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property in question was worth a great deal. After that time the property had very much depreciated in value, but the defendants relied upon the prospective capabilities of the property for docking purposes, when steamers in the St. Lawrence trade became too large to proceed up the river to the port of Montreal.

Held, that such a rise of the property was too contingent and remote at the date of expropriation to be regarded as an element in the market value of the property.

Flynn, K.C., and Choplean, for plaintiff.
Baillargeon, for defendants.

AUDETTE, J.

MARCH 17TH, 1913.

CANADIAN RUBBER CO. OF MONTREAL, LTD. v. COLUMBUS RUBBER CO. OF MONTREAL, LTD.

Trade Mark-Infringement - Similarity of Mark—Injunction-Damages.

Plaintiff company was the duly registered owner of a general trade-mark consisting of an effigy of Jacques Cartier surrounded by the words, "The Canadian Rubber Company of Montreal, Limited." The plaintiff, and its predecessor in title, had been for years large manufacturers of rubber footwear to which this mark was applied. It was established that so well-known was the mark in the trade that customers of merchants handling the plaintiff's goods in the province of Quebec would ask for them by the name of " Jacques Cartier," the "Canadian," or the "Sailor." In June, 1912, the defendant company proceeded to manufacture and sell a certain class of rubber footwear with the effigy of a sailor closely resembling that of Jacques Cartier in the plaintiff's trade-mark, surrounded with the words, " Columbus Ruber Company of Montreal, Limited," in a scroll chiefly differing from the one used by the plaintiff in that it was rectangular in form while that of the plaintiff was round. Defendants' mark was not registered.

Held, that there was such a similarity between the defendant's mark and that of the plaintiff as to be calculated to

deceive the public into purchasing the defendant's goods for those of the plaintiff, and that the defendant should be enjoined from placing on the market and selling rubber footwear and goods bearing the mark as above described.

2. That there should be a reference to the Registrar to ascertain what damages were sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's interference with its business.

T. C. Casgrain, K.C., and Stairs, for the plaintiff.
A. Geoffrion, K.C., for the defendants.

AUDETTE, J.

APRIL 2ND, 1913.

HARRISON v. THE KING.

Negligence-Public Work-Ice on Approach-Injury to the Person-Liability.

Suppliant sustained bodily injury by falling whilst walking over the footpath on one of the approaches to the Seigneur Street Bridge, over the Lachine Canal, in the city of Montreal. The place where he fell was under the care and control of the Dominion Government; and the superintendent of the canal and his assistants were charged with the duty of maintaining the footpath in question in good order. The accident happened at 11.30 o'clock of the night of the 6th of January, 1912, which date was a holiday. The footpath was in a slippery condition owing to ice, the weather at the time being very changeable. It was shewn by a witness, whose specific employment it was to spread ashes over this footpath for the purpose of preventing accidents to pedestrians, that at four o'clock on the afternoon of the day before the accident he had spread ashes on the spot where the suppliant fell; and that, although it was a holiday, he visited the footpath at two o'clock on the afternoon of the accident and found that the ashes were still there and that no more were required for safety.

Held, upon the facts, that no negligence was attributable to the superintendent of the canal or his assistants, and that the suppliant was not entitled to recover.

Curran, for suppliant.
Hackett, for respondent.

AUDETTE, J.

APRIL 5TH, 1913.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CANADA v. L'HEUREUX.

Constitutional Law -Seizure of Liquor in Possession of Dominion Crown under Authority of Provincial StatuteIllegality-Notice of Action-Prescription.

(1) The provisions of the Quebec Liquor License Act (R. S. Quebec (1909), sec. 14, pt. 2, chap. 5, title IV.), are not binding upon the Crown in right of the Dominion of Canada. Hence, when a person enters a building of the Intercolonial Railway of Canada and seizes and carries away therefrom certain liquors constituting freight consigned to third persons he cannot justify such seizure and conversion by invoking the authority of the said Act.

(2) Want of notice under Art. 88, C. C. P. (P.-Q.), in an action for damages against an officer, if not specially pleaded by the defendant may be raised at the trial, and evidence then adduced shewing that the requisite notice was in fact given.

(3) Prescription is not a matter coming within Arts. 2267, and 2188 C. C. P. (P.-Q.), and must be raised by the defence filed.

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man-Brakesmen Defective Coupling on Car-Knowledge of Defect-Acceptance of Risk-Unskilled Workman-Standard of Prudence-Liability.

T. was employed on the Intercolonial Railway as a brakesman. At the time of the accident whereby he lost his life he was one of the crew on a shunter-train working between dif

ferent stations along the line of the Intercolonial Railway in the Province of Quebec. The coupling device of one of the cars in this train was defective in that the chain connecting the pin and the lever was broken and disconnected so that the device would not act automatically. It is the practice of brakesmen to uncouple cars when the train is in motion by means of this automatic device. There are no rules or regulations of the road forbidding the work being done in this way. It was shewn by the evidence that the train hands knew that the coupling on this particular car was defective. The deceased was not a permanent employee and had not acquired that skill in coupling and uncoupling cars that more experienced brakesmen have. His attention was called by one of his fellow-workmen to the fact that the coupling was defective but notwithstanding this he undertook to uncouple the car while the train was in motion. Finding that he could not accomplish this with the defective device he went between the cars and attempted to do the work of uncoupling with his hands. He fell between the cars and the wheels passed over him injuring him fatally.

Held, that T. had accepted the risk of making the coupling under the circumstances; and that the Crown was not liable.

(2) If an inexperienced workman knowing from observation of his skilled fellow-workmen that a particular piece of work is hazardous if done in the method pursued by them, undertakes to so perform it, while another and less dangerous method is open to him, he is not observing a proper standard of prudence and ought not to be held blameless if any accident results from his lack of care.

Stein and Lapointe, for suppliants.
Cimon, for the respondent.

VOL. XXXIII. C.L.T.-45

LOCAL OPTION AND ITS EFFECTS.

This decision is the first of its kind, relative to the assessment of hotels where Local Option has come into force, and it will, therefore, be of interest to many of our readers.-ED.

In the matter of appeal from the Court of Revision of the town of Clinton. Between:

JOSEPH RATTENBURY AND THE CORPORATION OF CLINTON.

JOHN J. MCCAUGHEY AND THE CORPORATION OF CLINTON.

THOMAS GOULDEN PIKE AND JOSEPH E. REINHARDT AND THE CORPORATION OF CLINTON.

J. S. Killoran, for appellants.

The Mayor and Reeve, for corporation.

The appellants in each of the above-mentioned appeals, appeal against their assessment, on the grounds of (1), overcharge on land, and (2), that the appellants are not liable for business tax."

The appellants contend that the passage of the Local Option By-law, by the respondents, has reduced the value of appellants' hotel property to upwards of one-half its former value.

A standard author, Weir, on Assessment Law of Ontario, at p. 130, says: "It is a popular error that the costs of the buildings, less proper allowance for wear and tear, and other deterioration, should be the assessed value. By "value of the land" and "actual" value in this section is doubtless meant the market value, or the value as an asset of the owner's estate. Its "actual value, must, however, be measured in dollars, and is not more than what within a reasonable time, and with due care, can be realized from the sale of it."

"Strictly speaking, the value of the land, as of any other commodity, is the price it will bring at the time it is offered for sale." Squire qui tam Wilson, 15 C. P. 284.

There is no doubt that the passage of the Local Option By-law in Clinton has most materially reduced the value of

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