latter is in greater abundance than even from sugar and nitrous acid, or any other hydro-carbonous basis. A small scum of a peculiar oil always arises during the action of nitrous acid on these animal substances.

The carbonated alkalies have little action on wool, but the caustic fixed alkalies, when digested with it, speedily weaken its fibre, reduce it to a soft gelatinous pulp, and finally make a perfect solution. The alkali at the same time loses its alkaline properties, as it does in common soap. This saponaceous solution of wool is made for experiment in a few minutes, by boiling bits of wool or flannel in a caustic alkaline solution; and it has been recommended by Chaptal to be employed instead of common soap in cleansing cotton and other goods in manufactures, as by this means a number of refuse bits and clippings of wool and woollen cloth, which are now thrown away, may be put to some use. This soapy solution does not lather well when agitated with water, nevertheless it acts very powerfully in cleaning cloth. It has a strong and somewhat of fensive smell, which is left at first in the cloth, but goes off by short exposure to the air.

Wool, either in a raw or manufactured state, has always been the principal of the staple articles of this country. The price of wool was, in very early times, much higher, in proportion to the wages of la bour, the rent of land, and the price of butchers' meat, than at present. It was, before the time of Edward III. always exported raw, the art of working it into cloth and dyeing being so imperfectly known, that no persons above the degree of working people could go dressed in cloth of English manufacture.

The first steps taken to encourage the manufacture of woollen cloths was by Edward III., who procured some good workmen from the Netherlands, by means of protection and encouragement. The value of wool was considered as so essentially solid, that taxes were vested in that commodity, reckoning by the number of sacks; and in proportion to the price of the necessaries of life, and value of silver, wool was at least three times dearer then than it is now. The manufacturing of cloth being once introduced into the country, the policy of preventing the exportation of the raw material was soon evident; and the first act was that of Henry IV. c. 2, by which the exportation of sheep, lambs, or rams, is forbidden, under very heavy penalties.

By statute 28 George III. all former statutes respecting the exportation of wool and sheep are repealed, and nume rous restrictions are consolidated in that statute. By this act, if any person shall send or receive any sheep on board any vessel, to be carried out of the kingdom, such vessel shall be forfeited, and the person so offending shall forfeit 31. for every sheep, and suffer solitary imprisonment for three months. But wether sheep, by a licence from the collector of the customs, may be taken on board, for the use of the ship's company; and every person who shall export any wool, or woollen articles slightly made up, so as easily to be reduced again to wool, or any fuller's earth, or tobacco-pipe clay; and every carrier, ship owner, commander, mariner, or other person, who shall knowingly assist in exporting, or attempting to export, these articles, shall forfeit 3s. for every pound weight, or the sum of 50%. in the whole, at the election of the prosecutor, and shall also suffer solitary imprisonment for three months. But wool may be carried coastwise, upon being duly entered, and security being given, according to the directions of the statute, to the officer of the port from whence the same shall be conveyed; and the owners of sheep within five miles of the sea, and ten miles in Kent and Sussex, cannot remove the wool, without giving notice to the officer of the nearest port, as directed by the statute.

WOOL Combers. By 35 George III., c. 124, all those who have served an apprenticeship to the trade of a wool comber, or who are by law entitled to exercise the same, and also their wives and children, may set up and exercise such trade, or any other trade or business they are apt and able for, in any town or place within this kingdom, without any molestation; nor shall such wool combers, their wives or children, while they exercise such trades, be removeable from such place to their last legal settlement, till they shall actually become chargeable to such parish.

WORD, or WATCH WORD, in an army or garrison, is some peculiar word or sentence, by which the soldiers know and distinguish one another in the night, &c. and by which spies and designing persons are discovered. It is used also to prevent surprises. The word is given out, in an army, every night, to the lieutenant, or major-general of the day, who gives it to the majors of the brigades, and they to the adjutants, who give it first to the field offi

cers, and afterwards to a serjeant of each company, who carry it to the subalterns. In garrisons, it is given, after the gate is shut, to the town-major, who gives it to adjutants, and they to the serjeants.

WORDS. As we proposed, in PHILOSOPHY, mental, 104, we shall lay before our readers a view of Hartley's very important principles, respecting some of the leading phenomena of the understanding; and we beg to refer our readers to UNDERSTANDING, for another branch of those phenomena. These principles illustrate and apply the doctrine of association; and we deem it certain, that the philosophy of language can be pursued with complete success, only by those who have closely attende, practically, if not theoretically, to the influence of that ever active principle.

Words may be considered in four lights: first, as impressions upon the ear; secondly, as the actions of the organs of speech; thirdly, as impressions made upon the eye by characters; fourthly, as the actions of the hand in writing. We learn the use of them in this order; for children first get an imperfect knowledge of the meaning of the words of others; then learn to speak themselves; then to read; and, lastly, to write. Now it is evident, that in the first of these ways, many sensible impressions, and external feelings, are associated with particular words and phrases, so as to give these the power of raising the corresponding ideas; and that the three following ways increase and improve this power, with some additions to the ideas and variations of them. The second is the reverse of the first, the fourth of the third. The first ascertains the ideas belonging to words and phrases in a gross manner, according to their usage in common life. The second fixes this, and makes it ready and accurate. The third has the same effect as the second; and also extends the ideas and significations of words and phrases, by new associations, and in particular, by associations with other words, as in definitions, descriptions, &c. The fourth, by converting the reader into a writer, helps him to be expert in distinguishing, quick in recollecting, and faithful in retaining, these new significations of words. The action of the hand is not, indeed, an essential in this fourth method; composition by persons born blind having nearly the same effect; it is, however, a common attendant on composition, and has a considerable use deducible from association, at the same time making the

analogy between the four methods more conspicuous and complete.

Hence it appears, that words and phrases must excite ideas in us by association; and it further appears, that they can do it by no other means, since all the ideas which any worl excites are deducible from some of the sources above men

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tioned, most usually from the first or third and because words of unknown languages, terms of art not yet explained, barbarous words, &c. have either no ideas connected with them, or only such as some fancied resemblance, or prior association, suggests. It deserves to be remarked, that articulate sounds are, by their variety, number, and ready use, peculiarly fitted to signify and suggest, by association, both our simple ideas, and our complex ones formed from them.

We now proceed to describe the manner in which ideas are associated with words, beginning with childhood.

First, then, the association of the names of visible objects, with the impressions which these objects make upon the eye, seems to take place more early than any other, and to be effected in the following manner. The name of the visible object, the mother, for instance, is pronounced and repeated by the attendants to the child, more frequently when his eye is fixed upon his mother, than when upon any other objects, and much more so than when upon any particular one. The word mamma is also sounded in an emphatical manner, when the child's eye is directed to his mother with earnestness and desire. The association, therefore, of the sound, mamma, with the visible impression of the mother on the retina, will be far stronger than that with any other visible impression, and thus overpower all the other accidental associations; and these will also themselves contribute to the same end, by opposing one another. And when the child has acquired so much voluntary power over his motions, as to direct his head and eyes towards the nurse, upon hearing her name, this process will go on with accelerated velocity: and thus, at last, the word will excite the visible idea readily and certainly. The same association of the visible impression of the mother with the sound, mamma, will, by degrees, overpower all the accidental associations of this visible impression with other words; and, at last, be so closely confirmed, that the visible impression will excite the audible idea of the word. This, however, is not to our pre

sent purpose, but it is a process which takes place at the same time with the other, and contributes to illustrate and confirm it. Both together furnish a complete instance of one of the classes of connections. (§ 21.)

Secondly, this association of words with visible appearances, being made under many particular circumstances, must affect the visible ideas with a like particularity. Thus the mother's dress, and the situation of the fire in the child's nursery, make part of the child's ideas of his mother and fire. But then, as his mother often changes her dress, and the child often sees a fire in a different place, and surrounded by different visible objects, these opposite associations must be less strong than the part which is common to them all; and consequently we may suppose, that while his idea of that part which is common, and which we may call essential, continues the same, that of the particularities, circumstances, and adjuncts, varies.

Thirdly, when the visible objects impress other vivid sensations besides those of sight, such as pleasant or unpleasant tastes, smells, warmth, or coldness, &c. with sufficient frequency, these must have relicts or ideas, ($7), which will be associated with the visible ideas of the objects, and with the names of the objects, so as to depend upon them. Thus, an idea of the taste of the mother's milk will rise up in the mind of the child, on his hearing her name; and hence the whole idea belonging to the word mamma now begins to be complex, consisting of two sets of ideas derived from different senses; and these ideas will be associated together, not only because the same word raises both, but also because the original sensations were often received together. The stronger idea will therefore assist the weaker. Now, in common cases, visible ideas are the strongest; or, at least, occur the most readily; but in this case it appears to be otherwise. It would be easy to proceed to various other and more complex cases, in which the component ideas are united, and all made to depend on the respective names of visible objects; but what has been said is sufficient to show what ideas the names . of visible objects, proper and appellative, raise in us.

Fourthly, we must, however, observe, respecting appellatives, that sometimes the idea is the common compound result of all the sensible impressions received from several of the objects comprised under the general appellation;

sometimes, in a great measure at least, the particular idea of some one of these, namely, when the impressions arising from some one of the class are more frequent and vivid than those of the rest.

Fifthly, the names denoting sensible qualities, whether substantive or adjec tive, such as whiteness, white, &c. get their ideas in a manner which will be easily understood from what has been already stated. That visible impression which is common to all objects which have been frequently seen having the name, white, applied to them, becomes the leading feature of the ideas belonging to them; and the word excites that most vividly and universally, while it excites only faintly, or at least with great variation, the ideas of the peculiarities, circumstances, and adjuncts: and so of the other sensible qualities.

Sixthly, the names of visible actions, as walking, &c. raise the proper visible ideas by a like process. Other ideas may likewise adhere in certain cases, as in those of tasting, feeling, speaking, &c. Sensible impressions, in which no visible action is concerned, may also have ideas dependant upon words. However, some visible ideas generally intermix themselves here. These actions and perceptions are generally denoted by verbs, though sometimes by substantives.

Seventhly, as children may learn to read words, not only in an elementary way, viz. by learning the letters and syllables of which they are composed, but also in a summary one, viz. by associating the sound of entire words with their visi ble representations; and must, in some cases, be taught in this latter method, that is, while the sound of the word deviates from that of its elements; so both children and adults often learn the ideas belonging to whole sentences, in a summary way, and not by adding together the ideas of the several words in the sentence. And wherever words occur, which, separately taken, have no distinct proper ideas, their use can be learned in no other way than this; and this will be the case where the words are extremely ge neral, applying to a vast variety of visible objects, and to circumstances and relations which are not obvious to the uncultivated mind. Now, pronouns, and par ticles, and many other words, are of this sort. Thus, I walk, is associated at different times with the same visible impressions with, mamma walks, brother walks, &c. and therefore can for a long time suggest nothing permanently but the action of walking. However, the pronoun, I,

in this and innumerable other short sentences, being always associated with the person speaking, (as thou with the person spoken to, and he with the person spoken of), the frequent recurrency of this teaches the child the use of the pronouns; that is, teaches him what difference he is to expect in his sensible impressions, according as this or that pronoun is used; the vast number of instances making up for the very small quantity of information which each, singly taken, conveys. In like manner different particles, (that is, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions), being used in sentences where the substantives, adjectives, and verbs, are the same; and the same particles, when these are different, in an endless recurrency, teach children the use of the particles in a gross general way. For it may be observed, that children are much at a loss for the true use of the pronouns and particles for some years; and that they often repeat the proper name of the person instead of the pronoun; which confirms the foregoing reasoning.

Eighthly, the attempts which children make to express their own wants, perceptions, pains, &c. in words, and the corrections and suggestions of the attendants, are of the greatest use in all the steps that we have hitherto considered, and especially in the last, respecting the particles and pronouns.

Ninthly, learning to read helps children much in the same respects; especially as it teaches them to separate sentences into the several words which compose them; which those who cannot read are scarcely able to do, even when they arrive ́ at adult age.

Thus we may see how children and others are enabled to understand a continued discourse, relating to sensible impressions only; and how the words, in passing over the ear, must raise up trains of visible and other ideas, by the power of association. Our next inquiry must be concerning the words which denote either intellectual things, or collections of other words.

Tenthly, the words which relate to the several passions of love, hatred, hope, fear, anger, &c. being applied to the child when he is under the influence of these passions, get the power of raising up the ideas of those passions, and also the usual associated circumstances. The application of the same words to others helps also to annex the ideas of the associated circumstances to them, and even of the passions themselves, both from the

infectiousness of our natures, and from the power of associated circumstances to raise the passions. The words, however, denoting the passions, do not, for the most part, raise up in us any degree of the passions themselves, but only the ideas of the associated circumstances. We are supposed sufficiently to understand the continued discourses into which these words enter, when we form true notions of the actions, particularly the visible ones, attending the feelings denoted.

Eleventhly, the names of intellectual and moral qualities and operations, stand for a description of these qualities and operations; and therefore, if dwelt upon, excite such ideas as these descriptions in all their particular circumstances do. But the common sentences into which these words enter, pass over the mind too quick, for the most part, to allow of such delay. They are acknowledged as familiar and correct; and suggest certain associated visible ideas, and nascent internal feelings, taken from the description of these names, or from the words which are usually joined with them in discourses and writings.

Twelfthly, there are many terms of art in all the branches of learning, which are defined by other words, and which, therefore, are only compendious substitutes for them. The same holds in common life in numberless instances. Such words sometimes suggest the words of their definitions, sometimes the ideas of these words, sometimes a particular species comprehended under the general term, &c. But whatever they suggest, it may be easily seen, that they derive the power of doing it from association.

Lastly, there are words used in abstract sciences which can scarcely be defined or described by other words, such as identity, existence, &c. The use of these must therefore be learned, as that of the particles is. Indeed children learn their first imperfect notions of all the words considered in this and the last three paragraphs, chiefly in this way; and come to more precise and explicit ones only by means of books, as they advance to adult age, or by endeavouring to use them properly in their own deliberate compositions.

From the foregoing train of reasoning, the following inferences may be drawn.

1. Including under the head of definition, description, or any way of explaining a word by other words, excepting that by a mere synonymous term; and

excluding from the head of ideas the visible idea of the character of a word, and the audible one of its sound, and also all ideas which are either extremely faint or extremely variable; words may be distinguished into the four following classes: 1. Such as have ideas only; 2. Such as have both ideas and definitions; 3. Such as have definitions only; 4. Such as have neither ideas nor definitions.

It is difficult to fix precise limits to these four classes, so as to determine accurately where each ends and the next begins; and if we consider these things in the most general way, there is per haps no word which has not both an idea and a definition; that is, which is not occasionally attended with some one or more internal feelings, and which may not be explained, in some imperfect manner at least, by other words. However, the following are some instances of words which have the fairest right to each class. The names of simple sensible objects are of the first class. Thus white, sweet, &c. excite ideas, but cannot be, defined. Words of this class stand only for the stable parts of the respective ideas, not for the several variable parti cularities, circumstances, and adjuncts, which here intermix themselves.

The names of natural bodies, animal, vegetable, or mineral, are of the second class; for they excite aggregates of sensible ideas, and at the same time may be defined by an enumeration of their properties and characteristics. Thus likewise geometrical figures have both ideas and definitions. The definitions, in both cases, are so contrived as to leave out all the variable particularities of the ideas, and also to be more full and precise than the ideas generally are in the parts which are of a permanent nature.

Algebraic quantities, such as roots, powers, surds, &c. belong to the third class; and have definitions only. The same may be said of scientifical terms of art, and of most abstract general terms, moral, metaphysical, and vulgar. However, mental emotions are apt to attend some of these even in passing slightly over the ear, and these emotions may be considered as ideas belonging to the respective terms. Thus the very words, gratitude, mercy, cruelty, treachery, &c. separately taken, affect the mind; and yet, since all reasoning upon them is to be founded on their definitions, it seems best to refer them to this third class.

Lastly, the particles, the, of, to, for, but, &c. have neither definition nor ideas, as we have limited those terms.

2. It will easily appear, from the ab servations here made upon words, and the associations which adhere to them, that the languages of different ages and nations must bear a great general resemblance to each other, and yet have considerable particular differences; whence any one may be translated into any other, so as to convey the same ideas in general, and yet not with perfect precision and exactness. They must resemble one another, because the phenomena of nature which they are all intended to express, and the uses and exigencies of human life to which they minister, have a general resemblance. But then, as the bodily make and genius of each people, the air, soil, and climate, commerce, arts, sciences, religion, &c. make considerable differences in different ages and nations, it is natural to expect that the languages should have proportionable differences in respect of each other.

In learning a new language, the words of it are at first substitutes for those of our native language; that is, they are associated, by means of these, with the proper objects and ideas. When this association is sufficiently strong, the middle bond is dropped, and the words of the new language become substitutes for, and suggest directly and immediately objects and ideas; also clusters of other words in the same language.

In learning a new language, it is much easier to translate from it into the native one, than back again; just as young children are much better able to understand the expressions of others, than to express their own conceptions. And the reason is the same in both cases. Young children learn at first to go from the words of others, and those who learn a new language, from the words of that language to the things signified. And the reverse of this, viz. to go from the things signified to the words, must be difficult for a time, from the nature of successive associations. It is to be added here, that the nature and connections of the things signified often determine the import of sentences, though their grammatical analysis is not understood; and that we suppose the person who attempts to translate from a. new language, is sufficiently expert in passing from the things signified to the corresponding words of his own language. The power of association is every where conspicuous in these remarks.

3. It follows also from the foregoing reasoning, that persons who speak the same language cannot always mean the same things by the same words, but must