stances and object of his life and death. Analysis, if pursued to the last point, yields only what is common. It therefore, if depended on chiefly, and emphasized, belittles the great, instead of magnifying the little. The diamond becomes coal; the coal does not become diamonds.

Another example of destructive analysis in theology is found in the adjustment of the doctrines of divine providence and prayer. It is accepted by all Christians, as a law of events, that prayer brings blessings as truly and efficaciously as the rain brings fertility to the soil. The showers do not make every watered seed grow, and prayer does not further all the desires of praying hearts; but the one law is as fixed as the other, and both are unchangeable.

Now, we cannot help analyzing this law somewhat, to find how prayer fits into the course of divine providence. We discover, on reflection that it is itself an essential part of the plan. Some of the links in the great chain are human prayers. God ordains the prayers, just as much as the answers. This makes everything straight, Calvinistically. But the trouble is, that it not only makes the matter straight, but stiff and stark as death. The adjustment is simple, logical, complete; but after you have made it, you must forget about it in order to pray. It is a theological bludgeon, with which to bring down a man who denies the efficacy of prayer on the ground of God's immutable purposes. It is effectual. No opponent of this class, who knows what reasoning is, can stand against it. But when the weapon has done its work, it has to be laid aside. It will not do as a staff to constantly lean on. The reason is partly because a prayerful spirit is incompatible, for the time being, with philosophizing about prayer; and partly, because we cannot act naturally in anything while we think of our actions as being foreordained, or even foreknown, by any one. nowise affects the truth of anything because our minds are thrown into confusion by trying to carry it constantly side by side with something else; but it is practical wisdom to avoid such confusions.

It

The solution of the trouble may not be easy to all. A "sanctified common sense" will accomplish it by letting theories alone, and trusting implicitly the covenant and promises of God. A few minds may find relief by penetrating beyond this mechanical view of providence, till they get at least a glimpse of a deeper analysis. One thing is certain, the analysis which stops with saying that God ordains both the prayer and the answer is not ultimate. No one need fear being lost in metaphysical profundity, if this is the limit reached. Such an analysis is destructive to piety and doctrine, because it is shallow and frigid. Whether anything fully satisfactory can be reached is the same as whether the problem of divine and human agency can be solved.

A single example further may be found in the resolving of great truths into a multitude of frivolous details. This hardly deserves the name of analysis. It comes from the nursery, where the child, instructed in the doctrine of God's omniscience, asks: "Can he see in my pocket?" Yet the literature of theology contains specimens far inferior to this. I imagine that Rev. John Fletcher is here without a rival. Let the following testify:

In his "Remarks on the Rev. Mr. Toplady's 'Scheme of Christian and Philosophical Necessity," he says: "To imagine that before the foundation of the world the Almighty decreed that three idle boys should play the truant such an afternoon, in order to seek birds' nests; that they should find a sparrow's nest with five young ones; that they should torment one to death; that they should let another fly away; that they should starve the third, feed the fourth, and give the fifth to a cat, after having put its eyes out and plucked so many feathers out of its tender wings, to suppose this, I say, is to undo all by overdoing" (Sec. iii.).

This mode of analyzing, or rather disintegrating, a doctrine would doubtless "undo all" in some minds; but it is very silly as an argument, nevertheless. Take the following parallel statement: "To imagine that the Rev. John Fletcher,

in writing the above paragraph, should take the trouble to form over four hundred distinct letters, crossing every t, and dotting every i, moving his pen in almost every conceivable direction; that he should voluntarily employ in this service the various muscles of the thumb and four fingers. of his right hand, the muscles of his right arm, and many of the muscles of his body in bending over his paper; that he should turn both his eyes to follow the progress of his pen along each line, and its motion in the formation of the letters; to suppose, in addition, that the minute cells of his brain should grow warm with the operation of his mind, and his heart beat with a quicker pulse, and the blood flow stronger in every artery and vein, even to the tips of his little fingers; to suppose, also, that his mind should exert itself to choose to mention three boys, a sparrow's nest, five young ones, a cat, etc., instead of different things, to suppose this, I say, is to undo all by overdoing. He did not do these particular things; he only wrote the paragraph.”

When

There are various ways of meeting this peculiar argument by division. Properly employed, it needs no answer. trifles mar our happiness, the truth of a minute providence is the hope of our lives. Then such a promise as "Even the very hairs of your head are all numbered," becomes our sheet-anchor. But when we are in no conscious need of this comfort, and dwell on these minutiae for speculative entertainment, or select those of them which are belittling for use in controversy, then it is time to consider the difference between the use and abuse of this subdivisional analysis.

Mr. Fletcher's paragraph may be answered, in a manner, by proving that what he supposes to be so absurd and "undoing," is nevertheless true; the proof being drawn from scripture and reason. The proofs from reason would be of this sort that (1) God cannot have any providence worthy of him, unless it embraces everything, great and small; that (2) it is no more derogatory to God to decree these things than to know them, which he must do if he is omniscient; that (3) great consequences flow from apparently trivial

causes. For example, how could Mr. Fletcher have constructed this great argument, which he could not consider beneath God's providential notice, but for the very trivialities which he thinks God could not condescend to decree; that (4) since a man can know and determine a multitude of little things without diminishing his greatness, it is irrational to set any limit to God in this respect; and that (5) we are not obliged to suppose that God bestows equal thought on things both great and small-only sufficient thought to all.

There may be other arguments, equally convincing; but the only point I now insist on is, that this mode of reasoning by analyzing into frivolous details is unsound. It addresses the imagination, instead of the reason, and seeks to gain a point by confusing the mind instead of enlightening it. There is not a fact of history nor a truth of science that cannot be assailed in this way.

This Article is perhaps too heterogeneous to admit of any one general conclusion; the study of this topic certainly impresses one with the great need of common sense in theology. If the writer of this has violated it, then he must be content to have unwittingly strengthened the same conclusion, and to stand humbly at the foot of a very long and respectable class.

ARTICLE III.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

BY REV. E. P. BARROWS, D.D., LATELY PROFESSOR of HebreW LITERATURE IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

No. X.

INSPIRATION CONSIDERED IN ITS MODE.

It was shown in the preceding article that the end which the inspiration of the record has in view is that of giving to men, under the sanction of divine authority, a sure rule of faith and practice; and that this end is accomplished in the writings of the New Testament (to which the present inquiry has special reference), they coming to us with the two attributes of infallibility and sufficiency, both of which are included in their divine authority. The reader may naturally ask: Why, then, pursue the investigation any further? If the scriptures come to us with the sanction of divine authority, and contain an infallible rule of faith and practice, what more do we need? We answer: Nothing more, if men would only be content to rest here. But they are not thus content. From the consideration of the end of inspiration they have proceeded to that of its mode. They have propounded untenable theories concerning it; and some of them have identified with these theories the very essence of inspiration, denouncing in unmeasured terms those who dissent from their conclusions. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire, in a reverential spirit, what light we have from scripture, from the constitution of the human mind, and from the nature of language, respecting the mode of the Spirit's operation when "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," or wrote under a like guidance for the instruction of the church in all coming ages.