On the 9th of December, Admiral ready to move; but owing to the prevaDec. Porter was notified by General lence of stormy weather none of the 9. Butler that the land forces-con- vessels put to sea till the 12th, when the sisting of General Ames' division of the transports and smaller war vessels took twenty-fourth corps and General Paine's their departure, followed next day by division of the twenty-fifth corps, com- the New Ironsides, the five monitors, prising 6,500 men, with two batteries and the heavy steam frigates. The and fifty cavalry, the whole under the entire fleet, including transports, comcommand of General Weitzel-were prised seventy-five vessels, carrying 655 of Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to guns. Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for Of the two entrances to Cape Fear River, it was decided that New Inlet should be attacked, as offering more chances of success. Better facilities for of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on landing troops were afforded by the the mainland between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected, whether the enemy hold Fort Fisher or the batteries guarding the entrance to the river there, the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilming ton by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after-consideration. The details for the execution are intrusted to you and the officer im narrow strip of land terminating with Federal Point on the east side of the river than by any other part of the coast in the vicinity, and the capture of the works on it would give to the fleet not only command of the river, but by cutting off Fort Caswell, which controlled the west entrance, and rendering it of little further value to the rebels, would virtually close the port of Wilmington. mediately in command of the troops. Should the troops For the defence of New Inlet, reliance under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the army operating against Richmond without delay. "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General." As the troops for this enterprise were taken from the army of General Butler, and the operations were to take place within his territorial department, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions to subordinates should pass through his hands. But General Weitzel never received the instructions intended for his guidance, and never knew even of their existence till he read Gen eral Butler's report of the failure of the expedition. General Grant says in his report, "I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then I did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder boat." was placed by the rebels chiefly on Fort For passable, and much of the dry land is covered with wood or low undergrowth. The fort, with its commanding batteries forming practically one work, consisted of two fronts, the first or land front running in a direction across the peninsula-at this point seven hundred yards wide-being four hundred and eighty yards in length, while the second or sea front, running parallel with the beach from the right of the land front to the Mound Battery, is thirteen hundred yards long. The land front was intended to resist any attack from the north, while the sea front was intended to command New Inlet or prevent the landing of troops at Federal Point. The following extracts from the report of Colonel Comstock, the engineer who accompanied the land forces, gives more minute details respecting these defences: "The land front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear River side, connected by a curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses rising ten feet above it and running back on their tops, which were from twelve to eight feet in thickness, to a distance of from twenty to thirty feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-five feet in length on top. The earth for this heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner ends, more than thirty feet. in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work. Between each pair of traverses there were one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loopholed and has a banquette, runs in front of this place at a distance of about fifty feet in front of the foot of the exterior slope from the Cape Fear River to the ocean, with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river, and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain was a bomb-proof postern whose exterior opening was covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank fire along the curtain. The traverses were generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to have been revetted with marsh sod, or covered with grass, and to have had an inclination of fortyfive degrees, or a little less." "The sea front consists of a series of batteries, mounting in all twenty-four guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet, so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection of the guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are also generally bombproofed." In addition to these strong works there were also, a battery commanding the New Inlet channel, on Zeeke's Island, and several miles north of Fort Fisher the Flag Pond Hill and Half-Moon batteries. The transports arrived off New Inlet on the 15th of December, and on Dec. the 18th and 19th were joined by 15. the iron-clads, which had been obliged to put into Beaufort, in North Carolina, for coal and ammunition. The heavy- advantage to the attacking party. The armed frigates also arrived at the ren-gun-boat Louisiana, purchased for operadezvous a day or two after the trans- tions on the North Carolina sounds, was ports. The whole fleet had scarcely selected for the purpose. With the assembled, however, when the weather, view of deceiving the enemy as to her previously fair, became threatening, and true character, she was disguised as a on the 20th a heavy gale set in from the blockade runner, and was taken round southwest. To avoid the risk of scatter- from Norfolk in tow of the steamer ing his vessels, Admiral Porter deter- Sassacus to Beaufort, where she was mined to ride out the storm, and stored with two hundred and fifteen succeeded in doing so without accident tons of gunpowder, arranged so that of any kind beyond the loss of a few there were upon the berth-decks a tier anchors, the monitors as well as the of barrels of powder with their heads other large vessels behaving admirably. taken out, over which sixty-pound bags The transports being short of water, and of powder were placed in layers up to not calculated for riding out at anchor the deck. A house constructed on the in heavy weather, put back to Beaufort. after-deck was filled in the same manner. The wind then chopping round to the The entire mass was penetrated and westward, and the weather becoming connected by Gomez fuses, and every fine, the Admiral determined to take precaution was taken to insure the inadvantage of it and commence the attack stantaneous ignition of the whole. A on Fort Fisher and its outworks. method was devised of firing the fuses by clock-work, timed as desired, three instruments being provided in case one should fail. In case these should all fail, the ends of the fuses were united at another point, and placed beneath a perforated wooden framework, in which were set five lighted tapers, the lower ends of whose wicks were united with fuses. As a last precaution, arrangements were made to fire the ship at a point remote from the powder at the moment the crew left it. The vessel was put in charge of Commander A. C. Rhind, aided by Lieutenant S. W. Preston and thirteen officers and men. a weather seeming auspicious on the 23d, and Mr. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, having gone in the night before and Great results were expected in this attack from the explosion of a vessel filled with gunpowder in the neighborhood of the fort. The idea originated with General Butler, and was suggested to him by the accidental explosion in England, at Erith, on the Thames, on the 1st of October, 1864, of a hundred and fifty thousand pounds of gunpowder, by which a hundred yards of river embankment was blown away and a great number of houses in the vicinity thrown down. It was supposed that a similar mass of gunpowder exploded near Fort Fisher would cause the whole or portion of its walls to fall down, or fire the magazines, or paralyze the garrison, or in some way afford an important The ascertained that a vessel drawing seven feet water might be placed right on the edge of the beach, Commander Rhind was ordered to proceed and explode his vessel under the walls of Fort Fisher. At half-past ten at night the Louisiana started, and was towed toward the beach by the steamer Wilderness till the embrasures of the fort came plainly in sight, when the latter vessel cast off, and the Louisiana steamed on alone to within two hundred yards of the shore and about four hundred of the fort. She was then securely anchored, and her commander coolly made all the arrangements necessary to insure the explosion. This he was the better able to do from the fact that a blockade runner was going in right ahead of him, to which the forts were making signals, as they did also to the Louisiana. Before the vessel was abandoned, a fire was made under her cabin. The crew then taking to their boats made off to the Wilderness, which steamed rapidly away from the shore to avoid any share of the apprehended terrific results of the explosion. This took place at a quarter before two on the morning of the 24. 24th; but its effects were far from answering the expectations which had been formed respecting it. The Wilderness was a little shaken, and some glasses on board were broken, but no other damage was done on the vessel. To those on watch in the fleet, all the vessels of which had been directed by a general order to lie off twelve miles from shore, the noise produced by the explosion seemed scarcely louder than Dec. the report accompanying the discharge of a battery of light artillery; but it was distinctly heard at Newbern, eighty miles distant, and was there supposed to be the rumbling of an earthquake. Worst of all, not the slightest damage was sustained by Fort Fisher, and the garrison, so far from being paralyzed, as was expected, were unaware till long afterward that the explosion was not the result of accident. Notwithstanding the explosion had proved a failure and the transports were not yet come up, Admiral Porter, hoping to damage the fort to such an extent that the troops on their arrival would have little difficulty in carrying it by storm, determined to proceed at once with the attack, and at daylight on the 24th the fleet stood in toward the shore in line of battle, and at half-past eleven signal was made to engage the forts. The attacking squadron consisted of thirty-three vessels carrying upward of four hundred guns, with a reserve of seventeen small gun-boats carrying about one hundred guns. The first line of vessels, comprising the New Ironsides, the Monadnock, Canonicus, and Mahopac, anchored in line about a length apart, at a distance of three-quarters of a mile from the fort, each ship having in its rear, within easy supporting distance, a gun-boat to act as a tender. Behind the line of iron-clads, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, was formed a line of heavy frigates, comprising the Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash, and other vessels of similar power and character. Behind these was another line of vessels. A division consisting bursting of hundred-pounder Parrott chiefly of gun-boats took up a position to the south and southeast of the forts, and to the left of the frigates. Another division was stationed to the north and east of the iron-clads, in such a position as to be able to direct an enfilading fire on the works. While the various vessels of the squadron were getting into position, an active fire was kept up on them from the guns of the fort; but after the large vessels anchored and got their batteries fairly at work, no more shots were fired from the rebels except a few from the Mound and upper batteries. The fire of the entire fleet proved to be of such tremendous power, surpassing anything known in the history of naval warfare, that the rebel gunners all retired within their bomb-proofs; and within an hour and a quarter after the first shot was fired from the fleet the guns of the fort were silenced, two magazines blew up, and the fort took fire in several places. Notwithstanding that the rebel batteries were completely silenced, Admiral Porter directed his ships to keep up a moderate firing, in the hope of attracting the attention of the transports, and bringing them in, that the land forces might do their share of the work. During the five hours that the bombardment lasted, only one vessel, the gun-boat Yantic, left the line to report damages, though several were struck once or twice; and so quickly were the rebel batteries silenced, that not an officer or man was injured by their fire in the entire fleet. But some serious disasters were caused by the guns, on six different vessels, in which there were killed or wounded about forty officers and men. The effect of these accidents was to disconcert the crews to a great extent, and cause much distrust of this species of ordnance. At sunset General Butler arrived in his flag-ship with a few transports; but the hour being too late for effecting anything more that day, Admiral Porter signalled his fleet to retire for the night to a safe anchorage, which they did, unmolested. At half-past six on the morning of the 25th, General Weitzel had an inter- Dec. view with Admiral Porter, and 25. made arrangements with him for covering the landing of troops; and as soon as all the transports arrived and the necessary preparations had been made, which was about two in the afternoon, a reconnoitring party of 550 men under the command of General Curtis, and accompanied by General Weitzel, was landed about three miles above Fort Fisher, under cover of the fire of twelve gun-boats, and directed to move along the beach toward the forts as far as they could go-a slow and deliberate fire being at the same time kept up on Fort Fisher by the fleet, with the object of engaging the enemy's attention, and preventing them from opening upon the troops. General Curtis pushed his skirmish line to within fifty yards of Fort Fisher, causing on his way thither the surrender of the Flag Pond Hill battery, whose flag and garrison of fifty-five men were taken by seamen engaged in landing the troops, and conveyed on board |