by an intelligent author, Philo himselt has explicitly acknowledged in these remarkable words: "Supposing there were a God, "who did not discover himself immediately to our senses; would "it be possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, "than what appear on the whole face of nature? What, indeed, ❝ could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of "things;-render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupi"dity could mistake them ;-afford glimpses of still greater ar"tifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our 66 narrow apprehensions ;-and conceal altogether a great many "from such imperfect creatures ?"-The sceptical reasonings of Philo, therefore, do not, like those of the ancient Epicureans, hinge, in the least, on alleged disorders and imperfections in the universe, but entirely on the impossibility, in a case to which experience furnishes nothing parallel or analogous, of rendering intelligence and design manifest to our faculties by their sensible effects.—In thus shifting his ground from that occupied by his predecessors, Philo seems to me to have abandoned the only post from which it was of much importance for his adversaries to dislodge him. The logical subtilties, formerly quoted about experience and belief (even supposing them to remain unanswered), are but little calculated to shake the authority of principles, on which we are every moment forced to judge and to act, by the exigencies of life. For this change in the tactics of modern sceptics, we are evidently, in a great measure, if not wholly, indebted to the lustre thrown on the order of nature, by the physical researches of the two last centuries.

Another concession extorted from Philo by the discoveries of modern science is still more important. I need not point out its coincidence with some remarks in the first part of this section, on the unconscious deference often paid to final causes by those inquirers who reject them in theory;-a coincidence which had totally escaped my recollection when these remarks were written. I quote it here, chiefly as a pleasing and encouraging confirmation of the memorable prediction with which Newton concludes his Optical Queries; that "if Natural Philosophy, in "all its parts, by pursuing the inductive method, shall at

"length be perfected, the bounds of Moral Philosophy will be "enlarged also."

"A purpose, an intention, a design," says Philo, "strikes "everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to "reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim esta"blished in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of "the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also "discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the "COPERNICAN system is the maxim, That Nature acts by the

66

simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any "end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this "strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is "observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences lead us almost insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention."

*P. 106.

Since this sheet was cast off, I have been informed, from the best authority, that the conversation here alluded to, which I had understood to have taken place between Lord Chief Justice Mansfield and the late Sir Basil Keith, really passed between his Lordship and another very distinguished officer, the late gallant and accomplished Sir Archibald Campbell. I have not, how. ever, thought it worth while, in consequence of a mistake which does not affect the substance of the anecdote, to cancel the leaf; -more especially, as there is at least a possibility that the same advice may have been given on more than one occasion.

APPENDIX.

ARTICLE I. (See page 171.)

THE following article relates entirely to the question," How "far it is true, that all mathematical evidence is resolvable into "identical propositions?" The discussion may, in one point of view, be regarded as chicfly verbal; but that it is not, on that account, of so trifling importance as might at first be imagined, appears from the humiliating inference to which it has been supposed to lead concerning the narrow limits of human knowledge. "Put the question," says Diderot, "to any candid mathemati"cian, and he will acknowledge, that all mathematical proposi. "tions are merely identical; and that the numberless volumes "written (for example) on the circle, only repeat over in a hun"dred thousand forms, that it is a figure in which all the straight "lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal. "The whole amount of our knowledge, therefore, is next to no"thing."―That Diderot has, in this very paradoxical conclusion, stated his own real opinion, will not be easily believed by those who reflect on his extensive acquaintance with mathematical and physical science; but I have little doubt, that he has expressed the amount of the doctrine in question, agreeably to the interpretation put on it, by the great majority of readers.

As the view of this subject which I have taken in the text, has not been thought satisfactory by my friend M. Prevost, I have thought it a duty, both to him and to myself, to annex to the foregoing pages, in his own words, the remarks subjoined to the excellent and faithful translation with which he has honoured this part of my work, in the Bibliothèque Britannique. Among these remarks, there is scarcely a proposition to which I do not give my complete assent. The only difference between us turns on the propriety of the language in which some of them are ex

pressed; and on this point it is not surprising, if our judgments should be somewhat biassed by the phraseology to which we have been accustomed in our earlier years. The few sentences to which I am inclined to object, I have distinguished from the rest, by printing them in smail capitals.-Such explanations of my own argument as appear to be necessary, I have thrown into the form of notes, at the foot of the page.

In the course of M. Prevost's observations on the point in question, he has introduced various original and happy illustrations of the important distinction between conditional and absolute truths;-a subject on which I have the pleasure to find, that all our views coincide exactly.

"A la fin de l'article que l'on vient de lire, * l'ingénieux auteur renvoie à ce qu'il a dit au commencement. Il pense y avoir suffisamment prouvé que l'évidence particulière qui accompagne le raisonnement mathématique ne peut pas se résoudre dans la perception de l'identité. Recourons donc à cette preuve. Elle se trouve consister toute entière en réfutation.

"I. L'auteur commence par remarquer, que quelques personnes fondent l'opinion qu'il rejette sur celle qui prend les axiomes pour premiers principes. Et comme il a combattu celle-ci, il en conclut que sa conséquence doit être fausse. Un tel argument a en effet beaucoup de force pour ceux qui sont partis d'une certaine théorie sur les axiomes pour en conclure l'assertion contestée; mais il n'en a point pour les autres. Le rédacteur de cet article se range parmi ces derniers. Il a dit et il pense encore, que le mathématicien avance de supposition en supposition; que c'est en retournant sa pensée sous diverses formes, qu'il arrive à d'utiles résultats; QUE C'EST LA RECONNOissance de quELQUE IDENTITE QUI AUTORISE CHACUNE DE SES CONCLUSIONS; et toutefois il a dit et il persiste à croire, que les axiomes mathématiques ne font que tenir la place ou de définitions ou de théorêmes; et que les définitions sont les seuls principes des sciences de la nature de la géométrie. Voici ses propres expressions. * "J'ob"serve que de bonnes définitions initiales sont les seuls principes rigoureusement suffisans dans les sciences de raisonnement pur......... C'est dans les définitions que sont véritablement con"tenues les hypothèses dont ces sciences partent......... On pour"roit concevoir [toujours dans ces mêmes sciences], que les

principes fussent si nettement posés, que l'on n'y trouvât autre "chose que de bonnes définitions. De ces définitions retournées, "résulteroient toutes les propositions subséquentes. LES DIVER

Chap. II. Sect. 3. Art. II. of this volume.

+ Essais de Philos. Tom. II. p. 29, à Genève chez Paschoud, 1804.