how are those former conceived in and by themselves? | Well enough, say I; for they are to be conceived, as they are to be defined; 'but the definition of a thing is to express only its own nature and essence (as Spinosa himself says, Schol. 2. in Prop. 8.) considered apart by itself, into which (as hath been said) the efficient cause, which is extrinsical to it, enters not; and without considering whether it exist or exist not. Because definitions are of special kinds, or common natures, that exist not as such; not of existing individuals, except the one only self-subsisting, original Being, of whose essence existence is; which Spinosa himself acknowledges, and makes his twentieth proposition; as on the other hand, that "The essence of things produced by God involves not existence," is his twentyfourth. XII. But that the substance of things, whose essence involves existence, and whose essence involves it not, should be one and the same, exceeds all wonder! One would think, so vastly different essences of substance should at least make different substances; and that when Spinosa hath told us so expressly, that an "attribute of substance constitutes the essence of substance; and that all the attributes of substance are distinctly conceived; the conception of the one, not involving the conception of another;" and so do most really differ from each other, and make so many essences therefore, of substance really distinct, (though he once thought otherwise of the divine attributes, that they did only differ from each other ratione, and that God was a most simple Being, which he also takes pains to prove, R. D. Cartes. Princip. Philos. Append. part 2d. cap. 5. p. 117, 118,) one would surely hereupon think, that so vastly different attributes, as necessary existence, and contingent, should constitute the most different substances imaginable. For what is an attribute? Id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejus essentiam constituens. (Def. 4.) Now the essence of some substance the understanding most clearly perceives as involving existence in it. Existence therefore constitutes the essence of such substance, and is therefore an attribute of it. Some other essence it as clearly perceives, that involves not existence. Now this sort of essence is the attribute of somewhat. And of what is it the attribute? Why, he hath told us, "An attribute is what the understanding perceives of substance as constituting its essence;" therefore, some substance hath such an essence as involves not existence. Now let it hereupon be considered (albeit that I affect not to give high titles to any reasonings of mine) whether this amount not to a demonstration against the hypothesis of Spinosa, and the rest of his way, that all substance is self-existent; and that, even upon their own principles and concessions, so frequently acknowledging the world to be produced, and not self-existent, that even the substance of it is produced also; which they deny, viz." That whose essence, this unnamed author says, includes not existence, either hath some substance belonging to its essence, or it hath not. If not, it may exist without substance; and then unto what is it an attribute, or what doth it modify? If yea, there is then some substance, and particularly that of this world, in whose essence existence is not included; and that by consequence, the substance of this world is produced. But if any make a difficulty of it to understand, how all being and perfection should be included in the Divine Being, and not be very God; so much is already said to this in the former Part of this discourse, (viz. Chap. 4. Sect. XII. &c.) that as I shall not here repeat what hath been said, so I think it unnecessary to say more. And it is what Spinosa himself had once such sobriety of mind as to apprehend, when (Princip. R. D. Cart. Philosoph. more Geometr. demonstrat. Append. part 1. cap. 2.) he says thus of God, or of increate substance, that God doth eminently contain that which is found formally in created things, i. e. God hath that in his own nature, in which all created things are contained in a more eminent manner; and that there is some attribute in God, wherein all the perfections, even of matter, are after a more excellent manner themselves contained. Having before told us, n Manuduct, p. 107. (Princip. Part I. Axiom 8.) That by eminently, he understood when a cause did contain all the reality of its effect more perfectly than the effect itself; by formally, when it contained it in equal perfection. And so he might have told himself of somewhat sufficiently common (though not univocally) to the substance of the Divine Nature, and that of creatures; whereon to found the causality of the former, in reference to the latter, as effected thereby. But as he grew older, his understanding either became less clear, or was more perverted by ill design. CHAPTER II. Animadversions from a French writer, nameless. His pretence to confute Spinosa. The opinion of the world's being made of independent self-existing matter; chosen by him and asserted against two other opinions. That of matter's being created out of nothing rejected, and falsely charged with novelty. Moses, and the author to the Hebrews misalleged, vindicated. Self-originate, independent matter disproved: asserted by this author with evident self-contradiction; and without necessity. I. BUT having here done with him and that sort of men, I shall now very briefly consider the fore-mentioned Monsieur's way of confuting him. The conceit, that there must be such a thing as necessary self-subsisting matter, hath I confess seemed to be favoured by some or other name among the Ethnics of that value, as to have given some countenance to a better cause; besides some others, who with greater incongruity, and more injury to it, have professed the Christian name. It hath been of late espoused, and asserted more expressly, by this French gentleman, who hath not thought fit to dignify it with his name, doubting perhaps whether the acquainting the world with it, might not more discredit his cause, than his cause (in this part of it) could better the reputation of his name. However it be, though my inquiry and credible information hath not left me ignorant, I shall not give him occasion to think himself uncivilly treated, by divulging what he seems willing should be a secret. For though it was not intrusted to me as such, I shall be loth to disoblige him by that, whereby that I know I can oblige nobody else. It is enough that his book may be known by its title, L'Impie convaincu. It is professedly written against the atheism of Spinosa. And when I first looked into it, I could not refrain thinking of Plato's repartee to Diogenes, when the latter undertook to reprehend the other's pride, that he did it with greater pride. Although I think not the application is to be made in the strictest terms. For I will neither be so indulgent to Spinosa, as to reckon that any man's atheism can be greater than his; nor so severe to this his adversary, as positively to conclude he designed the service of any atheism at all. But I think him at least, unwarily and without any necessity, to have quitted one of the principal supports of the doctrine of a Deity; and that he hath undertaken the confutation of atheism, upon a ground that leads to atheism. II. He thinks, it seems, Spinosa not otherwise confutable, than upon the hypothesis of eternal, independent matter, which he thus explains in his preface, it being the second of the three distinct hypotheses whereof he there gives an account. a The second, he says, is theirs who assert two beings or two substances increate, eternal, independent, as to their simple existence, though very differently; the former whereof is God, the infinitely perfect Being, almighty, the principle of all perfection; and the second, matter, a being essentially imperfect, without power, without life, without knowledge; but capable nevertheless of all these perfections, by impression from God, and his operations upon it. This he pretends to have been the hypothesis of the ancient philosophers and divines (after he had acknowledged the former hypothesis-"That the world, and the matter of it, were drawn out of nothing by the infinite power of the first and supreme Being, which itself alone was eternal and independent,"-was the hypothesis of the greater part of Christian divines and philosophers.) And this second, he says, is the hypothesis which he shall fol a La seconde est celle de ceux qui, &c. Avertissement, III. To qualify the ill savour of that second opinion which he follows, he would have us believe it to be the more creditable, than the (rejected) first, which he says is a new thing in the world, and that it was not born till some ages after Christ; which is gratis dictum. And whereas he tells us, he takes notice, that Tertullian was the first that maintained it against a Christian philosopher, who defended the eternal existence of matter; he had only reason to take notice, That the philosopher he mentions, was the first, that calling himself a Christian, had the confidence to assert an opinion so repugnant to Christianity and to all religion, and who therefore first gave so considerable an occasion to one who was a Christian indeed, to confute it. Nor was Hermogenes a much more creditable name with the orthodox, ancient Christians, than those wherewith he graces the third opinion, besides the other ill company which might be assigned it, if that were a convictive way of fighting, by names. low, rejecting the first, but now mentioned; and in oppo- | clearly proved (and hath been proved, Part 1st) otherwise, sition to the third, which makes the world and its produc- viz. that necessary, self-originate being, is the root and tion to be nothing else than an emanation of the Divine fountain of all being, whether actual or possible; since Substance, whereby a part of itself is formed into a world. there is nothing actual brought into being, which is not And this, he says, was the opinion of the ancient Gnostics actually from it, and nothing possible, but whose possiand Priscillianists, and is for the most part of the Cabba- bility depends upon it. And what virtually comprehends lists, of the new Adamites or the illuminated, and of an all being, actual and possible, cannot but be infinite. For infinite number of Asiatic and Indian philosophers. without the compass of such all-comprehending being, there is nothing to bound it. And what is bounded by nothing, is unbounded or infinite. Whereupon also, matter plainly appears not to be of itself. For if it were, for the same reason it must be infinite and all comprehending. But nothing were more apparently contradictious and selfrepugnant, than the assertion of two all-comprehending beings; and if there be but one, that matter is not that one. But that it must be a necessary, self-originate, intelligent Being, which is the root of all being, I conceive already sufficiently proved in the former part of this discourse. Wherein it is also shown, that finite created beings, arising from that infinite self-originate one, limit it not, nor do detract any thing from its infinity, but concur to evidence its infinity rather; inasmuch as they could never have been, had they not been before contained within the productive power of that increate self-originate Being. It is, by the way, to be noted that the notion of infinity we now intend, doth not merely import unconfinedness to this or that certain space, (though it include that too,) for that, alone, were a very maimed, defective notion of infiniteness. But we understand by it the absolute all-comprehending profundity and plenitude of essence and perfection. Whereupon, it signifies nothing to the preserving entire the infinity of the self-originate, intelligent Being, only to suppose it such, as that it can permeate all the space that can be taken up by another (supposed) self-originate being. For still, since its essence were of itself, it were not virtually contained in the other. Which therefore would evince that other not to be in the true sense infinite. Whereupon we, IV. And for what he adds, That Moses was, he dares say, of his opinion; because he only gives such an account of the creation, as that it was made of an unformed preexistent matter; and the Apostle Paul to the Hebrews, saying, God drew these visible things out of those that were not visible. He shows, indeed, more daringness than solid judgment, in venturing to say the one or the other upon so slender a ground. As if every thing were false, which Moses and Paul did not say. But it appears rather from his way of quoting, (who, it is like, did not much concern himself to turn over the leaves of the Bible, that he might be sure to quote right,) that God did create that unformed matter, as he calls it. For it is expressly said, God created heaven, and earth, and that this earth (not matter) was without form, and void, Gen. i. 1, 2. And if this unformed earth and matter be, as with him it seems, all one, then the unformed matter is said to have been created. For God is said to have created that unformed earth; which must indeed pre-exist, unformed, to its being brought into form, not unto all creation. And the same thing must be understood of the unformed heaven too, though Moses's design was to give us a more distinct account of what was nearer us, and wherein we were more concerned. And indeed, is seems most agreeable to the letter of the text, and to the following history, so to understand those words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," viz. That in the beginning he created that which afterwards became heaven and earth, i. e. unformed matter. For heaven and earth as now they are, or as they were in their formed state, were not created in a moment, in the very beginning; but in several successive days, as the following history shows. And so much Tertullian aptly enough intimates to that Pseudo-Christian Hermogenes, Terræ nomen redigit in materiam, &c. Nor is Heb. xi. 3. capable of being tortured into any sense more favourable to his gross fancy, which (as the Greek text, if any will consult it, shows) says not, The things that are seen were made of things not appearing, but were not made of things appearing. As to what he adds touching the word créer, &c. I let it pass, not liking to contend about words often promiscuously used, but shall apply myself to the consideration of the thing in question, and show-1. How inconsistently this author asserts independent matter, both with the truth and with himself-2. How unnecessarily he doth it, and that the defence of the common cause against Spinosa did no way oblige him to it. V. First, How inconsistently he asserts it, 1. With the truth of the thing; for, (1.) Whatsoever exists independently and necessarily, is infinite. And herein I must do Spinosa that right, as to acknowledge he hath, in asserting it, done right to truth; though the grounds upon which he asserts it, are most perniciously false. But I conceive it is capable of being (2.) Prove the impossibility of independent, self-origi nate matter, from the known, agreed notion of God, viz. That he is a Being absolutely perfect, or comprehensive of all perfection. Even they that deny his existence, confess (though to the contradiction of themselves) this to be the notion of the thing they deny. Now, though this assertor of independent matter acknowledges it a being essentially imperfect, he can only mean by that, less perfect; not that it hath, simply, no perfection at all. 'Tis idle trifling to brangle about words. Perfection hath been wont to go for an attribute of being. He calls it a being; it must therefore have some perfection, some goodness, be of some value. Is it not better than nothing? Then, that perfection must be eminently contained in God; otherwise, how is he a Being comprehensive of all perfection? The imperfections of matter belong not to him; nor of any thing else. For imperfection is nothing; nor do the perfections of any creature belong to him formally, or in the same special kind, but eminently, and in a higher and more. noble kind. And so, to have all being and perfection, either for his own, or within his productive power, cannot, without contradiction, be denied of him, who is confessed to be God. And again, to be able to create, is surely a perfection. Omnipotency, more a perfection than partial impotency. Wherefore to assert matter could not be created by God, is to assert an impotent, imperfect God. Or since God can be conceived under no other notion than of a Being absolutely perfect) to assert none at all. (3.) This supposition not only denies to God all perfection, but it ascribes to matter, which he himself confesses the meanest sort of being, (as shortly it will be fitter to take further notice,) the high excellency of self-subsistence, the first and most fundamental of all divine perfections. (4.) If matter be, as such, an independent, self-originate thing, then every part or particle of matter must be so. And then, let such matter be supposed to fill up infinite space, we shall have an infinite number of independent entities, co-existing for ever; for a finite number cannot replenish infinite space: or let it be supposed (more agreeably to the pretended sentiments of this author) confined within the limits of the formed universe; and how un reasonably is such a thing as independent matter, supposed to be of itself, limited to one spot of immense space! For let the universe be supposed finite, though ever so vast, it must yet be conceived but as a minute spot, to the infinite unbounded vacuity that lies without it; and which yet he seems to acknowledge replenished with the Divine Being. Now let a man set himself to consider, and try how easy it will be to his thoughts to conceive one little portion of boundless space, taken up with a mean being, next to nothing, that is of itself there, and cannot but be there, and no where else, imposed upon the infinitely perfect Being; the all-wise and almighty God, who fills up all space unavoidably and from all eternity, so that he could not, if he thought it a cumber, disencumber or rid himself of it; and rather seemed of necessity, than of choice, to have made a world of it, as not knowing else what to do with it; with which imagination also the youth | of the world so ill agrees, for why then was it so lately made? verse is made it is already taken up, and pre-engaged therein, and it is limited thereto. Therefore the matter is yet to be created, of which the other worlds are to be made. and it can be so, otherwise no more worlds can be made: and thereupon the great God is, not without blasphemy, said to have gone to the utmost of his power, to have done in this kind all that he can. And this must be said, by this author, in express contradiction to the truth of the thing, to the most common and agreed idea or notion of the Divine Being; and now, most apparently, to himself. And therefore his high rant against Spinosa,b (in this point more orthodox than himself,) That he confounds in his philosophy being and perfection, Pretendant que, ce qui est, et ne renferme aucune negation d'etre, est une perfection, &c.—Pretending that whatsoever is, and includes not in its notion any negation of being, is a perfection, &c. is vain, and as much without cause, as what he afterward says about it is without sense. For he adds, That for his part he finds nothing more false or extravagant; and why (5.) But it further seems very evident, and more fully so? Because then pain and sorrow must be reckoned evidential of the absurdity of this conceit, that if there among perfections, and such real perfections as are worthy were such matter, the world could never have been made of God, or a Being infinitely perfect. And upon this, he of it. For how great alterations must such rude, undi- triumphs over such men, as supplanters of the Deity, ingested, unformed matter have undergone, in forming of stead of defenders of so great a Being, and as having lost such a world as this? But what greater inconsistency can their senses and their reason, &c. But if he had not lost we imagine, than that what exists necessarily, or of itself, his own, and abandoned himself to that fury and rage of should be alterable? What is of itself what it is, must be insolence which he there imputes to his opposers, he might eternally and without change what it is. So absurd, as have been capable of so much calm and sober considerawell as profane, it will be to ascribe to dull and senseless tion, as to have bethought himself, that among creatures, matter, or to any thing else, so peculiar and appropriate an a sense of pain, real grief and sorrow, correspondent to attribute and name as that of the Deity, I am that I am. their present, true causes, import more perfection, than For, hereupon, such matter were not only supposed vainly stupidity, insensibleness, and apathy; and if so, though and to no purpose, being never possible to be the matter pain and grief cannot formally agree to the most perfect of the world, but destructively, and against the very pur-being of God, to whom their causes cannot agree, that the pose that should be served by it. For such matter being life and percipiency do eminently agree to him, by which supposed to occupy the space of the formed world, must he can apprehend an injury, though not a real hurt, (which exclude thence any other matter of which it could be he can therefore only not apprehend, not because the performed; and make it, consequently, impossible there ceptive principle is wanting, but the object,) and by the should ever have been any such world as this, where the power of imparting whereof, he is able to make a creature supposition itself makes it be. This see discoursed more capable of pain and grief, where the objects shall (as they at large, Part I. Chap. 2. may deservedly) occur, and meet the perceptive principle; and that the power of making such a creature, is a greater perfection than an impotency of doing it. Which perfection therefore, he could not, consistently with himself, deny to God, having acknowledged him a Being infinitely perfect, or comprehensive of all perfection. Nor, (6.) And whereas his great reason for such self-originate, independent matter, viz. the imagined impossibility of creation, or that any thing can be produced out of nothing, (which so far as is needful, we partly have and further shall consider, in its proper place,) doth as much oppose the creation of any spiritual being, as material. If all that hath been said in the former part of this discourse, and by many authors besides, do sufficiently prove there are such spiritual or immaterial beings that are created, or are not of themselves; and that, of the property of thought, which is found belonging to them, matter is not capable, (which I shall think to have been done till I see the contrary evinced,) we must judge him very absurdly to have asserted such self-originate, independent matter. And as he hath asserted it very inconsistently with the truth of the thing; so, VI. 2. It will appear he hath done it as little consistently with himself. For, (1.) He acknowledges God to be L'etre infiniment parfait, tout puissant, et le principe de toute perfection-a Being infinitely perfect, almighty, and the principle of all perfection. Now how is he infinitely perfect, if his being include not all perfection? How is he almighty, if he cannot create? How is he the fountain or principle of all perfection, if the perfection of matter (which, as hath been said, though he make it essentially imperfect, must have some perfection belonging to it, since it is not mere nothing) be not eminently comprehended in his being? Besides that here acknowledging God to be omnipotent, and having denied the necessary, eternal, independent matter, which he imagines to be infinite, but limited and confined to the created universe only; I would hereupon demand of him, Cannot the blessed God, if he please, create many worlds? If he say, No, then how is he omnipotent?-If Yea, of what matter must they be made? Not of his (imagined) necessary, independent matter, for of that really none could: but according to him the present uni (2.) Doth he assert necessary increate matter, consistently with his own reasonings for the possibility of a vacuum, where he takes it for granted, that God can oneantir une petite partie de la matiere, &c.—annihilate some small particle of matter, one stone, for example, or one grain of sand. Which how ridiculously is it supposed, by one who supposes such matter necessarily self-existent! For who sees not that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, do infer one another, or signify rather the same thing. Therefore, no man, except Spinosa, could be at once more daring and more unhappy than this author. And as it hath thus appeared, that he hath asserted such self-originate, independent matter, very inconsistently both with the truth of the thing and himself; so, VII. Secondly, It will also appear he hath done it very unnecessarily; and particularly, without that necessity which he pretends of answering Spinosa. For there is no necessity of it so much as pretended, upon any account besides that of the common maxim, that nothing can come out of nothing; the sense whereof must first be inquired before it can be understood, how far it will serve his purpose, or infer the necessity of independent matter. The sense of it must either be this-That a being could never arise out of no-being, of itself, without a pre-existent, creative cause; which is most evidently true, but as evidently not to his purpose: or this-That what once was not, could never be produced into being by a pre-existent, omnipotent Cause: which were to his purpose, but is evidently, and by apparent self-contradiction, untrue. And what can make it have so much as the least semblance of truth? Either the authority of the maxim, or some plausible reason. For its authority; though that d of this see at large Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. which he claims to it of the ancient philosophers were little considerable, if ever so truly claimed, we have no ground to think it otherwise claimed than most untruly. Its authority, as he represents it, depends upon a worse authority. He is so modest as to expect it to be believed, upon his bare word, that this was the opinion of all the ancient philosophers before Christ's time; while yet he thinks not fit to tell us his name. But if their reasonings from it be considered, that generations are out of matter, and corruptions are into matter, we have no cause to apprehend they understood it otherwise than that natural agents did neither create nor annihilate any thing. Besides that, there is positive ground enough to conclude, that the more instructed and wiser pagans, long before Christ's time, did believe all things to have sprang from one intelligent, self-subsisting original, matter itself not being excepted. As, with the Egyptians, the inscription of the temple at Sais shows, "I am all that is, or was, or shall be," &c. and with the Grecians, their worshipping God, under the name of Pan: which could mean no other thing, than that they thought the Deity to comprehend eminently or virtually all beings besides, in its creative or productive power. And we have reason to think that pagan philosophers since Christ, such as Hierocles, Jamblichus, Porphyry, Plotinus, &c. who (as others have observed) were manifestly of this sentiment, understood the minds of the more ancient philosophers as well as this Monsieur; nor do they pretend to contradict them herein. And for the reason of the thing itself, he hath not the least appearance of any on his part, but that, because the finite power of a creature cannot bring a thing out of nothing, therefore omnipotency cannot; which is so far from concluding for him, that (as hath been intimated) it manifestly contradicts itself, and concludes the contrary. For how is that omnipotency, which cannot do every thing that implies not a contradiction? And how is that a contradiction, that what once was not, should afterwards come to be there being no objective impossibility or intrinsic repugnancy in the thing itself to exist, but that it were truly ens possible; (and we are out of doubt concerning matter for instance, or whatsoever else we are sure doth exist, :hat it could exist;) and supposing also that there be a sufficient, causative power, to make it exist, or produce it into being and what cause can be more sufficient than an omnipotent one, such as our author confesses God to be? Nor doth he deny that there are intelligent spirits, that were not of themselves; only he would have us think them but finer matter, impressed with intellectual power. But what akin is a mind to matter, except his own? And supposing a mind or intellect be stamped upon matter, it is then but added to it, not drawn out of it, as if matter had before contained it. And even thus, since mind or intellect is not nothing, (unless he will say, himself differs by nothing from unthinking clay,) we have something out of nothing. And who can think it more impossible to Omnipotency, to create matter, than a mind? But if he reckon thought, or intellect, is contained in matter, or included in the notion of it, then matter, as such, must be intelligent, and consequently all matter; and this will be absurdity enough, to give him as good a title to the privilege of not being reasoned against, as, from his magisterial way of writing, we may count Spinosa thought himself to have. Nor indeed will it leave any man so much as a conjecture at the reason why he should pretend to differ from him. For who can imagine, why his matter, endued with the attributes of extension and thought, might not do as well as Spinosa's substance? tion than he intended, so he will attribute less to God. For he will, at this rate, attribute no more to him. than hath been generally ascribed to ordinary natural agents; i.e. to produce into actual being, out of matter, that whereto there was in it some seminal disposition before. And here, indeed, is the source of his error, his reducing infinite power to the measures of finite; an insolent presuming to circumscribe Omnipotency, and making that simply impossible even to Almightiness itself, which is only so to created agents. And to this purpose, I find some reasonings in Sextus Empiricus, who tells us how the sceptics attempted to prove (besides their disputing against the other three sorts of causation) that dowμatov— an incorporeal thing, cannot be airiov owparos-the cause of any thing corporeal; arguing (and slightly enough) from the common methods of subordinate agents, to the operations of the Supreme Cause. Nor is it apprehensible, how one can find a medium; or while they make matter independent, how not to make God dependent. And when the Monsieur we are concerned with took a friendly notice of Hermogenes's consent with him upon this subject, he might as well have been at the pains to consider somewhat of what Tertullian wrote anainst him, that hereby, in some respect, God is made inferior and subject to matter, when without it he could not have made a world. Materia superior invenitur, quæ illi copiam operandi subministravit, et Deus subjectus materia videtur, cujus substantiæ eguit; nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget, fc.-Every one is subject to what he stands in need of. CHAPTER III. The reason of what next follows. Directions to readers not wont to inquire into the grounds of their religion. A summary and plainer proposal unto such, of what hath been said in the former Part, concerning God's existence and conversableness with men. The reasonableness (so much being already evinced) of alleging, and relying upon the testimony of the Holy Scriptures. The expressness of that testimony concerning the unity of the Godhead, the trinity therein. The absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. The infiniteness of God's knowledge, power, goodness, and presence. His propensions towards men, and aptness (supposing there were no obstruction) to human converse. Matters of doubt herein resolved. I. AND having thus far established and vindicated so principal a ground-work in this important cause,―That what is necessarily, or of itself, is an absolutely perfect Being, distinct from all things else; and a proper Object of religion, or whereto a temple, and all the worship thereof, duly belong, I shall now only suffer myself to be a little further diverted from my intended course, apprehending that their case is also to be considered, who have been less accustomed to this course, of reasoning out to themselves the principles of their religion: unto whom therefore what hath been hitherto attempted may seem, if not obscure in its parts, yet so tiresome in the whole, as not to meet with patience enough to trace the design that hath been driven on, to its issue and period; it being very incident to unexercised and less attentive readers, to lose their thread, and forget the scope of a discourse, and so still have the truth to seek even in the midst of it. And if what hath been hitherto said, prove unsatisfying to any, that justice must be done to the cause itself and to them, as to avow it must rather proceed either from this infirmity in the reader, or from the unskilfulness of the writer to propound things happily and to advantage; than either from the inevidence of the things themselves, or from want of capacity, even in an ordinary understanding. Nor doth any undertaking seem more feasible, or less to be despaired of, than plainly and satisfyingly to evince, to an unprejudiced understanding that shall attend, these first foundations of a religion and a temple, viz. That God is; capable and apt to receive worship from men, and impart blessedness to them. We shall therefore so far interrupt the current of this discourse, as to endeavour this, by giving a brief and plain sum of the more principal things that have been said to this purpose already. And to pre Or if he think matter, as such, to have only seminal reason or intellect in it, antecedently to his supposed divine impress upon it, how will that agree with his making it essentiellement imparfait,-essentially imperfect? Or what means his added capable neunmoins, its being never-and-That he is conversable with men, or is such as is theless capable of all such perfections by the impression of God upon it? Is that capacity something, or nothing? Or what sense is it to make it capable of having those perfections, which it is essential to it not to have? And surely, as he will attribute to matter more perfec pare for it, must desire you that have not been, as yet, | easy steps in a way that is in some part sufficiently beaten, wont to employ your minds this way, to observe the fol- however, that is sufficiently plain, and it is to be hoped lowing directions: you will soon see that matter put out of all doubt. Let this then be your first step: 1. That somewhat or other there is, that hath been from all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else. If this be not at the first view evident to you, or if it seem too large a step, we will divide it into parts; and consider well what is said for the proof of it, by these degrees. First, That you would not give place to discouragement, nor think too meanly of the understanding whereby God hath distinguished you from the inferior creatures. There is that mind and spirit in man, which doth compass many things of far greater difficulty than it is here to be employed about; though it can be exercised about nothing of so great consequence. That apprehensive power that can take in the orderly frame of such notions as are requisite to the exact skill of numbering or of measuring things, of navigation, of trade, of managing the common affairs of human life; that can lay down to itself such prudent maxims and rules whereby the inconveniences may in great part be avoided which are incident to common conversation, and the advantages gained which may serve one's own private and secular interests; that understanding which can do all this, would far more easily comprehend as much as is needful to the certain knowledge of God's existence, and that he is such as we ought to wor-you that something now is, you may be as sure, as of what ship, and may enjoy, if it apply itself hereto. Do not so despair as not to make an attempt; you know not the strength of your own mind till you have tried it. Secondly, That you indulge not, or do not suffer yourselves to be insensibly seized by, a mean and sordid sloth. Set your thoughts a-work with vigorous diligence. Give not out before you have well begun. Resolve, since you have a thinking power about you, you will use it to this most necessary purpose; and hold your thoughts to it. See that your minds do not presently tire and flag; that you be rationally peremptory, and soberly obstinate, in this pursuit: yield not to be diverted. Disdain, having minds that can reach up to the great Original and Author of all things, that they should be confined to this dirty earth, or only to things low and mean. Thirdly, Look on the things that are rationally evident to your understandings, as equally certain with what you see with your eyes. Are you not as sure that two and two make four (which judgment is the act of your mind) as that this thing which you look upon is black or white, or of this or that shape or figure? Do not so debase your own understandings, as to think nothing certain that comes under their judgment. It is true, they are apt enough to be deceived in many things, and so is your sense too; but if your sense could make you certain of nothing, what would become of justice and government among men ? Who could take an oath before a magistrate? What would become of the common actions and affairs of life? How could you eat or drink, or buy or sell, if you could not certainly distinguish one thing from another? Some things are so plain as that you can be in no doubt about them, as that this is bread, not a stone; that a horse, not a sheep; otherwise all the world must stand still, and all commerce and action cease. And if there were not some things sure to your minds, that you may certainly say, in some plain cases at least, this is true and that false, this right and that wrong, you would be at as great a loss. Otherwise, you might be apt to think a part of a thing greater than the whole, or that the same man might be at London and at Rome at the same time; and you might be as ready to kill your own father as to do him reverence, or to commit robbery upon your rich neighbour as relieve the poor, and judge the one as good an action as the other. (1.) Somewhat or other must ever have been; for otherwise, how could any thing come to be at all? Do you think it was possible, if ever there was nothing at all in being, of one sort or other, that any thing should have come into being? No surely, for which way should it be? It could not be made by another, there being no other to make it; and it could not make itself, itself being as yet nothing. But sure you can easily apprehend, that to make a thing be, is to do something; and as easily, that what is nothing, can do nothing. Therefore, when your eyes tell you see with your eyes, that somewhat or other hath ever been. Say with yourself, Somewhat now is, therefore somewhat hath ever been. If you discern not the clearness of this consequence, take the opposite to it: Nothing now is, therefore nothing will ever be; it is as broad as long. (2.) You may next proceed thus, that something or other hath been of itself; that is, without depending upon any thing else, or being beholden to any other thing for its being. Now here pause awhile, and consider what is said to make this plain to you. Either you must acknowledge something hath ever been of itself, or you must say that all things that are, or ever have been, were from another, without any exception. But mark now, if you say that all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, were from another, you contradict yourself; for besides all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, there is not another from whom they could be. Therefore it is impossible that all things without exception should have been from another; whence then it is plain that something must have been of itself, without depending for its being upon any thing else for it will come to the same contradiction, if you say all things depend upon some other; since there is nothing beyond all things: therefore, to say that all things depend, is to say they depend on nothing, that is, they do not depend. And to say they have all depended on one another for their being, or made one another, is altogether as absurd; for it will make the whole compass or circle of all being to depend upon nothing, or come at length to this, that some one made itself, or even (which is more gross) made its own maker; unless you will rest in some one that made all the other, and was itself not made by any of them. If you do not apprehend this yourself, desire any one that hath a better understanding to explain it to you, and you will soon see the matter intended by it to be as evident as your heart can wish. And so this will be out of question with you-That somewhat was of itself; which added to what was proved before, comes to this-That somewhat was ever of itself. And both these thus conjoined, plainly appear from what hath been said. For we have seen that nothing could possibly make itself, (which would absurdly imply, that before, it both was and was not,) and therefore, whatsoever was of itself, must ever have been, or never had beginning of being. So much, then, I suppose you take to be most certain, that something hath ever been of itself. Whereupon you may further add, Fourthly, As any particular thing is offered to you, for the purpose we are here aiming at, consider it well by itself, before you go further; and think thus, Is this plain (3.) That what was ever of itself, was necessarily. I and certain, yea or no? If at the first sight you think it hope you understand what is meant by being necessarily, not so, observe diligently what is brought for the proof of that is, being so as that it could not possibly but be. You it, and see whether now it be not manifestly certain; and may perceive that some things are so as that it was possiwhen you once find it is, fix it in your mind as a certain-ble they might not have been, as a house, a town, a garty; say, Thus far I am sure. Let not your thoughts run ment, or whatsoever was made by such makers as might back to this as a doubtful thing any more, or unravel their have chosen whether they would have made it, or no. own work; but make use of it as a certainty, to your Yea, or whatsoever is any way made to be, having before further purpose. not been; for what once was not, is manifest it was then possible for it not to be. But to be necessarily, is to be so as that it could never possibly but have been; that is, what is necessarily, is somewhat of so excellent a nature, as that it could never be out of being. Now what was II. Being thus prepared, take this brief account of what hath before been discoursed more at large. And, First, As to this first and great principle, That there is a God. Be but patient of being led by the hand a few |