff bacteria bargaining game BARGAINING WITH NEIGHBORS basin of attraction bestresponse dynamics Cambridge chapter cheap talk consider conventions convergence correlation costfree Defect defectors demand dividethedollar Economic Behavior emergence encounters Erev Evolution of Cooperation evolutionarily stable evolutionarily stable strategies evolutionary dynamics evolutionary game experimental fair division game theory Handicap Principle hare hunters hare hunting haystack Hobbes hunt hare hunt stag imitatethebest imitation dynamics imitation neighborhood individual interaction structure inthe Journal linear stag hunt mutant Nash equilibria natural salience ofthe Pemantle percent play players poisoners polymorphism population proportions prisoner’s dilemma probability problem random random encounters randomencounter rational Receiver’s Strategy reinforcement learning replicator dynamics secret handshake Sender senderreceiver game signaling games signaling system simulations Skyrms social contract specialists stag hunt game stag hunters stag hunting equilibrium Stochastic Suppose thatthe threeinaboat threeperson tothe twodimensional twoperson University Press Vanderschraaf weakestlink stag hunt Zahavi