are presumed to have notice of its contents, although the officer incorrectly records the same. Zear v. Boston SafeDep. & T. Co., 2 Kan. App. 505 (43 Pac. Rep. 977). The constructive notice imported by the record of an instrument is strictly limited to that which is set forth on its face; and if, in a deed or mortgage as recorded, the particular land in controversy is not so described as to identify it with reasonable certainty, the record is not notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers or judgment creditors. Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91 (66 N. W. Rep. 131), following Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319 (41 N. W. Rep. 1054). A recorded deed which describes the lands conveyed by courses, distances and monuments, together with the corners and the witnesses to the corners, and gives the location, as the same are given in an official survey made by a surveyor, is notice to a subsequent purchaser although the land is improperly designated as lying in the "northwest" instead of the "northeast," quarter of the section. Frick v. Godare, 144 Ind. 170 (42 N. E. Rep. 1015). The record of a mortgage of lot 16 block 67 is not notice of a mortgage on lot 16 block 57. Baker v. Bartlett, 18 Mont. 446 (45 Pac. Rep. 1084; 56 Am. St. Rep. 594). A stranger purchasing from a grantee of a mortgagor whose mortgage appears of record to be barred by the statute of limitations is not bound by a prior revival of the mortgage debt by the mortgagor of which he has no notice. Cook v. Prindle, 97 Ia. 464 (66 N. W. Rep. 781; 59 Am. St. Rep. 424), reversing Cook v. Prindle, Ia. (63 N. W. Rep. 187; see Vol. IV, § 714). An index of a mortgage properly recorded charges one with notice thereof where such index correctly states the name of the mortgagor and the mortgagee although it is defective for failure to show whether the figures designating the description of the land refer to section and township, or block and lot. Malbon v. Grow, 15 Wash. 301 (46 Pac. Rep. 330).

Sec. 745.

Miscellaneous notes. The holder of a forged instrument, although he acquired it in good faith, does not acquire any rights against the true owner of the interests. pretended to be conveyed, by having his instrument recorded first. Lee v. Kellogg, 108 Mich. 535 (66 N. W. Rep. 380).

Fraudulent alterations in judicial records may be corrected by the court having control over them. Weston v. Mt. Desert & Eastern S. L. Co., 88 Me. 306 (34 Atl. Rep. 159). Deeds should be recorded in the county in which the land is situated at the time of recording. Geer v. Missouri Lum. & Min. Co., 134 Mo. 85 (34 S. W. Rep. 1099; 56 Am. St. Rep. 489). When the holder of an instrument to be recorded has left it with the recorder to be recorded, it is to be regarded as actually recorded from that time, whether it was actually recorded at that time or not, or whether it was recorded in the wrong book. Farabee v. McKerrihan, 172 Pa. St. 234 (33 Atl. Rep. 583; 51 Am. St. Rep. 374). See Vol. II, §§ 554–557.

TIME FOR RECORDING.

[In Vol. II, §§ 563–611; Vol. III, §§ 638–648, and Vol. IV., §§ 717– 722, will be found a compilation of the statutory provisions of the several states and territories in reference to the time for recording deeds, etc. Below we note such amendments, changes and additional constructions as have been made.]

Sec. 746. Alabama. (See Vol. II, § 563; Vol. III, § 638.) Code, § 1810, applies to a lease of standing timber for a period of three years. Milliken v. Faulk, 111 Ala. 658 (20 So. Rep. 594).

Sec. 747. Colorado. (See Vol. II, § 567.) Applying the statute it is held that a creditor who attaches real estate standing upon the records in the name of the attachment defendant, acquires a lien upon the property attached, by virtue of the statute, which takes precedence of an outstanding unrecorded title or interest. provided the attachment is made without notice or knowledge of the outstanding title or interest. Wahrenberger v. Waid, 8 Colo. App. 200 (45 Pac. Rep. 518). A grantee who fails to record his deed until the land is attached by his grantor's creditor, who has no notice of the deed, takes subject to the attachment lien. Jerome v. Carbonate Nat. Bank, 22 Colo. 37 (43 Pac. Rep. 215).

Creditors and subseunder the statute as

Sec. 748. Florida. (See Vol. II, § 571.) quent purchasers are placed upon the same footing to prior unrecorded conveyances. Lusk v. Reel, 36 Fla. 418 (18 So. Rep. 582; 51 Am. St. Rep. 32); Rogers v. Munnerlyn, 36 Fla. 591 (18 So. Rep. 669).

Sec. 749. Illinois. (See Vol. II, § 574.) A junior deed duly recorded prevails over a prior unrecorded deed of which the grantee.in the junior deed had no notice. Stevens v. Shannahan, 160 Ill. 330 (43 N. E. Rep. 350).

Sec. 750. Indiana. (See Vol. II, § 575.) A mortgage not recorded within forty-five days cannot be asserted against persons having a right to mechanics' liens at the time of the recording although notice of them was not filed until afterwards. Jenckes v. Jenckes, 145 Ind. 624 (44 N. E. Rep. 632).

Sec. 751. Missouri. (See Vol. II, § 586.) The statute applies to trust deeds. Ladd v. Anderson, 133 Mo. 625 (34 S. W. Rep. 872).

Sec. 752. Montana. (See Vol. II, § 587; Vol. IV, § 720.) A mortgagee who files a lis pendens in his action to reform a description in his mortgage is not a "purchaser," nor is the lis pendens a “conveyance" within the meaning of this statute. Baker v. Bartlett, 18 Mont. 446 (45 'Pac. Rep. 1084; 56 Am. St. Rep. 594).

Sec. 753. Nebraska. (See Vol. II, § 588; Vol. III, § 642.) Applying Comp. Stat. 1895, § 4108, which is the same as § 4340 set out on Vol. II, § 588, it is held that a prior unrecorded deed, passing the legal title, made in good faith, for a valuable consideration, will take precedence of a title based on a judicial sale made under an attachment of execution, if such deed be recorded before the evidence of the title based on the judicial sale is recorded. Sheasley v. Keens, 48 Neb. 57 (66 N. W. Rep. 1010).

Sec. 754. Nevada. (See Vol. II, § 589.) The statute is not intended to impart notice other than to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267 (45 Pac. Rep. 1009).

Sec. 755. North Carolina. (See Vol. II, § 594; Vol. III, § 644; Vol. IV, § 722). Under the statute a grantee who takes a deed under an agreement that it is not to be recorded until a certain mortgage on the premises is paid takes subject to a lien of a judgment creditor of the grantor whose judgment was rendered after the execution, but before the recording of the deed. Board of Com'rs v. Micks, 118 N. C. 162 (24 S. E. Rep. 729).

Sec. 756, North Dakota. Revised Codes 1895, § 3594, contains the same provision as § 3293 of the Compiled Laws of Dakota referred to in Volume II, § 569.

Sec. 757. Oklahoma. (See Vol. II, § 597.) "No deed, mortgage, contract, bond, lease or other instrument relating to real estate, other than a lease for a period not exceeding one year and accompanied by actual possession, shall be valid as against third persons unless acknowledged and recorded as herein provided; except, actual notice to such third persons shall be equivalent to due acknowledgment, and recording." Laws, 1897, p. 94.

Sec. 758. Washington. (See Vol. II, § 608.) Section 1439, referred to in Volume II, § 608, now reads, “All deeds, mortgages, and

assignments of mortgages, shall be recorded in the office of the county auditor of the county where the land is situated, and shall be valid as against bona fide purchascrs from the date of their filing for record in said office; and when so filed shall be notice to all the world." Law, 1897, p. 5.

Sec. 759. Wisconsin. (See Vol. II, § 610; Vol. III, § 648.) In order for a subsequent purchaser to claim any benefit of § 2241, the particular conveyance under which he holds must be recorded before the instrument over which priority is claimed. Butler v. Bank of Mazeppa, 94 Wis. 351 (68 N. W. Rep.998).

REDEMPTION.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 760. Change in redemption statute-Impairing obligation of contracts-Constitutional law. The decision in the case of Beverly v. Barnitz, 55 Kan. 466 (42 Pac. Rep. 725; 49 Am. St. Rep. 257; 31 L. R. A. 74), epitomized in Vol. IV, § 723, has been reversed by the supreme court of the United States which holds that a statute which authorizes the redemption of property sold upon foreclosure of a mortgage, where no right of redemption previously existed, or which extends the period of redemption beyond the time formerly allowed, cannot constitutionally apply to a sale under a mortgage executed before its passage. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118. The same is held by the supreme court of Idaho, in construing Sess. Laws, 1895, p. 31. Wilder v. Campbell, Idaho (43 Pac. Rep. 677). The original ruling of the supreme court of Kansas was adopted by the supreme court of Montana in construing Mont. Act July 1, 1895, and by the supreme court of Oregon in construing Laws, 1895, p. 59. State v. Gilliam, 18 Mont. 94 (44 Pac. Rep. 394; 31 L. R. A. 721); State ex rel German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Sears, 29 Ore. 580 (43 Pac. Rep. 482). But since the decision of the United States supreme court these cases have been reversed. State ex rel Thos. Cruse Sav. Bank v. Gilliam, 18 Mont. 94 (45 Pac. Rep. 661; 33 L. R. A. 556); State ex rel Ger. Sav. & L. Soc. v. Scars, 29 Ore. 580 (46 Pac. Rep. 785).

Sec. 781. The right to redeem and who may exercise it. An owner exercising his right to redeem land acquires with it all the appurtenances, rights, preferences and privileges incident to the land. Hays v. Merchants' Bank, 14 Wash. 192 (44 Pac. Rep. 137). An attorney may redeem for his client who has the right to redeem without consulting with him where he knows that it is his client's desire to have such redemption made. Rogers v. Rogers, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 890). The right of a junior mortgagee to maintain an equitable action to redeem from a senior mortgage which has been foreclosed without making him a party is not lost by such junior mortgagee purchasing the property at his own foreclosure sale before the expiration of the statutory time to redeem. Mc Cormick Harvesting Co. v. Llewellyn, 96 Ia. 745 (65 N. W. Rep. 412). A general creditor of

a deceased person whose claim has been allowed against the estate, has no lien upon the real estate of the deceased which entitles him to redeem from the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the deceased in his lifetime, although the statute (Minn. Gen. Stat., 1894, § 4509) provides that "the allowance or disallowance of any claim shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for or against the estate." Nelson v. Rodgers, 65 Minn. 246 (68 N. W. Rep. 18). Under a statute (Colo. Gen. Stat., § 1851) giving the right of redemption to any defendant "whose lands or tenements shall be sold by virtue of any execution," it is held that actual ownership is not the test of the right to redeem and where land was sold as the property of a defendant he may redeem whether the land actually belonged to him or not. Floyd v. Sellers, Colo. App. (44 Pac. Rep. 371). A mortgagor whose equity of redemption has been sold on execution prior to a foreclosure sale under the mortgage which extinguished his title in the land, may redeem from the execution sale in order to assert his rights to any surplus arising from the foreclosure sale. Da Silva v. Turner, 166 Mass. 407 (44 N. E. Rep. 532). In construing Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 781, which provides that any person having a undivided interest in the property sold may redeem the property sold, or any parcel or parcels sold in one body, and "shall have a lien on the several shares of the other owners for their respective shares of