Essay. Page ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and over come it,... .No. XLV. 331 1. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Fœderal the particular structure of the Fœderal government 332 333 ...XLVI. 383 8. "its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," considered,.. 338 i. the British Constitution, as his standard of gov- 334 ii. his own expressed reasons referred to,. 335 ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, rela rii. general remarks on the State constitutions,.... 342 b. the necessity that "these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others," considered,.... XLVII. 342 348 i. "the powers belonging to one department ought not 348 Essay. Page i. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restrictions,. ..No. XLVII. 343 A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb the others,.. 343 a from the nature of our political organiza- 344 c. from necessary extent of its powers,....... 345 ..... 345 e. from the examples presented in history,... 345 B. an instance of executive encroachment accounted for,.... C. concluding remarks,.. 348 348 ii. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the members of each of two of the departments concurring, an appeal to the People may be taken, considered,.... ..XLVIII. 349 A. the People the only source of authority,.... 349 B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the People considered,.......... 350 C. it does reach the case of an improper combination of two departments of the government, D. by frequent applications it might impair the respect with which the People would regard the government,.. E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by a too frequent recurrence to the decision of the society,..... 350 350 351 F. the decisions thus obtained would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government,...... ..... 352 a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352 b. members of the legislature will probably be the members of the conventions to revise the form of government,..... c. when such appeals to the People, against the legislature, will be useful,........... 353 G. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to the People,.... ............ iii. periodical appeals to the People considered, 353 354 XLIX. 354 A. the disadvantage of short intervals discussed, 355 Essay. Page B. the disadvantage of long intervals discussed, No. XLIX. 355 C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to,.... 355 iv. the interior structure of the government should be so arranged that its several constituent departments, by their mutual relations, may keep each other in their proper places,.....L. 358 A. the members of each should have little to do in the appointment of members of the others, 359 C. the members of each should possess the con- 359 860 a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to,... 360 361 361 d. an increase of the power of the executive, 361 v. the advantages afforded by the Fœderal system 362 A. the division of the delegated powers between 362 B. the multitude of different and distinct inter- 362 b. "the House of Representatives,”. .LI. 365 A. the qualifications of the electors thereof,... 365 a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress,. 365 b. why not subject to regulation by the State legisla tures,... 365 c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 365 d. the advantages derived from the constitutional pro a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be safe," considered,. 366 Essay. Page i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an immediate dependence on, and sympathy with, the People,..... ....... No. LI. 366 ii. the length of terms of service in other govern ments,..... 367 i. British House of Commons, at different periods, 367 ii. Irish Parliament,.... 368 iii. the American colonies,... 369 iii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dan gerous,... ..... 370 370 iv. this conclusion strengthened by other circum- i. the Federal Congress will possess less power ..... 370 i, it will be restrained by its dependence on the iii. the other departments of the Fœderal govern- v. objection, that "where annual elections end, tyr- 370 370 .LII. 371 371 371 i. no adequate reason for the opinion,. iii. the practice of the British Parliament, by sim- 372 b. are "biennial elections necessary or useful,".. 373 378 i. greater scope of information necessary in the 374 i. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of for- 376 ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who reside at a distance from the capitol,............ 376 iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the greater number of inexperienced members,.... 377 iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious elections, ... v. conclusion, that "biennial elections will be as use 877 D. "the apportionment of its members to the several iv. the apportionment is governed by the same rule as that for the levy of direct taxes,.. ... 380 v. they are not considered as property merely, in the laws of the States which possess them,... 380 A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local 880 vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed to the several States should be proportioned to the comparative wealth of those States,... 382 b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the cen- E. "the number of which the House is to consist con- a. the importance which is attached to this subject,... 884 b. the difficulty of determining the proper number,.... 385 c. the small States require smaller ratios of representa- |