nations deduced the principles for such cases as might arise. This latter method was especially common among the early writers, such as Victoria and Suarez in the sixteenth century. The philosophical school, from Grotius to the middle of the eighteenth century, continued to propound the principles which should govern in supposed cases, should they ever actually arise. Statesmen looked to these treatises as authoritative sources. The prolific Moser, in the middle of the eighteenth century, made the historical method more prominent by giving less attention to the natural law, and by founding his system on usage and treaties. Bynkershoek (1673– 1743) had anticipated him in this method in special lines, but Moser extended the system and made it most ample. Succeeding writers mingled the two systems, inclining to the one or to the other. In the early days of the modern period the writers upon the law of nations outlined the course which states should pursue in their relations to one another. In the later days of the modern period, the writers upon the law of nations, while sometimes discussing problems before they arise, in general attempt to expound the rules and principles which have entered already into interstate action. The works of the text writers, from Grotius to the present, must be regarded as sources of highest value. The Supreme Court of the United States in case of the Paquete Habana in 1900 referring to the determination of questions involving international law, said: "For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concern ing what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." 1 19. Diplomatic Papers The diplomatic papers, as distinct from the state papers to which more than one state becomes a party, are simply papers issued by a state for the guidance of its own representatives in international intercourse. The papers are sometimes named state papers or included among the papers to which other states are parties,—in the United States, in the series known as "Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1868," and "Foreign Relations" since 1870; and in Great Britain in the "British and Foreign State Papers." These papers, showing the opinions of various states from time to time upon certain subjects which may not come up for formal state action, afford a valuable source of information upon the attitude of states toward questions still formally unsettled. The simple expression to state agents in the way of instructions or information as to the position of the state on a given matter may, if continued and long accepted, give to the principle involved the force of international sanction. This was almost the case in the so-called Monroe Doctrine? In these papers may often be found an indication of the line which the principles of international law will subsequently follow, and a general consensus by several states in diplomatic instructions may be considered strong evidence of what the law is on a given point. The Paquete Habana and the Lola, 175 U. S., 677. In signing the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the representatives of the United States made the reservation that, "Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." OUTLINE OF CHAPTER V STATES 20. DEFINITION OF A STATE. (a) Must be political unity. (b) Must possess sovereignty. 21. CONDITIONS OF STATE EXISTENCE. (a) Moral. (b) Physical. (c) Communal. (d) External relationship. 22. RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES. (a) De facto existence of a state. (b) Varying circumstances of recognition. (1) By division. (2) By union. (3) By admission of old states. (4) By admission of former barbarous communities. (5) Individual and collective recognition. (6) Example of an act of dissolution. (c) Acts constituting recognition. (d) Premature recognition. (e) Certain political conditions requisite for recognition. (f) Recognition irrevocable. (g) Consequences of recognition. (1) For the recognizing state. (2) For the recognized state. (3) For the parent state. CHAPTER V STATES 20. Definition of a State A State is a sovereign political unity. It is of the relations of states that public international' law mainly treats. From the nature of its subject-matter it is a juridical, historical, and philosophical science.1 These sovereign political unities may vary greatly. The unity, however, (a) Must be political, i.e. organized for public ends as understood in the family of nations and not Must be sovereign. political and for private ends as in the case of a commercial company, a band of pirates, or a religious organization. It is (b) Must possess sovereignty, i.e. supreme political power beyond and above which there is no political power. not inconsistent with sovereignty, that a state should voluntarily take upon itself obligations to other states, even though the obligations be assumed under stress of war or fear of evil. 21. Conditions of State Existence From the nature of the state as a sovereign political unity it must be self-sufficient, and certain conditions are therefore generally recognized as necessary for its existence from the standpoint of international law.2 'Holtzendorff, "Introduction droit public," 44. |