and freedom could rest with the smallest satisfaction or hope. With the solitary exception of Sweden, every state had fallen before the arms, or yielded itself up to the inAuence, of France. The war between that power and Russia, from which, at one stage of its progress, a favourable result was expected, had, by its final termination, not only extended and confirmed the empire of Bonaparte, but had also been succeeded by the most blind and complete devotion of Alexander to the interest and plans of his conqueror. The emperor of the French could thus, after the treaty of Tilsit, boast of having achieved much more than even entered the flattered imagination of Lewis the XIVth in the zenith of his conquests and glory. And not only was his power more extensive than any former European conqueror had ever possessed, but it had every appearance of being more solid and durable. In France itself, every thing answered his expectations and was devoted to his interest. Even when he had withdrawn all his forces against Russia, and was at a great distance from his capital, engaged in a doubtful contest, there was not the slightest appearance of discontent or intrigue. Wearied out with change, sick of rapine and bloodshed, or watched with such minute rigilance and care, that no plans could be formed inimical to the interest of Bonaparte, the people of France submitted to his civil government as peaceably and completely during the absence of himself and his armies, as they had done when guarded and oppressed by their presence. In his armies he had the most full and firm re. liance: their interest and fate were interwoven with his own. their very nature and constitution, they presented the most powerful motives that could draw forth talent, courage and skill. To the man of superior mind and views, the army held out the encouraging prospect of rising to the first power and honours of the state. Bonaparte and his generals had risen by means of it from the lowest origin; and the path by which they had arrived at their eminence, was still wisely left completely open for future candidates. The government of France thus secured a constant and regular supply of military skill, by the only effectual mode of securing it. To such as looked not so far or so high, the life of a soldier presented motives more level to the capacities and desires of the multitude; while they were engaged in actual warfare, an unchecked or encouraged liberty to gratify every passion, bound them to their officers and to their mode of life, and spurred them on to victory and carnage: while they remained in their own country, they were gratified by the superiority over the mere citizen, which the laws of France and the policy of Bonaparte allowed them. With an immense army thus constituted and disposed, animated and skilled by the defeat of all the powers on the continent of Europe, Bonaparte would have had no reason to doubt the solidity and permanency of his power, even if the governments to whom he had still left the name and shadow of freedom had been inclined or able to attack him. But there was not one, from whom, after the treaty of Tilsit, he had any thing to dread. A short sketch of their state and their views at the conclusion of the year 1807, will convince us how By unable or unwilling they were to 03 oppose oppose the power and the plans of Bonaparte. The emperor of Austria may justly be regarded as the least induced of all those whom he has conquered, to enter into . views. But he was under the necessity of complying with the mandates of the co..quero. Weakened by a bloodly, an ill-managed and unfortunate war; surrounded by states which owed their existence to France, and who from their position as well as from interest would defend her from at tack, it would have been madness in Austria to have gone to war with France, either for the purpose of asserting her independence and resisting the commands of Bonaparte, or with a view to regain her lost territories. The internal state of Austria was as little favourable to hostile designs: her government had not been taught by the misfortuncs she had suffered, to remove the causes which had produced them; intrigue, cabal and interest still influenced the determinations of her cabinets; her armies had been beaten by the armies of France, because the latter were commanded and led on by men, who had gained their appointments by their talents and skill; and yet Austria still persevered in the old system of giving officers to her armies from among such men only as could boast of a pure descent or of ill-gotten interest at court. The losses she had suffered rendered the cordial cooperation of all ranks necessary to her welfare; and yet her peasantry still groaned under such bondage as made them indolent, and indifferent under the misfortunes of their government. Her paper money forced into circulation, not called for by the extension of her commerce, nor supported by mutual confidence and credit, necessarily lost great part of its value on the mere rumour of a war with France. Besides these cir. cumstances, which of themselves would be sufficient to render her country a matter of indifference to Bonaparte, the emperor of Austria had sufficient wisdom to perceive, that the only chance he possessed of regaining any part of his lost territories, was by husband ng resources, and by re-establishing his finances and armies, by such slow and gradual methods as should not attract the notice and arouse the jealousy of Bonaparte, his The emperor of Russia,' after the peace of Tilsit, was less disposed, and probably not more able, than the emperor of Austria, to oppose · the plans of Bonaparte. The per fidy he discovered in agreeing to accept part of the territory of that power, in whose defence he had entered into the war, the ease with which, by the intrigues and flattery of Bonaparte, he had been converted from an enemy to a friend, proved at once how little he could be depended upon for the freedom of Europe, and how well he was suited to become the willing instrument of his conqueror. In the vain and delusive hope of extending an empire already too large and unwieldy, and which required in the person who govern. ed it rather the legislator than the warrior; he gave himself completely up to that system of policy which, by engaging him in a war with Great Britain and Sweden, fully answered the purposes of Bonaparte, by blocking up the sources of his wealth, and weakening the strength of his armies. His immense empire, destitute of ma nufactures, and covered with the raw materials necessary to carry them on, obviously required an open and friendly communication with such a country as Britain: yet with her, at the instigation of Bonaparte, he engaged in war; and moreover undertook to prohibit the importation of her manufactures; forgetting that if he did succeed, he must at the same time put a stop to the importation of the produce of his own country, which was either given in exchange for these manufactures, or actually supplied them. The situation and character of the minor states of Europe, at the period we are now considering, were in every respect favourable to the views of Bonaparte. In Spain it was probable that he meant to overturn the Bourbon family, and to place one of his own creatures; though from our imperfect know ledge of what was actually passing there, and of the precise means by which he intended to bring about his object, there appeared at one time reason to suppose that the royal family would be continued on the throne. He had driven, either designedly or by a prema tare disclosure of his hostile intentions, the house of Braganza from Portugal, and occupied it with his the final destiny which awaited it, seemed to depend on the successful termination of his schemes with regard to Spain. It is superfluous to speak individually of Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, or Germany. They were all either occupied by his troops or governed by his obedient vassals. Prussia had severely atoned for her former perfidy and rashness. The king and queen were obliged to live in the most humble and retired manner, and to witness with out a murmur, or even the expresson of pity, the exactions that were armies : wrested from their impoverished subjects by the French soldiers. Denmark, exasperated by our attack on Copenhagen, had thrown herself completely into the arms of France. Sweden alone, of all the powers on the continent, remained firmly opposed to Bonaparte, unseduced by his promises of a share in the spoil, and unsubdued by his menaces. The peculiar situation of her territories rendered them inaccessible to the power of France; and the ardour and heroism of the king was seconded by the zeal and affection of his subjects, now that the war threatened the provinces of Sweden, and that they again beheld their monarch in the midst of them. The possession of Sweden however, separated as it is from the rest of Europe, would not have been the object of Bonaparte's ambition, had he not been actuated by a personal hatred against its monarch, and by the wish to exclude Britain from the shores of the Baltic. For towards the destruction of this island his ambi tion and resentment were directed with more undivided thought, now that he had brought the whole contineat under his power. Here however he found his talents and formidable armies of no avail. France and Britain had no point of contact in the common mode of warfare. Every feet which the former had sent to sea had only increased the marine and added to the glory of England; while our armies, shut out from the continent, had no opportunity of meeting those of France. Bonaparte therefore had recourse to a new mode of warfare: his object was to annihilate the commerce of Britain, by shutting out her manufactures from the continent. Accustomed to find every obstacle giye way to the power of his armies, he forgot that commerce cannot be restrained; that the mutual wants of nations will be supplied in spite of decrees; and that the threat of blockading England, coming from a sovereign without a navy, can only show the impotence of his rage. But though every attempt to injure this country by decrees against its trade, must ultimately be unavailing, yet at first they will succeed in some measure, until successful modes of eluding the vigilance of those whose business or interest it is to prevent the introduction of our manufactures on the continent are found out. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if, at the beginning of this year, when every port in Europe, with the exception of those in Sweden, was shut against us, and when our amicable relations with America were in a very precarious state, our manufacturers should feel the pressure of distress. One of the first events we have to record is the meeting at Leeds for the purpose of petitioning for peace. It was held at the Mixed-Cloth Hall of that town on the 19th of January, and attended by nearly 10,000 per sons. A set of resolutions were unanimously agreed to: in these the meeting pointed out the distress under which the manufactures of Yorkshire laboured, arising from the war; and a petition to his majesty was drawn up, praying him to adopt such measures as might be thought most advisable for restoring at an early period the blessings of peace. As the nation was by no means disposed to purchase a precarious and dishonourable peace, in order that the manufacturers of Yorkshire might be relieved from their distress, and as it was the general opinion, that, under all the circumstances of Europe, and the known character and disposition of Bonaparte, no other peace could be obtained, the Yorkshire petition produced no effect. Besides, it is too well known, both from the general character of those who are deeply interested in trade, and from the actual behaviour of the Yorkshire manufacturers at former periods of the war, that their objection to its continuance, as it arose solely from its being injurious to their interests, would entirely disappear, or even be changed into approba tion, provided it increased the demand for their goods. The attention and interest of the public were drawn more gene rally and strongly towards the news which arrived from America. This country was placed in a very singu lar and disagreeable situation: her ships were exposed to be captured both by England and France; the carrying trade, by which she had gained so much wealth, could no longer be engaged in without great loss or risk. Bonaparte, by his absurd decree from Berlin, had forced from us our orders in coun cil, which, though meant to operate entirely to his disadvantage, un. avoidably fell hard on the Ame rican States. Nor did they de serve much pity; for, instead of protesting against the first mover of the absurd plans for restricting commerce, they tamely acquiesced in his orders, and reserved their complaints to be levelled against us, who in self-defence had been compelled to have recourse to the orders in council. Thus situated and disposed, the American congress, on the 22d of December 1807, resolved, in order to avoid the losses and hostilities which were to be apprehended from the measures measures respectively adopted by England and France, to lay a strict embargo on all the vessels of the United States. By the act which was then passed, their own vessels were prohibited from departing from a y of their ports; and ships from all other nations were commanded to quit the American harbours, with or without cargoes, as soon as the act was notified to them. This act, so singular in its nature, and so important in its consequences, passed a majority of nearly two to one. No person could question the right of the American States to Lay up all their vessels and permit them to rot, rather than expose them to insult or capture: the policy of the measure however, and the disposition which it manifests towards this country and France, admit of investigation. Even when regarded as a choice of evils, its policy may justly be suspected. How many different classes of American citizens must it deprive of the means of gaining a maintenance, disposing of their superabundant produce, or employing their capital! Their sailors must either starve on shore, or enter into English vessels; and thus, in the latter case, they are preparing fresh sources of dispute and rancour between the two countries. With respect to the disposition it manifests towards England and France, there can be no doubt, that though both must suffer from it, yet as the former carried on a more extensive commerce with America than the latter, she must suffer in a greater degree. If America, by means of the embargo, looked further than the mere safety of her ships and seamen; if she hoped, by withdrawing from the ocean, to compel France or Eng land to rescind their decrees, she certainly reckoned on a result not likely to be produced. Bonaparte pays too little regard to the sufferings of his subjects, to be turned aside, from measures he thinks will injure England, in order to relieve them; and England, while she commands the ocean, and preserves her superiority in manufacturing skill and capital, can never be at a loss to find a market for her goods. At first, however, the embargo excited a great alarm among commercial men; especially in Liverpool, which depends more than any other port on its connexion with America. In consequence of the alarm excited there, and the belief that the embargo resulted from our orders in council, and would be taken off, if they were repealed, petitions were drawn up and presented to parliament, before whom evidence in support of the allegations contained in them. was heard at great length: parlia ment however did not think proper to comply with their requests. Hitherto we have noticed events that interested the great bulk of the people only incidentally and indirectly; but the trial of general Whitelocke, which began on the 28th of January, fixed the anxious attention of all ranks and degrees of the British nation. The character of the British arms had suffered so deep a wound in the unsuccessful attack on Buenos Ayres; the lives of many brave and valu able men had been sacrificed, with such an entire neglect of all the means of safety or success; and the ill-will and rancour of the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies had been roused in a manner so fatal to every expectation of our future amicable and advantageous connexion with them, that the trial of |