such a contract. Boyer v. Chandler, 160 Ill. 394 (43 N. E. Rep. 803; 32 L. R. A. 113). Possession is only notice of the title under which it is held. Robertson v. Wheeler, 162 III. 566 (44 N. E. Rep. 870). Where a purchaser finds his vendor in possession, either in person or by a tenant, he has a right to assume that such possession was rightfully obtained, unless he has knowledge or information to the contrary. Robertson v. Wheeler, 162 Ill. 566 (44 N. E. Rep. 870). The continuance in possession of the tenants of a vendor after his conveyance does not impart notice of the rights of the vendee who does not place his deed on record. Wahrenberger v. Waid, 8 Colo. App. 200 (45 Pac. Rep. 518); Griffin v. Hall, 111 Ala. 601 (20 So. Rep. 485). For case depending upon particular facts and illustrating the proposition that possession is evidence of title, see Mickle v. Montgomery, 111 Ala. 415 (20 So. Rep. 441). In order for possession under an unrecorded deed to operate as notice to a purchaser, of the possessor's rights, the possession must be open, visible, exclusive and unambiguous. Wells v. American Mortg. Co., 109 Ala. 430 (20 So. Rep. 136). When possession of real estate under an unrecorded deed is relied on as notice to the purchaser of the property at execution sale, it must appear that there was actual possession, so as to give notice at the time of the rendition of the judgment under which the sale was made. Lusk v. Reel, 36 Fla. 418 (18 So. Rep. 582; 51 Am. St. Rep. 32).

Sec. 642. Presumption as to knowledge of title. Where a person other than the grantor is in possession of land, it is the purchaser's duty to inquire into the title, and the presumption of law is that upon such inquiry he learns the true state of the title. Actual possession of land is notice to all the world of whatever rights the occupant really has in the premises, and a vendor cannot convey to any other person without such person being affected by such notice. Actual knowledge of such possession on the part of those sought to be charged with such notice is not necessary. Notice in such cases is a legal deduction from the fact of possession. Possession, in order to be constructive notice of a claim of title, must be open, visible, and exclusive, and is shown by any

intention to appropriate it Such use may be any to calculated to apprise the Tate v. Pensacola, G.

use of the land that indicates an for the benefit of the possessor. which the land is adapted, and is world that the property is occupied. L. & Devp. Co., 37 Fla. 439 (20 So. Rep. 542; 53 Am. St. Rep. 251).

POWER OF ATTORNEY.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 643. Authority conferred by and conveyance under. A power of attorney authorizing one to "superintend" the property of his principals, and to "preserve, manage, sell, and dispose of" the same, and also to locate mill sites, mining claims, and water rights, and " to manage, work, sell and dispose of them," does not authorize the agent to execute a note and mortgage in the name of his principal although given to secure a debt incurred by the agent in the management of the property; and a failure of the principal to object to such an act, it appearing that he had no knowledge of it until the bringing of an action to foreclose the mortgage, does not constitute a ratification within the meaning of the Cal. Civ. Code, § 2310. Galinsky v. Allison, 114 Cal. 458 (46 Pac. Rep. 295). Under a power of attorney executed by the widow and daughter of R. H. W. in which the attorney is authorized "to hunt up, develop, establish, and dispose of all lands and land claims belonging to the estate of R. H. W. deceased, of which we are lawful heirs, and generally to represent and manage our interests in said estate, giving and granting unto our said attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as we might or could do if personally present," it is held that a conveyance by such attorney passed all interest of the principals held by them in such estate at the time of its execution, in whatever right. Parke v. Wynne, 89 Tex. 413 (34 S. W. Rep. 907).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

[In Vol. IV, S$ 591-632, will be found a compilation of the statutory provisions of the several states and territories concerning powers of attor ney. Below we give such amendments, changes and additional constructions as have been made.]

Sec. 644. California. (See Vol. IV, § 593). The legislature of 1897 enacted the Torrens system of land transfers. See Stat. 1897, pp. 138 166. This statute provides that, "before any person can convey, charge, or otherwise deal with registered land, or any estate or interest therein, as attorney in fact for another, the deed or instrument empowering him so to act shall be filed with the registrar, and a memorial thereof entered upon the original and duplicate certificates. If the attorney shall so desire the registrar shall deliver to him a certified copy of the power of attorney, with the endorsements thereon. Revocation of a power may be registered in a like manner." Statutes 1897, p. 155, § 66.

Sec. 645. Illinois. (See Vol. IV, § 600.) Illinois has adopted the Torrens system of land transfers. See Laws 1897, pp. 139 165. This statute provides that "before any person can convey, charge, or otherwise deal with registered land, or any estate or interest therein, as attorney in fact for another, the deed or instrument empowering him so to act shall be filed with the registrar, and a memorial thereof entered upon the register in like manner as in the case of a charge. If the attorney sha.l so desire the registrar shall deliver to him a certified copy of the power of attorney, with the endorsements thereon. Revocation of a power may be registered in like manner." Laws 1897, p. 156, § 67.

Sec. 646. Michigan. (See Vol. IV, § 608.) The record of a power of attorney recorded prior to Mar. 1, 1847, is made “prima facie evidence of the due execution and acknowledgment of such letter of attorney." Pub. Acts 1897, p. 112.

Sec. 647. Minnesota. (See Vol. IV, § 609.) Pub. Acts 1897, p. 491, validates prior conveyances of a married woman in which her hus band joined which were executed under a power of attorney given by such married woman in the execution of which power the husband did not join.

Sec. 648, New Jersey. (See Vol. IV, § 616.) For act validating deeds executed and recorded under power of attorney prior to July 4, 1776, see Laws, 1898, p. 671.

Sec. 649. North Dakota. (See Vol. IV, § 604.) "The certificate of acknowledgment by an attorney in fact must be substantially in the following form: State of.. ...County of........... ss: On this............day of.... in the year of. me (here insert the name and quality of the officer), personally appeared ..known to me (or proved to me on the oath of..

before

.)

to be the person who is described in and whose name is subscribed to the written instrument as the attorney in fact of............and acknowledged to me that he subscribed the name of.... thereto as prin

cipal and his own name as attorney in fact." Rev. Codes, 1895, § 3584. Instrument revoking power of attorney must be acknowledged or proved, certified and recorded in the same office in which the power is recorded. Revised Codes 1895, § 3596.

Sec. 650. Pennsylvania. (See Vol. IV, § 624.) For statute validating conveyances executed under power of attorney in his own name instead of in the name of his principal, see Laws 1897, p. 81.

Sec. 651. Utah. (See Vol. IV, § 626.) A husband or wife may constitute the other his or her attorney in fact. Rev. Stat. (1898), § 1205.

PUBLIC LANDS.

Sec. 652.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Conclusiveness of decisions of the state courts and land department. A judgment of a state court rendered before the issue of a patent for lands denying to one the right of preemption on account of his alienage does not bind the land department nor affect the title conveyed by a patent subsequently issued. Merriam v. Bachioni, 112 Cal. 191 (44 Pac. Rep. 481). In Illinois it is held that in determining the riparian rights of persons acquiring from the 'United States lands bordering on non-navigable waters, the courts of that state are not bound by federal decisions. Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462 (44 N. E. Rep. 286; 52 Am. St. Rep. 380; 33 L. R. A. 146). A decision of the secretary of the interior that certain land was not included within a grant to a corporation is conclusive until reversed in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and cannot be collaterally attacked in an action to recover the purchase price of the land by one to whom it has been conveyed by such corporation. Moore 1. Northern Pac. R. Co., 18 Mont, 290 (45 Pac. Rep. 215), following Colburn v. Railroad Co., 13 Mont. 476 (34 Pac. Rep. 1017). Where title to lands has passed from the government by a patent under a prior legal survey, courts are not

7.

bound by the interior department's affirmance of a resurvey. Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221 (42 N. E. Rep. 1011).

Sec. 653. School lands-Miscellaneous notes. A patent, regular in form, issued by the governor of the state for 80 acres of school land, conveys a prima facie title to the patentee. In an action brought by a person in possession of school land under a certificate of purchase, to quiet his title against the holder of a patent to such land, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show the invalidity of the patent and the facts that certificate of purchase is prior to the date of the patent, that the plaintiff is in possession of the land, that he has paid all the interest payments required by law, and that the balance of the purchase money is not due, are insufficient to overcome the patent, where it appears that the land has been taxable for a considerable number of years, and no proof is made with reference to the payment of the taxes, nor with reference to the transactions between the patentee and the officers authorized to make sales of school lands, on which the action of the governor in issuing the patent was based. Richards v. Griffith, 57 Kan. 234 (45 Pac. Rep. 600). A statutory provision (Neb. Com. Stat., ch. 80, § 14) providing that no assignment of a lease contract shall be valid unless the same be entered of record in the office of the commissioner of public lands and buildings, is for the protection of the state and no assignee obtains any right, as against the state, until the assignment has been entered of record; and an assignee whose assignment has not been so entered of record is not entitled to redeem from a forfeiture of the lease. Langan v. Binfield, 49 Neb. 857 (69 N. W. Rep. 123). Kan. Gen. Stat. 1889, par. 5769, construed and applied-application to purchase school land-notice-particular notice held not fatally defective. Beedy v. State, 4 Kan. App. 575 (46 Pac. Rep. 65). Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 80, art. 1, § 16, construed and applied-forfeiture of school land leases-notice. State ex rel Stewart v. Henton, 48 Neb. 488 (67 N. W. Rep. 443); Langan v. Binfield, 49 Neb. 857 (69 N. W. Rep. 123). Particular fact case as to liability of purchaser to account for improvements on the lands, see J. F. Hart Lumber Co. v. Rucker, 15 Wash. St. 456 (46 Pac. Rep. 728).