what slender. Thus, for example, prop. 12 of the Syllabus, The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations hinder the progress of science,' can be censured as false, presumptuous, scandalous, insulting to the Holy See and to the whole Church; but not as heretical, since it does not immediately or directly militate against revelation nor the truths defined by the Church, and the Pope has never defined it as heretical.

So also prop. 38, Many Roman Pontiffs have by their too arbitrary conduct contributed to the division of the Church into Eastern and Western,' is not heretical, but a false assertion,5 insulting to the Apostolic See. It is the same thing with Professor Nuytz's condemned assertion, that Boniface VIII. had first pronounced that the vow of celibacy taken at ordination made marriage null. That is historically false; for the question had been settled long before by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and before these by the several Councils of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and earlier still by the legislation of the East. 10 It is likewise incorrect that the doctrine by which the Pope is compared to a sovereign prince was first authorised in the Middle Ages. 11

1 Prop. 23: The Roman Pontiffs and Ecumenical Councils have exceeded the limits of their power, have usurped the rights of princes, and have even committed errors in defining matters of faith and morals.' 2 Fessler, Unfehlbarkeit, p. 35.

The book is described as 'continens doctrinas et propositiones respective scandalosas, falsas, temerarias, schismaticas, Romanis Pontificibus et Conciliis oecumenicis injuriosas [that exactly applies to the assertions we are considering], Ecclesiae potestatis, libertatis et jurisdictiones eversivas, erroneas, impias et haereticas.'

Cf. Prop. 29 Damn. 7 Dec. 1690, ab Alex. VIII. Denzinger, p. 345, n. 1186.

5 Cf. Bennettis, de Privileg. B. Petri. P. ii. t. iii. p. 720 seq. Prop. 72 of Syllabus: Boniface VIII. is the first who declared that the vow of celibacy pronounced at ordination annuls marriage.'

7 Sum. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 7, 11.

8 In Libr. sent. iv. d. 38. q. 2.

Hefele, Conc. v. pp. 175, 260, 262, 319, 340, 391.

10 Zsishman, Oriental. Eherecht, p. 475 seq.

11 Prop. 34 of the Syllabus: The doctrine of those who compare the Sovereign Pontiff to a free sovereignty acting in the Universal Church is a doctrine which prevailed in the Middle Ages only.'

PART II. THE PROPOSITIONS OF THE SYLLABUS.

§ 1. Prop. 1-18, 77-79. § 2. Independence of the Church as a perfect society. § 3. State interference. § 4. Indirect negative power in religious matters. § 5. The Placet. § 6. Appeal from a spiritual to a temporal judge. § 7. Power of the Church over temporal matters. § 8. Immunities. §.9. Instruction and education. § 10. Princes. Civil and ecclesiastical law. Ordination vows. § 11. Marriage. § 12. The family. Limits of State authority. § 13. Divergence of civil laws from ecclesiastical. § 14, 15. Non-intervention. § 16. Revolution. § 17. Sovereignty of the people. § 18. Practical materialism. § 19, 20. Liberalism. § 21. Errors of modern society. § 22. Folly of the conclusions wrongly drawn from the Syllabus.

$ 1.

We are primarily concerned with those propositions of the Syllabus which treat of the authority of Church and State and their relations to each other. No one will maintain that the propositions 1-7 against pantheism, naturalism, and absolute rationalism are dangerous to the State, unless he identifies the modern State with these systems, denies any divine influence on the world, and considers Christianity itself a danger to the vitality of the State. Again, either propositions 8-14, concerning moderate rationalism, will not be considered dangerous; or Frohschammer's science or philosophy must be considered indissoluble from modern States, and these must feel themselves appointed to enter the lists as its champion.

The propositions about religious indifference and latitudinarianism (15-18) will be spoken of in Essay XVII., as well as the kindred propositions about modern Liberalism (77-79); and propositions 21-23 will also be considered there and elsewhere. The fourth section refers to ecclesiastical condemnation of socialism, communism, secret societies, Bible societies, and of the clerico-liberal unions begun in Italy. The Popes have at all times pointed out the dangers which arise from secret societies; and many rulers refusing to give heed have too late experienced their disastrous effects. When it was asserted that the Papal constitutions against the Carbonari and Freemasons were powerless where these societies were tolerated by the civil go

vernment, the following facts were entirely overlooked, viz. that the excommunication attached to these constitutions is purely an internal action of the Church, and operates in the ecclesiastical sphere even where unsupported by civil disabili ties; that the Church steps in as the real guardian of morals, when such brotherhoods, shrouding their superiors, their aims and objects, in deepest mystery, impose unbounded obligations by fearful oaths. The Church is obliged to oppose the Protestant Bible societies, on account of the propagation of defective and falsified translations and tracts contrary to the faith. Unions of the liberal clergy, as they were formed in Italy, fostered disobedience against the Pope and the bishops, propagated principles opposed to those taught by the Church, and proved themselves thoroughly schismatical, so that even the Italian Government, which they desired to serve, withdrew its support.

1 Encyclica Quanta cura, § At vero alii of the Prop. 'constitutiones apostolicas, quibus damnantur clandestinae societates, sive in eis exigatur sive non exigatur juramentum de secreto servando, earumque asseclae et fautores anathemate muletantur, nullam habere vim in illis orbis regionibus, ubi ejusmodi aggregationes tolerantur a civili gubernio.'

$2.

Offence was likewise taken at the idea that the Church claims recognition as a divinely authorised, true, perfect, and independent society; that she will not allow that temporal authority can determine what her rights are, and within what limits she may exercise them (prop. 19).2

Supposing this proposition to be correct, the universality of the Church would be abolished, since different States could give her different rights and set arbitrary limits to her power. Either the Church has received a special and perpetual authority from Christ, in which case she cannot admit that the State has power at will to extend and retrench her authority, or she has not received such divine authority, and then all claim to it is untenable, the whole Church must be rejected, and no one can call himself a Catholic. And is this claim anything new on

the part of the Church? Do not all the works on canon law treat of the essential rights of the Church? Have not the Apostles and bishops exercised such rights before they met with recognition from the State ?3 Have not the Fathers of the Church already rejected with vehemence the interference of the civil power in the domain of ecclesiastical rights? Has the Church ever admitted prop. 20: Ecclesiastical power must not be exercised without the permission and consent of the civil government'? Did the Apostles recognise this proposition? If they had, would not the conversion of the Roman Empire have been impossible? Would not the Church have become a mere servant of every government? That there may be particular circumstances in which it is advisable or necessary to have the consent of the civil government for this or that act of ecclesiastical authority is quite a different thing from the general principle that this consent and permission is absolutely necessary in all cases.

The bishops of the Church have not received any of their privileges from the civil authority, nor can this authority depose or appoint bishops. The Church with her divinely appointed hierarchy does not receive her right of existence from the State; she was established by God by the side of the State and in spite of the State, at a time when the State was hostile to her. As the Church has the right of existence from herself and not from the State, she must in herself have the right of possessing and acquiring property.8 The Church can as little part with her divine right as she can change the institution of the primacy ordained by Christ, and transfer it from the successors of St. Peter to any other bishop, or as that there can be Catholic national Churches independent of the Roman Pontiffs.

1 Vid. supra, pp. 24, 25.

2

Syll. Prop. 19: The Church is not a true and perfect and independent society; she does not enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her Divine Founder, but it appertains to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits within which the Church may exercise authority.'

* Phillips, Kirchenrecht, ii. § 111, pp. 550 seq. 554.

• Hosius Cordub. Ep. ad Const. ap. Athan. Hist. Arian. § 41 (Opp. i.

p. 745, Migne). Athanas. 1.c. § 52 (ib. p. 756). Basil. ap. Theod. H. E. iv. 17, 19. Ambros. Ep. 51, n. 5 seq. de Obitu Theod. n. 34. Soz. vii. 25. Many proofs of this may be found in Mamachi, Antiqu. t. iv. p. 68 seq.

5 S. Hilar. adv. Auxent.: Quibus nam suffragiis ad praedicandum Evangelium Apostoli missi sunt? Quibus adjuti potestatibus Christum praedicabant? . . . Anne aliquam sibi assumebant e palatio auctoritatem? Edictisque regis Paulus Christo Ecclesiam congregavit? Nerone se, credo, aut Vespasiano aut Decio patrocinantibus tuebatur?'

Syll. Prop. 25: 'In addition to the authority inherent in the episcopate, further temporal power is granted to it by the civil authority either expressly or tacitly, which power is on that account also revocable by the civil authority whenever it pleases.'

Syll. Prop. 50: The lay authority possesses as inherent in itself the right of presenting bishops, and may require of them that they take possession of their dioceses before having received canonical institution and the apostolical letters of the Holy See.' Prop. 51: And, further, the lay government has the right of deposing bishops from their pastoral functions, and is not bound to obey the Roman Pontiff in those things which relate to bishops' sees and the institution of bishops.'

Syll. Prop. 26: The Church has not the natural and legitimate right of acquisition and possession.'

9

Syll. Prop. 35: There would be no obstacle to the sentence of a General Council or the act of all the universal peoples transferring the Pontifical Sovereignty from the Bishop and city of Rome to some other bishopric and some other city.'

10 Syll. Prop. 37: National Churches can be established after being withdrawn and separated from the authority of the Roman Pontiff.' Prop. 36: The definition of a National Council does not admit of any subsequent discussion, and the civil power can settle an affair as decided by such National Council.'

$3.

Other propositions appear even more important, in particular prop. 44: The civil authority can interfere in matters relating to religion, morality, and spiritual government. Therefore it has control over the instructions for the guidance of consciences, published conformably with their mission by the pastors of the Church; indeed it can decree in the matter of administering the holy Sacraments and the dispositions necessary for their reception.' This is purely a religious question, in which surely civil authority has no right to interfere. In such cases reference was made to the example of King Ozias,1 who was

nished for exercising priestly functions (2 Par. xxvi. 1-21).