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venues of his see, and bind his successors as much as tenant in fee could bind his heir. Then came the restraining statute 1 Eliz. But patents or grants of offices, with fees, salaries, or profits annexed to them, were not mentioned in that act. There were no general words adapted to the case of offices; yet there was not a single bishopric at that time without some offices granted. Had the Legislature meant to restrain the regranting them, as they should drop in, it must have been done by a special provision; with an exception of some at least of judicial offices. As the general restraint was not extended to the case, there was no occasion to make exceptions. Continuing ancient offices with the ancient fee, in the usual manner, was not a dilapidation of the revenue of the bishopric; every bishop left this power to be exercised by his successor, as his predecessor left it to be exercised by him; such grants being no new charge upon the bishopric, which only remained liable to the same fees or salaries to which it was liable before. And after stating several cases, he concluded in these words:" The office in question in this case is found never to have been more useful or necessary than it is now; yet all the bishops of Winchester, from the 1 Eliz., have thought the grants of it valid; every succeeding bishop has submitted to the grant made by his predecessor; and the greatest men of the kingdom, or the nearest relations of the bishop, have successively held the office. The present bishop thought this grant good for eleven years, but has conceived a doubt, from the misapplication and repetition of inconclusive and contradictory arguments, about the office being necessary; whereas we are all unanimously of opinion that an office and fee which existed before the 1 Eliz. is not within the statute; but may be granted since, precisely in the same manner in which it was granted before: that the utility or necessity of such an office is no more

This

material since the 1 Eliz. than it was before.
opinion we think agreeable to the words and intent
of the act, and every precedent since the statute:
therefore there must be judgment for the plaintiff."
18. Ministerial offices, requiring only common skill
and diligence, may be granted to two persons; and so
may also some judicial offices established by act of par-
liament. But an ancient judicial office cannot be
granted to two persons..

What offices

may be granted

to two persons.

Thus, King Henry VI. 4 Inst. 146.

Mary, st. 2.

having granted the office of high admiral to the Duke of Exeter and his son, the judges held it to be void, 2 Wm. and the charter being of a judicial office; for such ancient c. 2. offices must be granted as they formerly had been.

19. A grant to two persons to be Chief Justices of 11 Rep. 3 b. any of the courts at Westminster would be void but as to offices incident to the King's courts at Westminster, it seems to be in the discretion of the Judges, if they see that an office in their courts comprehends too much for one man to execute, to join another person with him. In such a case it must however be still granted as one office; for if it is divided into two or three offices, the prescription is interrupted, and it is not a grant of the ancient office.

20. Ecclesiastical offices, though of the judicial kind, may be granted to two persons, where there has been a usage of granting them in that manner.

Carth. 213.

21. The bishop of Llandaff granted the office of Jones v. Bew, chancellor or commissary of his diocese to two per- 4 Mod. 16. sons, to hold the same conjunctim et divisim, to them 1 Show. 289. and the survivor of them. It was agreed by the counsel on both sides, that this office had been anciently and usually granted in this manner. On a case stated out of Chancery, and referred to the Court of King's Bench, the question was, whether this was such a judicial office as could be granted to two persons. Resolved, that it was a good grant, because of the long and constant usage. And it was said, that the offices of most of the bishoprics in England were and had been constantly so granted.

1 Salk. 465.

What estate may be had in an office.

Dyer 285.

2 Inst. 382. 9 Rep. 48 b. 97 b.

1 Inst. 42 a.

1 Roll. Ab. 844. Harcourt v. Fox, 1 Show. 491.

Id.

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22. Salkeld reports, that in this case the Court said, if an office be granted to two, and one dies, the office does not survive, but determines. As if there are two sheriffs, and one of them dies, the other cannot act otherwise, if granted to two and the survivor of them.

23. With respect to the estate or interest which may be had in an office, several of the great offices of state were, and still continue to be, hereditary. Thus, the office of earl marshal was held by the Earl of Pembroke in fee simple; and is now held by the Duke of Norfolk in the same manner. The office of lord great chamberlain was held by the De Veres, Earls of Oxford, in fee simple; from whom it descended to the Dukes of Ancaster in the same manner; and upon the death of Robert Duke of Ancaster in 1779, without issue, it descended to his two sisters.

24. Although the offices mentioned in the last section are called offices in fee, yet the estate in them is not, strictly speaking, an estate in fee simple; for it is only inheritable by the lineal descendants of the first grantee of the office; not by any collaterals.

25. The offices of sheriff, gaoler, park-keeper or forester, steward or bailiff of a manor, have also been granted in fee simple. And it is held, that where an office may be granted in fee, it may be granted for life; or to one for life, remainder to another for life.

26. With respect to judicial offices, they cannot, in general, be granted for a greater estate than for life; because they are only exerciseable by persons of skill and capacity.

27. If an office be granted to a person, quamdiu se bene gesserit, the grantee has an estate for life. For as nothing but misconduct can determine his interest, no one can prefix a shorter time than his life, since it must be by his own act, which the law will not presume that his estate can determine. If the words be, quamdiu se bene gesserit tantum, the estate will not be abridged by the addition of the word tantum.

28. The judges of the several courts at Westminster formerly held their offices durante bene placito. By the statute 13 Will. 3. c. 2. it was enacted, that their commissions should be quamdiu se bene gesserint: but that it should be lawful to remove them on an address of both houses of parliament. Now, by the stat. 1 Geo. 3. c. 23. the judges are continued in their offices during their good behaviour, notwithstanding any demise of the crown but may be removed on an address of both houses of parliament.

29. Offices which do not concern the administration of justice, and only require common skill and diligence, may be granted for years; because they may be executed by deputy, without any inconvenience to the public.

Hard. 351.

30. The office of register of policies of insurance in Vale v. Priour, London was granted by the king for years; and adjudged to be a good grant, because it did not concern Jones v. Clerk, the administration of justice, but only required the skill of writing after a copy.

31. Offices of this kind may be granted to one person in trust for another; and the Court of Chancery will compel the execution of such a trust.

Hard. 46.

Borough,
Forrester 97.

Bellamy v.

9 Rep. 95.

32. No office of trust, requiring skill and capacity in the execution of it, can however be granted for years. 33. King James I. granted the office of marshal of Reynell's case, the Marshalsea for thirty-one years. It was held by the Lord Chancellor and four of the judges, that the grant was void; because this was an office of great trust annexed to the person, and concerned the administration of justice: that this trust being individual and personal, should not be extended to executors or administrators; for the law will not repose confidence, in matters concerning the administration of justice, in persons unknown.

6 Mod. 57.

34. It was determined in a subsequent case, that Sutton's case, the office of marshal of the King's Bench might be granted to a person for years, determinable on the

death of such person; for in that case the office could

not go to executors or administrators.

2 Show. R. 171. 35. Lord Hale is said to have been of opinion that an office of trust might be granted for years; for that the true reason of the determination in Reynell's case was, that the custom had been to grant it in fee. Lord Chancellor Finch is reported to have said that an office may be granted for years, for the same inconveniences attend an office in fee; and a person unknown and unfit, as an infant or feme covert, may happen to have the same, under an estate of inherit

9 Rep. 97 a.

176 a.

1 Inst. 42 a.

What offices

may be granted in reversion. Howard v. Wood,

2 Show. R. 21.

Rex v. Kemp,

1 Salk. 465. Skin. 446.

ance.

36. Offices may also be granted at will. In Reynell's case, the Judges said that the office of marshal of the Marshalsea had always been granted for life, or at will. And there is a precedent in Dyer of a grant by the King of the office of Chirographer of the Common Pleas, to hold as long as it should please his Majesty.

37. If the King grants an office to hold at will, and grants a rent to the officer for life, for the exercise of the office; this is not an absolute estate for life, because the rent being granted on account of the office, and for discharging the duties of it, whenever the grantee's interest in the office ceases, the rent is determined.

38. Ministerial offices, and also offices exercisable by deputy, may be granted in reversion, or rather to commence in futuro; and to take effect in possession upon the death of the person then holding the office.

39. The King granted an office to a person durante bene placito; afterwards granted the same office to another person for life; to commence from the death, surrender, or forfeiture, of the first grantee. It was objected that the second grant was void, for the first estate being at will, could not be surrendered or forfeited; and that an estate of freehold could not depend on an estate at will.

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