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ever of itself, it was in this sense necessarily; viz. so as that the excellency of its nature was such, as could never permit that it should not be; whence the name I AM agrees peculiarly and always thereunto. Nothing can otherwise be of itself, (not by making itself, which you have seen is impossible,) but by an everlasting possession of that excellency of being, which excludes all possibility of not being. It depends upon no one's choice or power, whether that which is of itself shall be or not be.

(4.) What hath thus ever been necessarily, still is, and will ever be; which is plain upon the same ground. What could never but be, can never but be; for its nature is such, as whereto not to be is impossible. Otherwise, if its nature had not been such, there being nothing else by which it should be made, it could never have been. Wherefore thus far you have firm footing in this first step; no part of the ground which it measures shakes under you. You may say you are sure of this-That somewhat there now is, that hath been from all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else, and that can never cease to be.-Set this down therefore for a certainty, and then add to it,

2. That whatsoever is not necessarily and of itself, is from and by that which is necessarily and of itself, as the first Author and Cause thereof. This is so certain, that nothing needs to be said for the proof of it more than hath been said already, so that you do but understand the meaning of it; which you cannot but do, if you consider that all things that are, or ever were, must be of one of these two sorts, viz. what was of itself, and what was not of itself, but from another: therefore, what is not of the first sort, must be of the second; that is, what was not of itself, must be from another; and then, what other must it be from? Surely from what was of itself, as its first and chief cause, whatsoever inferior or secondary causes it may have had besides, that were before it, caused by that first. So that you have now plainly before you, and in view, some or other eternal, necessary Being, not only to be considered as it is in itself, but as the original and root of all besides. Then go forward a little, and further add,

3. Neither this visible world, nor any thing of it, is necessarily, or of itself, without depending upon any thing else; and was therefore created and made by some more excellent Being that was so, and is quite distinct and diverse from it. That this may be evident to you, consider,

(1.) That whatsoever is changeable or imperfect, and capable of becoming more perfect, is not necessarily, and of itself, without dependence on any thing else. For what is of itself necessarily, and without dependence on any other, must have whatsoever belongs to it, all at once; for from whence should any addition or change happen any way to it? Not from any other, for it no more depends on another for addition, than it is liable to diminution by another, being what it is necessarily, or from itself: for nothing can impart or add what it hath not; and what it hath was in it before, and was in it necessarily, and therefore unalterably, and without possibility of any change. Now you know this visible world is continually changing, and in an imperfect state; and we may add, that there is somewhat invisible, of whose present being we are certain, that was not of itself, and that did not make this world. For instance, we are certain of the present being of our own mind and spirit, which we cannot see with our eyes, but by self-reflection we are sure we have somewhat in us that can think. Nor is there any thing that comes under our immediate, certain observation, more excellent than man himself, especially his mind and soul. And do you not yourself know, and find how changeable, indigent, and imperfect that is? Therefore you may be sure it is not of itself, or the maker of this visible world. If all the men in the world should join all their wit and power together, which way would they go to work to make such a world as this? yea, or even to make one single pile of grass, or grain of sand? Which way can you devise, then, they should make the sun or stars, or such an earth as this? It is plain, then, that all this world had a maker, distinct from itself.

(2.) Whatsoever being is of itself, is more excellent than what is not of itself. This you cannot but assent to at the

first sight: for besides that you must needs acknowledge it better to live of oneself, than to be beholden to another, you must also know that whatever being is not of itself, hath no excellency in it, but what was in that being that was of itself before; and therefore it had in it all the excellency that is in such things as proceeded from it, (unabated because in it necessarily,) together with the proper excellency of its own being, whereas the other sort of beings have but their own derived excellency only. Wherefore this also is most evident, that this world had a maker distinct from and more excellent than itself, that changes not, and whereto that name most properly agrees, I AM THAT I AM. Being sure of this, you may proceed, and conclude,

4. That the things which are manifestly not of themselves, but created and made, do plainly show that the Maker of them doth excel in power, wisdom, and goodness. The greatness of his works shows his mighty power; the nature, exactness, and order of them, his admirable wisdom; and his own self-sufficiency, and independency on the things made, show his rich and vast goodness in making them, as you may see more at large in Part I. Now therefore, if you have attended, you cannot but find you are sure and at a plain certainty concerning these four things: (1.) That somewhat was ever, and is necessarily. (2.) That what was not so did arise from that which was. (3.) That this world being not so, did therefore spring from that eternal, necessary, self-subsisting Being. (4.) And that this Being hath those particular excellences, whereof there are the manifest appearances and footsteps in the works that are made by him, (viz. especially power, wisdom, and goodness,) in himself. And thus the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead; so that they who see them not are without excuse. Rom. i. 20. If you be sure that any thing is, you may be sure somewhat was ever of itself: if you be sure any thing that was not of itself hath appearances of power, wisdom, and goodness in the frame of it, you may be sure that Being which was of itself is the powerful, wise, and good Creator and Maker of it. It is to be hoped, then, you are at a certainty,That God is.

III. Secondly, And now as to the second principle, that hath been insisted on also in the former Part,-That this God is conversable with men. You cannot surely doubt, but that he that made you, and gave you all that any way belongs to your being, can apply himself to you, or any of his creatures, in a way suitable to the natures which he hath put into you and them; nor that he is ready to converse with you, in a way suitable to the nature he hath given you, if you be such towards him, and so apply yourself to him, as you ought. For it is not a greater thing to do so, nor more exceeding or going beyond the reach of his power, wisdom, and goodness, as you cannot but see, than to have given being to you, and all things.

But now if what is further discoursed in that former Part, concerning the oneness of the Divine Being, and the infiniteness thereof, or concerning any other perfections there particularly asserted unto it, seem not so plain to you as is requisite to guide and facilitate your applications to him; what hath been more plainly said in this, is however sufficient, as more primarily fundamental and pre-requisite to that further knowledge of his nature and will towards you, which in another way is to be had and sought after.

A cloud and darkness are now drawn over the world of mankind; and though it be still very easily discernible that God is, it is yet more difficult to attain to so distinct apprehensions what he is, as are necessary to our conversing with him. Against this difficulty, he hath afforded a gracious relief; that is, he hath provided there should be a more express discovery of him extant among men, than can be collected by their making observations upon this world. The case was such with man, (grown now so great a stranger to God,) as to require a written revelation of his nature and will; and we have it in those scriptures which bear with us the name of the word of God. It were indeed very unseasonable and absurd, to urge their authority in the inquiry, whether there be a God or no? For what

authority have they more than other writings, but as they are God's word? Therefore to expect or give assent to them as such, while yet it remains an undecided controversy, whether there be any such one, or no, for whose sake the assent should be given, were to expose our religion, not to prove it. These holy writings were not intended, by their affirmation of it, to inform us of God's existence, which they suppose, and do not prove, as a thing we may otherwise be certain of; but to teach us our duty towards him, and what our expectations may be from him; and do therefore give us a true representation and discovery of his nature, (so far as it was needful for us preparatively first to know it,) and then next, of the present state of things between him and us, that we might be directed how to apply ourselves to him suitably to both the one and the other. It is true, that we can never know that there is a God, without knowing somewhat of his nature, or what a one he is. We cannot so much as inquire whether he be or no, but we must have some notion in our minds of the thing we inquire about; and so much as is necessary to this purpose, may be plainly gathered in the way we have gone hitherto. For if we understand the difference between something and nothing, between being and no being, and find that something is, or that there is some being; and again, if we understand the difference between a thing's being of itself, and being of or from another, and find the former must be the original of the latter, we cannot but understand ourselves, when we say there is an Original Being. And having some understanding what is meant by power, wisdom, and goodness; withal finding that not only the effects of these, but these very things themselves, are in the world, we cannot but be sure (because these things come not of nothing) that the Original Being is powerful, wise, and good. And now when we have thus found out an Original Being, that is of wisdom, power, and goodness sufficient to be the Author of such a world as this, we at once know both what God is, (sufficiently to distinguish him from all things else,) and are at a certainty that he is.

When we perceive that he hath given to all breath and being and all things; we have sought, and even felt and found him out, and found that he is not far from any one of us, since in him we live and move and have our being; that he is every where present, in this his creation, as the great Sustainer and the Life of the universe; and forasmuch especially as we are his offspring, (as even the light of a heathen poet could reach to discover, a sort of intelligent, designing, active beings,) that therefore the Godhead is not like silver, or gold, &c., but of a nature more nearly resembling that of our own souls, and the higher excellences of the best of his creatures, although eminently containing in himself also all the real perfections, virtues, and powers of all the rest. When we understand so much of God, (as we may by the light of our own reason,) we understand enough to give a foundation to religion, and to let us see he ought to have a temple, and worship; and another sort of temple than is made by men's hands, other worship than can be performed by the hands of men; as is there clearly argued, and inferred by the apostle, upon those plain grounds. Now when we are arrived thus far, it is seasonable to make use of the further help which we may observe the great, and wise, and good God to have most condescendingly, most aptly, and most mercifully afforded us, for our more distinct understanding of his nature, and our own state; and how we are to behave ourselves towards him thereupon.

IV. Taking notice therefore that there is a written revelation of him extant in the world, that bears his name, and gives itself out to be from him; if now we look into it, observe the import and design of it, compare it with what we before knew of his nature and our own; consider what is most obvious to an easy self-reflection in our own state and case, and how exactly this written revelation agrees and corresponds to those our former notices; taking in withal the many considerations that concur besides, to evidence to us the divine original and authority thereof: we cannot but have much rational inducement and obliga

a If we take notice that in some parts of this volume there are very ancient predictions, of the strongest and most unlikely events, that we see exactly fulfilled in the other parts.

|tion to receive, with all reverence and gratitude, this reve
lation, as from God; and to rely upon it, as a sure and
sacred light sent down from heaven, to direct us in all our
concernments God-ward. For finding our own great need
of such additional light, and apprehending it sufficiently
agreeable to the divine goodness to afford it, and expecting
it to be such, in its scope and design, as we find it is: if
we further consider it must have had some author, and
perceiving it not easy, with any plausible pretence, to affix
it to any other than to God himself: if we consider that it
was impossible it could be invented by men, without some
design of self-advantage, either in this world or in the
other; and how absurd any such expectation must be,
either from men here, (the contents thereof being so re-
pugnant to the common inclinations of men, as to oblige
those that owned them to the severest sufferings on that
account,) or from God hereafter, who could not be expected
to reward forgery, falsehood, and the usurpation of his
name: if, again, we further observe the positive attesta-
tions whereby he hath challenged and owned it as his own,
and wherein the divine power hath borne witness to the
divine truth contained in it: if the matters of fact on which
all depends appear not less certain than that there were
men and nations in the world, that we have not seen, and
before we were born; if we see it not only improbable,
but even next to impossible, that the records of those mi-
raculous attestations should have been forged, and nations
imposed upon thereby; and amongst them, many of the
wisest of men in those very times when the things recorded
were alleged to have been done, and in a matter wherein
their eternal hope was concerned; we shall upon the
whole see cause to judge, That as it were most absurd to
suppose such a revelation given by God, and no sufficient
rational evidence withal given that it is from him, (without
which it cannot serve its end, and so would signify no-
thing,) so that there is nothing wanting, in divine estimate
itself, to make up such a sufficient, rational evidence; nor
in our own, unless we would suppose it necessary that
every man should have a Bible reached him down by an
immediate hand from heaven, or make some other suppo
sition as fond and vain as that; or that we count not that
sufficient evidence, which ought to satisfy our reason, if it
do not gratify our fancy and curiosity too. It is not fit,
here, to say more of the divine original of those holy
writings, nor needful; so much being written already,
with so great clearness, on that subject, by many. That
therefore being out of question what you cannot reason out
yourselves, or apprehend from the reasonings of others,
concerning God's nature, tending to represent him worthy
of a temple with you, and capable of receiving and re-
warding your sincere and spiritual worship, fetch out
from that divine volume; for you may be sure, though
you cannot search him out unto perfection, he perfectly
understands himself, and is certainly such, as he there
tells you he is: and he there reveals himself to be such, as
to whom the temple and worship we here intend, cannot
be doubted (as he hath ordered things) to be both due and
grateful. Whatever might be otherwise matter of doubt,
is, by his express discovery of himself, taken away.
V. If it were still a doubt, after all that hath been for-
merly said for the reasoning out of these things, whether
the Deity be one only, or manifold; whether the world had
but one, or had not many makers; and so, whether there
be no danger of misapplying our religion, or of mistaking
the object of our worship. This word plainly tells us,
There is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things.
1 Cor. viii. 6. That he is God, and there is none else.
Isa. xiv. 21, 22. And that however there be three that
bear witness in heaven, and the stamp of whose name is,
in our baptism, distinctly and solemnly put upon us;
Matt. xxviii. 1 John v. yet (as in many other instances,
that may be in some respect three, which in some other
respect is but one) without the unnecessary, punctual de-
claration, how these are three, and how but one, it ex-
pressly tells us, these three are one.

|

And if it be yet a doubt with us (in which the reasonings of some may be too short to determine and resolve them)

b Dr. Stillingfleet, in his Origines Sacre, Grotius de Verit. Chr. Relig. Huet. Demonstr. Evangel. &c. Mr. Baxter's Reasons of Christian Religion. With

many more.

whether this one God be so absolutely and every way perfect as to be sufficient for us all; whether he can understand all our concernments, relieve us in all our necessities, hear our prayers, satisfy our desires, receive our acknowledgments and thanksgivings, and take notice with what love and sincerity they are tendered unto him; or, if he can do for us according to our necessities, and reasonable desires; whether we have any ground to believe that he will; this word of his plainly assures us, That he is God all-sufficient, Gen. xvii. 1.; that he hath all fulness in him. It often represents him to us, under the name of the Lord God Almighty; tells us that he can do every thing, and that he doth whatsoever it pleaseth him. It tells us his understanding is infinite, and particularly assures that he searches the hearts of men, and tries their reins; that they cannot think a thought, or speak a word, but he understands them afar off, and knows them altogether that his eyes are upon all the ways of men; that he knows all things, and therefore knows if they love him. And that we may be the more fully put out of doubt how easy it is to him to do so, we are assured, That he is every where present, that he fills heaven and earth, that the heaven, and heaven of heavens, cannot contain him; that there is no going from his Spirit, or flying from his presence; that if one go up to heaven, he is there; lie down in hell, he is there; go to the uttermost part of the sea, yet there his hand shall lead, and his right hand hold him.

CHAPTER IV.

That there is an obstruction to this intercourse. The method of the following discourse. Man's apostacy from God, and the vitiated state of his nature; not only represented in the sacred writings, but also acknowledged and lamented by pagans-very mistakenly, in some respects; wherein perhaps some of them not justly understood. This not the primitive state of man; therefore not to be imputed to the Author of nature. The temple of God hereby became unfit for the divine presence. Unsuitable. Disaffected. Hereupon forsaken, and most justly.

I. BUT so far it is, that there should want probability of a very inward commerce between God and man, that we have reason to think it rather strange, considering his nature and our own, it should not have been continual; and that his unbounded and self-communicative fulness was not by him always afforded, and always imbibed and drawn in by so capable and indigent a creature. One would wonder what should have discontinued this intercourse! What can be so apt to give and flow out, as fulness ? What should be so apt to receive and take in, as want and emptiness? Such a commerce then as can be supposed between onea that is rich and full, and them that are poor and necessitous, one would think should have never failed. So a fabulous dream may be significant, and not uninstructive, touching the reason and way of commerce between God and creature. We are therefore put upon ab new inquiry, and need no longer spend ourselves in anxious thoughts, Can there be any converse between God VI. And that all doubt may vanish, concerning his will and men? That we may rather say, How can it not be? and gracious inclination, how expressly doth he make or, How strange is it there is not more! that he hath not himself known by his name? viz. That he is the Lord, a temple in every human breast, replenished with his vital the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and presence! that there are nothing but ruins and desolation abundant in goodness and truth, &c. Exod. xxxiv. 7. And to be found, where one would expect a fabric worthy of by the same blessed and inspired penman of a part of these God, and an in-dwelling Deity! This must therefore be holy writings, (the beloved disciple, who lay in the bosom the sad subject of our thoughts awhile, What hath renderof his only-begotten Son; who also is in the bosom of the ed the blessed God so much a stranger on earth, and occaFather, and hath declared him,) we are not only told that sioned him in so great part to forsake his terrestrial God is Light, whereby the knowledge, purity, simplicity, dwelling? Whence we shall have the advantage (seeing and glory of the Divine Being are represented; but also, how just cause there was, on his part, for this deplorable once and again, that God is Love, that we might under- distance) to adore the grace that returns him to us, and stand him as a Being not of more glorious excellency in inclined him to take that strange course, which we find himself, than of gracious propensions towards his creatures. he did, to repair his forlorn temple, and fill this desolate, And lest it should be thought our meanness should ex- forsaken world with the joyful sound of those glad tidings, empt us, and put us beneath his regard, we are told, He" The tabernacle of God is with men." taketh care for sparrows, he heareth the ravens when they cry; and generally, that the eyes of all wait upon him, and he gives them their meat in season, Psal. cxlv. (which even the brute creatures are emphatically said to seek of God,) and that he opens his hand, and satisfies the desires of every living thing, Psal. civ. And besides what he hath so expressly testified concerning his own nature, his favourable inclinations towards men might sufficiently be collected from that very nature which he hath given to man, considered in comparison and reference to his own; that he made him in his own image; and that he being the Father of spirits, hath placed a spirit in man, so agreeable to his own spiritual nature; and by his own inspiration given him that understanding, that the mind begotten corresponds, by its most natural frame and constitution, to the mind that begot, the vous Tarpikos, (as it was anciently called,) his own Eternal Mind; and that if its own original be remembered, it turns itself towards him, seeks his acquaintance by an instinct he hath himself implanted in it, and cannot rest till he have such a temple erected in it, where both he and it may cohabit together. By all this, his aptness to that converse with men, which is imported in the notion of a temple, doth so far appear, that at least it is evident such converse cannot fail to ensue, supposing that there were nothing in the way that might be a present obstruction thereto. And it will more appear, when we have considered (since there is somewhat that obstructs this converse) what he hath done to remove the obstruc-propension to what is unlawful to him and destructive, tion, and how he hath provided that the intercourse may be restored, and his temple be resettled with men, upon everlasting foundations.

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II. We shall find he is no further a stranger in this world, than as we have made and continued him so: no further a home-dweller in it, than as by an admirable contrivance of wisdom and love, that will be the eternal wonder of the other world, he hath made way for himself: whereby his propensions towards men, prevailing against so great an obstruction, do even now appear at once both evident and marvellous, and ought to be not only the matter of our belief, but admiration.

Wherefore our discourse must here proceed by these steps, to show-1. That mankind hath universally revolted, and been in a state of apostacy from God;-2. That hereby the temple of God in man hath been generally made waste and desolate ;-3. That he hath laid both the new foundations and the platform of his present temple in Immanuel, God with us, his own incarnate Son, who rebuilds, beautifies, furnishes, inhabits it, and orders all the concernments of it.

III. 1. The first we do little need to labour in-every man's own reflection upon the vitiated powers of his own soul, would soon, as to himself, put the matter out of doubt; whence each one's testimony concerning his own case, would amount to a universal testimony. No man that takes a view of his own dark and blinded mind, his slow and dull apprehension, his uncertain staggering judgment, roving conjectures, feeble and mistaken reasonings about matters that concern him most; ill inclinations,

aversion to his truest interest and best good, irresolution, drowsy sloth, exorbitant and ravenous appetites and desires, impotent and self-vexing passions-can think human nature, in him, is in its primitive integrity, and so pure as when it first issued from its high and most pure original. By such reflection, every man may perceive his own ill

b Plat. Sympos.

case, in these and many more such respects; and by observing the complaints of the most serious, and such as have seemed most to study themselves, collect it is generally so with others also.

IV. They that have read the sacred volume, cannot be ignorant that all flesh have corrupted their way; that the great God, looking a down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, that did seek God, hath only the unpleasing prospect before his eyes even of a universal depravation and defection; that every one of them is gone back; they are altogether become filthy, there is none that doeth good, no not one; that all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; that this world lieth in wickedness; and that this was not the first state of man, but that he is degenerated into it from a former and better state; that "God made him upright," but that he is become otherwise, by his own "many inventions:" that by trying conclusions to better a state already truly good, he brought himself into this wofal plight; and by aiming at somewhat above, sunk so far beneath himself into that gulf of impurity and misery, that is now become to him as his own element and natural state. Yea and the matter hath that evidence, that even many of them who, for ought we know, never conversed with those sacred records, have no less clearly discovered their sense of the present evil state of man, than their ignorance of the original of that evil, though some of them carefully acquit God of it. We find their complaints of the malignity of ignorance, surrounding all the earth, and that corrupts the soul shut up in the body; that, as a garment and web, inwraps the minds of men, that they cannot look to him whose pleasure it is to be known, and who is not to be heard with ears, nor seen with eyes, nor expressed by words. That till it be rent in pieces, they have upon them the bond of corruption, the dark coverture, the living death, the sensible carcass, a moving sepulchre, which they carry about with them.

We find complaints, that by bonds and chains our mind is held, from our infancy: of certain "mean and debasing passions, that do fasten and even nail the soul to the body:' of much greater evils, and more grievous, than the most painful bodily diseases, gouts, stranguries, dysenteries, and myriads of the like; viz. all manner of sins, wickednesses, transgressions, ungodlinesses, which we have to lament as the maladies or disaffections of our soul.

Of certain old or inveterate spots," that are by all means to be washed and purged out: that there are certain principles of viciousness, as pleasures, griefs, lusts, fears, enkindled from the body, but mixed with the soul, and that absurdly bear rule over it.

And the naturalness P of these is more than intimated, while they are said to be rather from parents and our first elements than ourselves: or, rather to be imputed, as is elsewhere 9 said, to those that plant, than those that are planted. Whence also, vice is said to be involuntary (being rooted in our natures :) that whosoever are vicious, become so from such things as do even prevent our choice. And

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f 1 John v. i The so controverted Merc. Trismeg. c. 7. Secund. M. Ficin. Interpret. n της αγνωσίας κακία,

και της φθοράς δεσμόν.

Γ ειργμων και συνδέσεων των κατεχομενον, εκ βρέφων, νουν. lamb. de vit Pythng.

γουριας,

την πέρι το σώμα πλευρίτιδες, περιπλευμονίαι, φρενίτιδες, ποδάγρας, πραγ δυσεντερίαι, σε περί δε την ψυχην πολλως μείζονα και χαλεπωτε ρα, αθεσμα, κακά, παρανομίαι, ασεβήματα, idem. п-εуKαтεOKIррwoμievai knλides, p. 256, Hippar. Pythag.

ο αρχαι κακίας.

η εκ των γενετόρων και σοιχείων, μαλλον η εξ αμεων. Plat, Tim. Locr. Η αιτιατέον μεν τους φυτευόντας αει, των φυτευομενων μαλλον. Idem. Timæus.

η κακοι δε ακουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθα. Ibid.

Η αρξάμενοι εκ παίδων, και εξ αμαρτάνουσιν άκοντες. Idem. Hipp. Major.

p. 296.
takovata manuara,, Plotin. Enne. 1. lib. 8.

η μεμιγμένη γάρ ουν δη η του κόσμου φύσις εκ τε νου, και αναγκης. Idem. p. 77. ν των δε την αρετήν εκούσιον είναι έπεται το την κακιαν ακούσιον υπαρXew, &c. Alcinous, Cap. 30. * εξ αυτοφυούς μοχθηρίας, Μax. Τyr. Dissert. 25.

* το παρεπομενον τη ουσίαι ημών κακον. Hiero in Carm. Pythag. - τους εισπορευομένους εις τον βιον ποτίζει, παντες πινουσιν, αλλά οι μεν πλειον, οι δε ήττον. Tab. Cebetis. • Empedocles and Heraclitus represented as πολλακις οδυρόμενοι και λοιδορούντες την φύσιν ως αναγκην και πόλεμον ούσαν, αμιγές δε μηδεν μηδε ειλικρινες έχουσαν.

that all men do more evil than good, beginning even from their very childhood.

And (as another expresses it t) we offend from certain involuntary passions, in which the pravity of the soul is made to consist: or that we here partake a certain mundane ↳ nature, which, he says, is mixed of mind and necessity. And even from hence that virtue is voluntary; vice is, by another, concluded to be involuntary. "For," says that author, "who can willingly, in the most lovely and most noble part of himself, choose that which is the greatest of all evils?" esteeming vicious inclination the most repugnant thing to liberty, (as it is indeed in the moral sense,) and the greatest slavery. Whereupon, another inquiring, since God doth nothing but what is good, whence evils should come, resolves that whatsoever is good is from heaven, but all evil from our self-natural vileness. And y another speaks of an evil adhering to our being, and not only acquired, but even connatural to us; yea, and this evil is said to be the very death of the soul. The sadness of the common case of man in this respect, hath been therefore emblematically represented by a potion of error and igno rance, presented to every one at their first coming into the world, and whereof it is said all do drink, more or less; a woman called Imposture, accompanied by other harlots, Opinion, Lust, Pleasure, &c. seizing and leading away every one. And hence are bitter complaints and accusations poured forth even against nature itself, as being a mere force and war, and having nothing pure or sincere in it, but having its course amidst many unrighteous passions; yea, and its rise and first production are lamented, as founded in unrighteousness. The discontentful resentments whereof have made some not spare to censure our very make and frame, the uniting of an immortal thing to a mortal in the composition of man, as a kind of distortion of nature, that the thing produced, should be made to delight in having parts so unnaturally pulled and drawn together. VI. So that some of the ethnick philosophers have been so far from denying a corruption and depravation of nature in man, that they have overstrained the matter, and thought vicious inclination more deeply natural than indeed it is; and so taxed and blamed nature, in the case of man, as to be too liable to implied reflections even on the blessed Author of nature himself. Whereto the known principles of the sect of the Stoics do too plainly tend, who give in so vast a catalogue of the diseases and distempers of the mind of man: taking every thing into the account that hath the least of perturbation in it, without excepting so much as mercy itself, or pity towards them that suffer unjustly; and yet seem to subject all things to fate and natural necessity, whereby all these evils in the mind of man would be rejected upon the holy God, as their original cause.d Whence therefore some that were more sober have made it their business to vindicate God from so horrid an imputation; and one of much note animadverts upon the mistakes of such as seemed so to charge him, sharply blaming them for such an intimation; but more sharply (quarrelling others in his own dubious twilight) for the excuse they give of it, viz. b Twi Orntwi ovveрxopevov aðavarov. Plut. de Solert. Anim. p. 964.

c D. Laert. L. 7. But perhaps they have been somewhat misunderstood by their prejudiced opposers, or some unwary expression of theirs been stretched beyond what was meant. For though they reckon Aɛos among the distempers of the mind; yet so afterwards they do aveλenpooven too Whence it is probable they intended to place λɛos among the evils of man's nature no otherwise than as it should include undue perturbation in it, or as it might urge those who of unit or useasonable things for the aflicted person's relief than which are more apt to be passionate upon such occasions, than just and wise, to the nothing is more supposable: which occasioned that famous general Agesilaus, when his sick friend importuned him with tears, to stop the (then necessary) march of his army for his sake, (looking sadly back upon him,) to say, ws xaλɛπov E51 Cλɛɛiv kaι Opovεiv, How hard is it to be pitiful and wise! Plutar. Apophtheg. Lacon. And that afterwards making avedenpoovun vicious too, their meaning was, that a calm and sedate will or propension to relieve persons in distress was the virtue, both the other the opposite vices. Which seems more likely than Menagius's way of salving the Evartiopaves, by supposing ανελεημοσυνη here to have been misprinted for ελεημοσύνη, by some very as suming transcribers, that were willing rather to express their own mind than their author's. Observ. in Locum.

d And though in what follows they are sharply taxed, as laying all the evils of the world (moral as well as other upon God and nature, this seems to have proceeded from some lavish speeches of Chrysippus, that justly fell under the reprehension of Plutarch's severer and more sound judgment. Yet surely they did suppose another and purer state of nathey assign the common notion of vicious perturbation or passion, to call tare, out of which man was lapsed; otherwise, how come they, when it an irrational and (παρα φυσιν κίνησις] preternatural motion? What εantly call these diseases of the soul, therefore they understood them nature is that, which it is supposed to swerve from? Besides that, they not to be its very nature for then what were the diseased subject? Nor

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That God doth what they attribute to him in this matter, for the punishment of wicked men; falleging it were a grievous matter that God should will and revenge the same thing, that wickedness should both be, and be punished, according to the mind of God. Some do, with great reverence of the divine majesty, confess the rise of all this evil to be from man himself, viz. even that sort of evil which is called by the name of wickedness, is said to be from an innate principle, which the arbitrary power of a man's own soul hatcheth and fosters, and the fault is his who admits it; but God is faultless: that God did place the soul over a terrene body, as a charioteer over a cha-cellent, only to obey and serve; as now, every one that riot, which it might govern or neglect, &c.

So another says, that whatsoever things come into this world from God, are good; but evils proceed from a certain ancient nature, &c. By which what could he mean, but the hereditary pravity which hath in a long series descended from depraved progenitors, so as no longer to be a new thing; but of a forgotten original, and from of old reigning in the world?

They of this famous sect, the Platonists, seem often to attribute vicious inclination to the soul's being united with the body; (as supposing it to have existed pure and sinless before;) yet even they appear also not to have thought it impossible a human soul should sometime have been in an earthly body without sin. For their renowned leader discourses at large of a former incorrupt state of man in the body, (a golden age, as others also call it,) and of a defection or apostacy from it; which state, though his Egyptian tradition misinformed him about the continuance of it, he excellently describes, (as also man's declining from it,) telling us, that "then God familiarly conversed with men, taking care of them, as a shepherd of his flock: that he was chiefly intent upon the ducture and government of their minds; that (as he afterward says in another part of that unfinished discourse) while the godlike nature continued in sufficient vigour with them, they were obedient to laws, and behaved themselves friendly towards that m divine thing that was akin to them. Then they possessed | thoughts that were true, and altogether great; using meekness and prudence in reference to their own conditions and one another; that they disregarded all things in comparison of virtue. They easily bore a prosperous condition, esteeming all outward things little. They were not intoxicated or drunken with sensual delights; but sober and quick-sighted, and all things increased upon them through their mutual love and virtue. But they growing at length into a too great esteem and love of terrene things and that participation which they had of God decaying, (whereas all was well while the Divine nature remained with them,) and being variously intermingled with much deadly evil, and a kind of human custom or course of living," as elsewhere he so expresses sinful corruption, "prevailing among them, and they not able to bear a prosperous condition, came to shame, and ruin with it; having lost the loveliest of their most precious things." Agreeably whereto, another, discoursing of the nature and original of evil, places it in our being plunged and sunk into matter and corporeity: and commenting upon a noted Ppassage of his master, viz. "That our recovery must be by a speedy flight to God," &c. says, that this flight is not to depart from the earth, but that we become, even while we are on earth, righteous, and holy, and wise.

Therefore also have we with this sort of men, so frequent discourses of the purgative virtues, which suppose a lapse into great impurities; yet not so inseparable from our natures, but that by divine help (which they also sometimes speak of as necessary) a cure and redress may be wrought.

VII. Nor, if we consider, can it be so much as imaginable to us, that the present state of man is his primitive could it agree with that known dogma of theirs, that virtue is didakтov TI, a thing to be taught, if they should suppose vice in that sense natural. And indeed, that Plutarch entitles that book he hath against them, Tipi SoxWV Evavτiwpa, argues, they intended not the gross things he refutes, for no man intends contradiction to himself. And since no man can hold both parts of a contradiction, it is candid to suppose they would have chose rather to let go the worser part.

• Αλλα μεν τον θεον κολάζειν φησι την κακιαν και πολλα ποιειν επι και λάσει των πονηρών.

Γ' Έστι μεν ουν τούτο δεινόν τε και γίνεσθαι την κακιαν και κολαζεσθαι KATA TOV TOV Acos Aoyov. Plutar. de Repugnan. Stoicorum.

αρχήν την αυτοφυή, η Ψυχης εξουσια κνίσκει τε και τελεσφορεί ηι

state, or that he is now such as he was at first made. For neither is it conceivable, the blessed God should have made a creature with an aversion to the only important ends, whereof it is naturally capable; or, particularly, that he created man with a disaffection to himself; or that ever he at first designed a being of so high excellency as the spirit of man, to drudge so meanly, and be so basely servile to terrene inclinations; or, that since there are manifestly powers in him of a superior and inferior sort and order, the meaner should have been, by original institution, framed to command, and the more noble and exobserves may see the common case with man is. And how far he is swerved from what he was, is easily conjecturable, by comparing him with the measures which show what he should be. For it cannot be conceived for what end laws were ever given him, if, at least, we allow them not the measures of his primitive capacity, or deny him ever to have been in a possibility to obey. Could they be intended for his government, if conformity to them were against or above his nature? or were they only for his condemnation ? or for that, if he was never capable of obeying them? How inconsistent were it with the goodness of the blessed God, that the condemnation of his creatures should be the first design of his giving them laws; and with his justice, to make his laws the rule of punishment, to whom they could never be the rule of obedience and duty; or with his wisdom, to frame a system and body of laws, that should never serve for either purpose, and so be upon the whole useful for nothing! The common reason of mankind teacheth us, to estimate the wisdom and equity of lawgivers, by the suitableness of their constitutions to the genius and temper of the people for whom they are made; and we commonly reckon nothing can more slur and expose government, than the imposing of constitutions most probably impracticable, and which are never likely to obtain. How much more incongruous must it be esteemed to enjoin such as never possibly could! Prudent legislators, and studious of the common good, would be shy to impose upon men under their power, against their genius and common usages, neither alterable easily, nor to any advantage. Much more absurd were it, with great solemnity and weighty sanctions to enact statutes for brute creatures! And wherein were it more to purpose to prescribe unto men strict rules of piety and virtue, than to beasts or trees, if the former had not been capable of observing them as the latter were not? We insist not on the written precepts in the sacred volume, (where we have also the history of man's creation and fall,) but let the law be considered which is written in men's hearts; the vóμos onμrovoyikos, the racis Evvoμos, or the lex nata, (in the ethnick language,) which the eternal, lawgiving mind hath created in our souls. And how evidently doth that law convince, that we neither are nor do what we should! How gross and numerous deformities do we daily behold by that shattered and broken glass! how many things which we disapprove, or certainly would, if we discussed the matter with ourselves! How frequent buffetings are many, when they reflect, constrained to suffer at their own hands; even wherein (not having another law) they are only a law to themselves," Rom. ii. and have only their own thoughts, either their excusers, or accusers! And what doth that signify, but a lapse and recess from their original state? the broken imperfect memorials whereof, are a standing testimony against their present course; their notions of right and wrong, comely and uncomely, remonstrating against their vicious inclinations and ways. For would they ever reprove themselves for what was not possible to be otherwise? Or was man created a mere piece of self-contradiction; or with a nature made up of repugnancies, and perpetually at war with ονομα μοχθηρια αυτου του ελομένου αιτιαι· Θεός αναιτιος. Max. Τyr. ubi supra. h As he there proceeds.

ή όσα παρα θεου αγαθα, ταδε κακα εκ της αρχαίας φύσεως. Plot. Ennead

1. lib. 8. p. 77.

k Theatet.

m προς το συγγενες θείον.

ο πόλλοι των θνητών,

1η του θεου φυσις αυτοις εξήρκει.

η ή του θεού μοίρα.

p In Theatet.

QOU TO EK уN ATελÕεiv aλλα, &c. Plot. Enne. 1. lib. 1.

r Marin Procl.

Η ταύτα ο νομοθέτης τους διαθεσμοθετα ταις ψυχαίς. Hierocl. p. 19. and

210.

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