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TALLEYRAND BEGINS TO THREATEN.

tions on American commerce and discontinue prize proceedings, including awards unfavorable to American interests. On the other hand, it would be absolutely impossible to make a recantation of the President's speech, as that was beyond the range of diplomatic revision.

Hauteval then assured the envoys of Talleyrand's good disposition toward the United States and suggested a private and unofficial interview with the French minister. It was agreed that Gerry, who had known both Talleyrand and Hauteval in America, should represent the envoys. Accordingly, on October 28, Talleyrand received him in company with Hauteval, who acted as interpreter. This interview served but to confirm the impression that X., Y. and Z. had acted under Talleyrand's inspiration; for, though discreetly silent as to douceurs, Talleyrand made a still more peremptory request for a loan and exhibited a decree lately passed by the Directory requiring reparation for the language used by the President though he thought the operation of this decree might be prevented by an offer of money. Gerry's response was similar to that made by the envoys to Hottinguer, Bellamy and Hauteval. *

Still the agents of Talleyrand continued at work. They said that nothing could be done without money, that

*American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 161-163; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 388.

351

one of the members of the Directory was then in the pay of the privateers, that Hamburg and several other European States had been compelled to purchase peace, and that it would be to the interest of the United States to do likewise.* The immense power of France was painted in gorgeous colors, the humiliation of Austria was dwelt upon, and the conquest of Great Britain confidently predicted. They called attention to the situation of the United States and to the force which France was able to bring to bear upon her, arrogantly pointing out that France alone could save America, and that she ought to take warning from the fate of Venice. They said:

Perhaps you believe that in returning and exposing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this Government, you will unite them in their resistance to those demands. You are mistaken. You ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France, and the means she possesses in your country, are sufficient to enable her, with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the Federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France terms you, and you may assure yourselves this will be done." They asserted, moreover, that France would use her power without scruple.† Talleyrand had

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 162.

Ibid, p. 164; Bassett, Federalist System,

p. 231.

352

REPLY OF THE AMERICAN ENVOYS.

already advised the envoys that they should assume plenary powers and make the loan, and a new course was mapped out for the envoys to pursue. They must propose, in case a commission were were appointed to settle American claims, that all sums awarded to Americans be considered as advanced to France; that the envoys should procure from the home government the needed authority to make the loan; but that the douceur money must be paid at once, without awaiting instructions from America. Should the envoys agree to this, possibly during the interval captures and prize proceedings against American property would cease.*

The American envoys replied that the United States highly esteemed the power of France and that no nation wished more ardently to be at peace with her. But one object was dearer to Americans than the friendship of France, and that was their national

independence. America had a right to take a neutral position, and no nation had the right to force her out of it. If she should lend money to a belligerent power abounding in all the requisites of war but money, she would thereby relinquish her neutrality and actually become engaged in war. To lend this money under coercion, was to relinquish her government and to submit to foreign domination. The United States was prepared to make a vigorous struggle, at

Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 388-389.

least, before she thus surrendered her liberty.* Furthermore, they said that the United States had numberless times proven her friendship for France when almost the whole of Europe was leagued against her. But for this display of friendship how has France been treating her?

"Wherever our property can be found she seizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, she determines to treat us as enemies, and our making no resistance produces no diminution of hostility against us. She abuses and insults our Government, endeavors to weaken it in the estimation of the people, recalls her own minister, refuses to receive ours, and when extraordinary means are taken to make explanations the envoys who bear them are not received. They are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country, but, in the haughty style of a master they are told that unless they will pay a sum to which their resources scarcely extend they may expect the vengeance of France, and, like Venice, be erased from the list of nations."

*

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GERRY'S INTERVIEW WITH TALLEYRAND.

might expect an answer. Talleyrand replied that the letter had been submitted and that he would notify the envoys when the Directory had instructed him as to the course he was to pursue* In the meantime, Hottinguer and Bellamy repeatedly tried to draw the envoys into further discussion, but the envoys persisted in their determination to hold no further indirect intercourse. On December 13, however, Gerry remarked that he would be pleased to invite Talleyrand to dine with them, and at once Bellamy proposed to accommodate Gerry. The unscrupulous Frenchman then again, in Marshall's presence, urged the importance of making the loan to France and paying the bribe to the Directory, saying that unless the envoys should do so, arrangements would undoubtedly be made at once to ravage the coast of the United States. Gerry replied that France might ravage the coast, but never would she be able to subdue the country. On reaching Talleyrand's office, Gerry stated to him the substance of the conversation he had just held with Bellamy, and was informed that it was correct and that it would be given to him in writing. Talleyrand then made a memorandum stating the exact form of the proposed loan, but after showing it to Gerry, he burned it.†

*Ibid; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 389; Gordy, Political History, vol. i., p. 303.

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 167-168. See also the letter of Gerry

353

The envoys assiduously labored in an attempt to come to some satisfactory agreement with the Directory. They had become weary at the delay and angry at the demands of X., Y. and Z., and on December 19 decided to write a letter to Talleyrand in which the differences between the two countries would be discussed exactly as if they were accredited ministers. Accordingly, on January 17, 1798, they wrote a letter to the minister of foreign affairs, but this was not delivered until the last of the month.* The seizure of American ships, the embargo laid at Bordeaux, the operation of the Jay treaty on our treaties with France, etc., were all set down in the vigorous language of Marshall-in what Gibbs calls "a monument in the diplomacy of America." While it was satisfactory from the Federalist point of view, it could hardly have been deemed conclusive by those who took the Republican view.

To the Republicans perhaps the most unsatisfactory part of the letter was that which dealt with the attacks by France upon the rights of the United States. It was said that on May 9, 1793, the National Convention had passed a decree containing the following paragraph: "The French ships of war and privateers may stop and bring into the ports of the Republic such neutral vessels as are loaded, in

to Adams in John Adams' Works, vol. viii., pp. 610-612; McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 372-374; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 389-390.

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 169-182.

354

LETTER OF THE AMERICAN ENVOYS.

whole or in part, with provisions belonging to neutrals and destined for enemy's ports or with merchandise belonging to enemies." This decree, so far as it related to the United States, had been repealed May 23, was again passed May 28, repealed July 1, and reënacted July 27. It was said that the French government could not in good faith refuse to settle the claims of American citizens growing out of damages sustained before and during Monroe's stay in France; that on July 2, 1796, a decree had been passed providing" that all neutral or allied powers shall without delay be notified that the flag of the French Republic will treat neutral vessels, either as to confiscation, searches, or captures, in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them;"'* that on March 2, 1797, to offset the effect of Jay's treaty, France had declared that the goods of enemies found in American vessels and merchandise insufficiently proved to be neutral, were liable to confiscation; and such American seamen as were found on the ships of enemies shall be subjected to punishment as pirates, whether on those ships of their own volition or forced there by threats or violence; and that this decree had compelled American ships to possess papers which had not been contem

*See also Report of the American Historical Association for 1903, vol. ii., pp. 641, 668.

For text, see American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 12–13, 30–31.

plated under the existing treaties between the two nations.*

From the Republican point of view, again, the letter was unsatisfactory in that it failed to mention facts from which a just judgment of the conduct of the French Government could be reached. The Republicans asked why it was that the decree of May 9, confirmed by that of July 27, had remained in force for so many months. The causes of this were the antiFrench and pro-British attitude in America and the actions of Gouverneur Morris in France. That France was eager to do us justice is evident from the fact that, immediately after receiving convincing proof of the friendliness of the Americans and the American Government, she had passed the decrees of November 18, 1794, and

On February 27, 1797, Secretary of State Pickering made a report indicating categorically the character of the injuries suffered by American citizens as follows: "1. Spoilations and maltreatment of their vessels at sea by French ships of war and privateers; 2. A distressing and long continued embargo laid upon their vessels at Bordeaux, in the years 1793 and 1794; 3. The nonpayment of bills and other evidences of debt, drawn by the colonial administrations on the West Indies; 4. The seizure or forced sales of the cargoes of their vessels and the appropriating of them to public use without paying for them, or paying inadequately, or delaying payment for a great length of time; 5. The non-performance of contracts made by the agents of the government for supplies; 6. The condemnation of their vessels and cargoes under such of the marine ordinances of France as are incompatible with the treaties subsisting between the two countries; and 7. The captures sanctioned by a decree of the National Convention of the 9th of May, 1793, in violation of the treaty of amity and commerce." See American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 748-760. See also the report of June 22, 1797, in ibid, vol. ii., pp. 23–65.

FRENCH DECREE; TALLEYRAND'S ACCUSATIONS.

January 3, 1795. When, however, the United States practically repudiated its treaties with France by ratifying the Jay treaty, it was only natural that France should retaliate; for why should one party be held to a compact which the other breaks at will? This was the French view of the matter and also that of the Republicans.

On January 18, 1798, before the envoys had sent their letter to Talleyrand, a violent and outrageous attack was made by the Directory on the commerce of neutrals. On that day a decree was passed prohibiting the entrance into any French port of any vessel which during her voyage had made an English port or the port of any English colony, also rendering liable to confiscation any vessel laden with merchandise produced either in England or in any of her colonies.*

In their letter the envoys said that, as their labors were of no avail, and as they were not permanent ministers but envoys extraordinary, they felt it to be both wrong and useless to remain longer in France. As Talleyrand made no reply for two weeks, a messenger was sent on February 19 to ask if he had any reply to make and returned with the answer that he had none. On the 27th an interview was requested, and March 2 was set as the day, but the envoys accomplished nothing and left. Still continuing to

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 182; Allen, Our Naval War with France, pp. 33, 299.

McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 403-404.

355

keep the envoys on the defensive, the ⚫
artful Talleyrand upbraided them for
not visiting him privately, and then,
assuring them that he desired to es-
tablish permanent friendship between
the two nations, once again broached
the subject of an immediate loan. He
stated that the only scruple the United
States had was with regard to a
charge of neutral infidelity and this
could be overcome" by the astute con-
trivance of some lying subterfuge."
But Pinckney and Marshall could not
be moved; they sturdily and abso-
lutely refused to make a loan.* No
further word was received from Tal-
leyrand until March 18, when he sent
a letter accusing the envoys of deceit
and charging that the United States
had done everything possible to pro-
long the misunderstanding. How he
reached this conclusion is difficult to
discover, for he knew that one minis-
ter had been driven from France and
that three envoys had been waiting
for months to adjust the differences,
all the while being subjected to the
grossest insults, but nevertheless ex-
hibiting an earnest desire to restore
amicable relations between the two
countries. As though this were not
enough, Talleyrand had the audacity
to say that the United States had sent
to France as envoys

"Persons whose opinions and connections were too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely conciliatory. It is painful to be obliged to make a contrast between this conduct and that

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 186-187; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 391.

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