nents. The Church never decides upon questions raised by merely human curiosity, having no bearing upon revealed doctrine, and referring solely to temporal matters.

1 Bouix, Tract. de Papa, Paris, 1869, vol. i. p. ii. sect. 1, c. i. p. 235: 'Agitur dumtaxat de infallibilitate in definitionibus fidei libere a Papa, non tamquam doctore privato, sed quatenus universali pastore pronunciatis.' Cf. Kettler, Das Unfehlbare Lehramt des Papstes.

2 Du Plessis d'Argentré, Coll. Judic. i. p. 117.

3 Bouix, t. ii. p. 469 seq. Cf. p. 445 seq.

4 In 1704 the theological faculty of Douay drew this out in detail in their opinion on the notorious 'cas de conscience' (Du Plessis, t. iii. p. ii. pp. 425-439). Cf. Bolgoni, Fatti dogmatici ossia della infallibilità della Chiesa nel decidere sulla dottrina buona o cattiva de' libri; Brescia, 1788. Janner, De Factis Dogmaticis, Dissert. inauguralis; Wirceb. 1861: V. Schäzler, Die papstliche Unfehlbarkeit, p. 191 seq. Friedrich refuses to allow that ecclesiastical infallibility extends to facta dogmatica. We shall show later that the condemnation of Honorius by the Sixth Council, in so far as it was an ecumenical judgment, in no manner interferes with this extension.

5 C. A nobis, 28 de Sent. excom. v .39. The judgment of Innocent III. is also applicable; according to which any one may be bound in the eye of the Church and not in the eye of God, and conversely: Innoc. III. 1. ii. ep. 61, ad abbat. S. Andreae, pp. 599, 600. Abreptio and subreptio are here possible. Cf. Leo X. 1517, c. iii. Inhaerendo, v. 9, in Sept. The Pope may err in all Acts and Decrees not relating to revealed truth (Bouix, 1.c. p. 238, prop. 3). Calixtus III. wrote to Frederick III. in reference to appointments to benefices: Possumus enim et nos ut homines aliquando labi et errare, in his maxime, quae facti sunt' (Aen. Sylv. ep. 385). This is the meaning of the utterance of Paul IV. brought forward by the Gallicans in 1557 (Du Plessis, t. iii. P. i. p. 385).

Vide Schätzler, p. 202.

§ 3.

6

Infallibility is in no sense 'omnipotence,' in no sense a creative dogmatic power' enabling the Pope to create new dogmas at will. The definition of the Council excludes the possibility of this; it says, 'For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter, that by His revelation they might make known new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith delivered through the Apostles.' But some have feared that the Popes may abuse the gift; this also the decision of the Council renders impossible. The very essence of the assistance of the Holy Ghost is the preservation of the Popes from the

abuse of their supreme office of teacher, otherwise the Church would be plunged into error. The whole question is, whether or no Christ has promised such an assistance. If the Pope, in the discharge of his office of supreme teacher, has the assistance of the Holy Spirit, it is impossible the case should ever arise of a Pope misusing his power to the injury of the Church. This assistance is not a direct communication from the Holy Spirit, in other words, an inspiration; but by it the Pope is preserved from error in declaring and defining the truths of revelation. No appeal to the remissness of certain Popes in matters of faith is relevant to the present question, which is solely concerned with positive decisions. Christ promised to St. Peter and his successors that their faith should never fail. He did not promise that they should always fulfil in the best manner their mission of confirming the faith of their brethren. Pope Honorius may be reproached with having encouraged error indirectly by not proceeding against it with timely vigour, but it cannot be said that he ever defined error, which would alone tell against the dogma. Dr. Friedrich again misrepresents the dogma when, referring to Pope Honorius, he exclaims: A Pope who is capable of partaking in the guilt of spreading heresy, who can very possibly leave the Church in heresy and help to make her so, is, forsooth, to be infallible! A Pope is not infallible in proceedings such as those of Honorius, who contributed unintentionally to the increase of heresy by not issuing decisions against it. His letters contain no decision, neither do they contain any false doctrine. No decision of his ever was or could be condemned as false, otherwise the Sixth Council would have contradicted itself, for it recognised that the Holy See had in all time the privilege of teaching only the truth. He was condemned for having rendered himself morally responsible for the spread of heresy by having neglected to publish decisions against it; and in this sense alone was his condemnation confirmed by Leo II. As regards the case of signatures extorted from the Popes for instance from Liberius and Paschal II.—the want of freedom would render it impossible that these could be excathedra decisions. The definitions of the doctrine of the in

In

fallibility does not exclude the possible case of the internal conviction of the Pope not being necessarily the truth. The infallibility of the decision of a Pope speaking ex cathedrâ proceeds not from his own personality; he is not ex sese (of himself) infallible, but is so only from the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The decisions are infallible in themselves, and not only when they have received the consent of the Church, which was the doctrine of the four so-called Gallican articles rejected by Innocent XI. in 1682 and by Alexander VIII. in 1690. 1682, thirty-five French prelates-of whom nearly all afterwards retracted, and excused their conduct on the plea that they had acted under fear of the king-assembled by order of Louis XIV., and laid down four articles as a foundation for the 'liberty' of the Gallican Church. In the fourth article this passage occurred: 'In matters of faith the Pope has supreme authority, and his decisions are binding upon all Churches, and each Church in particular, but his judgment is not infallible without the consent of the Church.' It shamefully misrepresents the dogma to refer the words ex sese to the person of the Pope instead of to the decision ex cathedrâ, thus misinterpreting the opposed proposition, and not by the consent of the Church.'

The condemnation of Honorius is only valid inasmuch as it was confirmed by the Holy See. The French writer, Du Plessis d'Argentré (Collect. Judic. i. Praef. p. 3), says: '(Leo II.) cum ea exceptione acta sextae Synodi confirmat, quod Honorius ex sua parte tantam permiserit immaculatam fidem maculari. Itaque Latini Honorium Papam nonnisi ut fautorem haeresis Monothelitarum condemnare voluerunt.' Cf. Schwane, Dogmengesch. der Patrist. Zeit, p. 524 seq.

§ 4.

It is incumbent upon the Pope as well as upon the Council before deciding a question to search into the sources of divine revelation, and thus to have recourse to human means for inquiring after the truth. But all human means would not suffice to give us divine faith in a doctrine defined, whether by Pope or Council. The assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ can alone give us absolute certainty of the infallibility of the doctrinal decisions of the Church. This promise Christ

made as much to the Head of the Church as to the head joined to the body of bishops.

The opponents of the dogma assert what is absolutely false, in saying that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility deprives the episcopal body of the gift of infallibility, and places a single man in the position occupied by the whole Church. The promises vouchsafed to the entire episcopate and to the Church retain their full efficacy; the authority of Christ, which is the supreme power of the Church, speaks in the Pope alone and in the episcopate united to him. The Pope decides not as an individual man, but as Head of the Church reflecting the mind of the Church, which can never be separated from its head. The episcopate has only received promises of infallibility when joined to its head; apart, or separated, it has received none. The infallibility promised and granted to the Head of the Church and to the Apostles with St. Peter (active infallibility) is no other than that secured for the collective body of the faithful (passive infallibility) through the teaching office of the Church.

§ 5.

How is an ex-cathedrâ decision to be recognised? what are the signs by which it is to be distinguished from other utterances? Long before the Vatican Council theologians had discussed the tokens of an ex-cathedrâ decision,1 and collections had been made as in Denzinger's Enchiridion of creeds and definitions, the Popes of the Middle Ages laid great stress upon the intrinsic differences of their acts. Infallibility is bounded by the salvation of men, which is its end, and by God's revelation, to which it must conform. Innocent III. clearly states that judgments about persons in individual cases must not be supposed to be infallible. Benedict XII. carefully distinguishes between what he taught by a dogmatic decision3 upon the beatific vision from what he had propounded on the same subject in his private writings. For the Pope speaks ex cathedrâ only when, without constraint or fear, in perfect liberty,5 for the protection of the unity of the Church, and for the removal of disputes in matters of faith or morals, he pronounces a deci

1

sion or condemnation upon a question regarding faith or morals, whether it be that he excommunicates as heretics and excludes from the Church's communion those who teach contrary doctrine, or whether he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals as one to be held by the whole Church. Pope Agatho (A.D. 678) held his dogmatic letter to be binding upon all believers. The intention of binding all the faithful in virtue of the office of supreme teacher must be expressly stated. A critic of Bishop Fessler shows no understanding of the matter when he says that the proposition, the Pope must express the intention of binding by virtue of his office of supreme teacher, is new, and possibly condemned by Rome, since old theologians-for example, Gregory of Valencia and Melchior Canus-have taught this 'new doctrine' on various occasions; and it stands to reason that the Pope is able and willing to express clearly when he publishes a decision in matters of faith as supreme teacher of the Church. The Popes have always made quite clear when they pronounced such decisions; for example, Boniface VIII., in the Bull 'Unam sanctam,' makes quite clear that due obedience towards the Popes is binding upon all (declarimus, dicimus, definimus et pronuntiamus').

1 Petrus Ballerini, de Vi ac Ratione Primatus, Veronae, 1766, c. xv. Vide a detailed criticism, by Merkle, on the opinion delivered by the majority of the Munich theological faculty upon the subject of a Papal excathedrâ decision, Dillingen, 1869.

2 Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorem et definitionum, Wirceb. edit. iii. 1856; edit. iv. 1865.

3 Const. Benedictus Deus IV. Kal. Feb. 1336. Raynald. a. 1335, n. 9. Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 456, p. 182, ed. iv.

4 Ap. Raynald. a. 1335, n. 24: Ista autem quae in hoc libello per nostrum ministerium posita sunt, sic accipi volumus (exceptis conclusionibus per Nos in constitutione, quae incipit Benedictus Deus, determinatis) quae non per modum determinationis ecclesiasticae nec ut papaliter dicta aestimantur, sed ut scholastice et magistraliter dicta habeantur, sic, quod licitum sit cuique in illis dicere, quod ei magis consonum fidei et veritate divinae Scripturae ac dictis Sanctorum videbitur esse dicendum.'

The necessity for liberty is included in the required intentio obligandi, which is not possible without liberty. Cf. on this point Ballerini, 1.c. pp. 288, 289.

Gregor. de Valentia, t. iii. disp. 1, q. 1, punct. 7, q. 6, p. 301: 'Quotiescunque Rom. Pontifex in fidei quaestionibus definiendis illa, qua est praeditus, auctoritate utitur ab omnibus fidelibus tamquam doctrina fidei