matrimony, and legitimacy, which touched the inherit ance of the subjects. 2 Vent. 187. 75. The office of archdeacon's register is within Woodward v. the statute; and though the persons to whom the sale Fox, 3 Lev.289. and grant was made die, yet the archdeacon selling Willes R. 571. such office is disabled by this statute from making any other grant thereof; and the King shall have the nomination. 76. The office of cofferer of the King's household is within this statute; so that if a person purchases that office, he becomes thereby disabled from enjoying it. 77. Sir R. Vernon being cofferer of the King's house, sold the same, for a certain sum of money, to Sir A. Ingram'; and agreed to surrender it to the King, to the intent that a grant might be made of it to Sir A. Ingram. The surrender was accordingly made, and Sir A. I. was admitted. It was resolved by Lord Chancellor Egerton, the Chief Justice, and others, to whom the King referred the same, that this sale was void by the statute; that Sir Arthur was disabled to hold the office; and that the King could not, by a non obstante, dispense with this act, so as to enable Sir Arthur to enjoy the office at any time; even by a new grant upon a subsequent vacancy. Ingram's case, 1 Inst. 234 a. Cro. Jac. 386. Willes 241. 78. It was resolved, in a modern case, that a con- Huggins v. Bambridge, tract with the warden of the Fleet prison, who held only for life, under the Crown, that for a sum of money he should surrender the office to the King, to the intent that he should procure from the King a grant of the office to the purchaser, was void by the statuté 5 & 6 Edw. 6., though that office had been and might be granted to a subject in fee; and that a bond given to secure the payment of such consideration money could not be enforced in a court of law. Willes 571. 79. In another case it was held, that a bond given Layng v. Paine, by any of the officers mentioned in the statute 5 & 6 Edw. 6., for securing all the profits of an office to the Law v. Law, Culliford v. 1 Bro. Parl. Parsons v. Thompson, 1 H. Black. 322. What offices are not within this statute. Willes R. 241. person appointing, was void by that statute. So was a bond given by such an officer, to surrender the office, whenever the person appointing chose. 80. An agreement by a deputy, to pay his principal half the profits of the office, is not within the statute, because it is not to pay him a sum in gross, but only a part of the profits; which must be sued for in the principal's name, for they all belong to him ; though a share is to be allowed out of them to the deputy for his trouble. But where an auditor of Wales appointed a deputy; and it was agreed between them that the deputy should receive all the fees, &c. and pay the principal a certain sum of 2001. per annum, this was held void. 81. By the fourth section of this statute it is provided, that it shall not extend to any offices whereof any person shall be seised of an estate of inheritance, nor to any office of parkership, or of the keeping of any park, house, manor, garden, chase, or forest. And by the seventh section it is provided, that this act shall not be prejudicial to the Chief Justices of the King's Bench and Common Pleas, or to any of the justices of assise, touching or concerning any offices to be given or granted by them. 82. The offices of the sixty clerks in Chancery are not within this statute, nor the office of bailiff of a Godbolt's case, hundred; for it is not an office of trust, nor does it 4 Leon. 33. Prec. in Cha. Symonds v. 5 Burr. 2698. concern the administration of justice. J 83. This statute does not extend to commissions in the army. And it was formerly held, that the office of purser of a ship of war was not within it. But Lord Mansfield has said, that if the Lords of the Admiralty were to take money for their warrant to appoint a 19 Geo. 3. c. 12. person to be a purser, it would be criminal in the corrupter and corrupted. 1 H. Black. 326. Vide stat. 84. By the statute 49 Geo. 3. c. 12. it is enacted, that all the provisions of the stat. 5 & 6 Edw. 6. -shall be extended to Scotland and Ireland. And that when the interest of any person shall be forfeited under that act, or this act, the right of such appointment shall immediately vest in and belong to the Crown. B. 1. c. 4. § 4. 85. As the provisions of this statute do not extend to Where equity all the cases within the mischief which it was intended will interpose. to prevent, courts of equity have frequently interposed ; for though penal laws are not to be extended, as to Treat. of Eq. penalties and punishments, yet if there be a public mischief, and a court of equity sees private contracts made to elude laws enacted for the public good, it will interpose. M'Cullock, Du Chatel, 1 Bro. R. 124. 86. A person gave a sum of money to another for Morris v. procuring him a commission in the marines. Lord Amb. 432. Henley decreed the bargain void; and said "I lay down this rule, that if a man sells his interest, to procure a permanent office of trust or service under government, it is a contract of turpitude; it is acting against the constitution, by which the government ought to be served by fit and able persons, recommended by the proper officers of the Crown, for their abilities, and with purity." 87. Lord Rochfort being groom of the stole to his Hancington v. Majesty, and having the right of recommending pages of the presence, treated with the plaintiff's testator, to recommend him upon a vacancy, on condition that he should grant two annuities to particular persons. An action being brought on the bonds securing these annuities by the defendant's testator, for the arrears of the annuity, the plaintiffs filed their bill for an injunction. The defendants had demurred, and the demurrer had been over-ruled. Upon a motion to continue the injunction, upon the merits, the answer being put in, it was argued on the part of the plaintiffs, that the bonds were pro turpi causá; that Lord Rochfort having a confidence placed in him by the King, had abused that confidence by selling his recommendation; and that upon the public policy of the law, Hartwell v. Hartwell, 4 Ves. 811. How offices may be lost. By forfeiture. 9 Rep. 50 a. such an agreement ought not to stand. On the other hand it was argued, that it was allowed this was not an office within the statute of Edw. 6. that it was merely an office respecting the King's private, not his public character; and if it was turpis contractus, that might have been pleaded at law. Lord Thurlow expressed his doubts whether it might not have been brought upon the record at law by a plea, and made a defence there to the action : but thought that not a sufficient reason to prevent his interposition; the courts of law never having determined that it could be so brought there as a defence; admitting that it was not within the statute of Edw. 6., but treating it as a matter of public policy, and similar to marriage brocage bonds; where, though the parties are private persons, the practice is publicly detrimental. He ordered the injunction to be continued till the hearing; afterwards, upon the hearing, he ordered it to be perpetual. 88. Offices may be lost by forfeiture; by acceptance of another office incompatible with that which the person already holds; or by the destruction of the principal office; or the determination of the thing to which the office was annexed. 89. Offices of every kind are not only subject to forfeiture for treason or felony, like other real property: but it is also a general rule, that if a person having an office does any thing contrary to the nature and duty of it, or refuses to perform the services annexed to it, the office is forfeited; for in the grant of every office, there is a condition implied, that the grantee shall execute it faithfully and diligently. 90. It was said in Lord Shrewsbury's case, that "there are three causes of forfeiture or seizure of offices; for matter of fact: as for abusing, not using, or refusing. Abusing or misusing; as if the marshal or other gaoler suffer voluntary escapes, it is a forfeiture of their offices. So if a forester or park-keeper fell and cut down wood, unless for necessary brush, it is a forfeiture of their offices; for destruction of vert is destruction of venison. As to non-user, there is a difference when the office concerns the administration of justice, or the commonwealth, and the officer ex officio, or of necessity, ought to attend without any demand or request; there the non-user or nonattendance in court is a forfeiture. As the office of chamberlain in the Exchequer, prothonotary, &c. in the Common Pleas, &c.; for the attendance of these and the like officers is of necessity, for the administration of justice. So the attendance of the Clerk of the Market is of necessity for the common wealth : so of holding the sheriff's tourn. But when the officer ought not to attend or exercise his office, but on demand or request to be made by him to whom he is officer; there, non-user or non-attendance is no cause of forfeiture, without demand or request made. But when the office concerns any man's private property, and the officer ought, ex officio, to attend his office without request; there the non-user or non-attendance is no cause of forfeiture, unless the non-user or nonattendance is cause of prejudice or damage to him whose officer he is, in something which concerns his charge. As if a parker, or custos parci, does not attend one or two days, and within these days no prejudice or damage happens, it is no forfeiture: but if, by reason of his absence, persons unknown kill any deer, it is a forfeiture of his office. As to refusal, it is to be known, that in all cases when an officer is bound upon request to exercise his office, if he do upon request, it is a forfeiture. As if the steward of a manor is requested by the lord to hold a court, which he does not, it is a forfeiture." it 91. A filazer of the Court of Common Pleas was absent from his office during two years; and farmed it from year to year, without leave of the Court, for |