We have already decided in the case of this very receiver that he may bring suit in his own name, or use the name of the association. Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498 (ante, p. 17). The subject was also largely discussed in the case of The Bank of Bethel. The Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 383,* and the same views were held; the action in that case being brought against the insolvent bank. This disposes of the question as to the legal right of the receiver to sue. It remains, therefore, to determine whether it is necessary for the receiver, before bringing suit in an ordinary case of a debt or claim due the bank, to have the order of the Comptroller for that purpose. In the case already referred to, the receiver had instituted a suit in equity against some of the stockholders of the bank for the purpose of charging them with the personal liability prescribed by the twelfth section of the act; and we held that he had no right to do this without the Comptroller's direction. But it will be perceived that that was a very special case, out of the ordinary course, and one which involved an important consideration of the policy to be pursued. Stockholders are not ordinary debtors of the bank, but are rather in the light of creditors, their stock being regarded as a liability. They are entitled to all the surplus that remains, if any should remain, after the payment of the debts. They are only conditionally liable for those debts after all the ordinary resources of the bank have been exhausted, and they ought not to be prosecuted without due regard to the circumstances of the case. The determination on the part of those charged with winding up the affairs of the bank, to resort to this ultimate remedy, requires the exercise of due consideration; and a receiver ought not to take it upon himself to decide so important a question without reference to the Comptroller under whose direction he acts. Although it is his duty to collect the assets of the institution he does not distribute them, and cannot ordinarily know, without reference to the Comptroller, whether a prosecution of the stockholders will be necessary or not. Hence our decision in the case of Kennedy v. Gibson cannot fairly be quoted for the government of a case like the present, which is a suit to recover an ordinary debt. The language of the statute authorizing the appointment of a receiver to act under the direction of the Comptroller, means no more than that the receiver shall be subject to the direction of the Comptroller. Ante, p. 77. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri. It does not mean that he shall do no act without special instructions. His very appointment makes it his duty to collect the assets and debts of the association. With regard to ordinary assets and debts no special direction is needed; no unusual exercise of judgment is required. They are to be collected of course; that is what the receiver is appointed to do. We think there was no error in the decision of the court below on these points, and that the action was properly brought by the receiver. (The remainder of the opinion was devoted to a consideration of questions as to the admissibility of evidence.) The 30th section of the National Banking Act (R. S., § 5197) provides that National banks "may take, receive, reserve and charge on any loan, * * * interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State or Territory where the bank is located, and no more; except that where, by the laws of any State, a different rate is limited for banks of issue, organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized in any such State under this act." Held, that where the rate of interest allowed generally was higher than that allowed to State banks of issue National banks were entitled to the higher rate. RROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri. Action by Tiffany, trustee of Darby, a bankrupt, against the National Bank of Missouri, to recover, under the provisions of section 30 of the National Banking Act of 1864 (R. S., § 5197), twice the amount of interest paid by said Darby on certain loans made by the bank to him before he was adjudicated a bankrupt. The ground of the action was that the interest charged and paid was 9 per cent, whereas the lawful rate was alleged to be 8 per cent. In Missouri the general rate of interest was 10 per cent, but State banks of issue were limited to 8 per cent. On demurrer the court below held that the National banks of Missouri could take more than 8 per cent. S. Knox, for appellant. J. O. Broadhead, contra. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri. Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. In an action like the present, brought to recover that which is substantially a statutory penalty, the statute must receive a strict, that is, a literal construction. The defendant is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it. The question, therefore, is whether the thirtieth section of the act of Congress of June 3d, 1864, relative to National banking associations, clearly prohibits such associations in the State of Missouri from reserving and taking a greater rate of interest than 8 per cent. The rate limited by the laws of that State to be charged by the banks of issue organized under its laws. It is only in case a greater rate of interest has been paid than the National banking associations are allowed to receive that they are made liable to pay twice the interest. The act of Congress enacts that every such association "may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State or Territory where the bank is located and no more; except that where, by the laws of any State, a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized in any such State under the act." What, then, were the rates of interest allowed in Missouri when the loans were made by the defendants that are alleged to have been usurious? It is admitted to have been 10 per cent, per annum, allowed to all persons, except banks of issue organized under the laws of the State, and they were allowed to charge and receive only 8 per cent. The position of the plaintiff is, that the general provision of the act of Congress that National banking associations may charge and receive interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State where they are located, has no application to the case of these defendants, and that they are restricted to the rate allowed to banks of issue of the State, that is, to 8 per cent. This, we think, cannot be maintained. The act of Congress is an enabling statute, not a restraining one, except so far as it fixes a maximum rate in all cases where State banks of issue are not allowed a greater. There are three provisions in section 30, each of them enabling. If no rate of interest is defined by State laws, 7 per cent is allowed to be charged. If there is a rate of interest fixed by State laws for lenders generally, the banks are allowed to charge that rate, but no more, except that if Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri. State banks of issue are allowed to reserve more, the same privilege is allowed to National banking associations. of Congress, It speaks of State banks, Such, we think, is the fair construction of the act entirely consistent with its words and with its spirit. allowance to National banks, and limitations upon but it does not declare that the rate limited to State banks shall be the maximum rate allowed to National banks. There can be no question that if the banks of issue of Missouri were allowed to demand interest at a higher rate than 10 per cent National banks might do likewise. And this would be for the reason that they would then come within the exception made by the statute, that is, the exception from the operation of the restrictive words "no more" than the general rate of interest allowed by law. But if it was intended they should in no case charge a higher rate of interest than State banks of issue, even though the general rule was greater, if the intention was to restrict rather than to enable, the obvious mode of expressing such an intention was to add the words "and no more" as they were added to the preceding clause of the section. The absence of those words, or words equivalent, is significant. Coupled with the general spirit of the act, and of all the legislation respecting National banks, it is controlling. It cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress in providing for the organization of National banking associations, that it was intended to give them a firm footing in the different States where they might be located. It was expected they would come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to give them at least equal advantages in such competition. In order to accomplish this they were empowered to reserve interest at the same rates, whatever those rates might be, which were allowed to similar State institutions. This was considered indispensable to protect them against possible unfriendly State legislation. Obviously, if State statutes should allow to their banks of issue a rate of interest greater than the ordinary rate allowed to natural persons, National banking associations could not compete with them, unless allowed the same. On the other hand, if such associations were restricted to the rates allowed by the statutes of the State to banks which might be authorized by the State laws, unfriendly legislation might make their existence in the State impossible. A rate of interest might be prescribed so low that banking could not be carried on, Bullard v. Bank. except at a certain loss. The only mode of guarding against such contingencies was that which, we think, Congress adopted. It was to allow to National associations the rate allowed by the State to natural persons generally, and a higher rate if State banks of issue were authorized to charge a higher rate. This construction accords with the purpose of Congress, and carries it out. It accords with the spirit of all the legislation of Congress. National banks have been National favorites. They were established for the purpose, in part, of providing a currency for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of the general government. It could not have been intended, therefore, to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to ruinous competition with State banks. On the contrary, much has been done to insure their taking the place of State banks; the latter have been substantially taxed out of existence. A duty has been imposed upon their issues so large as to manifest a purpose to compel a withdrawal of all such issues from circulation. In harmony with this policy is the construction we think should be given to the thirtieth section of the act of Congress we have been considering. It gives advantages to National banks over their State competitors. It allows such banks to charge such interest as State banks may charge, and more, if by the laws of the State more may be charged by natural persons. The result of this is that the defendants, in receiving 9 per cent interest upon the loans made by them, have not transgressed the act of Congress, consequently they are under no liability to the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. BULLARD V. BANK. (18 Wallace, 589.) National banks cannot acquire lien on their own stock. The articles of association and the by-laws of a National bank prohibited the transfer of stock owned by any stockholder indebted to the bank until such indebtedness should be satisfied. Held, that the prohibition was invalid, under section 35 of the National Banking Act, and that the bank could not thus acquire a lien on the shares of the stockholders.* * See Bank v. Lanier, ante, p. 70. This case overrules Dunkerson's Case, 4 Biss. 227, and Knight v. Bank of Providence, 4 Am. Law Times Rep. 240, |