X.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF INVASION.

(LETTER TO THE "TIMES," JUNE 6, 1888.)

SIR, I had some difficulty in believing the First Lord of the Admiralty to be in earnest last night when he so lightly disposed of the possibility of invasion by stating the amount of steam tonnage which the operation would require. For what he said was equivalent to the assertion that an invading army could only cross the Channel in steamships of the largest size, and that the whole of it must pass at one trip. What folly was it, then, that possessed our grandfathers when, on seeing a great army assembled at Boulogne for the invasion of England, they made such efforts by sea and land to meet an enterprise which the First Lord and Sir J. Colomb perceive to be impossible to-day, and which was presumably ten times more impossible in the days before steam?

Napoleon, writing to the admiral whom he

had appointed to direct the operation, told him that the force he had assembled for the intended descent was 120,000 men, with 300 guns and 10,000 horses. The flotilla prepared to convey them consisted of flat-bottomed vessels of three classes: gun-brigs, heavily armed with artillery, and capable of conveying each a company of infantry of 100 men; gunboats, armed with fewer guns, carrying each a fieldpiece with its waggon and two horses; and pinnaces, each rowed by sixty to seventy soldiers. Of these about 1300 were assembled. Transport for the rest of the artillery horses, the cavalry, and the supplies was found in the fishing-vessels of the coast of from twenty to sixty tons, of which he had about a thousand. The troops were practised in embarking in this flotilla, with this result. Experiment," says Alison, "proved that 100,000 men, with 300 pieces of cannon and their whole caissons and equipage, could find their places in less than half-an-hour." In the same letter Napoleon remarked, "Let us be masters of the Strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world." The ideas of Napoleon, and of the people of England at that time, also of the Danes, the Saxons, of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror, were evidently widely at variance with

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those of the First Lord on the subject of transporting armies across the Channel. But we need not go so far back for examples; many now living, of whom I am one, took part in the landing of an invading army of 55,000 men with 124 guns on the shores of the Crimea ; the same army which a few days afterwards defeated the Russians on the Alma. The British troops were embarked in large sailing transports, each two of which were towed by a steamer. In this manner was accomplished a passage of the sea not to be measured, like that of the Channel, in minutes, but occupying from the 7th to the 14th of September. On the ground assumed by the First Lord, it would have been easy in 1854 to show that the landing of the Allied Army in the Crimea was an impossible undertaking. But I do not remember that any of those who effected it claimed to have performed a very remarkable achievement.

There is now a new circumstance greatly in favour of an invader; namely, the power of the fleet to ensure an unopposed landing. When Abercromby's troops approached the shore in Aboukir Bay, they entered a tremendous zone of fire from the French field-guns, which sank many of their boats. But now that every warship is an impregnable fort and carries guns of

irresistible power, an area of coast is kept absolutely clear for the landing. And as the first troops landed can either remain within that area or begin the advance, the same transports which conveyed them would be free to return and bring over the rest. Thus, while steamers would not be indispensable except to tow the transports, the flotilla need not necessarily be so large as to be able to convey the whole army at one trip.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, EDWARD HAMLEY.

June 5.

XI.

ARMY ESTIMATES.

(HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 12, 1889.)

IN In reply to the Secretary for War on the army estimates, General Sir E. B. HAMLEY said :-The right hon. gentleman has given us a clear outline of parts of what may become a very comprehensive scheme. I say "may become," for we must remember that the object of all the measures which he has described can only be to bring the forces of the kingdom, with the fullest effect which preparation can give, against an invader; and that these and all other such measures must be judged by the degree in which they promise to accomplish that result. But the only result which the right hon. gentleman has pointed to is the occupation of certain positions round London where, in a few days, the defenders of London could be concentrated and entrenched.

Now, there are two ways of looking at the