in which subjects calculated to create disunion were introduced; when he looked particularly to that clause of the speech which had been observed on by the noble duke, he found it impossible for him not to give his support to the amendment proposed. The speech referred to the fact of his majesty having been apprised of the intention of the enemy to combine the powers of the continent "in one general confederacy, to be directed, either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and inglorious peace.' That for this purpose states formerly neutral were to be forced into hostility, and compelled "to bring to bear against the different parts of his majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Portugal and Denmark." If this were really the case, it would be a complete justification of the conduct of this country, not only in the eyes of ourselves, but of the whole world. For the moment a nation meditates hostility against you, that is to be regarded as a declaration of war. No persons can be bound to lie by till it be convenient for their enemies to attack them. But then, to give effect to this justification, some proof of the truth and existence of it must be adduced. It is not sufficient to say, We know we were correct; it is essential to the character of a country acting in this manner, not for its vindication merely in the eyes of foreign nations, but even to the maintenance of its respect at home, to show some one or other of the proofs on which it founds its justification. Where, he would ask, were the demonstrations of hostility manifested on the part of Denmark towards this country? Where were

her armies? In Holstein. Where was her fleet? Lying in ordinary, Her armies, so far from being in. hostile movement against us, were, to the number of 25,000 men, encamped in Holstein, guarding against the inroads of the French. Had they been in Zealand, we might not so easily have been able to congratulate ourselves on the victory we obtained. Her navy, so far from meditating hostilities against us, was surprised, the greater part of it in a state of complete disrepair. It was said, how ever, that the French would have seized on Holstein, and might from thence easily have passed over to Zealand. This, his lordship understood, was by no means so easy as was imagined. Such a frost seldom occurred as to give a complete passage from the one place to the other; and even when it did so happen, the people of Zealand might break the ice nearest to their own side. Supposing, however, that the French might thus have got possession of the Danish navy, still it remained to be inquired what use they could make of it? For, in viewing a question of this kind, where we vindicated an outrage on our part, on the ground that we were apprehensive of a danger accruing thence to us, it became us to show that the injury we dreaded was imminent, and which we could only have averted from ourselves by the outrage we committed against our neighbour, which was comparatively of trifling import. On this principle, he would ask, what had we to dread from the addition to the French force of sixteen sail of the line, composed of such ships as those of Denmark? Even before the battle of Trafal gar, we could have had nothing to dread from such an accession of strength

strength to our enemy, far less now. Previously to that glorious victory, when the greater part of our ene mies' effective force was destroyed, at a time when all the northern powers were our declared enemies, did Britain shrink from the contest, or insinuate that she entertained such fears for her existence, as our recent attack on the defenceless Danes seems to betray? Surely not. We then bravely met the storm, and prevailed, as we should have done on the present occasion had we confined ourselves to our usual mode of honourable warfare. We were told, however, that these hostile dispositions on the part of the northern powers, had begun to show themselves ever since the peace of Tilsit. He would ask, then, why we had allowed a Russian fleet since that time to pass through the Mediterranean, and three sail of the line belonging to that power to go unmolested at the very time the Danish fleet was seized on. Would it not have been more magnanimous to attack the powerful than the weak? It was known that the minds of the inhabitants of St. Petersburgh were favourable to this country. By preseating itself at a proper season be fore that capital, our fleet might have gained possession of it, and thus Sweden would have been saved, and Denmark, who was as much our friend as Russia was our ally, would have been spared. This mode of warfare his lordship particularly objected to, as going to overturn the law of nations. It would have been more becoming in Great Britain to oppose our honour and good faith to our enemies' mode of warfare.

The earl of Aberdeen defended the expedition to Copenhagen; and maintained that self-protection was

a leading principle of the law of nations There wanted no greater proof of the inability of the Danish government to resist the power of France, and the determination of the latter power to compel it to join in hostilities against this country; than their joining the northern confederacy in 1801, and alleging as a reason for it, their inability to resist the power of Russia. It was in vain, therefore, to urge, that Denmark might have resisted the power of France, and thus draw an inference against the expedition, as it was evident she could not; added to which, she had repeatedly evinced hostility against this country.

Lord Grenville agreed in the terms of the king's speech, that we were "in the crisis of the fate of the country; and that the eyes of the world were fixed upon the British parliament;" for upon their wisdom depended the existence of the British empire, which had stood a thousand years, and of the British constitution, the pride and boast of human wisdom; both had ripened and grown together, and could only be maintained and preserved by the prudence of parliament. The points alluded to in the speech were those on which parliament were called upon to decide before any information was submitted to them, that could guide their decisior. Of these points, the seizure of the Danish fleet, and the bombardment of Copenhagen, were far the most prominent. On the justice and necessity of that measure it was difficult for him to pronounce, because he was ignorant of the grounds upon which it was to be justified. He had first to complain, that the assertions in the declaration and those contained in the speech of this day, were wholly at variance. Even that declaration

Was

was not laid before the house. The declaration supposed the existence of secret articles entered into at Tilsit, by virtue of which a general confederacy was to be formed against this country. These articles are the acts of hostility that are set up as a justification of our conduct towards Denmark: Where are those secret articles? The enemy denies their existence, and calls on us to prove it. What does the speech say;--we see nothing in it of those secret articles and arrangements it speaks only of information of the designs of the enemy to raise a confederacy against us. Was Den. mark a party to the secret articles we complain of? Why not attack Russia on the same grounds? But the house has only the assertions of ministers that such were the sentiments of Denmark. It is not enough to prove that France meditated such hostile intentions against us; it should likewise be proved, that she had the means of executing her designs. It is said, Denmark had not the means of resist ng France; and France once in possession of Holstein, must soon be in possession of Zealand; and therefore of Copenhagen, and of the Danish fieet. But is not Zealand an island? Is that island not secured by two branches of the sea, one of six miles broad, the other of sixteen miles? The channel that divides England from France is only five miles broader. God forbid it should therefore be said, that because the French were in possession of Calais, they would soon have possession of England. In heart and conscience we cannot justify the measure on the grounds laid before us. It were to be wished that a better case were made out: and if it can, let it be submitted to parliament. The noble

lord disapproved of the rejection of the mediation of Russia. He never would admit the doctrine, that in order to be a proper mediator, the mediating power must be perfectly impartial. The language of the speech on the subject of peace was also inconsistent. In one place the speech said his majesty was ready to negotiate on safe and honourable terms; and imme diately after that peace could only be negotiated upon a footing of perfect equality. Never could he wish that England should proceed to negotiate but on the footing of equality: but this perfect equality might be too nicely weighed and in the present state of Europe, the door should not be shut against peace upon honourable terms. The noble lord next adverted to our dispute with America, and the or ders in council restricting the trade of neutrals. He contended that the latter would involve us in a war with America: that France had assured America she would never put her decrees in force against American ships; and by that declaration we are placed in the light in which France would have stood, if the late orders in council had not been issued. France has not the means of putting in force her own decrees; it is England that has now lent her the aid of the British navy to give them full effect, and thereby to annoy and distress British commerce. As to Portugal, what have we done? we are excluded from the two most important ports in Europe: and the change is, that the Brazils are now governed by the prince regent of Portugal instead of being governed by his viceroy. Does that advantage compensate the great losses which we otherwise sustain by the fate that has fallen upon Portugals

and

and which we had taken no means to prevent? His lordship concluded by blaming ministers for not having done something to promote unanimity in Ireland, and express ing himself in terms of dissatisfaction at the whole of their conduct.

Lord Hawkesbury defended the attack on Copenhagen. They could not state their authority from obvious motives; but they had information that justified their proceedings. He stated the heads of information. First, they learned that there were secret engagements at the treaty of Tilsit; that the view of the parties was to confederate all the powers of Europe, and particularly to engage or seize on the fleets of Denmark and Portugal to annoy this country. They heard this from their public ministers then abroad. They heard it from their faithful ally, Portugal. They also received information of the hostile intentions of Denmark from a quarter to which they had often been indebted for the first knowledge of the designs of Bonaparte-from, or rather through, the disaffected in Ireland! They learned that Ireland was to be attacked from two points-Lisbon and Copenhagen; and they never found the information of these persons, however they came by it, false. And, finally, they had a confidential communication, that in the council of the highest authorities in Copenhagen the matter was discussed, whether, on an option that they should join either England or France, an option which they understood was to be put to them, they resolved to join France. Having learnt this, ministers would have been traitors if they had not secured the fleet. He then went over the other topics of lord Grenville's speech-Portugal, America,

the orders in council, and the state of Ireland. On the two last he declined saying much. The one would come regularly before them on a future day, and the less that was said of the other the better.

Lord Buckinghamshire explained the measure of our sending a force to Madeira, in 1800, which had been alluded to by lord Hawesbury, as similar in principle to that of seizing the Danish fleet.

The earl of Lauderdale, in a most argumentative speech, urged the constitutional necessity of a bill of indemnity for the orders of council.

Lord Mulgrave said, that neither at the time of rejecting the Russian mediation, nor at this moment, had government any copy of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. They were in possession of secret projects-but could only assert, not adduce proof of their nature.

The amendment, and another amendment by lord Grenville, declaratory of the opinion of the house, that it would neither be respectful to his majesty, nor becom ing the dignity of the house, to give opinion as to the propriety of rejecting the Russian mediation, till the papers relative to that question were before the house--were both negatived without a division.

The address was then agreed to, and ordered to be presented.

In the house of commons, The speaker informed the house, that he had been in the house of peers, and had heard his majesty's speech by the lords commissioners read, of which he had procured a copy: which, according to usual custom, being read,

Lord Hamilton (son of the mar quis Abercorn) rose, and in a maiden speech moved an address of thanks. He began by advert,

ing to the nature of the struggle in which we were embarked; and to the nature and spirit of the foe with whom we had to contend. We were not, he said, only opposed as mar to man, or as nation to nation, against one of the most gigantic powers that ever existed in the world, but to a power which, in addition to its own strength, had succeeded in absorbing into itself almost every other European state. The situation of the country was, therefore, most critical; it required the most vigorous exertion, it demanded the most liberal sacrifices. Faint-heartedness would be our destruction. There was no midway for us between success and ruin. Under such circumstances, the contemplation of the resources and 'spirit of the country was a subject of consolation and pride; and how ever the protraction of the war, with the inevitable burthens, and the partial obstruction to commerce which that protraction occasioned, were to be lamented, we had only to look around us, to be thankful for the contrast which we presented to neighbouring nations; to be thankful for the liberty, for the happiness, for the pre-eminence which we enjoyed; to be thankful that, instead of our means having been impaired by our difficulties, they had, on the contrary, increased with them, and had been cemented by the very circumstances which were projected for their destruction. Great Britain at the present moment exhibited the astonishing spectacle of a country, which, at the end of fifteen years war with a most powerful antagonist, had gained every thing, and lost no. thing. Every where we had in flicted blows on our enemy, no where had we received a blow from him. Our commerce had

flourished; our wealth had increased; our possessions had mul tiplied. Our navy, always formidable, had swept every hostile fleet from the face of the ocean. War, the curse of every other nation, had to Britain been a comparative blessing. Indeed, such was the extraordinary state of Europe, that he apprehended very much that war was the only mode by which the advantages which we had acquired could be maintained. Peace, under the present circumstances, while it would be as expensive to us as war, would be ten times as dangerous. Successfully, however, as we had resisted the machinations and the violence of our foe, still the house was not less bound to take care that those ministers, whose duty it was to direct the resources and the energies of the country, were fulfilling that duty; that they were competent to the discharge of the function with which they were invested; and that they deserved a continuation of the con fidence of the country. This would be best ascertained by a retrospect of their acts; and those acts were so fully described in his majesty's most gracious speech, that it appeared to him needless to recupi tulate them. Having, however, briefly adverted to them, he said, of the many important subjects of consideration suggested by his majesty's speech, none were more important than the principles adopted, and the steps taken, by our government, to frustrate the enemy's designs against our commerce. It was the broad principle of retalia tion and self-defence. The com duct of France had annihilated every thing in the world like new. trality. There existed but two powers, the enemy's and our own: fortunately these powers were too

unequal