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Sec. 609.

Building and loan association mortgages

- Foreign associations. A mortgage taken by a foreign building and loan association which has not complied with the statutory requisites for doing business in the state in which the mortgaged lands are situated may be enforced for the money lent, and for tax liens paid, with interest, but no recov ery can be had by reason of bonus, premium, dues and other charges made by said association under its rules and laws. Maine Guarantee Co. v. Cox, 146 Ind. 107 (42 N. E. Rep. 915). The court say: "There is no doubt as to the power of the legislature to prescribe the conditions upon which a corporation organized under and by virtue of the laws of another state may do business in this state. Insurance Co. v. Harrah, 47 Ind. 236; Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250 (5 N. E. Rep. 178); State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609 (31 Pac. Rep. 1097; 34 Am. St. Rep. 152; 18 L. R. A. 657). As shown in Elston v. Piggott, 94 Ind. 14, however, a foreign corporation, unless forbidden by law, may loan money in this state, take mortgage security therefor, and have judgment of foreclosure, in case the debt created thereby is not paid. It is also clear, we think, that though a foreign corporation may be prohibited from doing a particular kind of business in this state, unless there has first been a compliance with such regulations as may be prescribed by law, yet this will not make it unlawful for such corporation to do business here of a general character, as loaning money or collecting a debt. Boulware v. Davis, 90 Ala. 207 (8 So. Rep. 84)."

Sec. 610. Building and loan association mortgages -Determining amount due-Method of computation. To compute the amount of recovery on foreclosure of a mortgage in a building and loan association for default of the mortga gor, there should be added to the arrearages of dues, interest, and fines, the present value of the anticipated future payments, all stated dues, and interest for the remainder of the time required for the maturity of the stock; that is, the amount of principal which, with interest thereon from the present date to the time of maturity of the stock, would equal the total amount of such anticipated future payments. Roberts v. American Bldg & L. Ass's, 62 Ark. 572 (36 S. W. Rep. 1085; 33 L. R. A. 744). Where a stockholder in a building

and loan association executed a mortgage to it, in determining the rights of the parties, he is chargeable with the amount of the loan with interest and is entitled to credit with his payments upon stock with interest upon each payment from the time it was made. Middle States Loan, B. & C. Co. v. Hagerstown M. & U. Co., 82 Md. 506 (33 Atl. Rep. 886). In an action to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a loan (made by the share for premiums) by a building and loan association to one of its members, the amount of the recovery should be determined in accordance with the special statutory rule applicable to loans of that character, as provided by Kan. Gen. Stat. (1889), ch. 23, art. 17, § 272. Murphy v. Goodland Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 2 Kan. App. 330 (43 Pac. Rep. 863). It is held in Nebraska that in ascertaining the amount due on a building and loan mortgage, the borrower is entitled to a credit of the present value of the stock at the time of foreclosure, as well as to a fair and reasonable credit on account of unearned premium; and by-laws fixing the terms of ascertaining such credit will be enforced, where not unconscionable. Livingston Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200 (68 N. W. Rep. 375). Forfeited payments made by a member of a loan association on shares which lapse in consequence of his default cannot be credited upon his loan from the association. Pioneer Sav. & Loan Co. v. Cannon, 96 Tenn. 599 (36 S. W. Rep. 386; 54 Am. St. Rep. 858; 33 L. R. A. 112). As to the proper method of accounting in case of foreclosure of a mortgage given to a building and loan association, see Rowland v. Old Dominion Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 118 N. C. 173 (24 S. E. Rep. 366); Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 117 N. C. 308 (23 S. E. Rep. 450; 53 Am. St. Rep. 585); Maudlin v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 63 Minn. 358 (65 N. W. Rep. 645).

Sec. 611.

Miscellaneous notes. A mortgagee is not bound by a subsequent judgment, to which he is not a party, rendered against his mortgagor in favor of the holder of a tax title. Logan v. Stieff, 36 Fla. 473 (18 So. Rep. 762). A mortgage given to secure a certain debt cannot be extended, by mere oral declaration, to secure an entirely different indebtedness contracted subsequently to the execution of the mort

gage. Bell v. Coffin, 2 Kan. App. 887 (43 Pac. Rep. 861). A mortgage given by one as surety to secure the performance of an executory contract between other parties, is discharged by a subsequent material alteration of such contract by the parties thereto without the mortgagor's consent; but it will remain enforcible as to other independent obligations which it is given to secure and which are in no way connected with the contract. Parke & Lacy Co. v. White River Lum. Co., 110 Cal. 658 (43 Pac. Rep. 202). A mortgage to two persons, given in lieu of their heirship interests in the mortgagor's estate, which stipulates for the payment of a certain sum to one at a given date and an equal sum to the other at a later date, was held not to be a joint mortgage which could be enforced by the survivor for the whole amount. How. Ann. Mich. Stat., §§ 5560, 5561, applied. Cooley v. Kinney, 109 Mich. 34 (66 N. W. Rep. 674). A mortgage given upon lands in which a wife subsequently acquires a dower interest for life can only be enforced against such interest in such proportion as the gross value of her right of dower bears to the value of the entire mortgaged premises, and a complaint to enforce the lien of the mortgage against such dower interest must aver the facts from which the amount chargeable against it can be calculated. Fowle v. House, 29 Ore. 114 (44 Pac. Rep. 692). For collation of authorities discussing how far the negotiability of a note is affected by stipulations in a mortgage given to secure it, see Brooke v. Struthers, 110 Mich. 562 (68 N. W. Rep. 272; 35 L. R. A. 536); Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580 (68 N. W. Rep. 278; 35 L. R. A. 544). Cal. Const. Art. 13, § 5, applied-validity of mortgagor's agreement to pay taxes on mortgage. California State Bank v. Webber, 110 Cal. 538 (42 Pac. Rep. 1066).

NOTICE.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec, 612. Instruments not entitled to record. Where one holding in subordination to a reversionary estate takes and records a tax deed of the premises in which the description is

so indefinite as to be applicable to any number of pieces of property in the community, such deed is insufficient to constitute notice of an adverse claim to the premises supposed to be conveyed. Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Ala. 160 (20 So. Rep. 604). The recording of a memorandum of a sale of land which is neither acknowledged nor proved, does not constitute constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser. Brinton v. Scull, N. J. Eq. (35 Atl. Rep. 843).

Sec. 613. Knowledge sufficient to put one on inquiry. Whatever is sufficient to put a party upon inquiry is notice. Frick v. Godare, 144 Ind. 170 (42 N. E. Rep. 1015). When a purchaser of real estate has knowledge of such facts respecting the title as would lead an honest man using ordinary caution to make further inquiry, and does not do so, he is chargeable with notice of such facts as by the use of ordinary diligence he might have learned. O'Connor v. Mahoney, 159 III. 69 (42 N. E. Rep. 378); Barret v. Baker, 136 Mo. 512 (33 S. W. Rep. 162). One who takes the acknowledgment of a deed and delivers it to the grantee is chargeable with notice of the latter's title. Greenlee v. Smith, 4 Kan. App. 733 (46 Pac. Rep. 543). A wife is not charged with notice of a parol agreement of her husband affecting the priority of his rights as mortgagee as they appear of record. Loewen v. Forsee, 137 Mo. 29 (35 S. W. Rep. 1138). Proceedings by an administrator to sell lands of his decedent to pay debts are not constructive notice to a purchaser of such lands from the heirs of such decedent of an unrecorded deed executed in pursuance of such sale. Robertson v. Wheeler, 162 Ill. 566 (44 N. E. Rep. 870). Particular facts held insufficient to charge a mortgagee with notice of a prior unrecorded purchase money mortgage. Protection Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Knowlas, 54 N. J. Eq. 519 (34 Atl. Rep. 1083). A purchaser who employs one as his attorney who assisted the vendor in acquiring the title to be conveyed is not chargeable with notice of facts which the attorney acquired under his employment by the vendor, and a disclosure of which would be a breach of professional confidence. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153 (66 N. W. Rep. 518; 57 Am. St. Rep. 899). A corporation is charged with the knowledge of its president, act

ing as attorney in fact of one making an assignment to it. Witter v. McCarthy Co., Cal. (43 Pac. Rep. 969). For case depending upon particular facts and which illustrates what is sufficient to put one upon inquiry, see Barrett v. Baker, 136 Mo. 512 (37 S. W. Rep. 130).

Sec. 614.

Possession as notice of unrecorded deed. Payment of taxes and making occasional improvements by the grantee in an unrecorded deed, his grantor at the same time and with his consent exercising concurrent acts of ownership over the premises, will not charge a subsequent purchaser with notice of such deed. Jerome v. Carbonate Nat. Bank, 22 Colo. 37 (43 Pac. Rep. 215). The court say: "With respect to the character of possession which operates as notice of the rights of one claiming thereunder, it is said that neither actual occupation, cultivation, nor residence are necessary to constitute actual possession, when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.' Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41; Simmons Creck Coal Co. v. Duran, 142 U. S. 417-442 (12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 239). It is a familiar principle of equity jurisprudence that, if one obtains a conveyance of property, with notice of an equity in relation thereto binding upon his grantor, he will also be bound.' Only innocent purchasers without notice will be protected. Actual notice, however, is not essential. If the subsequent purchaser' has knowledge of such facts as ought to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to the title, he is chargeable with notice of all facts pertaining thereto to which diligent inquiry and investigation would have led him.' If reliance is had upon possession, it must be visible and exclusive and continuous, and not temporary or occa. sional. It may be evidenced, however, by any acts which clearly show an appropriation of the property to the use of the person claiming the same. Mason v. Mullahy, 145 Ill. 383 (34 N. E. Rep. 36). It has also been said that this possession must be inconsistent with the title of the apparent owner by the record.

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