and Denmark.' Now, the difficulties which have arisen between Germany and Denmark have nothing to do with this treaty. They have nothing to do with the succession, but with a cause totally and entirely different; and it was not until the death of the late King of Denmark, that the question of the succession was introduced, to complicate the original grounds of the discussion. It is very important to draw a distinction between these two questions, which are entirely different. The question so long at issue was the fulfilment or non-fulfilment by Denmark, of engagements entered into in 1851, to which the Treaty of 1852 made no reference. I do not deny, that, so far as Austria and Prussia are concerned, those engagements were inducements to lead them to concur in the treaty; but, at the same time, the treaty is not conditional on those arrangements. Her Majesty's Speech is, therefore, made to state on this point that which is not the fact. Now, this is a matter of very considerable importance, because the case is considerably complicated by the different positions which, since the death of the late King of Denmark, have been taken up by the greater Powers and the smaller Powers in Germany. At the present moment there are two interventions, if I may call them so, in Denmark, and these two interventions are being carried on by different parties, and for evidently different objects. The engagements had reference to rights claimed on behalf of the duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, and the question remains, how far has Denmark contravened her engagements as to the rights, liberties, and privileges she was to give to those duchies, and under no circumstances to incorporate Schleswig with the Danish monarchy, or to take any step tending to that result? These were the whole of the questions which, up to the present year, were in dispute between the powers of Germany and Denmark. Since the death of the late King of Denmark a Federal occupation of Holstein has taken place, and that occupation is admitted to be legal for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851 in reference to the rights of the duchies; but under the cover of that occupation or execution, claims, with respect to which I will say nothing, to the throne of the duchies have been put forward-claims, which had been actually rejected and repudiated, and never until this moment brought forward since the Treaty of 1852. The parties now proceeding against Denmark do not rest their claim on any opposition to the treaty. On the contrary, they proclaim that they are proceeding in the spirit of the treaty. They have been outvoted by the Diet, and they proceeded to take the matter into their own hands. Professing an open and undisguised respect for the treaty, they are acting entirely without the consent of the Diet. We have the King of Prussia taking up arms in strenuous defence of constitutional rights, and we have the Emperor of Austria joining in a crusade for the protection of oppressed nationalities. And these two Powers, recognizing a treaty which

the minor Powers wish to set aside, are undertaking, as the mandataries of these minor Powers, to attack and carry on war against Denmark for considerations and objects totally different from those contemplated by the Diet. This is the state of the question at the present moment; but I cannot avoid thinking that with a little good judgment, a little good management, and a little good temper, it ought to have been settled without a frightful appeal to arms. Surely it could have been no difficult fact to ascertain-if the parties were willing to listen to reason-as the case was one in which the intervention of a friendly power might be appliedwhether a certain engagement entered into by Denmark had or had not been fulfilled, or whether one of the parties was not demanding more than it was entitled to. I do not question the right of Prussia to ask for a fulfilment of those engagements to the utmost; I do not question the duty of Denmark to fulfil them as far as actually possible-to fulfil them as far as that is not rendered impossible by one of the parties opposed to Denmark; but I say that if when this question arose, this country had occupied the position she ought, she would have been in the position to play the part of mediator, and that the circumstances might have been adjusted by a little good management on the part of the Foreignoffice of England. But how could you have expected that Germany would yield to your interference in this case? In this quarrel there is a people who believe they are struggling for their liberty and independence. That fact will gain them great sympathy in Europe, more especially because they are carrying on the struggle with a force disproportionate to the necessities of the case; but how could you have expected that your interference would be effectual when you had alienated France, offended Russia, and more or less quarrelled with every Power in Europe?-when you had not a Power you call your friend, and, moreover, when the danger which threatened you in this complication was a fierce and destructive war between England and the united Powers of Germany? What could be more threatening to the peace of Europe than England being committed to a sanguinary quarrel with the whole of Germany in a case in which, whether rightly or wrongly, the feelings of the people of Germany are enlisted on one side? For my part, I certainly should shrink from such a war as one of the greatest disasters that could happen to this country."

Lord Derby went on to express his earnest hope that Lord Russell would be able to give them an assurance that the country was not committed by any act of the Government either to a conflict with Germany, or to the abandonment of an ally who had trusted to the protection of England. He pointed out the many dangers that Germany incurred by war. Any contest between that country and England would give France the opportunity of acting on any ambitious designs in regard to Germany if she entertained such. Proceeding then to the subject of the civil war raging in America, Lord Derby again im

puted to Earl Russell that he had only succeeded by his interference in alienating both of the contending parties. He had offended the Confederates, and from the Federals he had been met by a demand that out-blustered Lord Russell himself. The Federal Government held this country responsible for all the damage the commerce of the North had suffered from the "Alabama." He hoped the despatch had been answered in a manner that would put an end to all such demands. In conclusion, he recapitulated the existing differences between Her Majesty's Government and most of the European Powers, and denounced the policy that had produced such embarrassments as a source of national danger.

Earl Russell answered Lord Derby's speech, following that noble lord through all the topics to which he had adverted. He avowed his own conviction that in almost all cases, the exceptions being very rare, intervention in the affairs of foreign countries was not only unjustifiable in itself, but almost always failed in its effect, aggravating the evils it was intended to remedy. With respect to the charge of not acting in concert with France in our foreign policy, he admitted that he could not, as a British Minister, adopt that principle of implicit adhesion to the policy of the French Empire which Mr. Disraeli had declared to be the proper rule of action for this country. He was sure that the Emperor himself must see, as a just and intelligent man, that there were many courses which might be advisable for France to take, in which it would not be wise or practicable for England to follow her. In regard to the Mexican expedition, it had been stated over and over again that it was not our intention to take any part in altering the Government of that community. When we found that such was not the policy of France, but that she declared she could not treat with the present Government of Mexico, we were obliged, in accordance with our originally-declared intention, to separate ourselves from the French Government. The Spanish Minister held the same language. Then it was said that we had declined to join with our ally in offering our good offices to the contending parties in the United States. It was obvious, however, that if such a proposal had been made by the two Governments and rejected, the recognition of the South would soon have followed. Our Government felt, that any such interference, instead of doing good, would only give offence; and that there was a much better chance of reconciliation between the North and the South, if these two parties were left to settle their differences by themselves. Next as to Poland. It was not correct, as Lord Derby had stated, that our Government had acted entirely by itself, and had differed from Austria on the subject. On the contrary, there had been frequent communication with the Austrian Government. We had ascertained that, taking into account the state of the finances of Austria, and the 4,000,000 of her Polish subjects, that Power would have been most unwilling to push their differences with Russia to the point of war. In

regard to the interests of England, if she had embarked in a war with Russia, she would have had not only to recognize Poland, and to fight for Poland, but to make a Poland. She must have established not only the ancient kingdom, but also what are called the western provinces of Russia, which were formerly a part of Poland. To embark in so vast an undertaking, involving the dismemberment of the empire of Russia, was a responsibility too great for our Government to assume, and a vast majority of the people of this country would have been opposed to such a war. At the same time he denied that we had aggravated the evils of Poland by holding out false hopes of support. He had himself explicitly declared in that house that he did not intend to go to war for Poland. He believed that the inclination of the French people also was decidedly adverse to such a war. With respect to the charge of our having rejected the proposition of the French Emperor for a Congress, it was not the fact that our answer had been curt or rude in its terms; but it was true that, giving credit to the Emperor for his good intentions, we had declined his proposal because we could not perceive any solution of the questions which would have been brought before such a Congress except that of war. Russia would have refused to be bound by any decision of the Congress with regard to Poland, and Austria would have done the same with respect to Venetia. What, then, would have been the result? Either war must have been undertaken to enforce the decrees of the Congress, or those decrees would have been null and void. Entering then upon the controversy between Denmark and Germany, Earl Russell gave a brief account of the circumstances out of which the present difficulties had arisen-the conferences between the Great Powers of Europe which had led to the making of the Treaty of London in 1852, and the adhesion to that treaty of several Powers, some of which had since attempted to evade its obligations. He described also the engagements entered into by the King of Denmark at that time with reference to the duchies, and the disputes which had arisen as to those engagements; the order made by the Diet of Frankfort on the 1st of October for Federal execution, the excess of power which the Diet had so assumed and the remonstrances which in consequence thereof Her Majesty's Government had addressed to the Diet. Then followed the death of the King of Denmark, which had given occasion to increased agitation, the question of the right of succession to the Throne, for which the Treaty of 1852 had fully provided, being now raised as an additional subject of controversy. Austria and Prussia had taken a course with reference to this matter which was neither intelligible nor consistent. They had proceeded to occupy Schleswig as "a material guarantee" to enforce the fulfilment of the engagements of 1851, thereby acknowledging King Christian to be Duke of Schleswig, whose title the other Powers, members of the Diet, denied in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg. Austria and Prussia had then given notice to Denmark

that, under the penalty of war, she should revoke the Constitution of November within forty-eight hours. England had advised that the Constitution should be so revoked, and Russia had made the same recommendation; but the King of Denmark, as a constitutional King, required time to convoke the Rigsraad in order to obtain the sanction of that assembly to the step. Austria and Prussia had unreasonably refused to allow the time necessary for this purpose. In order to give security for the compliance of Denmark, it had been proposed that there should be a protocol, recording, in the names of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, the intention of the Danish Government to make the required concession. This proposition also the German Powers had rejected. They had excused themselves for their non-compliance on the plea that, if after having been prepared to enter Schleswig they had stopped in their course, there would have been such a commotion in Germany as would have exposed them to the risk of a revolution. It was hard, indeed, for Denmark to be made the scapegoat for German dissatisfaction. Earl Russell read to the house a letter which our ambassador at Berlin had addressed to the Prussian Minister, Herr von Bismarck, requesting to know whether his Government still admitted the validity of the treaty obligations of 1852, and he read also the vague and equivocating answer which had been returned by the Minister to the inquiry. It remained, he said, for future events to give a clue to the construction of that answer. He trusted that the Queen's Government would be permitted to exercise their own judgment upon such events as they arose. For his own part, he had refrained from holding out any hopes of material assistance to Denmark. Our Government had offered her the best advice in their power, but nothing more. Danish Minister had repeatedly said to him, "We expect no material assistance from England, but we do expect sympathy." The noble lord concluded with some general remarks upon the state of European politics, pointing out some of the dangers which threatened the pacific condition of particular States: but expressing his belief that there existed at present in France, Russia, and in this country the strongest desire to maintain peace. If three such Powers were resolved on that course, he did not believe that any serious war was likely to occur in Europe. He fully accepted the statement of Lord Derby that it was for the Government to stand upon a policy of their own, not to ask Parliament to suggest one. Such was the duty which Her Majesty's Ministers felt to be incumbent upon them, and they would use their best exertions to fulfil it.

The

The only other speakers on this occasion were Earls Grey and Granville. The former expressed himself disapprovingly of the conduct of the Government on the Danish question. He could not help fearing, he said, that they had done too much or too little. "The tendency of what they have already done-namely, the mission of Lord Wodehouse, and the pressing advice given to Denmark, as to