tenancy in common or joint tenancy of one-half, one-fourth, or other particular fraction of the whole; or for a particular interest as a life estate, or tenancy for years, or remainder in the whole; and that a general contribution of a sum of money toward the entire purchase is not sufficient."

The theory of resulting trusts when, for example, a conveyance of land is made to one person for a money consideration furnished by another, is that the latter's money has become transformed into land without change in the beneficial ownership. Equity regards the land as his property in its changed form, since that was the intention of the parties. Accordingly, when a person other than the grantee furnishes only a part of the consideration, a trust cannot attach by implication on this theory, unless it is shown that the part paid by him went into or was paid for a definite part of the land with the intention that the beneficial ownership in that part should be in him. Barger v. Barger, 30 Or. 268. Although equity will sometimes construct a trust when there is no such intention, and such constructive trust does not differ in substance from a resulting trust, it seems better for the sake of clearness to reserve the term "resulting trusts" for those which arise from presumed, or implied, intention, which in no case can be contrary to the actual intention as proved by proper evidence.

The beneficial interest resulting to one who furnishes only part of the

consideration cannot bear a larger proportion to the whole property than the share of the purchasemoney paid by him bears to the whole consideration. Thus a trust as to three-fourths of the property cannot be established by showing by parol that the parties intended one-fourth of the purchase price to pay for three-fourths of the title. Under such circumstances the resulting trust cannot exceed onefourth. Collins v. Corson, 30 A. 862 (N. J. Ch. 1894); McGee v. Wells, 52 S. C. 472, 479; O'Donnell v. White, 18 R. I. 659. But there seems no reason why the intention of the parties might not be used to cut down the beneficial interest below the cestui's pro tanto share.

The expression "aliquot part " is interpreted to mean merely a definite part, not an exact factor of the whole. Skehill v. Abbott, 184 Mass. 145; Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367.

The understanding of the parties that a trust shall result pro tanto when one furnishes part of the consideration need not be expressed, but may frequently be gathered from the mere circumstance that one has furnished a definite part of the whole. Skehill v. Abbott, 184 Mass. 145. This seems to be the usual presumption when there is nothing in the relationship of the parties or in the other circumstances which can adequately account for such use of another's property. Sanders v. Steele, 124 Ala. 415; Camden v. Bennett, 64 Ark. 155; Costa v. Silva, 127 Cal. 351; Stevenson v. Smith,

189 Mo. 447; Baylor v. Hopf, 81 Tex. 637; Obermiller v. Wylie, 36 Fed. 641. See also Heiskell v. Trout, 31 W. Va. 810.

There have been several cases where the court would not imply a trust pro tanto when it was clearly shown that a husband had used part of his wife's money in the purchase with her consent, but without any expressed understanding that she should bave an interest in the property. Rotter v. Scott, 111 Iowa, 31; Jackson v. Kraft, 186 Ill. 623; Schierloh v. Schierloh, 148 N. Y. 103; McCormick v. Cooke, 199 Pa. St. 631. See also Dudley v. Dudley, 176 Mass. 34. But in Missouri, where a husband cannot become owner of his wife's separate property or use it for his own benefit without her written consent, a trust pro tanto has been implied under similar circumstances. McLeod v. Venable, 163 Mo. 536;

Crawford v. Jones, 163 Mo. 577; Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 61; Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 647. See also Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619.

When the purchase price is paid with funds owned by two or more as tenants in common or as joint tenants or as copartners, and the title is taken by one of them a trust results for the others so that the equitable interests in the property will be the same as were the legal interests before the conversion. Speer v. Burns, 173 Pa. St. 77; Fay v. Fay, 50 N. J. Eq. 260.

When the money of another is used without right in the purchase of property, a constructive trust may be decreed as to all or part of the property according as justice requires. Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling Co., 1 S. D. 388, 393. See infra under constructive

trusts.

trust for the son as to the balance unless he had induced the father to give the mortgage to enable him to make the purchase in the father's name, and had promised to pay it, so that the mortgage note was in substance the son's debt as between the two.

But in Gray v. Jordan, 87 Me. 140, where a husband purchased in the name of his wife paying no money down, but giving mortgage notes of the wife indorsed by him with the understanding between him and his wife that he should pay the mortgage notes, which he subsequently did, a trust was held to result for the husband. In Gilchrist v. Brown, 165 Pa. St. 275, the court in a dictum expressed the opinion that a trust would result for the wife from her payment of instalments of the purchase price after the conveyance to her husband, “provided such payments are made in pursuance of the contract under which the title was acquired and upon the agreement that she is to recover the title to so much as she pays for in exchange for her money." See also Levy v. Mitchell, 114 S. W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).

The effect of these decisions is that although the actual payments may be subsequent to the passing of the title, the effect of the understanding existing at the time title was taken is that the person paying has entered into an obligation to pay, which in substance makes the title holder only a surety as to the subsequent payments.

Merely showing a subsequent payment of purchase money by the person for whose benefit the purchase was intended will not be enough. There must be at least a real understanding or a liability to pay which dates back to the time when the legal title passed. Ostheimer v. Single, 73 N. J. Eq. 539.

The assumption of an incumbrance debt by the grantee as part of the consideration of the transfer will not prevent the whole beneficial interest from passing to another on a resulting trust if it was understood that the latter should pay the encumbrance and he subsequently does so. Skahen v. Irving, 206 Ill. 597. See also Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N. H. 241.

In case of an executory contract of sale, title to pass at the time of the last payment, a trust may result from any one of the payments made prior to the passing of the title. Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267. The same is true of payments made for a bond for title. Scranton v. Campbell, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 388; Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C. 237.

Use of funds of another than the owner to improve the property will not raise a resulting trust; Clark v. Timmons, 39 S. W. 534 (Tenn. 1897); although equity may under some circumstances declare an equitable lien upon the property for the amount expended, as where a fiduciary uses funds of another to improve the property or to pay an incumbrance. Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Webb. v. Bailey, 41