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by the common law of Virginia under which lands acquired by a corporation in violation of its charter can be forfeited to the state."

Sec. 62. Eleemosynary purposes-What are. A trust to provide education in mechanical arts for "boys and girls of California" is not void for uncertainty; nor does it violate the provision of the constitution (Art. 20, § 9), forbidding perpetuities "except for eleemosynary purposes." People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 (45 Pac. Rep. 270; 35 L. R. A. 269). The court say: "It may at once be said that the trust creates, and is intended to create a perpetuity. It may further be said that the beneficiaries under it are not limited to the poor. But is it for these reasons any the less an eleemosynary trust? It is quite true that the word ' eleemosynary' comes to us from the Greek word meaning 'alms,' but, while it is always interesting to note the origin and first meanings of words, this knowledge is frequently more curious than valuable; while to insist that the original meaning shall govern the word in its modern use and acceptation is very rarely permissible. It is in this way interesting to note that'sycophant' comes from Greek words meaning 'fig informer;' but it would scarcely be contended to-day that a man could not properly be called a sycophant unless he had dealings in figs. In short, words by use are sometimes degraded, sometimes ennobled; sometimes narrowed in meaning, sometimes broadened. Eleemosynary' has come in the law to be interchangeable with the word charitable.' A charitable trust or a charity is a donation in trust for promoting the welfare of mankind at large, or of a community, or of some class forming a part of it indefinite as to numbers and individuals. It may, but it need not, confer a gratuitous benefit upon the poor. It may, but it need not, look to the care of the sick or insane. It may, but it need not, seek to spread religion or piety. Schools and libraries, equally with asylums, hospitals, and religious institutions, are included within its scope. It is impossible to enumerate specifically all purposes for which eleemosynary trusts may be created. The difficulty is inherent in the subject-matter itself. With the progress of civilization new needs are developed, new vices

spring up, new forms of human activity manifest themselves, any or all of which, for their advancement or suppression, may become the proper object of an eleemosynary trust." A trust for the purposes of education or science is a charitable use, as that term has been interpreted in modern jurisprudence. Spence v. Widney, Cal. (46 Pac. Rep. 463).

Sec. 63. Preventing diversion-Parties and remedies. The donor as the founder of a charity, has a standing in court to restrain the diversion of the property donated from the charitable uses for which it was given. Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659 (35 Atl. Rep. 1072; 55 Am. St. Rep. 594; 35 L. R. A. 113). An owner of real estate in a city, neither contiguous to nor fronting on a lot dedicated on the town plat to church purposes, and such owner not being a member of the congregation holding services in the building erected on such lot, cannot maintain an action to enjoin and restrain the change of the use of such lot from pious to secular purposes. Armstrong v. Portsmouth Bldg. Co., 57 Kan. 62 (45 Pac. Rep. 67). The state is a proper party to an action to enforce the proper management of a public charity, authorized by Cal. Stats. 1885, p. 49, People ex rel Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 (45 Pac. Rep. 270; 35 L. R. A. 269). Members who have been denied the use of church property must appeal to the courts for redress and not resort to acts of trespass. Fulbright v. Higginbotham, 133 Mo. 668 (34 S. W. Rep. 875).

Sec. 64. Change of creed - Rights to property. Where the majority of a church abandons the religious faith on which the church was founded, such majority cannot hold the property belonging to the church, as against the minority, which adheres to the original faith. Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361 (33 N. E. Rep. 777; 44 N. E. Rep. 363; 32 L. R. A. 839). In reviewing the authorities upon this question the court say: "In Roshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 462 (8 Am. Rep. 275) it is said that it is the duty of the court to decide in favor of those, whether a minority or majority of the congregation, who are adhering to the doctrine professed by the congregation, and the form of worship in practice, as also in

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favor of the government of the church in operation, with which it is connected at the time the trust was declared. The title to church property of a divided congregation is in that part of it which is acting in harmony with its own law, and the ecclesiastical laws, usages, customs, and principles which were accepted among them before the dispute began are the standard for determining which party is right.' These quotations from the case named are but quotations from previous cases, a long line of which, both English and American, are cited in that case. That case has been so frequently quoted with approval by American courts of last resort on questions of this kind that the principles announced therein may be regarded as settled law in this country." "The court, in the case quoted from, further said in relation to the title deed in the case, equally pertinent in this, that'a religious society, incorporated or unincorporated, is but the trustee of a charity, and it has always been peculiarly within the province and duty of a court of equity to prevent the diversion of property held in trust for such purposes from the object and design of the original endowment. Whenever a church or religious society has been originally endowed in connection with or subordination to some ecclesiastical organization and form of church government, it can no more unite with some other organization, or become independent, than it can renounce its faith or doctrine, and adopt others. It was ultra vires. * * * They might, indeed, as individuals, have formed any kind of church they pleased, independent or connected with any other ecclesiastical organization. The land was before them, but they must cease to be a German Reform church, and abandon all claim of right to hold any of the property of that church. It was a part of their religious liberty, guaranteed to them by the constitution of the commonwealth, to separate from their former association if they became dissatisfied with its faith or order, and build for themselves another church, and organize on other principles; but it was no part of that liberty to appropriate to themselves in their new capacity property which had been solemnly conse crated to other uses. * * * To this question there can be but one answer in law, equity, good conscience,-justice as well to the living as the dead.' The court adjudged that the

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minority were acting in harmony with the law of the church, and that they were entitled to the property. These principles were recognized and reaffirmed by this court in the late case of Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind. 486 (29 N. E. Rep. 13; 14 L. R. A. 518), where it is said that there is no doubt that a person owning property in his own right may dedicate such property by way of trust to support and propagate any definite doctrines or principles, provided it does not violate any law of morality, and sufficiently expressed in the instrument by which the dedication is made the object of the trust. In such cases it is the duty of the courts, in a case properly made, to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust attaching to it, and, so long as there are persons in interest, standing in such relation to the property as that they have a right to direct its control, they may prevent the diversion of the property to any use different from that intended by the donor. If such trust is confided to a religious denomination or congregation, it is not in the power of a majority of that denomination or congregation, however large the majority may be, by reason of a change of religious views, to carry the property thus dedicated to a new and different doctrine.'" * * "The leading case cited in support of the proposition that the majority of a church divided into two conflicting bodies may hold the church property, though such majority may have abandoned the religious faith on which it was founded, is Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679. That was a case where the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, of Louisville, Ky., became divided into two conflicting bodies, each claiming to be the church, and each claiming the right to the control and possession of the church edifice and property. The case has no application here, because the division. there did not arise out of any difference of religious faith or belief, nor was there any claim that either side had changed their religious belief from that on which the church was founded. But the division. was solely on account of differences in political belief. One side adhered to the cause of the Union during the war of the Rebellion, and the other side adhered to the cause of the Rebellion. Appellee's counsel quote most of the following passage in the opinion in that case in support of their contention: The second class of

cases which we have described has reference to the case of a church of a strictly congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members, or by such local organizations as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government, and to property held by such a church, either by way of purchase or donation, with no other specific trust attached to it in the hands of the church, than it is for the use of that congregation as a religious society. In such a case, where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the right of such bodies must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of the government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to use the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of church control, then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no right in the property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization; for, if such were permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dog. mas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the property when purchased or given, the court will not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use those who, by regular succession and order, constitute the church, because they have changed in some respect their views of religious truth.' There was not only no case before the court of a church divided into two factions on account of one of them having abandoned the original faith on which it was founded, but the court was not speaking of such a case, nor a violation of a trust arising out of such a case by the use of the house of worship by the departing majority. The existing religious opinions, the right of inquiry into which is denied in the opinion, have no reference to the original faith on which

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