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the purchaser at his sale, to assert an individual claim in the land, and this estoppel extends to the purchaser of the same land at a sale by such vendor's administrator. Cooper v. Lindsay, 109 Ala. 338 (19 So. Rep. 379). Where, in the division of an estate, one of the distributees takes a note executed to the decedent by a third party, another takes its equivalent in money, and the taker of the note subsequently takes a mortgage from the maker, upon lands which he claims to hold, and subsequently acquires a title thereto by foreclosure, there is nothing in the transaction which estops the distributee who received the sum of money from asserting an interest in the land adverse to the mortgagee. Cooper v. Lindsay, 109 Ala. 338 (19 So. Rep. 379). One holding under a deed the record of which has been destroyed is estopped to assert his title against a subsequent mortgagee of his grantor, where he assisted in procuring the loan from the mortgagee without disclosing his title. Shattuck v. Canley, 119 N. C. 292 (25 S. E. Rep. 872). For cases depending upon particular facts and illustrating in a general way the doctrine of estoppel in pais, see Hart v. Mt. Pleasant Park Stock Co., 97 Ia. 353 (66 N. W. Rep. 190); Walker v. Bottomley, 110 Mich. 127 (67 N. W. Rep. 1083); Craddock v. Short, 134 Mo. 449 (35 S. W. Rep. 1141).

Sec. 300.

Estoppels as applied to the publicBoundaries. Long acquiescence in the use of the way which forms the boundary between two adjacent owners will estop each from asserting that it is not a true boundary. In a proper case this rule would apply to the public, as where the public has permitted the abutting owner to occupy a part of the street for an unreasonable length of time and make subse quent improvements thereon, such as the erection of buildings; but the rule does not apply to the public where the improvement consisted merely in the erection of a farm fence and the cultivation of the land inclosed thereby. Bice v. Town of Walcott, 64 Minn. 459 (67 N. W. Rep. 360).

Sec. 301. Vendee estopped to dispute title of vendor. A vendee, having acquired possession of land from his vendor under an executory contract to purchase the same, and having

failed to pay for the same, and to surrender possession upon demand, after he had forfeited his right thereto, is estopped, when sued by his vendor for the possession of the land so wrongfully withheld, to dispute his vendor's title, or to set up as a defense any outstanding title acquired by the vendee during the continuance of such possession. Lake v. Hancock, 38 Fla. 53 (20 So. Rep. 811; 56 Am. St. Rep. 159).

Sec. 302. Estoppel as a rule of evidence. On trial of title to land a party is estopped to dispute the title under which he claims. This rule applies to the trial of title in an action of partition. Alexander v. Gibbon, 118 N. C. 796 (24 S. E. Rep. 748; 54 Am. St. Rep. 757). The court say: "This rule of estoppel, based upon a common source, is not simply an arbitrary fiction of the law. It is based on sound reasoning and logical deduction. If two parties claim title from A., it must be conceded by them that A. had the title, or they would not claim under him. This being so, it is not necessary to consume time in proving what is admitted to be true,—that A. had the title. Then A. is made the starting point, and it is only left to determine who has A.'s title, or the title derived from A. In a case of tenancy in common, where the parties claim as heirs at law, under the canons of descent, the establishment of the common source determines the rights of the parties. As, in this case, all the heirs at law of J. M. Alexander claim that he was the owner of this land at the time of his death, this establishes as to them the legal title to this land, and they are forever estopped to deny this; just as any other parties of record are estopped by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. So, we see that the operation and effect of this rule of estoppel is to establish the title in the plaintiffs. And the rule that the plaintiffs must recover by the strength of their own title, and not by the weakness of the defendants' title, is preserved."

EVIDENCE.

Sec. 303.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Altered deeds-Admissibility-Validity. In Nebraska it is held, overruling Johnson v. Bank, 28 Neb. 792 (45 N. W. Rep. 161); Courcamp v. Weber, 39 Neb. 533 (58 N. W. Rep. 187), that where a written instrument shows upon its face a material and obvious alteration, the presumption of law is that such alteration was made before the instrument was finally executed and delivered, and such instrument is not rendered incompetent evidence solely because such alteration appears therein; that whether the alteration is a material one is a question of law, for the court; but when, by whom, and with what motive, such alteration was made, is a question of fact, for the jury or trial court, to be determined like any other question of fact. Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443 (68 N. W. Rep. 645). It is held that an immaterial alteration in a written instrument after its execution, does not render it void. Kelly v. Thuey, (37 S. W. Rep. 516).

Mo.

Sec. 304. Parol evidence-Negotiations-Collateral contracts. Where parties to a contract have put it in writing, and that writing, upon its face, purports to contain the whole agreement between them, it will be the only evidence of the contract as concluded; and no parol proof of what was said and done during the negotiations which led to it will be admitted to alter or contradict it, or to supply additional terms. In such case, proof will not be received to show a collateral promise, between the parties, at the negotiations, unless that promise. relates to a subject distinct from that to which the written contract applies. Mc Tague v. Finnegan, 54 N. J. Eq. 454 (35 Atl. Rep. 542). As a general rule parol evidence is not admissable to contradict a written agreement whether simple or by deed; but this rule does not apply in cases where the

parol evidence in no way contradicts the terms of the written contract but tends to establish an independent or collateral agreement not in conflict with it. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148 (33 S. W. Rep. 914; 54 Am. St. Rep. 823; 34 L. R. A› 824). Citing, Betts v. Demumbrune, Cooke 48; Leinau v. Smart, 11 Hump. 308; Cobb v. Wallace, 5 Cold. 539 (98 Am. Dec. 435); Lytle v. Bass, 7 Cold. 303; Stewart v. Insurance Co., 9 Lea 104; Vanleer v. Fain, 6 Humph. 104; Ferguson v. Rafferty, 128 Pa. St. 337 (18 Atl. Rep. 484; 6 L. R. A. 33); Durkin v. Cobleigh, 156 Mass. 108 (30 N. E. Rep. 474; 32 Am. St. Rep. 436; 17 L. R. A. 270); and the case also holds that the rule does not apply in cases where the original contract was verbal and entire and a part only of it was reduced to writing. Citing, 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) § 284a; 1 Starkie, Ev. 267; Vanleer v. Fain, 6 Humph. 104; Dick v. Martin, 7 Humph. 263; Mitchell v. Bank, 8 Humph. 216; Leinau v. Smart, 11 Humph. 308; Cobb v. O'Neal, 2 Sneed 438; Cobb v. Wallace, 5 Cold. 539 (98 Am. Dec. 435); Bryan v. Hunt, 4 Sneed 543 (72 Am. Dec. 262); Lytle v. Bass, 7 Cold. 303; Bissenger v. Guiteman, 6 Heisk. 277; Hicks v. Smith, 4 Lea 464; Smith v. O'Donnell, 8 Lea 468; Hawkins v. Lee, Id. 42; Breeden v. Grigg, 8 Baxt. 163; Waterbury v. Russell, Id. 162; Brady v. Isler, 9 Lea 356; Barnard v. Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 139 (2 S. W. Rep. 21); Lewis v. Turnley, 97 Tenn. 197 (36 S. W. Rep. 872).

Sec. 305. Parol evidence to show true consideration. Where the consideration for a deed is expressed by a stipulation reciting that "this conveyance is made by the grantors, and accepted by the grantee, in full satisfaction of all claims of the grantee against the grantors, or either of them, to this date, and of any and all kinds, and in satisfaction of any pretended claims to the grantee against the estate of James French, deceased, of any and all kinds," the stipulation is not contractual, but is in the nature of a receipt or release, which can be explained by parol evidence. French v. Arnett, 15 Ind. App. 674 (44 N. E. Rep. 551). An agreement between a grantor and grantee concerning the erection of certain fences on the property, which forms part of the consideration for the conveyance, may be shown by parol. Dodder v.

Snyder, 110 Mich. 69 (67 N. W. Rep. 1101). The rule admitting parol evidence to show the true consideration of a deed will not be extended to the admission of evidence to defeat the operation of a deed as a valid and effective grant. Smith v. McClain, 146 Ind. 77 (45 N. E. Rep. 41). The actual consideration for a deed may be shown by parol. Wheeler v Campbell, 68 Vt. 77 (34 Atl. Rep. 35); Wilfong v. Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283 (23 S. E. Rep. 730). Where a deed from a husband and wife recites that the consideration therefor is her relinquishment of her dower rights in the land owned by the husband, parol evidence is not admissible to show that such recital included the relinquishment of dower in lands which had been previously conveyed. Halferty v. Scearce, 135 Mo. 428 (37 S. W. Rep. 113). A parol agreement forming part of the consideration for a deed may be shown. Breitenwischer v. Clough, 111 Mich. 6 (69 N. W. Rep. 88).

Parol

Sec. 306. Parol evidence-Particular cases. evidence is admissible to show that a mortgage was executed without any consideration and with an intention on the part of both parties that it should never be enforced. Church v. Case, 110 Mich. 621 (68 N. W. Rep. 424). Citing, Colț v. Mc Connell, 116 Ind. 249 (19 N. E. Rep. 106); Baird v. Baird, 145 N. Y. 659 (40 N. E. Rep. 222). Where the intention of the parties has been expressed in a written instrument, parol evidence going to show their intention will not be heard. Fuller v. Weaver, 175 Pa. St. 182 (34 Atl. Rep. 634); Strunk v. Smith, 8 S. Dak. 407 (66 N. W. Rep. 926). The terms of a written lease cannot be changed by parol evi. dence Harrison v. Howe, 109 Mich. 476 (67 N. W. Rep. 527); Long v. Perine, 41 W. Va. 314 (23 S. E. Rep. 611). A real estate mortgage can not be extended by parol to secure an entirely different indebtedness subsequently contracted. Bell v. Coffin, 2 Kan. App. 337 (43 Pac. Rep. 861). Parol contemporaneous agreement of the parties cannot be shown for the purpose of converting a conveyance of a fee simple title into a conveyance of a life estate. Caffey's Ex'rs v. Caffey, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 616 (35 S. W. Rep. 788). The rule that parol evidence will not be heard to contradict the

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