It will be said, that in the last century they were fighting in the cause of Liberty; but in this war they had not that animating principle ⚫ to support their efforts.' But if History be examined, it will be found that the quantity of Liberty they had to defend, and to inspirit them to its defence, was as great in the latter period as in the former; long before which, the Spanish ideas of domination had been very much reduced by the robberies that Nation had suffered. If they had chosen to capitulate, they had no longer to fear the tyranny of the Duke of ALVA: the quantity of Freedom which would have remained to them, would have somewhat exceeded that of the late Austrian Netherlands.

It was solely for that difference in the liberty of their Constitution, that the Dutch supported so many years of War then; but it must have been apparent beforehand, to the men of property and information, that the quantity of Freedom they must lose by the late Con quest, was indefinitely greater than that difference they so gloriously 'contended for. There are degrees even in bloody and ferocious tyranny; and deservedly infamous as his memory is, they know that even TOLEDO would

be

be disgraced by a comparison with ROBES PIERRE; and the soldiers of Philip, with his abandoned assassins. They saw the total ruin before them, and had not the spirit to take the measures necessary to resist it. Every man of property in Holland, would without doubt have been glad of continuing his inaction, under the armed protection of all the rest; but there were none who would do more to defend him in it than he would himself: the effort would have been a voluntary tax upon all; but it was a tax each man was willing all the rest should pay, if he could continue excused. They confided therefore to the ordinary exertions of Government what Government was unequal to; and sat still while they saw operations that would have been inadequate at best, traversed by self-designed Despots, and the pioneers that smooth all obstacles in their road to Despotism, the fanatics of Liberty; and thus ruin overwhelmed them all. A supine indolence, with respect to your great stake and interest, if it be the same, will produce the same effect; but remember that your fall is from a nobler height, and you will be precipitated into a perdition still deeper."

But

But the idea then entertained in Holland, and too frequently entertained here, that we may safely trust our fate to the exertions of Government, without giving our personal aid to them, deserves a fuller consideration: During almost a century and a half, Men of Property in this Country have been adequately protected (with some transitory interruptions) in Peace and War, by the sole operations of the Executive Government. Hence they have long ceased to repose any of their confidence where Nature meant to place much of their security, in all states of Society, even in that of refinement, their personal exertions. They expect to derive entire security from Government; but the old forms of Government in Europe are not constructed to bring forth the whole force of a People, but only a limited part of it; and a power may be organized in one Nation to enable it to effect the former, or bring forward its whole physical strength; and if such a State should attack another, which refuses to exceed its accustomed degree of exertion, the latter must perish in the contest. The inequality is as great or greater, than that of a battle between two Nations, one of which possess fire arms, while the other is totally destitute of them. When new modes

of

of attack are invented one on side, they must be copied by the other, or it must perish.

An old Government therefore cannot stand against the new organization, without a change, which shall either add indefinitely to the strength of the Executive Power, or Associations of the People for General Defence, and in aid of its ordinary military power. The former is destructive of Liberty: the latter, under due modifications, its brightest ornament and defence.

Hitherto our actual insecurity has been solely considered, but the very appearance and sus-picion of insecurity may have very bad consequences, which may even call into existence the evils which would not otherwise have taken place; especially in Commercial States, abounding in paper currency. This hangs upon opinion, and when that is withdrawn, it falls; an incident which would infallibly be the signal of the Insurrection described above. I might have given the reasoning, to follow in the ordinary manner; but having evidence almost juridical for the point I contend for, I shall make use of that. Apparent weakness pre-disposes to fear: threats of invasion, and apprehen

sion of insurrection, augment it indefinitely, "and the longer the minds of the people brood "over the evil they are apprehensive of, the "more their fears increase, and the more likely

they are to provide themselves with what "they think the best means of securing them"selves against the evils they may apprehend, "that is, general bankruptcy (1)." The most timid will collect Coin for flight, or to bury it on the breaking out of the supposed danger; "alarm of invasion will occasion demands for "Guineas in many places(2):"—"The farmers "will suddenly bring the produce of their lands. "to sale, and carry the notes they procure by these "means to the Bank for payment (3)." Thus,

a great deal of the Specie will be concealed "and locked up (4) :" "If only a few persons "of timid minds choose to invest a large por"tion of their property in Guineas, instead of

66

using them merely as that means of circula❝tion for which they were intended to serve, the "effect will be considerable(5) ;" and the pro

(1) Minutes of the Lords' Committee on the stoppage of Payment at the Bank, p. 39.-(2) Evidence of G. ELLISON, Esq. (3) Evidence of H. THORNTON, Esq. ib. p. 76.—(4) Commons' Third Report on ditto, p. 5. Ib. Evidence of Mr. BOSANQUET, p. 29. Mr. ELLISON, p. 121.-(5) Minutes of the Lords; Evidence of HENRY THORNTON, Esq, P. 71.

02

portion