heat of the sun in the day-time, will naturally and necessarily fall over the eaves and down on the walks, and run off into the gutters of the streets. At the freezing time of the evening it will be arrested in its flow, and congealed with the same descent or inclination of the walks-thicker where it falls, and growing thinner, until it ceases to run at this place, about the middle of the walk. These conditions are produced by natural causes, or the operation of the laws of gravitation and temperature. Such places may be defects in the walks, but they are natural and common defects, for which the municipality is not responsible. They are unpreventable and irreparable. As said in Taylor v. City of Yonkers, a late case in New York (11 N. E. Rep. 642): "It often happens that a fall of rain of the melting of adjoining snow is suddenly followed by a severe cold, which covers everything with a film, or layer of ice, and makes walks slippery and dangerous. This frozen surface is practically impossible to remove until a thaw comes which remedies the evil. The municipality is not negligent for awaiting the result." Our own cases are sufficient authority for holding that the presence of such ice on the walk is not a defect for which the city is liable. Grossenbach v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W. Rep. 182; Schroth v. City of Prescott, 63 Wis. 652, 24 N. W. Rep. 405; Cook v. Milwaukee, 27 Wis. 192. The cases cited by the learned counsel of the appellant are not applicable. There is no evidence that this ice was piled up so as to make it oval or uneven, except close to the building, where a pedestrain would not walk. I think we can say that there is no evidence whatever of the culpable negligence of the city for not preventing or removing this layer of ice on the walk. For that reason alone the trial court was warranted in granting the nonsuit.

On the other ground for the nonsuit-of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff-very little need be said, as the evidence is very short, and to the point. The plaintiff testified that at this time he was not employed, and was laying off, and walking around. At this time he was on his way towards the depot, and was walking right along. He saw the walk ahead of him, and looked at it. He was looking at the sidewalk strait ahead. His attention was not diverted, and he was not looking away. He could see that walk just as well as he could then see the floor (in the room where he was examined). He did not notice the ice on the walk.

He resided in the same block where the ice was, and had passed the same place often before, and saw how the ice was formed by the water spattering down from the roofs, and had seen the ice there and in several other places on that walk. From his own testimony there cannot be the least question but that the plaintiff slipped and fell on this ice through his own want of ordinary care. He knew all about it, and how it was formed, and passed the place nearly every day going to the depot to see the trains come in, and looked at the walk right ahead of him at this

time, and it was daylight, so that he could see it. There was room on the walk where there was no ice for him to pass over, if he chose to do so. He was grossly careless, or he would not have slipped down on this narrow patch of level ice. This conclusion is inevitable. He was well aware of all the danger there was in passing over this place, and took no precaution for his safety. The learned city attorney cites many cases of this court in his excellent brief, from Achtenhagen v. Watertown, 18 Wis. 331, down to Hopkins v. Rush River, 70 Wis. 10, 34 N. W. Rep. 909, and 35 N. W. Rep. 939, illustrative of such negligence. In Schaeffer v. Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246, the court says in a similar case: "If the snow and ice presented a dangerous obstruction," etc., "it must follow, since its nature and character were known to the plaintiff, that it was imprudence in him to venture upon it, or that, if it was prudent for him to pass over it, he did not exercise due care." To the same effect is Wilson v. Charleston, 8 Allen, 137. It is said in Quincy v. Barker, 81 Ill. 300: "If it be conceded that the ice upon the sidewalk was an obstruction, it was a defect in the walk that could readily be detected. It was in the center of the walk, and in plain view, and could not escape the attention of a pedestrian unless he was walking in a hasty and reckless manner." There are many other cases cited in the brief of the learned counsel of the respondent to similar effect. This appears to be one of the plainest cases of contributory negligence to be found in the books. There was an utter want of common care and prudence on the part of the plaintiff. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

NOTE. The foregoing opinion really furnishes its own best commentary; its conclusion is based upon two material facts, both indisputably established, either of which precludes recovery-negligence on the part of plaintiff, and want of it on the part of defendant; and this conclusion will be found amply supported by authority on all sides.

The municipal duty to abate dangerous walks, etc., is ministerial, not judicial., Lehn v. Brooklyn, 19 N. Y. Sup. 668.

Cities are not liable for want of efficiency in the plan of construction, that being a legislative or judicial function, over which courts have no authority. Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489. And yet, while there can be no liability based upon mere error of judgment, there may be liability for actual negligence, even as to the plan adopted. North Vernon v. Voelger, 103 Ind. 314.

It is entirely beyond human ingenuity to devise a plan which is not capable of danger to heedless persons. Shippy v. Au Sable (Mich.), N. W. Rep. And even local usage goes a long way towards fixing public duties, as to the care of highways in winter. McKellar v. Detroit, 5 Mich. 153. Municipal liability is founded on the negligence of municipal officers, in the discharge of their official duties, and cannot be established without proof of such negligence. Dubois V. Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219. Perhaps no better statement of the correct rule, and no more imposing array of authorities, can be found in the books, than is given in Barnes v. Dist. of Col., 91 U. S. 540, where Justice

Hunt uses this language: "The authorities establishing the doctrine that a city is responsible for its mere negligence are so numerous and so well considered, that the law must be deemed to be settled in accordance with them."

In support of this proposition, he cites the following: Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 189; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 658; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Springfield v. Le Claire, 49 Ill. 46; Smoot v. Mayor, 24 Ala. 112; Selma v. Perkins, 68 Ala. 145; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; Cook v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 50; Richmond v. Long, 1 Gratt. 35; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio 46; Galveston v. Barbor, 62 Tex. 12

The negligence above mentioned, as being the sole ground of municipal liability, is not necessarily gross negligence, but merely the want of reasonable care. City, etc. v. Riley, 39 Ill. App. 401.

In other words, each case is merely a question of due diligence, reasonable care, on the part of plaintiff, and the want of them on the part of the defendant. Manifestly, this is a mixed question of law and fact; the jury should ascertain the attendant and surrounding facts and circumstances; from the facts thus found, the court should draw the conclusion as to negligence. A few illustrations, taken at random, will show that, practically, each case must necessarily furnish its own rule.

The corporation is not an insurer against accidents upon its streets and sidewalks; nor is every defect therein (even though it may have occasioned the injury complained of) actionable; it is sufficient if the streets are in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary modes. Hixon v. Lowell, 13 Gray 59. The city is not liable for any mere defect, unless of such a character as to render the walk not reasonably safe for travel in the ordinary modes; and the question whether a walk was reasonably safe is for the jury. Young v. Kansas City, 44 Mo. App. 600.

When snow falls on a walk, so as to become an obstruction, it is the duty of the city to remove the same, but it must be allowed a reasonable time in which to do so. If it unnecessarily permits such obstructions as ice and snow to accumulate, to an extent that renders the walk dangerous or unsafe, and persons (not themselves negligent) fall and sustain injury by reason thereof, the city is liable, but not otherwise. Smith v. Chicago, 38 Fed. Rep. 388.

If due diligence has been used to remove accumulations, the city is not liable. Hays v. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402.

The municipal obligation to use reasonable care, etc., does not call for the removal of ice which merely renders the walk slippery, but which does not accumulate so as to obstruct travel, there being no ridges or inequalities to trip pedestrians. Henks v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 530. Where the corporation failed to clean the gutters, which consequently filled up and overflowed, covering the adjacent walks with water which suddenly froze, the city was deemed negligent. Gaylord v. New Britain (Conn.), 20 Atl. Rep. 365. So, also, where a ridge of ice and snow five or six inches high, and very uneven and slippery, was allowed to accumulate and remained undisturbed for a week. Keane v. Watertown, 130 N. Y. 188. It is only, however, when an accumulation is allowed to remain in such uneven and rounded conditions that persons using due care cannot walk over it without danger of falling, that the municipality is liable. Boberg v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 523.

But the law does not require impossibilities; and

where snow fell for three days in succession, followed by sudden freezing, the city was not liable for an in jury sustained during that time. Winne v. Albany, 15 Y. Sup. 423. And where snow and rain fell Tuesday, followed by an intense freezing which continued until Friday, at which time the injury occurred, the city was not negligent in waiting for a thaw. Slavin v. New York, 8 N. Y. Sup. 906. Again, the lapse of fortyeight hours, after the snow ceased falling, before the walks were cleaned, was not constructive notice that such walks were in a dangerous condition, and was not proof of negligence. O'Connor v. New York, 8 N. Y. Sup. 530. GEO. C. WORTH.

BOOK REVIEWS.

RAY ON NEGLIGENCE OF IMPOSED DUTIES-CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.

This is the third volume in what may be called a series devoted to the subject of Negligence of Imposed Duties. The first was on the special topic of personal limitations. The second treated of contractual limitations. The present volume is on the subject of carriers of passengers and as the author says in his preface "the attempt is made to state, not only the law of passenger carriers and the principles by which negli gence of imposed duties involving liability is determined, but also what in fact constitutes negligence of the imposed duties of the passenger carriers, as decided by the courts with the reason on which the decision is grounded. The book impresses us as having been carefully written and conscientiously prepared.

3. APPEAL-Record Affidavits.- An affidavit of an attorney filled in the trial court, that neither he nor his client, who was a party, had notice or opportunity to be present at the trial, is not sufficient on appeal to overcome the recital in the journal entry that the parties came "by their attorneys;" especially when the verity of the entry has been sustained by the judge of the trial court, who may be presumed to have personal knowledge; and when it appears that the complaining party had two attorneys, one of whom may have been present.-EVANS V. STETTNISCH, U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 931.

4. ARBITRATION-Validity of Submission.-An agreement to submit certain matters to arbitrators, under the statute, is of no effect if the names of the arbitrators are not in it when it is acknowledged. They can. not be inserted afterwards.-NORTHWESTERN GUARANTY LOAN CO. V. CHANNELL, Minn., 55 N. W. Rep. 121.

5. AWARD-Payment -A refusal to abide by an award by both parties thereto, made at different times, and without any meeting of the minds, does not operate as a discharge or payment thereof.-HYNES .V WRIGHT, Conn., 26 Atl. Rep. 642.

6. BANKS AND BANKING - Usury.-To entitle a party to the benefit of Act 1882, § 2, providing a forfeiture of double the amount of usurious interest, a counter claim must set up such claim in an action to recover the sum loaned, or an independent action must be brought to recover such penalty.-LOAN & EXCH. BANK V. MILLER, S. Car., 17 S. E. Rep. 592.

7. CARRIERS - Passenger - Negligence. Where the rear platform of a car is not at a safe place for passengers to alight, failure on the part of the carrier to warn passengers of that fact is negligence, though it was safe to alight at the front platform. - MCDONALD V. ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co., Iowa, 55 N. W. Rep. 102.

8. CARRIERS-Passengers-Trespasser.-Plaintiff was injured while traveling on defendant's freight train, and claimed that he was a free passenger on such train, as part owner of a car load of stock being transported by defendant. The evidence showed that the stock was owned by one G, with whom the contract of carriage was made, and whose name alone appeared in the bill of lading, and who was alone entitled, under the contract, to free transportation. Plaintiff's only claim to the stock was a verbal agreement with G to buy part thereof after reaching their destination, if he could give proper security: Held, that plaintiff was a trespasser on defendant's train, and could recover only for injury caused by the wantonness or willfullness of defendant's servants. RICHMOND & D. R. Co. v. BURNSED, Miss., 12 South. Rep. 958.

9. CERTIORARI-Municipal Corporations.-Where the power of a municipal body to remove from office is not discretionary, but only for cause, after notice and

hearing, the proceedings are judicial in their nature, and may be reviewed on certiorari. On such review the court will inspect the record to see whether the body had jurisdiction, and kept within it, and whether the charges preferred were sufficient in law, and will examine the evidence, not for the purpose of weighing it, but to ascertain whether it furnished any legal and substantial basis for the removal. - STATE V. COMMON COUNCIL, Minn., 55 N. W. Rep. 118.

10. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Partnership.-A mortgagee of personal property belonging to a partnership, hav ing a mortgage valid only as to the interest of one of the partners, cannot maintain replevin against a receiver in charge of the partnership property under appointment from a court of competent jurisdiction.FRANKHOUSER V. WORRALL, Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1097.

11. CHATTEL MORTGAGE Sale. 1 A mortgagor of a chattel may make a valid sale of the mortgaged prop. erty with the mortgagee's oral consent. In such a case a sale by the mortgagor passes the title to a purchaser in good faith. - FRICK CO. v. WESTERN STAR MILLING CO., Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1103.

12. CHATTEL MORTGAGE TO SEVERAL MORTGAGEESRelease.-A mortgage running to several mortgagees jointly to secure a joint debt may be paid to and released by either mortgagee. FLANIGAN V. SEELYE, Minn., 55 N. W. Rep. 115.

13. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Attachment.-In an action brought by a mortgagee of a stock of merchandise against a sheriff who had levied on a portion thereof under an attachment, where it appears that the plaintiff has taken possession and disposed of all of the balance of the stock, except that attached by the sheriff, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to account for the property sold by him before he can recover.MANNEN V. BAILEY, Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1085.

14. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Crops Afterwards Planted. -A person conveyed land for a nominal sum, subject to several mortgages, in which the grantee was interested. By an agreement made at the time, the grantee was to sell the grantor the same land on semi-annual payments; the grantor to pay taxes, insurance, and costs of foreclosure, if necessary. Possession was to remain in the grantee until part of the debt should be paid and until then all crops, except, etc., were to be. long to the grantee, who was to apply the proceeds on the debt. In case of default the agreement wasto be void, and the grantor to deliver up the premises to the grantee: Held, an attempted mortgage of crops afterwards to be planted, and therefore inoperative as to creditors.-MERCHANTS' & MECHANICS' SAV. BANK V. HOLDREDGE, Wis., 55 N. W. Rep. 108.

15. CHATTEL MORTGAGES - Lien-Good-will.-Where a newspaper, whose entire plant and good-will have been mortgaged, is consolidated with another, the name of the paper changed, and a new corporation formed to publish it, which, in the course of business, entirely uses up the mortgaged plant, the lien of the mortgage does not apply to the existing plant, substituted for that so consumed, nor to the good-will of the newspaper, even though the new corporation occupied for some years the old place of business, and paid interest for 10 months on the mortgage debt.-METROPOLITAN NAT. BANK V. ST. LOUIS DISPATCH CO., U. S. S. C., 13 S. C. Rep. 944.

16. CONTRACTS-Construction Evidence. Defend ants ordered from plaintiffs "600 2-inch boiler-flue ferrules; 1,500 21⁄2-inch; and 1,200 3 inch. This is outside diameter:" Held, that it was competent to show, for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the order, that, in the trade in which both parties were engaged, boiler-flue ferrules are standard articles of common use, and that it was the general custom to designate them by the size of the flues on which they were to be used; also that boiler flues are always manufactured in certain regular and standard sizes of exact outside diameters, and that, if the dimensions named in the order were to be applied to the ferrules, and not to the flues, the ferrules could not be used as

"boiler flue ferrules."-MERCHANT V. HOWELL, Minn., 55 N. W. Rep. 131.

17. CONTRACTS-Evidence.-In an action to recover for breach of a parol contract for the sale of timber and use of defendant's saw mill, the evidence showed execution of the contract so far as defendant was concerned by giving plaintiff possession of the mill and timber. It tended to show also that defendant had afterwards obtained possession of the mill by artifice; that he refused to again surrender it to plaintiff, and otherwise interfered with plaintiff's

work, plaintiff for a time submitting. There was evidence of an advance in the price of timber after the contract: Held, sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question as to breach of the contract and consequent damages. BUCKLIN V. DAVIDSON, Penn., 26 Atl. Rep. 643.

18. CONTRACTS Prosecute.

Public Policy - Agreement not to In an action on a note alleged to have been given in consideration of an agreement not to criminally prosecute a third person, it is error for the court, in its charge, to confine the defense to proof of an express agreement; but it should submit to the jury the question whether or not the execution of the note was made in consideration of an agreement by the payee not to prosecute, and should leave the jury to determine, from all the facts, whether or not such an agreement, either expressly entered into, or to be inferred from the circumstances had been made.WEGNER V. BIERING, Tex., 22 S. W. Rep. 258.

19. CONVERSION-Claimant of Attached Property.Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 327, provides that the sheriff may deliver any attached property to the person in whose possession it was found, on the execution to plaintiff of a forthcoming bond: Held, that the execution of such bond by residents of Tennessee made them parties to an action against their vendor in Arkansas, in which their property was attached, so that a failure by the obligors to assert their rights in such action estopped them from afterwards maintaining an action against plaintiffs therein for its conversion by levy and sale under special execution issued on the judgment rendered in their favor. - LOWENSTEIN V. MCCADDEN, Tenn., 22 S. W. Rep. 426.

20. CORPORATION-Appointment of Receiver.-Under Rev. St. § 1222, providing that a receiver may be appointed when a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights, a court of equity has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in proceedings to secure an accounting of the officers, and the application of the funds to the proper objects of the corporation.-SUPREME SITTING OF THE ORDER OF IRON HALL V. BAKER, Ind., 33 N. E. Rep. 1128.

21. CORPORATION-Dissolution-Irrigation District.Since St. 1887, p. 29, providing for the organization and government of irrigation districts, and for the acquisition of water and other property, makes no provision for a judicial sentence dissolving a corporation formed thereunder because of a nonuser, an action cannot be maintained to dissolve such corporation, since, in the absence of a law specially conferring it, courts are without power to dissolve a public corporation on such grounds.-PEOPLE V. SELMA IRRIGATION DIST. Cal., 32 Pac. Rep. 1047.

22. CORPORATIONS Liability of Stockholders.-In order to charge persons as subscribers to the capital stock of a corporation, it must be shown that they subscribed to the stock of the particular corporation on account of which the liability is claimed or that they have in some manner recognized their liability as such stockholders.-HARRISON NAT. BANK OF CADIZ V. VOTAW, Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1111.

23. CORPORATIONS-Transfer of Stock Certificate.-An owner of stock loaned it to his son, so that the latter might become a director in the corporation. The son had a certificate issued to himself, which he afterwards delivered to his father, together with a power of at

torney signed in blank. The stock was then attacked for debt as belonging to the son: Held, that the delivery was to a bona fide purchaser, within St. 1884, ch. 229, and that the father could therefore hold the stock as against all persons.-ANDREWS v. WORCESTER, N. & R. R. Co., Mass., 33 N. E. Rep. 1109.

24. CORPORATION-Water Companies.-An allegation that a corporation was "organized for the purpose of constructing, owning, and operating a water-works system," is a sufficient allegation that it is organized under Rev. St. § 3851, relating to the incorporation of companies to supply any city or village with water, etc., and precludes the assumption that the corporation was organized under section 4200, relating to the incorporation of companies to carry on the business of water-works sold under judgment or decree.-CLOW V. BROWN, Ind., 33 N. E. Rep. 1126.

25. COURTS-Organization of States-Jurisdiction.When the Supreme Court of Washington was created under its constitution and the organic act, and took possession of cases pending in the territorial supreme court, it required the power to remand criminal cases to the superior courts, the successors of the former territorial district courts, for execution of its judg. ments.-WAY V. WOOLERY, Wash., 82 Pac. Rep. 1082.

26. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.-On trial of an indictment for an attempt to commit an abortion, whereby the woman died, a physician of 18 years' practice, who at tended deceased during her last illness, testified that a week before her death she was delivered of a five months fœtus; that he assisted in the delivery, and had previously examined her: Held, that such witness was qualified to testify as to the cause of her death.-COMMONWEALTH V. THOMPSON, Mass., 33 N. E.

Rep. 1111.

27. CRIMINAL LAW-Argument of State's Attorney.— Code, § 3636, provides that if a defendant in a criminal case does not testify the State's attorney shall not refer to such fact, but, should he do so,defendant shall be entitled to a new trial: Held, that a statement that "they have the same right we have to put the defendant upon the stand, and let him tell his story, the same as we have," made in argument, in the presence of the jury, by the State's attorney, was in violation of the statute. -STATE V. BALDOSER, Iowa, 55 N. W. Rep. 97.

28. CRIMINAL LAW-Burglary.—A conviction of burglary will not be reversed for the refusal of a continuance because of an absent witness, where the evidence of the witness, if material and true, was too remote to have affected the verdict, under the facts proven.GOLDSMITH V. STATE, Tex., 22 S. W. Rep. 405.

29. CRIMINAL LAW-Continuance.-Rev. St. § 4223, which provides that unless a person be tried within a certain time after indictment he shall be discharged, applies only in cases where the State is in fault, and not where the delay was caused by continuance granted on defendant's motion.-STATE V. MARSHALL, Mo., 22 S. W. Rep. 452. 30. CRIMINAL LAW Disorderly House. A house wherein the keepers permit persons to habitually assemble and engage in betting, winning and losing money and property on the prospective rise and fall in stocks, bonds, grain, and other produce, is a com. mon gaming house, and, though there is no penal statute applicable to such particular species of gambling, the owners and controllers of such house are guilty of keeping a disorderly house.-KNEFFER V. COMMONWEALTH, Ky., 22 S. W. Rep. 446.

31. CRIMINAL LAW-Murder - Insanity. Where the evidence shows that, if defendant was at any time previous to the homicide insane, he continued so, and had no lucid intervals, a failure to instruct the jury that the burden is on the State to show that the homi cide was committed during a lucid interval is not error.-STATE V. SCHAEFER, Miss., 22 S. W. Rep. 447.

32. CRIMINAL LAW-Theft.-Where defendant, who wished to leave the neighborhood to avoid a difficulty, took his cousin's saddle on the pretense of borrowing

it to go hunting, but left with him more than sufficient property to pay for it, with a letter directing him to take such property in payment, such taking did not constitute theft.-BECKHAM V. STATE, Tex., 22 S. W. Rep. 411.

33. CRIMINAL PRACTICE.-An indictment charging that defendant, on a certain day "did, then and there being one P, a female under the age of 18 years, unlawfully and feloniously take from one P, her father, he then and there having in the legal charge" of her person, and without his consent, for the purpose of concubinage, is sufficient, under Rev. St. 1889, § 3484, providing that the taking away of any female under the age of 18, from her father, for the purpose of concubinage, is a felony.-STATE V. JOHNSON, Mo., 22 S. W. Rep. 463.

-

34. CRIMINAL PRACTICE Workhouse Men.-Rev. St. 1889, ch. 18, § 744, provides that all warehouse receipts shall be negotiable by indorsement and delivery, as bills of exchange and promissory notes. Section 742 makes it unlawful for any workhouse man or other person to sell or in any manner remove any goods for which a receipt has been given by him, "without the written assent of the person holding such receipt:" Held, an indictment charging defendants with selling grain received for storage, without the assent of the person from whom they received

it, is insufficient without also alleging that such person was the holder of the receipt at the time of the sale.-STATE V. KIRBY, Mo., 22 S. W. Rep. 453.

35. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Remarks of Counsel.-A judg ment in a criminal case will not be reversed on appeal because of improper remarks of counsel, unless the trial court has, on application, refused a new trial.GRIER V. JOHNSON, Iowa, 55 N. W. Rep. 80.

36. DEED- Record. Bona Fide Purchaser.-Hill's Ann. Laws, § 3029, provides that when a deed purports to be an absolute conveyance, but is made defeasible by a deed of defeasance, the original conveyance shall not be defeated, as against the devisee of the maker of the defeasance, without actual notice thereof, unless such instrument shall have been recorded: Held, that the continued possession by the grantor of land was not notice of an unrecorded defeasance held by him.— EXON V. DANCKE, Oreg., 32 Pac. Rep. 1045.

37. DEED Community Property.-A deed by a widow, of community property in satisfaction of a community obligation, made 15 years after her husband's death, and after she had taken out letters of administration, and the estate had been partitioned in whole or in part, and the administration had been closed, does not convey the interest belonging to her deceased husband in his lifetime, since it will be presumed that her power over the community as survivor for such purpose had then ceased.-WILLIAMS V. HARDIE, Tex., 22 S. W. Rep. 399.

39. EJECTMENT - Tenancy in Common. Where the owner on an undivided one-fourth interest in a tract of land, acting solely for himself, sues to recover the whole tract from a person in possession under an adverse title, and where it appears that the plaintiff and the holder of the other three-fourths have no community of interest, and do not recognize each others' titles: Held, that the plaintiff can only recover possession of his own share in an action of ejectment.KING V. HYATI, Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1105.

40. ELECTION OF CONTEST-County Commissioner"Eligible."-Gen St. 1889, par. 1622, provides that "no person holding any State, county, township or city office, or any employer, officer, or stockholder in any railroad in which the county owns stock, shall be

eligible to the office of county commissioner:" Held, that the word "eligible," as used in the statute, means "legally qualified;" that is, capable of holding office. The term "eligible," as used, does not mean "eligible to be elected" to the office of county commissioner at the date of the election, but "eligible or legally qualified" to hold the office after the election; that is, at the commencement of the term of office -DEMAREE V. SCATES, Kan., 32 Pac. Rep. 1123.

41. ESTOPPEL

Acceptance of Legacy-Where a residuary clause in a will merely leaves all of testator's remaining property, real and personal, without speci fying any particular land or interest, it only gives such interest as testator may be found to have; and a specific legatee, by accepting his legacy, is not estopped from claiming that a deed from him to the testator, absolute on its face, of land which was in the possession of testator at his death, and which is claimed by the residuary devisees under such a residu ary clause, was intended as a mortgage, and that the mortgage debt is satisfied. In such case parol evidence. is not admissible to show that testator intended, by the residuary clause, to devise the land as belonging to him absolutely.-TOMPKINS V. MERRIMAN, Penn, 26 Atl. Rep. 659.

44. FEDERAL OFFENSE Post Office Obstructing Mails. Boys who place obstructions on the track of an electric railway whereon the United States mails are carried, and by so doing delay the mail, or force it to be carried in some other way, are guilty of the crime of obstructing the mails, under Rev. St. § 3995.UNITED STATES V. THOMAS, U.S. D. C. (W. Va.), 55 Fed. Rep. 380.

45. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-An instruction that one purchasing goods partly for cash and partly in satisfaction of a pre existing debt will be protected as a bona fide purchaser only to the extent of the cash payment, and not even to that extent if he has received at the same time other goods, more than sufficient to reimburse him for the cash payment, is sufficiently favorable to the purchaser even if it contains error. -GAVIN V. ARMSTEAD, Ark., 22 S. W. Rep. 431.

46. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Knowledge of Grantee. Where a mortgagor attempts to convey all his property, and the corn and cotton he expects to raise in the two years following, to secure an amount largely in excess of what he owes, when he is embarrassed by debt, and the mortgagee has knowledge of his financial condition, it will be presumed that the mortgage is in fraud of creditors, and the burden is on the mortgagee to overcome such presumption.HENRY V. HARRELL, Ark., 22 S. W. Rep. 433.