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A. D. 1894.

Limitation prescribed.

1870, XIV., 8112.

Twenty years.
Ib., $113.

1880, X VII., 415.

Six years.

1870, XIV., $114.

CHAPTER III.

Time of Commencing Actions other than for the Recovery of Real Property.

SEC.

110. Limitation prescribed.

111. Twenty years.

112. Six years.

113. Three years.

114. Two years,

SEC.

115. One year.

116. Actions upon current account.

117. Actions for penalties.

118. Actions for other relief.

119. Actions by the State.

Section 110. The periods prescribed in Section 94 for the commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property shall be as follows:

Sec. 111. Within twenty years:

1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any Court of the United States, or of any State or Territory within the United States.

2. An action upon a bond, or other contract in writing, secured by a mortgage of real property; an action upon a sealed instrument other than a sealed note and personal bond for the payment of money only, whereof the period of limitation shall be the same as prescribed in the following Section.

Subdivision 2 does not apply to action for breach of warranty in deeds made before 1870.-Bratton v. Guy, 12 S. C., 42. Nor to seal note which matured before that time.-Nichols v. Briggs, 18 S. C., 473. But mortgage given to secure it might be foreclosed at any time within twenty years.-Ib. Nor to bond executed before that time.-Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C., 141; State v. Lake, 30 S. C., 43. But it does apply to official bond executed since that time.Strain v. Babb, 30 S. C., 342.

Sec. 112. Within six years:

1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability, express or implied, excepting those provided for in Section 111.

Applies to actions on warranty in deed.-Bratton v. Guy, 12 S. C., 42.

In actions against heirs or devisees to subject real estate in their possession to payment of debts of ancestor or devisor, nine months must be added to the six years.-Cleveland v. Mills, 9 S. C., 430.

2. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.

3. An action for trespass upon or damage to real property. 4. An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property.

Applies to action to recover houses on land sold to plaintiff by party in possession.-Dominick v. Farr, 22 S. C., 585. To action to recover amount of mistake in compromise settlement of note.-McMakin v. Gowan, 18 S. C., 502.

5. An action for criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.

6. Any action for relief on the ground of fraud, in cases which, heretofore, were solely cognizable by the Court of Chancery, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.

A. D. 1894.

7. Action may be brought in any of the Courts of this State 1891, XX., 1042. properly having jurisdiction thereof on any policies of insurance, either fire or life, whereby any person or property resident or situate in this State may be or may have been insured, or for or on account of any loss arising thereunder, from the date of such loss, or from the accrual of the cause of action under said policy, in policy not any clause or condition in the said policies or limitations therein controlling. contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

Where goods held for safekeeping are destroyed, this limitation begins to run from date of loss or of owner's notice thereof, and not from time of demand.-Cohrs v. Fraser, 5 S. C., 356.

Subdivision 6 applied.—Means v. Feaster, 4 S. C., 257; Beattie v. Pool, 13 S. C., 379; Kibler v. McIlwain, 16 S. C., 550; Suber v. Chandler, 18 S. C., 526; Richardson v. Mounce, 19 S. C., 477; McSween v. McCown, 23 S. C., 342; City Council v. Bank, 23 S. C., 410; Amicker v. New, 33 S. C., 28.

Sec. 113. Within three years:

Limitations

Ib.

Three years.

1. An action against a Sheriff, Coroner or Constable, upon a 1870, XIV., $115. liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the non-payment of money collected upon an execution. But this Section shall not apply to an action for an escape.

2. An action upon a statute, for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the State, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.

Sec. 114. Within two years:

Two years.

1. An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false impri- Ib., 116.

sonment.

2. An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the State.

An agreed forfeit of a certain amount to State for breach of contract is stipulated damages and not a technical penalty; and action therefor is not hereby barred in two years.-Lipscomb v. Seegers, 19 S. C., 425.

Sec. 115. Within one year :

1. An action against a Sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process.

One year.

I b., § 117.

A. D. 1894.

Actions upon

I b., § 118.

Sec. 116. In an action brought to recover a balance due current account upon a mutual open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account on either side.

Actions for penalties. Ib., $119.

Actions for other relief.

Ib., 120.

Actions by the State.

1 b., § 121.

When action

menced.

A seal note on one side and an open account on the other do not constitute such a mutual open and current account.-Chapman v. Chapman, 31 S. C., 405.

Sec. 117. An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture given, in whole or in part, to any person who will prosecute for the same must be commenced within one year after the commission of the offense; and if the action be not commenced within the year by a private party, it may be commenced within two years thereafter, in behalf of the State, by the AttorneyGeneral, or the Solicitor of the Circuit where the offense was committed, unless a different limitation be prescribed in the statute under which the action is brought.

Sec. 118. An action for relief not herein before provided for must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued.

Action founded upon purely legal demand not governed by this Section.— McMakin v. Gowan, 18 S. C., 502.

Sec. 119. The limitations prescribed in this Chapter shall apply to actions brought in the name of the State, or for its benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private parties.

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Section 120. An action is commenced as to each defendant deemed com- when the summons is served on him, or on a co-defendant, who 1880, XIV., §122. is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him. An attempt to commence an action is deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this Title, when the summons is delivered with the intent that it shall be actually

served, to the Sheriff or other officer of the County in which the defendants or one of them usually or last resided; or, if a corporation be defendant, to the Sheriff or other officer of the County in which such corporation was established by law, or where its general business was transacted, or where it kept an officer for the transaction of business.

Cureton v. Dargan, 12 S. C., 122; State v. Cohen, 13 S. C., 198.

A. D. 1894.

defendant out

Ib., 8123.

Sec. 121. If when the cause of action shall accrue against Exceptionany person he shall be out of the State, such action may be com- of State. menced within the terms herein respectively limited after the return of such person into this State; and if after such cause of action shall have accrued such person shall depart from and reside out of this State, or remain continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more, the time of his absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of such action.

The saving clause of this Section as to persons who "return" to the State embraces such persons as come into the State without a previous residence here.-Burrows v. French, 14 S. C., 165.

to persons un

Sec. 122. If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned Exception as in the last Chapter, except for a penalty or forfeiture, or against der disabilities. a Sheriff or other officer for an escape, be, at the time the cause Ib., § 124. of action accrued, either

1. Within the age of twenty-one years; or,

2. Insane; or,

3. Imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal Court for a term less than his natural life

The time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action; except that the period within which the action must be brought cannot be extended more than five years by any such disability, except infancy; nor can it be so extended, in any case, longer than one year after the disability ceases.

An infant has as much time within which to bring his action as persons not under disability, and under this Section he has one additional year after his majority, but no longer, to do so, if the time limited expire before or within that additional year. -Fricks v. Lewis, 26 S. C., 237; Anderson v. Simms, 29 S. C., 247.

Death of person entitled belimitation

Sec. 123. If a person entitled to bring an action die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, fore and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced by his representatives, after the expiration of that time, and within

expires.
1870, XIV., $125.

A. D. 1894.

Suits by aliens. lb., $126.

Where judgment reversed. I b., § 127.

Stay of action by injunction, &c.

Ib., § 128.

Disability must exist when right accrued.

Ib., § 129.

Two or more disabilities.

Ib., § 130.

This Title, when not to ap

ply.

Ib., § 131.

The like.

Ib., § 132.

one year from his death. If a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced against his executors or administrators after the expiration of that time, and within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration.

Only applies to cases where the Statute commenced to run in lifetime of decedent, and statutory period expired before administration.-Strain v. Babb, 30 S. C., 342. It must be shown that the action was commenced within one year after letters testamentary or of administration were granted, or the plea of Statute of Limitations will not avail.-Foggette v. Gaffney, 33 S. C., 303.

Where statutory period has not expired before administration, the executor or administrator, under the law protecting administrator or executor from suit for nine months, that time must be added to the statutory period.—Cleveland v. Mills, 9 S. C., 435; Hayes v. Clinkscales, 9 S. C., 450; Moore v. Smith, 29 S. C., 254.

Where action is in form ex delicto, and defendant die, it cannot be revived against his personal representatives.—Huff v. Watkins, 20 S. C., 477.

Sec. 124. When a person shall be an alien subject, or citizen of a country at war with the United States, the time of the continuance of the war shall not be part of the period limited for the commencement of the action.

Sec. 125. If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of action survive, his heirs or representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal.

Sec. 126. When the commencement of an action shall be stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition shall not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

Sec. 127. No person shall avail himself of a disability, unless it existed when his right of action accrued.

Where disability intervenes after right of action accrues, it does not stop this Statute.-Shubrick v. Adams, 20 S. C., 49.

Sec. 128. When two or more disabilities shall co-exist at the time the right of action accrues, the limitation shall not attach until they all be removed.

Sec. 129. This Title shall not affect actions to enforce the payment of bills, notes or other evidences of debt, issued by moneyed corporations, or issued or put in circulation as money.

Sec. 130. This Title shall not affect actions against directors or stockholders of a moneyed corporation, or banking associations, to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created by law; but such actions must be brought within

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