which no one expected to be of long duration. Many of these new troops passed from that Washington review, and were swallowed up. by the grand army without having been inspected by the commanding General, who afterward considered this fact one cause of his defeat. But the nation was eager for action; a portion of the press fiercely urgent for a forward movement; the two houses of Congress impatient of delay; so, all unprepared, General Scott ordered the advance, against his own judgment, to appease the general clamor.

ADVANCE OF THE GRAND ARMY.

From the time of the President's proclamation calling for troops until the 12th of July, immediately preceding the advance of the Grand Army under General McDowell, to attack the rebel forces at Bull Run, the time had been industriously employed in preparation. Fortifications had been erected on the north side of the Potomac, at eight or ten points within a radius of three miles from Washington and Georgetown. No military force of the rebels was then known to exist on the Maryland shore; but from Mount Vernon to the mouth of the Chesapeake on the south, and from the Chain Bridge to the junction of the Shenandoah at Harpers Ferry on the north, they held undisputed possession.

General Patterson had crossed the Potomac early in July, with a force of thirty thousand men, and was encamped at Martinsburgh, on the 12th, having instructions from the Commander-in-chief to hold the rebel army under General Johnston in check, should he attempt to move forward to Manassas for the purpose of reinforcing Beauregard's command at that point. Johnston was at Winchester, on the direct route to Manassas Gap, twenty-five miles from Martinsburgh, and it was a matter of vital importance that he should be prevented from making a further advance.

The entire marching force of General McDowell was but about fiftyfive thousand, while twenty thousand were left as a reserve at Washington and vicinity, under the command of General Mansfield.

And thus the combatants stood, when a day of fearful, bloody ending dawned upon them-a day almost without a parallel in the world's history for deeds of daring and stubborn endurance, unflinching bravery, and wild panic.

Manassas was selected by the Confederates on account of its controlling position. Nature had done very much towards rendering it a second Gibraltar, and art had completed the work. The country around was wild and broken, with but few roads fit for the movements of an

army, and those easily guarded. Centreville was twenty-two miles distant from Washington, and Manassas Junction six or seven more. About midway between the two flowed the little rivulet of Bull Run, in a general direction from north-west to south-east. A road led from Centreville to the Junction, crossing the Run three miles from that place, at "Blackburn's Ford," while a turnpike running towards Warrenton, also crossed Bull Run at Stone Bridge, four miles distant. Somewhat east of south, a country road from Centreville crossed Bull Run, and the railroad at "Union Mills."

The Confederate force was distributed along the Run from Union Mills to the Stone Bridge, with reserves and a strongly fortified position near the junction.

The army of General McDowell, when it marched to attack that position, numbered about 30,000 men, consisting, with the exception of 700 or 800 regular troops, of raw volunteers, none of whom had been under military discipline more than two or three months. Added to this must be remembered the fact that, within three days, ten thousand of the number would have a right to claim their dismissal, as their term of enlistment (three months) would then expire. An army, consequently, less prepared to march to the attack of a strongly fortified position it would have been difficult to assemble; and this was rendered more fatal in its effects from the fact that the officers, with the exception of a few who had fought in the Mexican war, were unused to actual fighting, and almost totally unacquainted with their different commands.

Under these unpromising auspices, the army marched from the banks of the Potomac on the afternoon of July 16th. It advanced in four columns, toiling along under the burning sun and over the hot ground. One by the turnpike, one on the right, and one on the left of the railroad, and another between the turnpike and railroad. Expecting to encounter the enemy at Fairfax Court-House, seven miles this side of Centreville, where they had thrown up intrenchments, the three columns were directed to coöperate at that point. But the place was entered about noon on the 17th, only to find the intrenchments abandoned and signs of a hasty retreat visible.

On the morning of the 18th, the different columns commenced their march from Fairfax to Centreville. While General McDowell made a personal reconnoissance to the left, making the forward movement a mere demonstration, Major J. G. Barnard, chief-engineer of the staff, proceeded to examine the enemy's position in front. In this, however, he had been anticipated by General Tyler, who had pushed a brigade on towards Blackburn's Ford. Troops were in motion on the plateau of Manassas, moving up to reinforce the enemy's lines, and though no attack had been intended by the commanding general at that particular

point, they opened upon them with two twenty-pounder guns in hope of ascertaining the position of these batteries. A reply was soon obtained a battery, invisible except by the smoke, poured forth rapid discharges, and it required the assistance of a battery of rifled sixpounders to enable the Union troops to silence it. The brigade was then filed down to the stream and skirmishing maintained for some time. This battle, though apparently of small importance, was disastrous, inasmuch as it disorganized the arrangements of the commanderin-chief, and was accompanied by great loss of life, when compared with the magnitude of the undertaking and any beneficial result that could have sprung from it. The possibility of charging into Manassas, even under the most fortunate circumstances, was so remote, that the wisdom of an action at that point and at that time has been gravely questioned by the best military authorities. That night the columns of the army united, and encamped about a mile in the rear of Fairfax Court House, upon a broad hill side, and on the extended plain at its base. A stream of water which crossed the grounds rendered the spot peculiarly important to the soldiers.

The next day was spent in reconnoitering, and in determining how and where an attack should be made. The Stone Bridge was guarded by batteries, and the ground beyond obstructed by formidable abattis. The roads leading to fords between Blackburn's and the Stone Bridge were mere by-paths, and the opposite bank of the stream steep, tangled, and obstructed. Two miles above, however, there was a good ford, but slightly guarded, at Sudley's Spring.

On these data the plan of attack was based, as follows: One division, under Colonel Miles, to make, with one of its brigades, a false attack on Blackburn's Ford; another division (Tyler's) to move up the turnpike to the Stone Bridge and threaten that point, and at the proper time carry it, and unite with the principal column, which consisted of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions; then by a flank movement reach the Sudley Ford, and descending the right bank of the stream, take the defences in the rear of Stone Bridge, and give battle with the united force, strike at the enemy's railroad communication, or otherwise, as circumstances should dictate.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

Bull Run, that once unknown name, is marked with great crimson letters upon the scroll of time! Tears wrung from the anguished soul, tears hot and blinding, still fall at the mere mention of its ill-omened name. A nation's miserere has been tolled from uncounted steeples over