To make good his charge against Butler, the lecturer adduces copious extracts, to which he subjoins the following remark: Now I entertain no doubt, that this is a just account of the original constitution of our nature, that such is the due subordination of its various powers and propensions, such the legitimate order of their respective operations. But you can hardly fail to have been sensible, how little reference there is, in these representations, to the fallen condition and depraved character of this nature.' He is however, far from intending to insinuate that the fallen and degenerate condition of man has no place in Butler's Theology,' but regards him as one of those who in their reasonings on morals,' appear ' at times, as if they had forgotten the characters of human nature, which, on other occasions, they have admitted.' In the extracts'-he adds

which have just been given from the Bishop's sermons, we are certainly in a great degree, allowed to lose sight of the present character of human nature, and are left to suppose it, in its present state, such as it was designed, by the author of its constitution to be.' 2

Whatever may be the construction put upon the extracts presented by the lecturer to his auditory, when taken out of their connexion in the Bishop's general argument; it will be found no easy task to force upon his representation of hu

1 Lect. iv. p. 125.

2 Ibid p. 126.

man nature, when viewed as a whole, the meaning which is here so confidently assigned to it.

6

The description given by Butler cannot be regarded as a 'just account of the original constitution of our nature,' unless it be first proved that man's inclination did not originally coincide with his sense of duty; for before the Bishop begins the statement of his views in the preface to his sermons, he guards against any misconception of his phraseology, arising from the notion that by acting according to nature, was meant, acting as any of the several parts without distinction of a man's nature, happened most to incline him.' Such a caution would have been needless in reference to a being whose 'powers and propensions were in due subordination;' and therefore we may assume that Dr. Wardlaw is not here combating the real sentiments of Butler. Further; it is impossible to pursue the Bishop's train of reasoning, without perceiving the great stress he lays upon the distinction between the power which a principle may happen to possess, and that which it has a real right to exercise. Could there have been any room for such distinction, if the writer had been considering only what man originally was, and not what he now is? Would it have been necessary to prove that appetites ought to be subject to reason? Would it have been necessary to concede that they often refused this subjection, and usurped a power which did not properly belong to them? Could such insubordination hap

pen, or even require to be guarded against, in creatures who maintained their original integrity and perfection?

These remarks will be enough to show, that Butler has adopted no such extravagant notion of human nature, as the author of Christian Ethics' imputes to him; that he regards man as he now is, and not as he was at his first creation; that he supposes the existence of disorder and insubordination among the powers of the human mind; and that, if he does not speak so clearly and strongly on the subject of human depravity as might be desired, he says nothing which can be fairly set in opposition to that doctrine.

6

Dr. Wardlaw in a note at page 390, allows that the defect in Bishop Butler is in part supplied' by Dr. Chalmers, who takes up the illustration of a watch, which the Bishop had adopted; and argues that it is of capital importance to distinguish between an original and proper tendency, and a subsequent aberration.' The watch may be in disorder-the regulator may have lost its power-but yet the original design of the whole may be discoverable, notwithstanding this derangement. Dr. Wardlaw conceives that this illustration, and the reasoning connected with it, is not at all inconsistent with any of his own statements. But the true difference appears to be this: Dr. Chalmers, after Butler, supposes such a derangement to have taken place among the mental powers, as still left it possible for man to

discern the rule of right, the standard of moral good and evil, though he had not the power to keep the rule, or to reach the standard. The tables of the law were broken, but not rendered useless, because not illegible. Whereas in Dr. Wardlaw's judgment, the disorganization is so entire, as to leave nothing definite and certain in our moral judgments; no clear rule of rectitude, no moral standard by which the quality of actions might be tried. The tables of the law deposited by the Divine hand in the temple of the human breast, are—according to him—not merely broken --but ground to powder, a mere ' heap of rubbish.' Conscience itself is a thing of no value. • Has this presiding and ruling power,' he asks, in the nature of man been found fulfilling its appropriate function, inspiring right feelings, and dictating right practice, towards the one blessed Object of reverence, and love, and homage, and obedience? Does not the entire history of our race, from the beginning hitherto, reply in the negative? And if conscience has failed here, we must insist upon it, that it has essentially failed in every thing.''

That is, because conscience cannot do every thing, it can do nothing-because it fails to answer every purpose, which revelation itself answers, it essentially fails in every thing! Surely, there may be something real, and even important in its nature and office, though it may not be able to accomplish all which the Lecturer here requires.

1 Lecture iv. p. 129.

In the discussion of a question, however, like the present, it is of the utmost consequence to understand the exact meaning of the principal terms employed. What, for instance, is the precise notion which Dr. Wardlaw attaches to the expression, the innate depravity of human nature?'

Does he mean a depravity so great as to be incapable of augmentation? If so, then the concession of the existence of this depravity would imply the utter uselessness of the moral powers in the regulation of human life. But none will seriously contend, in the face of all experience, for such a position. However deep and virulent may be the disease of human nature, we know that indulgence, evil habits, and the force of bad example will make it still deeper and more virulent. "The carnal mind is enmity against God" in a child, as well as in an adult; but it does not bear those traces of daring and inveterate hostility in the infant breast, which it assumes in the heart, and even manifests in the countenance of one hackneyed in the ways of vice. And, to apply the argument immediately to conscience; it is observable that, whatever blighting influence original sin has produced upon it, in the first instance, there is a process of deterioration still lower, through which it may pass, and that it has not arrived at its worst state till it has become seared, by a long course of actual transgression. In all reasonings therefore respecting the original depravity of our nature, this distinction must be