ligible. So it is in regard to the conversion of the soul. That it is by the agency of the Spirit of God is clear beyond dispute; and it is equally clear that it is done in perfect accordance with the freedom of man; that no effect is produced which the truth is not fitted to work out; and that it is in entire accordance with all the powers of our rational nature. If these things are so, then two conclusions follow from what has been said, of more importance to us than any other which can have relation to this subject; and with a bare allusion to these I shall conclude this discourse. The first is, that of encouragement. There is one Agent who can accomplish all that is needful to be accomplished in our salvation; and if the sinner perishes, it will not be because he who is entrusted with the work of changing the heart is deficient in power. There is no heart so hard, that it may not be subdued; none so proud, that it may not be humbled; none so wicked, that the Holy Spirit cannot make it holy. What man cannot do, he can accomplish; and in our conscious weakness and sinfulness, therefore, we may feel that he has power to effect in our souls all that need be effected to secure our salvation. The other conclusion which follows from the view that has been taken is, that there is an obligation resting on man in regard to this change. If it were in all respects like creating a world, or like raising the dead; or if, in any sense, the work of the Spirit were of the nature of miracle, there would not be any such obligation. Man could be under no more obligation to love God and repent of sin than he is to create a new star or sun, or to lift up the tides of the ocean. But conversion is wholly a different thing. In the whole change man is a freeman. He acts in view of truth, and the effect is in accordance with truth. His own active powers are concerned, for all the change is on those powers,-securing their proper action. Hence, there is an ample field for our agency; for our use of means; for our putting forth our efforts in the work. And hence there is true philosophy, as well as an incentive to exertion, to work, and to trust in God, in the remark so often made, that man should make the effort for his own salvation as if it were to be secured wholly by his own power; and yet depend on the grace and Spirit of the Lord as if he could do nothing. Or to express the same thing, and to express all, in the better language of an inspired apostle, man should "work out his own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure." May God give us all grace to do it, for Christ's sake, and to him be all the praise. Amen. SERMON XXI. THE NATURE OF REPENTANCE. ACTS xx. 21.-"Testifying both to the Jews, and also to the Greeks, repentance toward God." PAUL, in the passage before us, refers to the main things on which he insisted in his preaching. As a leading point he "testified" or bore witness to the necessity of exercising repentance toward God. The necessity of this he urged on all of the two great divisions of the human family to whom he had access- -the Jews and the Greeks:-that is, he urged it on all classes alike; on every human being. He in reference to whom repentance was to be exercised was God: "repentance toward God." It was his law which had been violated. Transgressions in their most important bearings always terminated on him. He had a right to take cognizance of them. He only could pardon those who had committed them. Paul, therefore, in all places laid it down as one of the primary doctrines of religion, and one of the things essential to salvation, that every human being should exercise repentance toward God. I propose, at this time, to enter on the consideration of the subject of repentance-a subject occupying a primary place in all systems of religion which regard man as in any sense a sinner. It was a primary doctrine in the system of Lord Herbert, the first and the best of British Deists; it was the leading doctrine of John the Baptist-of the Saviour himself-of Paul. "In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judea, and saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. iii. 1, 2. From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, Repent for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. iv. 17. So Paul here says that he had taught the Ephesians publicly, and from house to house, "testifying repentance towards God." : There are many interesting and important inquiries in regard to repentance which a minister of religion ought to be able to answer. What is repentance? What is the reason of its appointment as a condition of salvation? Why could not men be saved without it? What is its efficacy in a system of revealed religion? How is true repentance distinguished from false? Why will not that regret which every man feels when he has done wrong be sufficient for salvation, even though he should not embrace the gospel? These and kindred inquiries always occur to thinking minds when the subject of repentance is suggested; and on these I propose to submit some views which I trust will show the reason of the place assigned to it in a system of revealed religion. The first question which presents itself is, What is repentance? To that inquiry I intend at present to confine my remarks. The views which I entertain of the nature of repentance, I will express in a few propositions, which I trust will make it plain to all. I. Repentance, in general, is a state of mind which springs up in view of perceived personal guilt. I say 'in general,' because I wish under this head to describe it as a mere mental operation experienced by all men, or as it exists in the mind of every one when he is made sensible of wrong-doing. Every man experiences repentance of some kind. If he did not, you could not define it so that he could understand it, any more than you can define colours to a blind man, or harmony to the deaf. The peculiar nature of evangelical repentance will be the subject of a distinct proposition. The inquiry now before us is, What is repentance as a mental operation, distinguished from other mental operations? The proposition which I have laid down is, that it is a state of mind which springs up in view of perceived personal guilt. Let us analyze this, and see whether we cannot find here all the essential elements of which the mind is conscious when it exercises repentance. (1.) It is in view of perceived guilt. I mean that the mind must perceive or see that it has done wrong. You must see that something has been done or omitted for which you are blameworthy. The mind cannot repent without this. It never does. You cannot make a man repent for the colour of his hair, or for having a deformed limb, or for a natural impediment in his speech, however much he may regret its existence, or seriously feel its disadvantage. In relation to an action which a man performs, you cannot make him repent unless he perceives that it is wrong, and that he deserves blame for it. If he esteems what he has done to be right, all arguments are vain to induce him to exercise repentance. Your appeals are powerless as long as he does not see that he is blameworthy for what he has done. If he thinks that circumstances justified what he has done, though others may think that it was wrong; if his mind is so little enlightened that he does not know what was right or wrong in the case; if he is so debased by vice, or superstition, or ignorance, that his moral perceptions are blunted and paralyzed, you will labour in vain to awaken in his bosom the feelings which constitute repentance. If, for instance, he has killed a man, and is conscious that he did it in self-defence, however much he may regret the necessity of the act, while he retains the belief that it was justifiable and right, you can never excite in his bosom the feelings of repentance. (2.) The second thing in my statement of what constitutes repentance in general is, that it must be in view of personal guilt. I mean by this, that a man cannot repent for the act of another. Repentance always has metes and bounds, and is always limited by what we ourselves deserve. There is no other guilt but that which is personal; and you can never make a man feel any other. The human mind has been so created that it can repent for no other and every theory formed on the supposition that one man can repent for the sin of another, and every instance in which a man has attempted to persuade himself that he has done it, must be false. The soul of man has not been made in a manner so loose, and so regardless of laws, that either of these things is possible. You may regret what another man has done; you may suffer on account of it in person, in property, in health, or in your family; ; you may weep over it all your life, but you do not repent of it. The son of an intemperate father has abundant occasion to regret the career which his father has pursued. It may have deprived him of property which he would otherwise have inherited; it may have made him the early victim of disease; it may have subjected him to the passionate outbreaks of one who has been made a madman by intoxication; it may have separated him from the respectable society which he might otherwise have enjoyed; it may have prevented his acquiring an education, and preparing himself for honourable usefulness; it may have compelled him to enter on life every way under disadvantage, and many a time he may have wept over it, but it is an abuse of language to say that he has ever repented of it. Between his feelings, deep and pungent as they may be, and what they would have been if he had been himself the drunkard, there is a line which is never crossed; and God has so made the human soul that it never can be crossed. So of the shame which an erring daughter may bring on a family; so of the deep sorrow which invades the soul when a son is reckless and abandoned. The blood which mantles your cheek then, is made to mount there by a different law from that which diffuses the shame and sorrow of repentance when you yourself have done the wrong.-The principle which I am here laying down is universal. Your own mind can never exercise repentance for what another has done, nor can repentance with you be connected with any of his acts, except so far as he is your agent, or you have authorized him to act in your place, and then the repentance is not for what he does, but for what you did in appointing him. That class of theologians who suppose that it is the duty of men to repent of the sin of Adam, advance a dogma which is against all the laws of the human mind; and they who work themselves up into a belief that they do repent for what he did thousands of years before they had any being, however amiable their tears may be, and however their sorrows may assume the semblance of piety, must be ignorant of the nature of their own mental operations. That they may regret what he did; that they may mourn over the ravages of sin introduced by his guilty act, no one can doubt;-that they should repent of what he or any other man ever did, the laws of our nature render impossible. A man can as properly take to himself credit for the virtuous deeds performed by another, and claim a reward for them, as exercise repentance for his vices and his follies. (3.) The third thing which is implied in my statement is, that repentance is a state of mind which springs up by a law of our nature when our personal guilt is perceived. What I mean is, that when it exists at all, it is originated by this law. I will not say that repentance always in fact exists when guilt is perceived, for I know that it is possible for a man by an effort of will, or under the influence of some strong perverted purpose, to oppose the regular operations of the laws of his own mind, and to resist conclusions which the fair exercise of reason would reach if there were no perversion and no opposition. Such may be the stubbornness of his will, such the determination not to see a certain result in a process of reasoning, that he may set aside the clearest testimony; and evidence, which according to the laws of his nature ought to make a deep impression on him, may in fact make none, while evidence which may in fact have no real force, may seem to him "strong as proof of holy writ." So, I admit, it may be in regard to repentance. It is possible that a man may perceive his guilt, and yet may hold his mind in stern resistance to the laws which would lead him to repentance. He may resolve not to feel; not to weep; not to make confession; not to allow the usual marks of guilt to be depicted in the eye, the cheek, the frame. He may even tremble under the consciousness of guilt, and yet resolve not to abandon his course, though to persevere in it may require him to drive his purposes over all the finer feelings of his nature. What I mean is, that where repentance does exist, it springs up in accordance with one of the regular laws of our nature. It is |