before? And besides, if it were pre-existent, as it must be if a soul be generated out of it, then they were not the first and only causes of this production. And in another way than that of generation, how will any form the notion of making a soul? Let experience and the making of trial convince the speculators. By what power, or by what art, will they make a reasonable soul spring up out of nothing?

It might be hoped that thus, without disputing the possibility of an eternal, successive production of souls, this shift may appear vain. But if any will persist, and say, that how, or in what way soever they are produced, it is strange if they need any nobler cause than themselves; for may not any living thing well enough be thought capable of producing another of the same kind, of no more than equal perfection with itself? To this we say, besides that no one living thing is the only cause of another such, yet if that were admitted possible, what will it avail? For hath every soul that hath ever existed, or been in being, been produced, in this way, by another? This it were ridiculous to say, for if every one were so produced, there was then some one, before every one; inasmuch as that which produces, must surely have been before that which is produced by it. But how can every one have one before it? A manifest contradiction in the very terms! For then there will be one without the compass of every one. And how is it then said to be every one? There is then it seems one besides, or more than all. And so all is not all. And if this be thought a sophism, let the matter be soberly considered thus: The soul of man is either a thing of that nature universally (and consequently every individual soul) as that it doth exist of itself, necessarily and independently, or not. If it be, then we have, however, a wise intelligent being necessarily existing, the thing we have been proving all this while. Yet this concession we will not accept, for though it is most certain there is such a being, we have also proved the human soul is not it. Whence it is evidently a dependent being, in its own nature, that could never have been of itself, and consequently not at all, had it not been put into being by somewhat else. And being so in its own nature, it must be thus with every one that partakes of this nature. And consequently it must be somewhat of another nature that did put the souls of men into being. Otherwise, the whole stock and lineage of human souls is said to have been dependent on a productive cause, and yet had nothing whereon to depend and so is both caused by another, and not caused. * And therefore since it is hereby evident it was somewhat else, and of another nature, than a human soul, by which all human souls were produced into being: we again say, that distinct being either was a dependent, caused being, or not. If not, it being proved that the soul of man cannot but have had an intelligent or wise cause, we have now what we seek-an independent, necessary, intelligent being, if it do depend, or any will be so idle to say so; that, however, will infallibly and very speedily lead us to the same mark. For though some have been pleased to dream of an infinite succession of individuals of this or that kind, I suppose we have no dream as yet, ready formed, to come under confutation, of infinite kinds or orders of beings, gradually superior, one above another; the inferior still depending on the superior, and all upon nothing. And therefore, I conceive, we may fairly take leave of this argument from the human soul, as having gained from it sufficient evidence of the existence of a necessary being, that is intelligent, and designedly active, or guided by wisdom and counsel, in what it doth.

We might also, if it were needful, further argue the same thing from a power or ability manifestly superior to, and that exceeds the utmost perfection of, human nature, riz. that of prophecy, or the prediction of future contingencies; yea, and from another that exceeds the whole sphere of all created nature, and which crosses and countermands the known and stated laws thereof, viz. that of working miracles; both of them exercised with manifest design; as might evidently be made appear, by manifold instances, to as many as can believe any thing to be true, more than what they have seen with their own eyes; and that do not take present sense, yea, and their own only, to be the alone measure of all reality. But it is not necessary we

insist upon every thing that may be said, so that enough be said to serve our present purpose.

XVI. And that our purpose may yet be more fully served, and such a being evidenced to exist as we may with satisfaction esteem to merit a temple with us, and the religion of it, it is necessary that we add somewhat concerning,

9. The divine goodness; for unto that eternal Being, whose existence we have hitherto asserted, goodness also cannot but appertain; together with those his other attributes we have spoken of.

It is not needful here to be curious about the usual scholastical notions of goodness, or what it imports, as it is wont to be attributed to being in the general, what, as it belongs in a peculiar sense to intellectual beings, or what more special import it may have, in reference to this. That which we at present chiefly intend by it, is a propension to do good with delight; or most freely, without other inducement than the agreeableness of it to his nature who doth it; and a certain delectation and complacency, which, hence, is taken in so doing. The name of goodness (though thus it more peculiarly signifies the particular virtue of liberality) is of a significancy large enough, even in the moral acceptation, to comprehend all other perfections or virtues, that belong to, or may any way commend, the will of a free agent. These therefore we exclude not; and particularly whatsoever is wont to be signified, as attributable unto God, by the names of holiness, as a steady inclination unto what is intellectually pure and comely, with an aversion to the contrary; justice, as that signifies an inclination to deal equally, which is included in the former, yet as more expressly denoting what is more proper to a governor over others, viz. a resolution not to let the transgressions of laws, made for the preservation of common order, pass without due animadversion and punishment; truth, whose signification also may be wholly contained under those former more general terms, but more directly contains sincerity, unaptness to deceive, and constancy to one's word: for these may properly be styled good things in a moral sense; as many other things might, in another notion of goodness, which it belongs not to our present design to make mention of. But these are mentioned as more directly tending to represent to us an amiable object of religion; and are referred hither, as they fitly enough may, out of an unwillingness to multiply, without necessity, particular heads or subjects of discourse.

In the meantime, as was said, what we principally intend, is, That the Being whose existence we have been endeavouring to evince, is good, as that imports a ready inclination of will to communicate unto others what may be good to them; creating, first, its own object, and then issuing forth to it, in acts of free beneficence, suitable to the nature of every thing created by it. Which, though it be the primary or first thing carried in the notion of this goodness, yet because that inclination is not otherwise good than as it consists with holiness, justice, and truth, these therefore may be esteemed, secondarily at least, to belong to it, as inseparable qualifications thereof.

Wherefore it is not a merely natural and necessary emanation we here intend, that prevents any act or exercise of counsel or design; which would no way consist with the liberty of the divine will, and would make the Deity as well a necessary Agent, as a necessary Being; yea, and would therefore make all the creatures merely natural and necessary emanations, and so destroy the distinction of necessary and contingent beings: and, by consequence, bid fair to the making all things God. It would infer not only the eternity of the world, but would seem to infer either the absolute infinity of it, or the perfection of it, and of every creature in it, to that degree, as that nothing could be more perfect in its own kind, than it is; or would infer the finiteness of the divine Being. For it would make what he hath done the adequate measure of what he can do, and would make all his administrations necessary, yea, and all the actions of men, and consequently take away all law and government out of the world, and all measures of right and wrong, and make all punitive justice, barbarous cruelty and consequently, give us a notion of goodness, at length, plainly inconsistent with itself.

All this is provided against, by our having first asserted

In the meantime, that there is, however, a necessary being, unto which all the perfections whereof we have any footsteps or resemblances in the creation do originally and essentially belong, is undeniably evident.

Now, that we may proceed, what can self-essentiate, underived power, wisdom, goodness, be, but most perfect power, wisdom, goodness? Or such, as than which there can never be more perfect? For since there can be no wisdom, power, or goodness, which is not either original and self-essentiate, or derived and participated from thence; who sees not that the former must be the more perfect? Yea, and that it comprehends all the other (as what was from it) in itself, and consequently that it is simply the most perfect? And the reason will be the same, concerning any other perfection, the stamps and characters whereof we find signed upon the creatures.

But that the being unto which these belong is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind, must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion and import of such a self-originate necessary being. Some indeed, both more anciently, and of late, have inverted this course; and from the supposition of absolute perfection, have gone about to infer necessity of existence, as being contained in the idea of the former. But of this latter we are otherwise assured upon clearer and less exceptionable terms. And being so, are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose. And in the general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary being we have already evinced, that it have in it (some way or other, in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter) the entire sum and utmest fulness of being, beyond which or without the compass whereof no perfection is conceivable, or indeed (which is of the same import) nothing.

Let it be observed, that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary being only, but from hence, that it is such as we have found it; though indeed these very terms import not a little to this purpose. For that which is necessarily of itself, without being beholden to any thing, seems as good as all things, and to contain in itself an immense fulness, being indigent of nothing. Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness, or a sense of want only; in opposition whereto, every good and virtuous man hath or may attain a sort of drápketa or self-fulness, and be satisfied from himself: (which yet is a stamp of divinity, and a part of the image of God, or such a participation of the divine nature, as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature:) but we understand by it (what is naturally before that) want itself really, and not in opinion, as the covetous is said to be poor. On the other hand, we here intend not a merely rational, (much less an imaginary,) but a real self-fulness. And so we say, what is of that nature, that it is, and subsists wholly and only of itself, without depending on any other, must owe this absoluteness to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature, as we cannot well conceive to be less than whereby it comprehends in itself the most boundless and unlimited fulness of being, life, power, or whatsoever can be conceived under the name of a perfection. For taking notice of the existence of any thing whatsoever, some reason must be assignable, whence it is that this particular being doth exist, and hath such and such powers and properties belonging to it, as do occur to our notice therein. When we can now resolve its existence into some cause that put it into being, and made it what it is, we cease so much to admire the thing, how excellent soever it be, and turn our admiration upon its cause, concluding that to have all the perfection in it which we discern in the effect, whatsoever unknown perfection (which we may suppose is very great) it may have besides. And upon this ground we are led, when we behold the manifold excellences that lie dispersed among particular beings in this universe, with the glory of the whole resulting thence, to resolve their existence into

a So that whatever there is of strength in that way of arguing, the glory of it cannot be without injury appropriated to the present age, much less to any particular person therein: it having, since Anselm, been ventilated by divers others heretofore. D. Scet. dist. 2. Q. 2. Th. Aquin. P. 1. Q. 2.

And now considering him as a wise Agent, (which hath been proved,) and consequently a free one, that acted not from any necessity of nature, but his mere good pleasure herein, we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him which we find him to have displayed in so vast and glorious a work, but will readily believe him (supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what hath been discoursed before) to have a most inconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and perfection in him, that is not represented to our view in this work of his: and account, that he who could do all this which we see is done, could do unspeakably more. For though, speaking of natural and necessitated agents, which always act to their uttermost, it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing, to their power of doing somewhat that is much greater; yet as to free agents, that can choose their own act, and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein, the matter is not so. As when some great prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person, especially that deserved nothing from him, or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour, besides his poverty and misery; we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence and bounty, which would incline him to do much greater things, when he should see a proportionable cause.

But now, if taking notice of the excellences that appear in created beings, and inquiring how they come to exist and be what they are, we resolve all into their cause; which, considering as perfectly free and arbitrary in all his communications, we do thence rationally conclude, that if he had thought fit, he could have made a much more besides display of himself; and that there is in him, what appears, a vast and most abundant store of undiscovered perfection.

When next we turn our inquiry and contemplation more entirely upon the cause, and bethink ourselves, But how came he to exist and be what he is? Finding this cannot be refunded upon any superior cause; and our utmost inquiry can admit of no other result but this, that he is of himself what he is, we will surely say then, He is all in all. And that perfection which before we judged vastly great, we will now conclude altogether absolute, and such beyond which no greater can be thought.

Adding, I say, to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness, from the works which we see have been done by him, (for why should we lose any ground we might have esteemed ourselves to have gained before?) the consideration of his necessary self-subsistence: and that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is, but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own nature; whereby he was not only able to make such a world, but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is, and hath: we cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal, and comprehensive of whatsoever can lie within the whole compass of being.

For when we find that among all other beings, (which is most certainly true not only of actual, but all possible beings also,) how perfect soever they are or may be in their own kinds, none of them, nor all of them together, are or ever can be of that perfection, as to be of themselves without dependence on somewhat else as their productive, yea and sustaining, cause; we see besides, that their cause hath all the perfection, some way, in it that is to be found in them all: there is also that appropriate perfection belonging thereto, that it could be; and eternally is (yea and could not but be) only of itself, by the underived and incommunicable excellency of its own being. And surely, what includes in it all the perfection of all actual and possible beings, besides its own, (for there is nothing possible which some cause, yea and even this, cannot produce,) and inconceivably more, must needs be absolutely and every way perfect. Of all which perfections this is the radical one, that belongs to this common Cause and Author of all things, that he is necessarily and only self-subsisting,

art. 1. contra Gentil, 1. 1. c. 10. Bradwardin. 1. 1. c. 1. And by divers of late, as is sufficiently known, some rejecting, others much confiding in it, both of these forner, and of modern writers,

For if this high prerogative in point of being had been wanting, nothing at all had ever been. Therefore we attribute to God the greatest thing that can be said or thought, (and not what is wholly diverse from all other perfection, but which contains all others in it,) when we affirm of him that he is necessarily of himself. For though when we have bewildered and lost ourselves (as we soon may) in the contemplation of this amazing subject, we readily indulge our wearied minds the ease and liberty of resolving this high excellency of self or necessary existence into a mere negation, and say that we mean by it nothing else than that he was not from another; yet surely, if we would take some pains with ourselves, and keep our slothful shifting thoughts to some exercise in this matter, though we can never comprehend that vast fulness of perfection which is imported in it, (for it were not what we plead for, if we could comprehend it,) yet we should soon see and confess that it contains unspeakably more than a negation, even some great thing that is so much beyond our thoughts, that we shall reckon we have said but a little in saying we cannot conceive it. And when we have stretched our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure, though we may suppose ourselves to have conceived a great deal, there is infinitely more that we conceive not.

Wherefore that is a sober and most important truth which | is occasionally drawn forth (as is supposed) from the so admired Des Cartes by the urgent objections of his very acute, friendly adversary, that the inexhaustible power of God is the reason for which he needed no cause; and that since that unexhausted power, or the immensity of his essence, is most highly positive, therefore he may be said to be of himself positively, i. e. not as if he did ever by any positive efficiency cause himself (which is most manifestly impossible) but that the positive excellency of his own being was such, as could never need, nor admit of, being

caused.

And that seems highly rational, (which is so largely insisted on by Doctor Jackson, and divers others,) that what is without cause must also be without limit of being; because all limitation proceeds from the cause of a thing, which imparted to it so much and no more; which argument, though it seems neglected by Des Cartes, and is opposed by his antagonist; yet I cannot but judge that the longer one meditates, the less he shall understand, how any thing can be limited ad intra, or from itself, &c. As the author of the Tentam. Phys. Theol. speaks.

But that we may entertain ourselves with some more particular considerations of this necessary being, which may evince that general assertion of its absolute plenitude or fulness of essence: it appears to be such,

III. As is first, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity. For what can be at a greater, than that which is necessarily, which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible? Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no being, seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all being. And, if here it be said that to be necessarily and of itself needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing hath, be it never so scant or minute a portion of being; I answer, seems indeed so, if we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance. But if you consider the matter more narrowly, you will find here is also signified the nature and kind of the being possessed, as well as the manner of possession, viz. that it is a being of so excellent and noble a kind, as that it can subsist alone without being beholden: which is so great an excellency, as that it manifestly comprehends all other, or is the foundation of all that can be conceived besides. Which, they that fondly dream of necessary matter, not considering, unwaringly make one single atom a more excellent thing than the whole frame of heaven and earth: that being supposed simply necessary, this the merest piece of hap-hazard, the strangest chance imaginable, and beyond what any but themselves could ever have imagined. And which, being considered, would give us to understand that no minute or finite being can be necessarily.

b Ad ob. in Med. resp. quartæ.

And hence we may see what it is to be nearer, or at a further distance from not-being.

For these things that came contingently into being, or at the pleasure of a free cause, have all but a finite and limited being, whereof some, having a smaller portion of being than others, approach so much the nearer to not-being. Proportionably, what hath its being necessarily and of itself, is at the furthest distance from no-being, as comprehending all being in itself. Or, to borrow the expressions of an elegant writer, translated into our own language,d "We have much more non-essence than essence; if we have the essence of a man, yet not of the heavens, or of angels." "We are confined and limited within a particular essence, but God, who is what he is, comprehendeth all possible essences."

Nor is this precariously spoken, or as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesy. But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed, and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear. For if any thing be, in this sense, remoter than other from no-being, it must either be, what is necessarily of itself, or what is contingently at the pleasure of the other. But since nothing is, besides that selforiginate necessary being, but what was from it; and nothing from it but what was within its productive power; it is plain all that, with its own being, was contained in it. And therefore, even in that sense, it is at the greatest distance from no-being; as comprehending the utmost fulness of being in itself, and consequently absolute perfection. Which will yet further appear, in what follows. We therefore add,

IV. That necessary being is most unmixed or purest being, without allay. That is pure which is full of itself. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense, (which few will think,) nor in the moral; but as, with metaphysicians, it signifies simplicity of essence. And in its present use is more especially intended to signify that simplicity which is opposed to the composition of act and possibility. We say then, that necessary being imports purest actuality; which is the ultimate and highest perfection of being. For it signifies no remaining possibility, yet unreplete or not filled up, and consequently the fullest exuberancy and entire confluence of all being, as in its fountain and original source. We need not here look further to evince this, than the native import of the very terms themselves; necessity and possibility; the latter whereof is not so fitly said to be excluded the former, as contingency is, but to be swallowed up of it; as fulness takes up all the space which were otherwise nothing but vacuity or emptiness. It is plain then that necessary being engrosses all possible being, both that is, and (for the same reason) that ever was

SO.

For nothing can be, or ever was, in possibility to come into being, but what either must spring, or hath sprung, from the necessary self-subsisting being.

So that unto all that vast possibility, a proportionable actuality of this being must be understood to correspond. Else the other were not possible. For nothing is possible to be produced which is not within the actual productive power of the necessary being: I say within its actual productive power; for if its power for such production were not already actual, it could never become so, and so were none at all: inasmuch as necessary being can never alter, and consequently can never come actually to be what it already is not; upon which account it is truly said, In æternis posse et esse sunt idem. Wherefore in it, is nothing else but pure actuality, as profound and vast as is the utmost possibility of all created or producible being; i. e. it can be nothing other than it is, but can do all things, of which more hereafter. It therefore stands opposed, not only, more directly, to impossibility of being, which is the most proper notion of no-being, but some way, even to possibility also. That is, the possibility of being any thing but what it is; as being every way complete and perfectly full already.

V. Again, we might further add, that it is the most abstracted being, or is being in the very abstract. A thing much insisted on by some of the schoolmen. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue after their manner, may carry some such sense as this, (if it may,