his title is brought in question under facts showing a substantial dispute in reference thereto, the court ordinarily will not enjoin, or, if an injunction has been already granted, will not make it perpetual, until there is a settlement of the title at law, unless in cases of serious and irreparable injury the aid of the court is invoked to preserve the property pending a legal suit already instituted to test the legal right; but the second section of Florida Acts 1889, ch. 3884, extends the powers of the court of chancery in the cases therein provided for beyond the limits of its jurisdiction as exercised when the right of trial by jury was first secured in this state by constitutional provision, in this: that claimants of timbered lands are given the right to have an injunction against the trespasses mentioned, without reference to the character of the injury as being irreparable or the adequacy of the legal remedy for the wrong, or actual possession of the claimant. To the extent of conferring jurisdiction on the court of chancery to enjoin the trespasses mentioned in this section, by a mere trespasser without color of right or authority, the act can operate; but to the extent of awarding an account for damages for a mere trespass cognizable at law, and in respect to which the court of equity had no jurisdiction independent of the statute, it impairs the right of trial by jury according to the course of the common law and secured by the constitution. Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637 (18 So. Rep. 859; 30 L. R. A. 754)·

Sec. 708. Appointment of receivers - Practice. After a state court has rendered a judgment establishing a mechanic's lien upon specific property and ordered its sale, the execution of such decree cannot be interrupted by the appointment of a receiver by a federal court. Rogers & Baldwin Hard. Co. v. Cleveland Bldg Co., 132 Mo. 442 (34 S. W. Rep. 57; 53 Am. St. Rep. 494; 31 L. R. A. 335). In an action to foreclose a mortgage on the interest of a lessee it is not competent for the court to appoint a receiver to represent the interests of both the lessee and lessor. Woodward v. Winchill, 14 Wash. 394 (44 Pac. Rep. 860). An order appointing a receiver at the request of the mortgagee, in so far as it authorizes the receiver to take charge of property not covered by the mortgage, is void. Alabama Nat. Bank v.

Mary Lee Coal & Ry. Co., 108 Ala. 288 (19 So. Rep. 404). Where a judgment creditor's demand is secured by mortgage, a receiver of the judgment debtor's property may be appointed in supplementary proceedings, although the creditor has not exhausted his mortgage security. Whether a receiver should be appointed is a matter resting in the sound judicial discretion of the court. It would be oppressive, and an abuse of discretion, to appoint one where it appeared that the mortgage security was ample to pay the creditor in full. Bean v. Heron, 65 Minn. 64 (67 N. W. Rep. 805). An order appoint. ing a receiver, pendente lite, cannot be superseded as a matter of right, during the pendency of an appeal from that order, but the court may, in its discretion, allow a supersedeas upon conditions which it may affix for the protection of the parties. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 48 Neb. 755 (67 N. W. Rep. 766).

Sec. 709. Receivers in foreclosure proceedings. A petition by the plaintiff in foreclosure proceedings for the appointment of a receiver, filed after a decree of foreclosure, which showed that the property was inadequate to secure the debt; that the debtor was insolvent; that the mortgagors did not occupy the property; that the security was in peril from the lapse of insurance and the maturity of taxes, was held sufficient. Harris v. United States Sav. Fund & Inv. Co., 146 Ind. 265 (45 N. E. Rep. 328). In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the insolvency of the mortgagor, the inadequacy of the security, and the failure to apply the rents of the mortgaged premises in keeping up the security, by paying delinquent taxes and interest past due on a prior mortgage, is a sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite to collect the rents and so apply them; and the fact that the mortgagor, at the time of making the first mortgage, gave the mortgagee therein named a written assignment of these rents cannot be urged by the mortgagor as a reason why a receiver should not be appointed. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Backus, 64 Minn. 43 (66 N. W. Rep. 5). A statute (Iowa Code, 2903) authorizing the appointment of a receiver in foreclosure proceedings, under certain conditions, "during the pendency of the action" does not prevent the appointment of

a receiver during the period allowed for redemption, under a stipulation contained in the mortgage. Such a stipulation is valid and enforcible against the grantee of the mortgaged premises. Hubbell v. Avenue Ins. Co., 97 Ia. 135 (66 N. W. Rep. 85).

Sec. 710. Suits affecting lands in hands of receivers. Under § 140, Cal. Civ. Code, a receiver takes the husband's lands subject to all prior liens and the prior lien holders may take such proceedings elsewhere as are necessary for the enforcement of such liens, without regard to the volition of the court or judge making the appointment. When a receiver is appointed under § 140, Cal. Civ. Code, and the court appointing refuses the holder of liens on the husband's lands lying in other counties leave to enforce them in other courts, mandamus will lie to compel the court to grant such leave. It is not a contempt of court for a lien holder on lands for which a receiver has been appointed under § 140, Cal. Civ. Code, to proceed without leave of court appointing receiver, to enforce his liens in other courts, on the lands lying within the jurisdiction of such other courts. Petaluma Sav. Bank v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. 488 (44 Pac. Rep. 177).

Sec. 711. Sale of lands in hands of receiver. A receiver's sale will not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price unless there be some unfair practice at the sale or those interested are surprised without their fault or negligence. Parker v. Bluffton Car Wheel Co., 108 Ala. 140 (18 So. Rep. 938). Notice of a motion to confirm a receiver's sale given to a creditor who, on behalf of himself and other creditors, applied for the appointment of the receiver is sufficient, where no objection is made to it by such other creditors. Parker v. Bluffton Car Wheel Co., 108 Ala. 140 (18 So. Rep. 938). Property in the custody of a receiver cannot be ordered sold upon the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien by a court other than the one appointing him. Premier Steel Co. v. McElwaine-Richards Co., 144 Ind. 614 (43 N. E. Rep. 876).

Sec. 712. Receivers in proceedings supplementary -New York statute construed. In New York, the Code

of Civil Procedure, § 2468, provides that on filing the order appointing the receiver or a certified copy, in the county where the property is situated, the real property is vested in the receiver. This statute is held to apply only where the judgment creditor has exhausted his remedy at law for the sale of the real estate. Faneuil Hall Nat. Bank v. Bussing, 147 N. Y. 665 (42 N. E. Rep. 345). Speaking of the statute in question, the court say: "This section, however, is to be read and construed in connection with the other provisions of the statute, and cannot be taken literally. It must be constantly kept in mind that the receiver is appointed in proceedings supplementary to the execution, and takes no such absolute title to real estate as would enable him to sell it when it is subject to the lien of judgments, and can be sold under executions issued thereon in the manner pointed out by statute, and subject to all rights of redemption. The receiver's title to the real estate is a qualified one in the nature of a security for the plaintiff in the judgment. It does not divest the debtor of the legal title, but the latter's conveyance of the premises would be subject to the claim of the receiver. The proceedings supplementary to the execution, as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, are a substitute for the former creditors' bill in chancery, and are a summary mode of ascertaining the judgment debtor's property interests of every kind. It is only when the remedy at law has been invoked and exhausted that the creditor may avail himself of those more effective remedies which are to be found in a court of equity."

Where three persons

Sec. 713. Parties plaintiff. jointly contract for the purchase of land, making a cash payment to the seller, giving him their joint notes for the balance of the purchase money, and taking from him a bond to convey the land to them jointly upon the payment of the notes, neither one of the purchasers can maintain an action against the seller for a breach of the bond, without joining therein the other purchasers, unless some good reason for a failure sc to do, such as death, or their refusal to join, is alleged. Phil lips v. Poole, 96 Ga. 515 (23 S. E. Rep. 504). Where the only interest one has in real estate is reversionary in its nature and

dependent on a contingency which has never happened and probably never will happen he cannot maintain an action for an injury to the property. Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636 (45 Pac. Rep. 874). Owners of separate tracts of land which will be permanently injured by a contemplated public improvement may unite in an action to enjoin the improvement; but they must sue separately to recover damages to their respective tracts caused by the same public improvement. Geurkink v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 (44 Pac. Rep. 570).

Sec. 714. Parties defendant. In a proceeding by executors to cancel a deed of their testator on account of nondelivery all persons in life who could claim under the deed a vested interest in the land conveyed are necessary parties. Brown v. Brown, 97 Ga. 531 (25 S. E. Rep. 353; 33 L. R. A. 816). Parties acquiring an interest in land pendente lite, may be admitted to defend after the granting of a new trial, and having been made parties below are necessary parties to an appeal from the order granting new trial. Pierce v. Downing, 56 Kan. 250 (43 Pac. Rep. 223).

Sec. 715. Commencement of suit-Sufficiency of complaint. Where a statute provides that a suit in chancery shall be commenced by filing a bill of complaint, it is held that the filing of such bill is the commencement of the suit within the statute of limitations. Johnson v. Davidson, 162 Ill. 232 (44 N. E. Rep. 499). A bill of complaint in equity which shows no cause of action against the defendants with reference to the subject matter of the suit, and tenders no issue with them and shows that it cannot tender an issue even by amendment, will not support a judgment, even upon default. Hall v. Melvin, 62 Ark. 439 (35 S. W. Rep. 1109). Under the Iowa Code, § 2630, causes of action by the same party against the same party, in the same right, where either may be prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings, may be joined in the same petition. Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co., 97 Ia. 343 (66 N. W. Rep. 231). It is sufficient in a bill for an injunction to restrain a steam railroad company from laying its tracks on the land of the complainant, to allege that the complainant is the owner and occupant of the premises, giving the boundaries thereof,