confirm judicial sales. Beatrice Paper Co. v. Beloit Iron Works, 46 Neb. 900 (65 N. W. Rep. 1059). Executors may appeal from an order of court setting aside and refusing to confirm a sale made by them under the will. Warehime v. Graf, 83 Md. 98 (34 Atl. Rep. 364). The validity of a deed made by a commissioner appointed to make a sale of land is not affected by the fact that there is nothing added to his signature to show that the deed was not executed in his individual capacity, it not appearing that he had any interest in the land. Exum v. Baker, 118 N. C. 545 (24 S. E. Rep. 351).

Sec. 426. Title and rights of purchaser. The rule of caveat emptor applies to judicial sales. Cooper v. Lindsay, 109 Ala. 338 (19 So. Rep. 379). A purchaser at a sale made at public auction in pursuance of an order of court is not bound to look beyond the decree in order to ascertain its necessity. He is bound to ascertain that the court had jurisdiction to grant the order, but, finding that it has, the truth of the record in other respects may be assumed. Munday v. Kaufman, 48 La. 591 (19 So. Rep. 619). Where an advance bid necessitates a resale, a purchaser at the first sale who is entitled to have a cash payment made to the officer returned to him leaves such money with the officer does so at his own risk and is not entitled to have the same credited on the amount bid by him at a subsequent sale of the property by another officer. Head v. Moore, 96 Tenn. 358 (34 S. W. Rep. 518). Under Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 77, § 30, a purchaser at a sale under a decree must take out his deed within five years from the expiration of the time of redemption or his certificate of purchase becomes void and he loses all rights thereunder. Brown v. Ridenhower, 161 Ill. 239 (43 N. E. Rep. 976).

Sec. 427.

Purchaser's liability upon failure to complete his purchase. If one becomes a purchaser at a judicial sale, and fails to complete his purchase as required by the decree, he is liable for the difference between the amount of his bid and the sum realized at the second sale; but, to hold him liable, the sale must be reported, and a rule awarded and served upon him to show cause why he should not complete

his purchase, or, in default, the property be resold at his expense, and at his risk of liability for any difference between the sum for which he agreed to purchase and the sum realized on the resale. Stout v. Philippi M'f'g & Mer. Co., 41 W. Va. 339 (23 S. E. Rep. 571; 56 Am. St. Rep. 843). Where upon failure of an accepted bidder to complete his purchase the sale is treated by the officer as a nullity and a resale is made and confirmed without objection, the first purchaser cannot be held liable for the difference between the price realized and his bid. Makemson v. Brann, Ky. (37 S. W. Rep. 495). A statute (Md. Code, Art. 16, § 194) which authorizes a court of equity, upon a purchaser's failure to complete his purchase, to order a resale and enter a decree against him for any deficit is not unconstitutional as interfering with the right of jury trial. Capron v. Devries, 83 Md. 220 (34 Atl. Rep. 251).

Sec. 428.

Control by court-Setting aside. A court has power to control its process, and, for sufficient reason, may recall an execution or order of sale, and set aside an appraisement of property made thereunder, and the fact that all the property made liable by a decree is not described in the execution or order of sale issued, is sufficient reason for its so doing. Beatrice Paper Co. v. Beloit Iron Works, 46 Neb. 900 (65 N. W. Rep. 1059). It is only on the ground of fraud, or that some one has been prejudiced by the sale of lands en masse, that the sale will be set aside, in equity, because the property was not sold in separate parcels. Kerfoot v. Billings, 160 Ill. 563 (43 N. E. Rep. 801).

Sec. 429. Agreement to set aside sale-Validity. Where, before a sale made under a decree is confirmed, it is agreed, at the instance of the purchaser, between him and a creditor under the decree entitled to a part of the proceeds of the sale, that if the latter will agree to the setting aside of the sale, he, the purchaser, will save the creditor harmless from all loss which he may sustain by reason of setting the sale aside and having the property again offered, it is held that such contract is not per se a fraud upon the due administration of justice and, unless such fact is made to

appear, it is binding upon and enforceable against the purchaser. Wick v. Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43 (24 S. E. Rep. 587).

Sec. 430. Setting aside sales for inadequacy of price. Mere inadequacy of price unaccompanied by fraud or other irregularity, is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a judicial sale. Old Dominion Inv. Co. v. Moomaw,

Va. (25 S.

E. Rep. 540). A sale will not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price, unless the inadequacy is so gross as to raise a presumption of fraud, or until, in addition to such inadequacy, there are serious irregularities in the mode of the sale, or circumstances of unfairness toward the debtor. Kerfoot v. Billings, 160 Ill. 563 (43 N. E. Rep. 804). In order to avoid a judicial sale on account of the inadequacy of price, such inadequacy must be clearly proved. Shreveport Rod and Gun Club v. Board of Com'rs, 48 La. 1081 (20 So. Rep. 293). A judicial sale may be set aside for gross inadequacy of price when coupled with other irregularities. The following have been held sufficient as additional reasons: an attack upon the title of the property by interested persons, which has the effect of deterring bidders and depressing the value of the property, Wood v. Drury 56 Kan. 409 (43 Pac. Rep. 763); an abuse of the officer's discretion in selling in bulk when he should have sold in parcels, Lundy v. Seymour, 55 N. J. Eq. 1 (35 Atl. Rep. 893); a failure to give proper notice, Conroy v. Carroll, 82 Md. 127 (33 Atl. Rep. 423); the issue of an execution without authority, Donham v. Hoover, 135 Mo. 210 (36 S. W. Rep. 627); the premature issue of an execution. containing an insufficient description of the land, Leachman v. Capps, 89 Tex. 690 (36 S. W. Rep. 250). Where property worth $40,000 to $50,000 is sold upon an execution to an attorney of the execution creditor for $250, the sale will be set aside upon the application of a mortgagee who had no notice of the sale and whose attorney had been misled as to the existence of the judgment by a statement of plaintiff's attorney, and a description of the property given in the notice of sale, although technically correct, was so general that the officer making the sale did not know what property he was selling, although the insolvent owner of the fee makes no complaint of such sale. Barclay, J., dissenting. Rodgers &

Baldwin Hardw. Co. v. Cleveland Bldg Co., 132 Mo. 442 (34 S. W. Rep. 57; 53 Am. St. Rep. 494; 31 L. R. A. 335). Where lands are sold for a price so grossly inadequate as to be little more than a nominal consideration, a very slight additional circumstance indicative of bad faith on the part of the purchaser, or of a combination among bidders, will be sufficient ground for setting aside the sale. Iona Sav. Bank v. Blair, 56 Kan. 430 (43 Pac. Rep. 686). One who has been grossly negligent in ascertaining, and attending to, his interests in property sold at a foreclosure sale can not have the sale set aside for inadequacy of price. Vint v. Monk, 56 Kan. 789 (44 Pac. Rep. 986).

Sec. 431. Guardians' sales-Practice. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, 2692, providing, as to real estate, that whenever a better investment as to value thereof can be made, the proper court may, on the application of the guardian, order the same, or a part thereof, to be sold, authorizes the court to direct an exchange of the lands of the ward for other lands. Decker v. Fessler, 146 Ind. 16 (44 N. E. Rep. 657). Ga. Code, § 1828; Acts 1889, pp. 156, 157, construed and applied-sale of ward's lands for reinvestment. Crawford v. Broomhead, 97 Ga. 614 (25 S. E. Rep. 487). A guardian's sale and deed thereunder made under Tex. Act of 1846 do not pass any title unless the sale is confirmed by the court. Greer v. Anderson, 62 Ark. 213 (35 S. W. Rep. 215). In North Carolina a guardian's sale may be either public or private, in the discretion of the court. North Carolina Code, §§ 1590, 1602, construed and applied-jurisdiction of the superior court in proceedings to sell ward's lands. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C. 712 (24 S. E. Rep. 124). Particular cases in which amendments by a probate court made in its records of a guardian's sale long after the execution of the deed thereunder, are held void. Kurtz v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 60 (67 N. W. Rep. 808).

Sec. 432. Guardians' sales-Description of land in petition. Construing Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 23, §§ 42, 43, 47, 48 and 53, concerning proceedings by a guardian to sell his ward's land, it is held upon an exhaustive review of the

authorities that although the statute does not in express words require the petition to set forth or describe the property, it should describe all the land that the ward owns, especially that which is sought to be sold, but any description therein will be sufficient, when collaterally assailed, if it provides the means of identifying the property; and the description need not be more specific, definite and certain than is required in a deed; hence, a general description of the premises in such petition, as all the real estate of the ward situate in this state, or in any particular county or city, therein, is not void for indefiniteness and uncertainty. The proceedings will not be invalidated by reason of a manifest false statement in the description of the property in the application and license, when the remainder of the description, after rejecting that which is erroneous, is sufficiently certain to enable the land to be located. Huberman v. Evans, 46 Neb. 784 (65 N. W. Rep. 1045). The court say: "The authorities do not agree as to the necessity of describing in the application the property sought to be sold. Some hold that it is essential, and that, when a license is based upon a petition with the description omitted, the order and sale thereunder are void. Leary v. Fletcher, 1 Ired. 259; Duckett v. Skinner, 11 Ired. 431; Spruill v. Davenport, 3 Jones (N. C.) 42; Very v. McClellan, 6 Gray 535 (66 Am. Dec. 423); Weed v. Edmonds, 4 Ind. 468; Trent's Adm'r v. Trent, 24 Mo. 307; Wilson v. Hastings, 66 Cal. 243 (5 Pac. Rep. 217); Gilchrist v. Shackelford, 72 Ala. 7. And others say that it is not essential that the property be particularly described in a petition for its sale. Wells v. Mills, 22 Tex. 302; Wells v. Polk, 36 Tex. 121; Davis v. Touchstone, 45 Tex. 491 ; Bryan v. Bauder, 23 Kan. 95. And there is another line of cases which holds that if the description is omitted from the application for an order of sale, or the petition is otherwise defective, it is an error or irregularity merely, available alone in a direct proceeding to review the decision, but that the order allowed on such a petition is not void when assailed collaterally. Among the numerous decisions sustaining this doctrine are Burke v Wheat, 22 Kan. 722; Hodgin v. Barton, 23 Kan. 740; Watts v. Cook, 24 Kan. 278; Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 42 O. St. 254; Rumrill v. Bank, 28 Minn. 202 (9 N. W. Rep. 731);