Of the proceedings of committees on opposed bills III. Of the duties of the committee as to reporting their proceed- OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON; I. Of the continuity and permanence of the senate of the United II. Writ for the election of the members of the house of commons The writ to the sheriff, on a general election III. Of the liability of returning, officers LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. PRELIMINARY. 1. THE political science of modern times, in its analysis of the different functions of civil government, under whatever name or form they may be exercised, has arranged them all in three grand divisions, denominated the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. In all modern constitutional governments, each of these classes of functions is appropriated to a separate and distinct department, which is intended to be, and to a greater or less extent is, practicallyindependent of either, or both of the others.1 The most important of these departments, both because of the nature of its functions, and because it is necessarily the depositary of so much of the absolute power of the people, as they see fit to intrust to their government, and do not confer upon other departments, is the legislative. 2. The department of legislation, in the greater number of modern States, and in every one of the States composing the American Union, as well as in the government of the Union itself, consists of two separate and distinct branches, possessing independent and 1 The separation has been deemed so essential in this country, that it has been provided for, in express terms, in the constitutions of many of the States; and several of them declare also not only that the departments shall be separate, but that no person or persons, belonging to one, shall exercise any of the powers belonging to either of the others, except in cases expressly permitted. In Maine, the constitution of which contains the latter provision, it has been held, on that ground, that the office of justice of the peace is incompatible with that of sheriff, deputy sheriff, or coroner. See Chapman v. Shaw, Greenleaf's Reports, III. 372; Opinion of the Justices, etc., Same, III. 484; and Bamford v. Melvin, Same, VII. 14. t coördinate powers; both of which must concur in every act of legislation; each of which is composed of a sufficient number of members to give it the character of a deliberative assembly; and whose concurrent acts, in matters of legislation, are (with two or three exceptions) subject to a negative, either absolute or qualified, on the part of the executive power. 3. Of these two branches in the legislatures of this country, though they are in fact equal in power and dignity, the one, being a smaller and more select body, is usually regarded as the upper house, and the other, consisting of a larger and less select body of members, as the lower. The members of the former, commonly called the senate, are usually required to possess certain peculiar qualifications, as to age and residence; are chosen by more numerous constituencies, and sometimes by a comparatively select, that is, a more highly qualified body of electors; and are not unfrequently elected for longer terms of office. The members of the latter, variously known as representatives, burgesses, commons, or delegates, are chosen by smaller constituencies; sometimes, by a more popular suffrage, that is, by electors of less qualifications; and often, for shorter periods of official duty. There are States, however, in which the qualifications of the electors, the term of office, and the conditions of eligibility, are precisely the same, in reference to both branches. 4. The functions of the upper and lower houses, though absolutely the same in matters of legislation, (with certain exceptions which will be adverted to hereafter,) are, in some of the States of the Union, essentially different in certain respects, in which their powers have been specially enlarged or restricted by the fundamental law; the former, for example, sometimes exercising the functions of an executive council, as in the federal government, or of a judicial tribunal, in the last resort, as formerly in the State of New York; and the latter, (not unfrequently, however, in conjunction with the other,) sometimes electing or appointing to office, either in the first instance, or, in the case of a failure to elect, on the part of electors, whose duty it is, in the first instance, to make certain elections. There is one matter, however, within the usual and ordinary powers of the two branches, in reference to which their functions are essentially different, namely, the impeachment and trial of public officers for official misconduct, in which the of fender is impeached or accused by the lower house, and tried and sentenced by the upper. 5. From a general view of some of the characteristic features of the legislative assemblies of this country, it is manifest, that their original type is to be found in the parliament of Great Britain ; upon the model of which they have all been formed, with such modifications and changes, as have been found necessary to adapt them to the various circumstances and wants of the people. The most striking of these differences are, that, in this country, both branches are elected by the people for specified terms, and that the members of the lower house (and of the other also, either wholly or in part) are apportioned among and elected by their several constituencies, upon the principle of equality;1 whereas, in England, the house of lords is composed of members who are not elected at all, but who sit as members, during their lives, in virtue of hereditary or conferred right, as the nobility or temporal lords, or of their appointment to high dignities in the church, as the archbishops and bishops, or lords spiritual; and the members of the house of commons, though elected, are not apportioned among the several constituencies and elected upon the principle of equality of representation, but chiefly upon the principle of corporate or municipal right. 6. Besides these differences between the British parliament and the legislative assemblies of the United States, there is another of not less importance, namely, that the existence and powers of the former rest only upon custom and tradition, aided by occasional statute provisions; whereas the latter are founded in, and for a great part regulated, limited, and controlled by, written fundamental laws or constitutions. 7. There is still another difference, not inferior perhaps in importance, which is, that the British parliament can only be convened at the pleasure of the sovereign, who is invested with full power both to convene and dissolve it, and is only required by law not to suffer a longer period than three years to elapse between the dissolution of one parliament and the convening of another; while, in the several governments of the American Union, the meetings, periods of existence, and manner of dissolution, of the legislative assemblies, are all provided for and regulated by the fundamental laws. 8. The legislative department, however carefully separated and kept distinct both from the executive and judicial departments, and though exercising coördinate and independent functions, is nevertheless by its very nature, the depositary of so much of the supreme 1 Constitution of Massachusetts, Part II. Chap. I. Sect. III. ་ |