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eral assembly in such cases is not conclusive. Palmer v. Tingle, 55 O. St. 423 (45 N. E. Rep. 313). In Indiana it is held that every scheme for the division or disposition of property by chance is prohibited by law and that every contract or agreement in aid of any such a scheme is void as against public policy. Lynch v. Rosenthal, 144 Ind. 86 (43 N. E. Rep. 1103; 55 Am. St. Rep. 168).

Sec. 80. Contracts champertous and in restraint of trade. Where one who has no interest in, or title to, land, accepts the deed thereto from another, but pays nothing for the conveyance; and in contemplation of litigation to be instituted by himself, agrees that if he realizes anything he will pay the grantor what is right and if he gains nothing he will pay costs and expenses, it is held that such deed is a champertous contract and therefore void. Johnson v. Hilton, 96 Ga. 577 (23 S. E. Rep. 841). A contract, whereby a railroad company grants to a particular telegraph company the exclusive right to establish lines of communication along its right of way is void, as in restraint of trade. Union Trust Co. of New York v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (Postal Telegraph Cable Co., Intervenor). 8 N. M. 327 (43 Pac. Rep. 701). Rev. St. U. S., § 5263, authorizing telegraph companies to operate lines of telegraph over public domain and along military or post roads, etc., in effect prohibits a railroad company from granting an exclusive franchise along its right of way to any single telegraph company. Union Trust Co. of New York v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (Postal Telegraph Cable Co., Intervenors), 8 N. M. 327 (43 Pac. Rep. 701). Citing, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Burlington & S. W. Ry. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 1; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 513. An agreement not to sell land except for a given price is not void as against public policy. Rackemann v. Riverbank Imp. Co., 167 Mass. 1 (44 N. E. Rep. 990; 57 Am. St. Rep. 427).

ance.

Sec. 81. Rescission of-As to what is a disaffirmThe disaffirmance of one's contract or deed may be shown by an effort to restore the parties to their original condition or any other act which unequivocally manifests the

intention not to be bound by the contract. Such disaffirmance may arise from conduct clearly inconsistent with the contract. Thrash v. Starbuck, 141 Ind. 673 (44 N. E. Rep. 543). Citing, Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Ohio 252; Long v. Williams, 74 Ind. 115; Scranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68; Law v. Long, 41 Ind. 586; Haynes v. Bennett, 53 Mich. 15 (18 N. W. Rep. 589); Pyne v. Wood, 145 Mass. 548 (14 N. E. Rep. 775); Vent v. Osgood. 19 Pick. 572.

Sec. 82. As to the right of rescission-Particular cases. Where a sister conveys land to a brother on an agreement that the latter will support their aged parents during life, and the brother having been put into possession under a deed of conveyance refuses to support the parents, but makes haste to sell and convey the land, the contract may be rescinded and the deed set aside. Wilfong v. Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283 (23 S. E. Rep. 730). One who exchanged his land for a stock of goods which he had ample opportunity to examine cannot have the contract rescinded because he overvalued the goods. Adams v. Pardue, Tex. Civ. App.

(36 S. W. Rep. 1015). The rule is, that the right to disaffirm a contract for fraud, must be exercised promptly after the discovery of the fraud. Wood v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kas. 399 (43 Pac. Rep. 760). Citing, Bell v. Keepers, 39 Kas. 105 (17 Pac. Rep. 785). When a deed is attacked for fraud and evidence is insufficient to induce the court to avoid it absolutely, but there are suspicious circumstances as to the adequacy of consideration and fairness of the transaction, the court will permit it to stand for the sum already paid. Morell v. Miller, 28 Ore. 354 (43 Pac. Rep. 490). Citing, Boyd v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch. 478; U. S. v. Griswold, 7. Sawy. 308 (8 Fed. Rep. 496). A vendee is not entitled to a rescission of a conveyance of lands to him because they are not the lands he believed he was getting, where he could have discovered his mistake by ordinary care and his failure to do so was not the fault of the vendor. Beebe v. Birkett, 109 Mich. 663 (67 N. W. Rep. 966). A vendee cannot have his contract of purchase set aside on account of fraud, where he, after having full knowledge of all the facts, and his legal rights, joins with his vendor in conveying the land to another from whom he subsequently

takes the deed. Bostick v. Haynie, Rep. 856).

Tenn.

(36 S. W.

Sec. 83. Rescission of-Placing parties in statu quo. One who seeks to rescind a contract for fraud must repudiate it and tender back what has been received by him under its terms. Brady v. Cole, 164 Ill. 116 (45 N. E. Rep. 438); Lovell v. McCaughey, 8 S. Dak. 471 (66 N. W. Rep. 1085). As to return of consideration by one non compos, see Infants and Insane Persons. Where a vendor who has received part of the purchase price and executed a deed to his vendee which is delivered in escrow, seeks to rescind the sale on account of the vendee's unreasonable delay in the performance of the conditions of the escrow, he must return the purchase money paid and make reimbursement for improvements made. Tyler v. Cate, 29 Or. 515 (45 Pac. Rep. 800). A sale of land which has been procured by an agent of the vendor by means of promises which he had no authority to make and upon which the vendee relies, may be rescinded by the vendee upon the vendor's refusing to perform the promises of the agent, it appearing that the parties can be placed in statu quo. This is on the ground that the vendor cannot retain what is beneficial in the transaction while disclaiming that which is onerous. Rackemann v. Riverbank Imp. Co., 167 Mass. 1 (44 N. E. Rep. 990; 57 Am. St. Rep. 427). A vendee who seeks to rescind his contract of purchase on account of want of title in his vendor will not be held to account for the value of a house upon the land, which had been destroyed by fire, unless such destruction was the result of the vendee's negligence. Mackey v. Bowles, Ga. 720 125 S. E. Rep. 834).

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Sec. 84. Limitations upon corporate holding of land and making of contracts. Under Virginia Code, 1887, § 1073, which limits the quantity of land to be held by a railroad, it is held that where land in excess of the amount permitted has been conveyed to a railroad, it can make a valid title to its purchaser; and that the only remedy for a violation. of this statute is by proceedings against a corporation to forfeit its charter. Fayette Land Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274 (24 S. E. Rep. 1016). Statutory restrictions upon corporations as to the amount of land which they may hold will not be extended by implication to incorporated societies which are authorized to incorporate under the statutes, but which in fact have not incorporated and do not assume to act as corporations. Alden v. Rector of St. Peter's Parish, 158 Ill. 631 (42 N. E. Rep. 392). In the absence of legislative restraint, a city council has the right to take and hold land by devise under a will. McIntosh v. Charleston, 45 S. C. 584 (23 S. E. Rep. 943). A statute imposing certain conditions upon a foreign corporation in order for it to transact business in a certain state will not be construed so as to affect the right of such corporation to enforce valid contracts made with it before the passage of the statute. Pioneer Sav. & Loan Co. v. Cannon, 96 Tenn. 599 (36 S. W. Rep. 386; 54 Am. St. Rep. 858; 33 L. R. A. 112). An agreement in a trust deed executed to a foreign corporation of Louisiana to the effect that the laws of Arkansas are to govern in the construction of the obligation secured thereby is not doing business in Arkansas by such corporation so as to bring it within the statute imposing conditions upon foreign corporations in order that their transactions may be binding on citizens of that state. British & A. Mortg. Co. v. Winchell, 62 Ark. 160 (34 S. W. Rep. 891).

Unless

Sec. 85. Same-Foreign corporations. prohibited by the law creating it, a foreign corporation organized for the purpose of "mining and milling of gold or other minerals" in another state may acquire and dispose of real estate in such state in furtherance of the objects of its creation. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C. 712 (24 S. E. Rep. 124). The court say: "While a foreign corporation is not authorized to exercise powers in another state not granted in its charter, Diamond Match Co. v. Register of Deeds, 51 Mich. 145 (16 N. W. Rep. 314); Bank v. Godfrey, 23 Ill. 531, yet, where the privileges of holding real estate is therein conferred, it may, under the rules of comity, buy, hold, and sell land to the same extent that domestic corporations are authorized to deal in it. And, whether foreign or domestic, if authorized to hold land at all, they have all of the powers of an individual in relation to it, except in so far as they are expressly restricted by law. Lancaster v. Improvement Co., 140 N. Y. 576 (35 N. E. Rep. 964; 24 L. R. A. 322, and note); Com. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 129 Pa. 463 (18 Atl. Rep. 414; 15 Am. St. Rep, 724, and note); Blair v. Insurance Co., 10 Mo. 559 (47 Am. Dec. 129, and note); Ducate v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 172 (95 Am. Dec. 529, and note); 2 Mor. Priv. Corp. §§ 960-965."

Sec. 86. Deeds and Mortgages by-Power to make -Manner of execution. Construing and applying Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 2309, 2310, it is held that an unauthorized mortgage of a corporation can only be ratified in the same manner that the corporation could have conferred original authority to execute the same. Blood v. La Serena Land & W. Co., 113 Cal. 221 (45 Pac. Rep. 252). A conveyance of the real estate of a corporation shown to have been executed by one as its agent in pursuance of a resolution passed by, and entered upon the minutes of, such corporation is prima facie valid. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C. 712 (24 S. E. Rep. 124). The power of a municipality to incumber by mortgage lands devoted to public purposes, cannot be inferred from authority given to sell such lands. Vaughn v. Board of Com'rs, 118 N. C. 636 (24 S. E. Rep. 425). Where the board of directors of a corporation having general power to execute such obligations, execute

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