clothing throughout, to economize transportation. Commissary whisky enough to stupefy the entire force was carried away in rebel canteens, and aided some of the captives to escape from their guards that night. "The torch was carried down the line of wagons till 230 were consumed, a distance of three miles toward Bridgeport, when the rebels, fearing the advance of Union cavalry, beat a retreat up the valley." A Union force of mounted men, under General Crook, went in pursuit of Wheeler, and overtaking him at Shelbyville, to which he had set fire, attacked and routed him. Crook gave this account of his operations in his report of October 10th: "I have the honor," he says, "to inform you that I have had three fights with the enemy since I left the Sequatchie Valley, whipping him very badly each time. The last battle ended at Farmington, Tenn., where I fought Wheeler's entire command with only two brigades. I cut his force in two, scattering a large portion of it, capturing 4 pieces of artillery, 1,000 stand of cavalry arms, and 240 prisoners, besides the wounded. "As I pushed on after the enemy immediately, I have not been able to ascertain the number of their killed and wounded; but it was very heavy. They were scattered over a distance of fifteen miles from this, and their retreat was a perfect rout, their men deserting and straggling over the country. I pursued them with great vigor; but their horses being better than mine, I was only able to come up with a couple of regiments at Sugar Creek, left to detain me. I made a charge on them, capturing some fifty of them, and scattering the remainder in the mountains. When within eight miles of the river I struck the gallop; but when I reached the river, I found they had all crossed at a ford some three miles above Samp's Ferry, where they commenced to cross twelve abreast. "I never saw troops more demoralized than they were. I am satisfied their loss in this raid was not less than 2,000. No fears need be entertained of their making another raid soon." Large rein While the Army of the Cumberland was striving to hold Chattanooga, with the enemy confronting it and making desperate efforts by cavalry raids in its rear to cut off its communications and prevent it from being supplied or reinforced, great efforts were being made to secure its safety. The Government acted with promptitude. forcements were ordered to hasten to Chattanooga; and to give unity to military operations in the West, the Departments of the Ohio, of the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee were combined into the "Military Division of the Mississippi," and placed under the com- oct. mand of General Grant, the con- 16. queror of Vicksburg. Rosecrans was,. at the same time, relieved, and General Thomas, who had arrested the ruin threatened at Chickamauga, was appointed his successor in the command of the Army of the Cumberland. CHAPTER XXIII. The Army of the Cumberland in its Intrenchments at Chattanooga.—Inquietude in regard to its Communications. -Relief at hand.-Marches of Hooker and Sherman.-The Army of the Cumberland reinforced.-New Communications opened.-Hooker's Movement and Engagement with the Enemy described.-Enemy's Version.-The Enemy confess themselves worsted.-General Grant prepared to advance.-General Bragg detaches a Force under Longstreet against Knoxville. -The Movements of Burnside.-Grant attacks Bragg.-Bragg beaten and driven from his Position.-Disappointment of the Army vented upon their General.—Clamor against Bragg.—Bragg removed.— Johnston appointed his Successor. 1863. AT the moment General Rosecrans the Army of the Cumberland was bivwas relieved, and General Thomas ouacked-not encamped, for very little assigned to the command, the Army camp equipage was to be had. This of the Cumberland was, though securely small area comprised all that we held intrenched within the works and fast-south of the Tennessee River. The nesses of Chattanooga, by no means free north side we held entire, with troops from inquietude in regard to its com- stationed to guard the fords above. Our munications. base was at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and supplied from dépôts at Louisville and Nashville by a single line of badlyworn railroad. The south side of the river, from Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport, was held by the enemy, and the river road on the north side was rendered impassable by rebel sharpshooters stationed on the opposite bank, thus forcing us to bring all supplies over a distance of fifty or sixty miles, taking the road from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley, over the mountains, into the 'Anderson' road, thence to Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee by means of pontoon bridges, constructed here from such materials as the forests and this dilapidated town could afford. "Our position," says a campaigner, was just about the town of Chattanooga, which is situated in the bend of a river. Both our flanks rested upon its banks-our right at Chattanooga Creek, near the base of Lookout Mountain, our left at Citico Creek. Our picket lines followed these two creeks for a distance, and then across the low ground between, which lies also between the foot of Missionary Ridge and the higher grounds about Chattanooga, upon which our works were constructed. These works were connected with each other by a strong line of rifle-pits, commenced on the night the troops arrived here from Chickamauga, and afterward strengthened. Behind this line, and around the town, the greater portion of N. Y. World. "Rains had rendered the valleys a bottomless mass of mud, and the mountain roads so many mountain torrents. The line of supply was well marked by the remains of wagons, mules, horses, etc., for the entire distance. Add to this that Wheeler, by his 'raid,' destroyed several hundred wagons loaded with supplies, and also cut our single line of railroad." Relief, however, was at hand. General Hooker having been placed in command of the eleventh and a portion of the twelfth corps, detached from the Army of the Potomac, was hastening from the east, and General Sherman, with a large force, from the west, to reestablish the communications of the Army of the Cumberland and increase its strength. Notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy to obstruct their march, both Hooker and Sherman succeeded in reaching the point proposed, and their services were immediately put into requisition by General Grant, who, on arriving at Chattanooga, determined at once to open a river and a shorter land communication with his base. To accomplish this, "a plan," says the writer before quoted, "was proposed by the chief engineer of the army, as follows: The boats for a new bridge over the river here were nearly completed. He proposed to fill these boats with armed men, the other bridge equipage to be sent by land; float them down in the night past Lookout to a point known as Brown's Ferry, and effect a landing. Then it was proposed to occupy, on the enemy's side of the river, two hills, which would form a complete tête-de-pont. Then recross the boats, and with them ferry over more troops to occupy, and then throw over the bridge. Hooker was to move at the same time up the valley, crossing the river at Bridgeport, and unite with the forces landed from here, thus opening the river, the road to Kelly's Ferry, and the direct road to Bridgeport, as well as giving us the river road on the north side of the river around its bend. Generals Grant, Thomas, Smith, and Brannan went to the point proposed about the 23d of October, and the move was determined upon and executed on the night of the 26th of October. 66 Everything proved remarkably successful. The surprise was complete; the landing effected; the hills gained with but a slight skirmish with the pickets which were at the point of landing, and a very feeble one from a brigade of infantry and regiment of cavalry stationed in the valley beyond the hills forming the tête-de-pont. The majority of this force made the best of its way to Lookout Mountain; but a portion was captured. The bridge, 900 feet long, was thrown in about five hours, and communication established with the south from the north side of the river. The distance between this bridge and the one at Chattanooga was one and a half miles by land, while the distance by water was about eight. Hooker moved up the next day and joined with the eleventh corps. A portion of the twelfth corps was left at Wauhatchie. Longstreet and Bragg, from the top of Lookout Mountain, looked down discomforted on all this, and resolved to attack Hooker, thus hoping to frustrate the end to be gained, which was our holding of the two firstnamed roads. An attack ensued the following night, which resulted in the complete thwarting of the enemy's design and the forcing him to take up that side of Lookout Creek next the mountain; Hooker remained on this ground until the battle of Mission Ridge, thus covering the line of communication. about ten miles of wagon transportation over good roads instead of sixty over the worst of roads. An interior line of defence sufficient to hold this place with a small force was now constructed, and, meanwhile, plans were matured for the accomplishing of the main object of the campaign here, which was the clearing of East Tennessee." General Grant, having securely re-established his communications, and plentifully supplied and largely reinforced his troops, determined upon an advance. General Bragg, in the mean time, ap 'This movement saved the army from starvation. For although our troops could repel any direct assault, they might well have hesitated to make a flank movement-and so leave Chatta-parently confiding in the strength of his nooga-from military considerations, aside from the fact that this point could not be given up for any reason without yielding all of Tennessee and Kentucky, and falling back to the line of the Ohio River, which of course could not be thought of. In fact, Chattanooga must be held at all hazards. "Supplies now began to come through. A steamboat had been built at Bridgeport; another, captured here, had been repaired, and was capable of carrying 200,000 rations. It ran the blockade of Lookout Mountain (the point of which between Chattanooga and Lookout creeks, the enemy still held by pickets and infantry force, while their batteries on top commanded some distance each way), arriving safely at Brown's Ferry. It was passed through the pontoon bridge ground until the battle of Missionary Ridge, thus covering the line of communications, and in connection with the other boat ran regularly to Kelly's Ferry from Bridgeport, thus giving us position, or not fully appreciating the enterprise and resources of his antagonist, ventured to weaken his army by detaching a force of 20,000 men or more under Longstreet, on an expedition against Knoxville, then held by General Burnside. The movements of Burnside were so directed as to draw Longstreet as far away as possible, and to involve him in the delays of a siege. The forces of the enemy were thus so widely separated, that the possibility of conveniently reuniting them was prevented. Grant now advanced to attack Bragg, weakened in numbers but strong in position. "The enemy in our front," wrote the correspondent* already quoted, "held Missionary Ridge,' the Chattanooga Valley, and Lookout Mountain, his left resting on the latter, his right on the ridge near the tunnel on the Knoxville and Chattanooga Railroad, while his pickets occupied the south bank of the Tennessee River for miles above us. N. Y. World. His supplies came over the railroad from Atlanta and Dalton. His heaviest force was in the valley (Chattanooga) between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and on that slope of Lookout Mountain, thus placing it very nearly on his centre. The ridge itself was heavily posted with artillery. "In this condition of things, the plan of attack was as follows: A division of Sherman's troops was to be sent to Trenton, threatening the enemy's left flank. Under cover of this movement, Sherman's main body was to march up by Hooker's lines, crossing the Brown's Ferry bridge mostly at night, thence into a concealed camp on the north side of the river, opposite South Chickamauga Creek. One division was directed to encamp on the North Chickamauga; about 120 pontoons were to be taken, under cover of hills and woods, and launched into the North Chickamauga ; these were to be filled with men, to be floated out into the Tennessee and down it until opposite the South Chickamauga (about three miles below); to effect a landing on that bank, throw up works; cross the remainder of the command in the same boats, or a portion of them; to bridge the Tennessee and South Chickamauga ; and then cross the artillery and move at once to seize a foot-hold on the ridge, taking up a line facing the enemy's right flank near the Howard's corps, of Hooker's tunnel. command, was to cross into the town by the two bridges, and fill the gap between Sherman's proposed position and the main body of Thomas' army. Hooker, with the remainder of his force and the division sent to Trenton, which should return, was to carry the point of Lookout, and then threaten the enemy's left, which would thus be thrown back, being forced to evacuate the mountain and take position on the ridge, and then our troops being on both flanks, and upon one flank threatening the enemy's communications, to advance the whole line, or turn the other flank, as the chances might dictate. Then to follow as far as possible with a part of our force, while Sherman destroyed the railroad from Cleveland to Dalton, and then pushed on to relieve Knoxville, and capture, disperse, or drive off Longstreet from before it. Such were the main points of the plan proposed, matured, and rounded into definite form by General Grant and his coadjutors. "General Smith, chief engineer, took personal charge of the preliminaries necessary for the move on our left flank. The pontoons were put in the Chickamauga; the men encamped; the bridge trains ready to debouch at the proper point; and so completely was everything arranged, that no confusion whatever occurred. Artillery was posted on our side of the river to cross-fire in front of the point of landing, and force the same, if necessary. "On Monday, November 24, an armed reconnoissance was made by General Thomas on his left, which developed the enemy's lines and gave to us a line of battle in advance of our picket lines, at the same time allowing the eleventh corps (Howard's) to come into the posi |