contradiction, ever admit to be called God. But if we suppose most perfect, essential power, wisdom, love, by original, eternal, and most natural necessity, to have coexisted in that being most intimately united, though distinct; that seemingly important reason will appear but a shadow, and accordingly vanish as such.

And indeed this is no more than what, in effect, such as discourse upon this subject do commonly say (though perhaps some may less consider the ducture and sequel of their own professed sentiments) when they speak of the incomprehensibleness of God's essence, and how impossible it is a finite mind should form or receive a full and complete idea of it; or when they therefore say, that any conceptions we can have of the wisdom, goodness, or any other attribute of the Divine Being, are still but inadequate conceptions; whereby they must mean, when we consider for instance the wisdom of God, that we not only fall infinitely short of conceiving all that belong to the Divine Being, in that kind, but there is also infinitely more belonging thereto, in other kinds, than it is possible that conception can contain or express. And when we have the conception in our minds of the Divine wisdon, do we not apprehend there is really somewhat else in the Divine Being, whereof that term hath no signification? or will we say his wisdom and his power are really the same thing? as they must either be the same or divers things. If we say they are the same, we must, I doubt, confess ourselves to say what we do not understand, especially when, in the abstract, we affirm them of one another, and of God; and accordingly say that wisdom is power, and power is wisdom, and the one of these is God, and the other, God. I know a formal distinction is commonly admitted, i. e. that the conception of the one is not included in the conception of the other. But are these different conceptions true or false? If false, why are they admitted? If true, there must be somewhat in the nature of the thing corresponding to them. But if we say they are distinct, but most intimately and eternally united in the Divine Being, by a necessary natural union, or that it is not impossible so to be, what we say will, I think, agree with itself, and not disagree with any other conception we are obliged to have concerning the blessed God.

In the meantime, I profess not to judge, we are under the precise notions of power, wisdom, and goodness, to conceive of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: nor that the notions we have of those or any other divine perfections, do exactly correspond to what, in God, is signified by these names; but I reckon, that what relief and ease is given our minds by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these to be the very same things, may facilitate to us our apprehending the Father, Son, and Spirit to be sufficiently distinct, for our affirming, or understanding the affirmation, of some things concerning some one, without including the other of them.

that man.

XIV. But some perhaps will say, while we thus amplify the distinction of these glorious three, we shall seem to have too friendly a look towards, or shall say in effect, what Dr. Sherlock is so highly blamed for saying, and make three Gods. I answer, that if with sincere minds we inquire after truth, for its own sake, we shall little regard the friendship or enmity, honour or dishonour, of this or If this were indeed so, doth what was true become false, because such a man hath said it? But it is remote from being so. There is no more here positively asserted, than generally so much distinction between the Father, Son, and Spirit, as is in itself necessary to the foundng the distinct attributions, which in the Scriptures are severally given them-that when the Word or Wisdom was said to be with God (understanding it, as the case requires, with God the Father) in the creation of all things, we may not Chink, nothing more is said than that he was with himself; that when the Word is said to be made flesh, 'tis equally said the Father was made flesh, or the Holy Ghost; that when the Holy Ghost is said to have proceeded from, or have been sent, by the Father, or the Son, he is said to have proceeded from himself, or have sent himself.-But, in the meantime, this is offered, without determining precisely how great distinction is necessary to this purpose. It is not here positively said these three are three distinct substances,

three infinite minds or spirits. We again and again insist, and inculcate, how becoming and necessary it is to abstain from over-bold inquiries, or positive determinations, concerning the limits, or the extent of this distinction, beyond what the Scriptures have, in general, made necessary to the mentioned purpose; that we may not throw ourselves into guilt, nor cast our minds into unnecessary straits, by affirming this or that to be necessary, or impossible in these matters.

XV. The case is only thus, that since we are plainly led by the express revelation God hath made of himself to us in his word, to admit a trinal conception of him, or to conceive this threefold distinction in his being, of Father, Son, and Spirit; since we have so much to greaten that distinction, divers things being said of each of these, that must not be understood of either of the other; since we have nothing to limit it on the other hand, but the unity of the Godhead, which we are sure can be but One, both from the plain word of God, and the nature of the thing itself; since we are assured both these may consist, viz. this trinity, and this unity, by being told there are three, and these three (i. e. plainly continuing three) are ev, one thing; which one thing can mean nothing else but Godhead; as is also said concerning two of them, elsewhere, (there being no occasion, then, to mention the third,ы) İ and my Father are one thing. We are hereupon unavoidably put upon it to cast in our own minds (and are concerned to do it with the most religious reverence and profoundest humility) what sort of thing this most sacred Godhead may be, unto which this oneness is ascribed, with threefold distinction. And manifestly finding there are in the creation made unions, with sufficient remaining distinction, particularly in ourselves, that we are a soul and a body, (things of so very different natures,) that often the soul is called the man, (not excluding the body,) and the body, or our flesh, called the man, (not excluding the soul,) we are plainly led to apprehend, that it is rather more easily possible there might be two spirits (so much more agreeing in nature) so united, as to be one thing, and yet continuing distinct; and if two, there might as well be three, if the Creator pleased. And hence are led further to apprehend, that if such a made union, with continuing distinction, be possible in created being, it is, for ought we know, not impossible in the uncreated; that there may be such an eternal unmade union, with continuing distinction. And all this being only represented as possible to be thus, without concluding that thus it certainly is, sufficiently serves our purpose, that no pretence might remain of excluding the eternal Word, and the eternal Spirit, the Godhead, as if a trinity therein were contradictious and impossible, repugnant to reason and common sense. Where now is the coincidency?

XVI. Nor is there, hereupon, so great a remaining difficulty to salve the unity of the Godhead, when the supposition is taken in, of the natural, eternal, necessary union of these three that hath been mentioned.

And it shall be considered, that the Godhead is not supposed more necessary to exist, than these three are to coexist in the nearest and most intimate union with each other therein. That Spiritual Being which exists necessarily, and is every way absolutely perfect, whether it consist of three in one, or of only one, is God. We could never have known, 'tis true, that there are such three coexisting in this one God, if he himself had not told us. What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? Even so the things of God none knoweth, but the Spirit of God. In telling us this he hath told us no impossible, no inconceivable, thing. It is absurd and very irreligious presumption, to say this cannot be. If a worm were so far capable of thought, as to determine this or that concerning our nature; and that such a thing were impossible to belong to it, which we find to be in it, we should trample upon it! More admirable Divine patience spares us! He hath only let us know that this is the state of his essence, whereof we should have been otherwise ignorant. This is its constitution, (q. d. ita se habet comparatam) thus it is in and of itself, that there are three in it to be conceived, under the distinct notions of Father, Son, and Spirit, without telling us expressly how far they are distinct, in terms of art, or in scholastic forms of speech.

e 1 Cor. i. 11,

But he considered us as men, reasonable creatures; and that when he tells us there are three existing in his being, of each of which some things are said that must not be understood spoken of the other, and yet that there is but one God: we are not incapable of understanding, that these three must agree in Godhead; and yet that they must be sufficiently distinct, unto this purpose, that we may distinctly conceive of apply ourselves to, and expect from, the one and the other of them. And the frame of our religion is therefore ordered for us accordingly, i. e. for us to whom he hath revealed so much. Others, to whom such notices are not given, he expects should deport themselves towards him, according to the light which they have, not which they have not.

XVII. But an hypothesis in this affair, which leaves out the very nexus, that natural, eternal union, or leaves it out of its proper place, and insists upon mutual consciousness, which, at the most, is but a consequence thereof, wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the unity of the Godhead. If two or three created spirits had never so perfect a mutual perspection of one another, that would not constitute them one thing, though it probably argue them to be so; and but probably; for God might, no doubt, give them a mutual insight into one another, without making them one; but if he should create them in as near a union, as our soul and body are in with one another, (and it is very apprehensible they might be created in a much nearer and more permanent one, both being of the same nature, and neither subject to decay,) they would as truly admit to be called one something, (as such a creature might well enough be called, till a fitter name were found out,) notwithstanding their supposed continuing distinction, as our soul and body united, are, notwithstanding their continuing distinction, called one man. And I do sincerely profess such a union, with perpetual distinction, seems to me every whit as conceivable, being supposed unmade, uncreated, and eternal, as any union is among creatures, that must therefore be a made thing, or a temporal production.

And whereas necessity of existence (most unquestionably of an intellectual being) is a most certain and fundamental attribute of Deity; the Father, Son, and Spirit being supposed necessarily existent, in this united state, they cannot but be God; and the Godhead by reason of this necessary union cannot but be one; yet so, as that when you predicate Godhead, or the name of God, of any one of them, you herein express a true but an inadequate conception of God: i. e. the Father is God, not excluding the Son and Holy Ghost; the Son is God, not excluding the Father and the Holy Ghost; the Holy Ghost is God, not excluding the Father and the Son. Thus our body is the man, not excluding the soul; our soul is the man, not excluding the body. Therefore their union in Godhead being so strict and close, notwithstanding their distinction, to say that any one of them is God, in exclusion of the other two, would not be a true predication. 'Tis indeed said, the Father is the only true God; but that neither excludes the Son nor the Holy Ghost from being the true God also; each of them communicating in that Godhead which only is true. It had been quite another thing, if it had been said, Thou, Father, only, art the true God.

XVIII. The order, moreover, is this way also very clearly preserved and fitly complied with, of priority and posteriority, (not of time, as every one sees, but nature,) which the names Father, Son, and Spirit, do more than intimate. For the Father (usually called by the divines Fons trinitatis) being by this appellation plainly signified to be first in this sacred triad; the Son, as that title imports, to be of the Father; and the Spirit to be of, or from, both the other: let these two latter be considered as being of or from the first, not by any intervening act of will, by which it might have been possible they should not have been so; but by natural, necessary, eternal promanation; so as that necessity of existence is hereby made as truly to agree to them as to the first, which is acknowledged the most fundamental attribute of Deity. This promanation is hereby sufficiently distinguished from creation; and these two set infinitely above all creatures, or the whole universe of created beings. Nor is there hereby any place

d John xvii. 3.

left for that unapt application of a son and a grandson deriving themselves from the grandfather, or two brothers from one father.

And although it be also true, and readily acknowledged, that there are numerous instances of involuntary productions among the creatures, and which are therefore to be deemed a sort of natural and necessary productions; yet that necessity not being absolute, but ex hypothesi only, i. e. upon supposition of their productive causes, and all things requisite to those productions, being so, and so, aptly posited in order thereto, all which depended upon one sovereign will at first, so that all might have been otherwise, this signifies nothing to exempt them out of the state and rank of creatures, or invalidate this most unalterable distinction between created being and uncreated.

XIX. But if here it shall be urged to me that one individual, necessarily existent, spiritual Being alone is God, and is all that is signified by the name of God; and therefore that three distinct individual, necessarily existent, spiritual Beings must unavoidably be three distinct Gods: I would say, if by one individual, necessarily existent, spiritual Being, you mean one such Being, comprehending Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, taken together, I grant it. But if by one individual, necessarily existent, spiritual Being, you mean either the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, taken sejunctly, I deny it; for both the other are truly signified by the name of God too, as well as that one. I therefore say, the term individual must in this case now supposed (as possible, not as certain) admit of a twofold application; either to the distinct essence of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost; or to the entire essence of the Godhead, in which these three do concur. Each of these conceived by itself are (according to this supposition) individual essences; but conceived together, they are the entire individual essence of God. For there is but one such essence, and no more; and it can never be multiplied, nor divided into more of the same name and nature as the body and soul of a man, are one individual body, and one individual soul, but both together are but one individual man: and the case would be the same, if a man did consist of two, or three spirits so (or more nearly) united together, as his soul and body are. Especially if you should suppose, which is the supposition of no impossible or unconceivable thing, that these three spirits which together, as we now do suppose, do constitute a man, were created with an aptitude to this united co-existence, but with an impossibility of existing separately, except to the Divine power which created them conjunct, and might separate them so as to make them exist apart: which yet cannot be the case in respect of three such uncreated spiritual Beings, whose union is supposed to be by natural, eternal necessity, as their essences are; and are therefore most absolutely inseparable.

XX. Or if it should be said, I make the notion of God to comprehend Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and a Godhead besides common to these three:

I answer; nothing I have said or supposed, implies any such thing; or that the notion of God imports any thing more of real being, than is contained in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, taken together, and most intimately, naturally, and vitally, by eternal necessity, united with one another. As in a created being, consisting of more things than one, taken together and united, a man for instance, there is nothing more of real entity, besides what is contained in his body and his soul united and taken together. 'Tis true that this term, a man, speaks somewhat very diverse from a human body taken alone, or a human soul taken alone, or from both, separately taken; but nothing diverse from both united, and taken together. And for what this may be unjustly collected to imply of composition, repugnant to Divine perfection, it is before obviated. Sect. 13.

If therefore it be asked, "What do we conceive under the notion of God, but a necessary, spiritual Being?" I answer, that this is a true notion of God, and may be passable enough, among pagans, for a full one. But we Christians are taught to conceive under the notion of God, a necessary, spiritual Being, in which Father, Son, and Spirit do so necessarily co-exist, as to constitute that Being; and

e P. 138. of these considerations.

that when we conceive any one of them to be God, that is but an inadequate, not an entire and full, conception of the Godhead. Nor will any place remain for that trivial cavil, that if each of these have Godhead in him, he therefore hath a trinity in him; but that he is one of the three who together are the One God, by necessary, natural, eternal

union.

Which union is also quite of another kind than that of three men (as for instance, of Peter, James, and John) partaking in the same kind of nature; who, notwithstanding, exist separately, and apart from each other. These three are supposed to co-exist in natural, necessary, eternal, and most intimate union, so as to be one Divine Being.

Nor is it any prejudice against our thus stating the notion of the Godhead, that we know of no such union in all the creation, that may assist our conception of this union. What incongruity is there in supposing, in this respect, as well as in many others, somewhat most peculiarly appropriate to the being of God? If there be no such actual union in the creation, 'tis enough to our purpose, if such a one were possible to have been. And we do know of the actual union of two things of very different natures so as to be one thing, and have no reason to think the union of two or more things of the same sort of nature, with sufficient remaining distinction, less possible or less intelligible.

XXI. Upon the whole, let such a union be conceived in the being of God, with such distinction, and one would think (though the complexions of men's minds do strangely and unaccountably differ) the absolute perfection of the Deity, and especially the perfect felicity thereof, should be much the more apprehensible with us. When we consider the most delicious society which would hence ensue, among the so entirely consentient Father, Son, and Spirit, with whom there is so perfect rectitude, everlasting harmony, mutual complacency, unto highest delectation; according to our way of conceiving things, who are taught by our own nature (which also hath in it the Divine image) to reckon no enjoyment pleasant, without the consociation of some other with us therein; we for our parts cannot but hereby have in our minds a more gustful idea of a blessed state, than we can conceive in mere eternal solitude.

God speaks to us as men, and will not blame us for conceiving things, so infinitely above us, according to the capacity of our natures; provided we do not assume to ourselves to be a measure for our conceptions of him, further than as he is himself pleased to warrant, and direct us herein. Some likeness we may (taught by himself) apprehend between him and us, but with infinite (not inequality only, but) unlikeness. And for this case of delectation in society, we must suppose an immense difference between him, an all-sufficient, self-sufficient Being, comprehending in himself the infinite fulness of whatsoever is most excellent and delectable, and ourselves, who have in us but a very minute portion of being, goodness, or felicity, and whom he hath made to stand much in need of one another, and most of all of him.

But when, looking into ourselves, we find there is in us a disposition, often upon no necessity, but sometimes from some sort of benignity of temper, unto conversation with others; we have no reason, when other things concur, and do fairly induce, and lead our thoughts this way, to apprehend any incongruity in supposing he may have some distinct object of the same sort of propension in his own most perfect being too, and therewith such a propension itself also.

XXII. As to what concerns ourselves, the observation is not altogether unapposite, what Cicero, treating of friendship, discourses of perpetual solitude, "that the affectation of it must signify the worst of ill humour, and the most savage nature in the world. And supposing one of so sour and morose a humour, as to shun and hate the conversation of men, he would not endure it, to be without some one or other to whom he might disgorge the virulency of that his malignant humour. Or that supposing such a thing could happen, that God should take a man quite out of the society of men, and place him in absolute solitude, supplied with the abundance of whatsoever nature could of Prov. viii. g Gen. i. 1 John i.

m John iii.

h Prov. viii. n John x.

covet besides; who, saith he, is so made of iron, as to endure that kind of life?" And he introduces Architas Tarentinus reported to speak to this purpose," that if one could ascend into heaven, behold the frame of the world, and the beauty of every star, his admiration would be unpleasant to him alone; which would be most delicious, if he had some one to whom to express his sense of the whole."

We are not, I say, strictly to measure God by ourselves in this, further than as he himself prompts and leads us. But if we so form our conception of Divine bliss, as not to exclude from it somewhat, whereof that delight in society which we find in ourselves may be an imperfect faint resemblance; it seems not altogether disagreeable to what the Scriptures also teach us to conceive concerning him, when they bring in the eternal Wisdom, saying, as one distinct from the prime Author and Parent of all things, Then was I by him, as one brought up with him, and daily his delight.

XXIII. However, let the whole of what hath been hitherto proposed be taken together, and to me, it appears our conception of the sacred trinunity will be so remote from any shadow of inconsistency or repugnancy, that no necessity can remain upon us of torturing wit, and racking invention to the uttermost, to do a laboured and artificial violence (by I know not what screws and engines) to so numerous plain texts of Scripture, only to undeify our glorious Redeemer, and do the utmost despite to the Spirit of grace. We may be content to let the word of God (or what we pretend to own for a Divine revelation) stand as it is, and undistorted speak its own sense. And when we find the Former of things speaking as We or Us, when we find another I, possessed by the Lord, in the beginning of his way, before his works of old; so as that he says of himself (as distinct from the other) I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was-and, When he prepared the heavens I was there, &c. When we find the Child born for us, the Son given to us, called also the mighty God, and (as in reference to us he fitly might) the everlasting Father. When we are told of the Ruler that was to come out of Bethlehem-Ephrata, that his goings forth were from everlasting: that, The Word was in the beginning with God, and was God-1 that all things were made by him, and without him nothing was made that was made that this Word was made fleshthat his glory was beheld as the glory of the only-begotten Son of the Father, full of grace and truth; even that same he that above was said to have been in the beginning with God, and to be God:-that when he who was said m to have come down from heaven, was, even while he was on earth, at that time, said to be in heaven :-that we are told by himself," he and his Father are one thing-that he is not only said to know the heart, but to know all things:-that even he who P according to the flesh came of the Israelites, is yet expressly said to be over all, God blessed for ever:-that when he was in the form of God, he humbled himself to the taking on him the form of a servant, and to be found in fashion as a man:-that 'tis said, all things were created by him, that are in heaven, and on earth, visible and invisible, thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, and that all things were created by him, and for him; than which nothing could have been said more peculiar or appropriate to Deity:—that even of the Son of God it is said, he is the true God and eternal life:-that we are so plainly told, he is Alpha and Omega, the first and the last," he that was, and is, and is to come, the Lord Almighty, the beginning of the creation of God: the searcher of hearts:-that the Spirit of God is said to search all things, even the deep things of God:-that lying to him is said to be lying to God:-that the great Christian_solemnity, baptism, is directed to be in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:-that it is so distinctly said, there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and that these three are one thing.

I cannot imagine what should oblige us so studiously to wiredraw all this to quite other meanings. XXIV. And for the leaving out of the last mentioned

i Isa. ix. • John xxi.

k Mic. v. p Rom. ix.

text in some copies, what hath been said (not to mention | divers others) by the famously learned Dr. Hammond upon that place, is so reasonable, so moderate, so charitable to the opposite party, and so apt to satisfy impartial and unprejudiced minds, that one would scarce think, after the reading of it, any real doubt can remain concerning the authenticness of that 7th verse in 1 John v.

Wherefore now taking all these texts together; with many more that might have been mentioned, I must indeed profess to wonder, that with men of so good sense, as our Socinian adversaries are accounted, this consideration should not have more place and weight, That it being so obvious to any reader of the Scriptures to apprehend from so numerous texts, that Deity must belong to the Son of God, and that there wants not sufficient inducement to conceive so of the Holy Ghost also; there should be no more caution given in the Scriptures themselves to prevent mistake (if there were any) in apprehending the matter accordingly and to obviate the unspeakable consequent danger of erring in a case of so vast importance. How unagreeable it is to all our notions of God, and to his usual procedure in cases of less consequence! How little doth it consist with his being so wise and so compassionate a lover of the souls of men, to let them be so fatally exposed unto so inevitable and so destructive a delusion! that the whole Christian church should through so many centuries of years, be even trained into so horrid and continued idolatry by himself who so severely forbids it! I cannot allow myself to think men of that persuasion insincere in their professing to believe the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, when the leader and head of their party wrote a book, that is not without nerves, in defence of it. But I confess I cannot devise, with what design they can think those Scriptures were written! or why they should count it a thing worthy of infinite wisdom to vouchsafe such a revelation to men, allowing them to treat and use it as they do! And that till some great Socinian wits should arise fifteen hundred years after, to rectify their notions in these things, men should generally be in so great_hazard of being deceived into damnation by those very Scriptures, which were professedly writ to make them wise to salvation!

XXV. Nor is it of so weighty importance in this controversy, to cast the balance the other way, that a noted critic (upon what introducement needs not be determined) changed his judgment, or that his posthumous interpretations of some texts (if they were his interpretations) carry an appearance of his having changed it; because he thought such texts might possibly admit to be interpreted otherwise, than they usually were, by such as alleged them for the trinity, or the (disputed) Deity of the Son or Spirit, or that the cause must be lost, upon his deserting it, or that he was still to be reckoned of the opposite party, (as this author calls it,) and that such texts as we most relied upon, were therefore given up by some of our own.

sense, he in another? they in such a sense as admits a trinity, he in a sense that excludes it?

But (for such things as did need a superadded verbal revelation) how easy is it to an inventive, pervicacious wit, to wrest words this way, or that.

XXVI. The Scriptures were writ for the instruction of sober learners; not for the pastime of contentious wits, that affect only to play tricks upon them. At their rate of interpreting, among whom he ranks himself, 'tis impossible any doctrine can with certainty be founded upon them. Take the first chapter of St. John's Gospel, for instance, and what doctrine can be asserted in plainer words, than the Deity of Christ, in the three first verses of that chapter ? Set any man of an ordinary, unprepossessed understanding, to read them, and when he finds that by the Word is meant Jesus Christ, (which themselves admit,) see if he will not judge it plainly taught, that Jesus Christ is God, in the most eminent, known sense; especially when he shall take notice of so many other texts, that, according to their most obvious appearance, carry the same sense. But it is first, through mere shortness of discourse, taken for granted, and rashly concluded on, that it is absolutely impossible, if the Father be God, the Son can be God too, (or the Holy Ghost,) upon a presumption, that we can know every thing that belongs to the Divine nature; and what is possible to be in it, and what not; and next, there is hereupon not only a license imagined, but an obligation, and necessity, to shake heaven and earth, or tear that divine word that is more stable into a thousand pieces, or expound it to nothing, to make it comply with that forelaid presumptuous determination. Whereas if we could but bend our minds so far to comply with the plain ducture of that revelation God hath made unto us of himself; as to apprehend that in the most only Godhead there may be distinctions, which we particularly understand not, sufficient to found the doctrine of a trinity therein, and very consistent with the unity of it; we should save the Divine word, and our own minds, from unjust torture, both at once. And our task, herein, will be the easier, that we are neither concerned nor allowed to determine, that things are precisely so, or so; but only to suppose it possible that so they may be, for ought that we know. Which will I am certain not be so hard nor so bold an undertaking, as his, who shall take upon him to prove, that any thing here supposed is impossible.

Indeed if any one would run the discourse into the abyss of infinity, he may soon create such difficulties to himself, as it ought not to be thought strange, if they be greater than any human understanding can expedite. But not greater than any man will be entangled in, that shall set himself to consider infinity upon other accounts; which yet he will find it imposed upon him unavoidably to admit, whether he will or no: not greater than this author will be equally concerned in, upon his doing that right to truth, in opposition to the former leaders of his own party, as to acknowledge the omnipresence of the Divine essence, (p. 32.) which he will find, let him try it when he will: nor yet so great, nor accompanied with so gross, so palpable and horrid absurdities, as he will soon be encountered with, should he retract his grant, or entertain the monstrousmaimed, and most deformed, impious conceit of a finite, or limited Deity.

texts.

Nor indeed do we need to expect that natural sentiment in itself, that there is but one God, (which this author takes such pains to prove, as if he thought, or would make other men think, we denied it.) For though it is so generally acknowledged, doth he not know it is not so generally understood in the same sense? Against whom doth he write? Doth he not know they understand this oneness in one

XXVII. Yet also in this present case, the impossibility to our narrow minds of comprehending infinity, is most rationally improveable to our very just advantage. It ought to be upbraided to none as a pretext, or a cover to sloth, or dulness. 'Tis no reproach to us that we are creatures, and have not infinite capacities. And it ought to quiet our minds, that they may so certainly know they have limits; within which, we are to content ourselves with such notions, about indemonstrable and unrevealed things, as they can, with great ease to themselves, find room for.

I can reflect upon nothing in what is here proposed, but what is intelligible without much toil, or much metaphysics. As matters, of so common concernment, ought, to our uttermost, to be represented in such a way that they may be so; we need not be concerned in scholastic disquisitions about union; or by what peculiar name to call that which is here supposed. It's enough for us to know there may be a real, natural, vital, and very intimate union, of